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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AMY 
HOHNSTEIN, Appeals Bureau Director; MARK 
RICHMOND, Appeals Hearing Examiner; 
JANET HARDY, Appeals Hearing Examiner; 
GEORGIA SMITH , Records Custodian; and 
John and Jane Does 1-V, in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the State of 
Idaho 
Defendant/Respondent 
Appealed from the First Judicial District, Bonner County, Idaho 
Honorable BARBARA A. BUCHANAN, presiding 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
James M. McMillian 
A ttomey at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 




BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
§ 
§ 
Location: Bonner County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Clerk, District Court 
Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho, Unknown John 
And Jane Does 1-V 
§ 
§ 
Filed on: 03/20/2017 
Case Number History: 
§ Appellate Case Number: ISC 45911-2018 
CASE INFORMA TIO:\ 
Statistical Closures AA- All Initial District Court 











Case 03/27/2018 Appealed Case -
Status: Supreme Court Appeal 
























Bonner County District Court 
03/27/2018 
Clerk, District Court 
PARTY INFOR'\,fATION 
Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
John And Jane Does 1-V, Unknown 
EH:"iTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
Notice of Appearance 
Plaintiff: Johnson, Dale Appearance James McMillan 
ROA - Converted Event 
Lead Attorneys 
McMillan, James Michael 
Retained 
208-7 52- l 800(W) 




Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E, 
F and H(l) Paid by: McMillan, James (attorney for Johnson, Dale) Receipt number: 0004070 
Dated: 3/24/2017 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Johnson, Dale (plaintiff) 
New Case Filed Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 


















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
For Damages and Demand for Jury Trial 
• Summons Issued 
Summons Issued for State of Idaho - Original in File 
• Summons Issued 
Summons Issued for Amy Hohnstein - Original in File 
• Summons Issued 
Summons Issued for Mark Richmond - Original in File 
• Summons Issued 
Summons Issued for Janet Hardy - Original in File 
• Summons Issued 
Summons Issued for Gerogia Smith- Original in File 
ROA - Converted Event 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/3/2017 to Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho; 
Assigned to. Service Fee o/$0.00. Summons Issued for State of Idaho - Original in File 
ROA - Converted Event 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/3/2017 to Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho; 
Assigned to. Service Fee o/$0.00. Summons Issued for Amy Hohnstein - Original in File 
ROA - Converted Event 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/312017 to Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho; 
Assigned to. Service Fee o/$0.00. Summons Issued for Mark Richmond- Original in File 
ROA - Converted Event 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/3/2017 to Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho; 
Assigned to. Service Fee o/$0.00. Summons Issued for Janet Hardy- Original in File 
ROA - Converted Event 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 5/3/2017 to Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho; 
Assigned to. Service Fee o/$0.00. Summons Issued for Georgia Smith- Original in File 
Summons 
Party: Defendant Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho 
Summons Issued for State of Idaho - Original in File 
Summons 
Party: Defendant Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
Summons Issued for Amy Hohnstein - Original in File 
Summons 
Party: Defendant Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho 
Summons Issued for Mark Richmond- Original in File 
Summons 
Party: Defendant Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho 
Summons Issued for Janet Hardy - Original in File 
Summons 
Party: Defendant Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho 
Summons Issued for Georgia Smith- Original in File 
Summons 

















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
Served: 06/21/2017 
Summons Issued for State of Idaho - Original in File 
Summons 
Department Of Labor, State Ofldaho 
Served: 06/21/2017 
Summons Issued for Amy Hohnstein - Original in File 
Summons 
Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
Served: 06/21/2017 
Summons Issued for Mark Richmond- Original in File 
Summons 
Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
Served: 06/21/2017 
Summons Issued for Janet Hardy - Original in File 
Summons 
Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho 
Served: 06/21/2017 
Summons Issued for Georgia Smith- Original in File 
Notice of Appearance 
Defendant: Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho Appearance Douglas A Werth 
• Notice of Appearance 
Special and IRCP l 2(b)(4) and (5) Motion to Dismiss 
.Motion 
IRCP l 2(b)(J) to Dismiss 
• Memorandum 
in Support of IRCP 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss 
• Declaration 
of Lisa Mason 
.Motion 
to Change Venue 
• Declaration 
of Amy Hohnstein 
• Notice of Hearing 
re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
.Motion 
for Telephonic Hearing (without Objection) 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion to Dismiss 08/02/2017 02:00 PM) Defendant's Motion 
.Order 
Granting Motion for Telephonic Hearing 















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
Continued 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 08/02/2017 02:00 PM: Continued 
Defendant's Motion 
(Doug Werth by phone) 
• Stipulation 
to Continue Hearings 
.Order 
To Continue Hearings 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion to Dismiss 09/06/2017 01:30 PM) 
Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Defendant's Motion 
(Doug Werth by phone) Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 08/02/2017 02:00 
PM: Continued 
.Objection 
to Motion/or Change of Venue and Motion to Dismiss 
• Declaration 
of Dale Johnson 
• Memorandum 
Second in Support of IRCP l 2(b)91) Motion to Dismiss 
• Declaration 
Second of Lisa Mason 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result/or Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 09/06/2017 01:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Pages Douglas Werth 
(CourtCa/l) 
Motion to Dismiss (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Douglas Werth (CourtCa/l) Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 09/06/2017 
01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
• Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing date: 9/6/2017 
Time: 1: 30 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Minutes Clerk: Sandra Rasor 
Tape Number: 1 
James Mcmillan, 
Dale Johnson, 
Douglas Werth by Phone 
• Memorandum 


















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Memorandum Decision and order Granting Defendants' IRCP 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss 
.Judgment 
Judgment 
Civil Disposition Entered 
Civil Disposition entered for: Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho, Defendant; Johnson, 
Dale, Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/15/2017 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Miscellaneous 
Registered Mail Fee Paid by: Rose Johnson Receipt number: 0012649 Dated: 9127/2017 
Amount: $1.40 (Credit card 
Miscellaneous 
Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Rose Johnson Receipt number: 0012649 Dated: 
Miscellaneous 
Court Tape Fee Paid by: Rose Johnson Receipt number: 0012649 Dated: 9/2712017 Amount: 
$1.25 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous 
Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Rose Johnson Receipt number: 0012649 Dated: 
Miscellaneous 
Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Rose Johnson Receipt number: 0012649 Dated: 9/27/2017 
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card 
• Memorandum 
Defendants Idaho Department of Labor's memorandum of Costs 
• Memorandum 
Defendant Idaho Department of Labor's 
Memorandum in Support of Request 
for Attorney's Fees 
.Motion 
for Reconsideration and Motion 
to Allow Additional Discovery 
• Declaration 
of Dale Johnson 
• Declaration 
of Doug Werth in Support of 
Idaho Department of Labor's Request 
for Costs and Fees 
• Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider 
• Declaration 
Third of Lisa Mason 
• Declaration 


















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Third of Lisa Mason 
• Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion 11/08/2017 03:30 PM) Plaintifj's Motion/or Reconsideration 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion 11/08/2017 03:30 PM) Plaintifj's Motion to Allow Additional Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion/or Attorney fees and Costs 11/08/2017 03:30 PM) Defendant's Motion 
.Notice of Hearing 
Plaintifj's Motions I Defendant's Motions 
.Objection 
to Motion and Memorandum/or Fees and Costs 
• Returned/Undeliverable Mail 
Returned/undeliverable Mail (resent to new address now entered into /STARS) 
~Motion 
For Telephonic Hearing (Without Objection) -Attorney Werth 
• Declaration 
of Rose Johnson in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Additional 
Discovery 
• Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery 
'II Declaration 
Supplemental of Dale Johnson in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Additional 
Discovery 
.Affidavit 
of James McMillan in Support of Motion/or Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional 
Discovery 
• Order Granted 
Motion/or Telephonic Hearing 
(Attorney Werth) 
.Motion 
Amended Motion/or Telephonic Hearing (Without Objection) 
• Memorandum 
Second in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider 
.Notice 
of Intent to Present Further Testimony and Evidence 











BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Costs scheduled on 11/08/2017 03:30 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages Defendant's 
Motion 
Attorney Werth Court Call 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11/08/2017 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Plaintiff's Motion to 
Allow Additional Discovery 
Attorney Werth CourtCall 
Attorney Werth CourtCall 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11/08/2017 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Attorney Werth CourtCall 
Motion Hearing (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
Attorney Werth CourtCall Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11/08/2017 03: 30 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO 
Motion Hearing (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Additional Discovery 
Attorney Werth CourtCall 
Attorney Werth CourtCall Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11108/2017 03: 30 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Defendant's Motion 
Attorney Werth Court Call Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Costs scheduled on 
11/08/2017 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Pages Defendant's 
Motion 
Attorney Werth Court Call 
• Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Pl Mtnfor Reconsideration Def Mtnfor Atty Fees 
Hearingdate: 11/8/2017 
Time: 3:30 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Sandra Rasor 
Tape Number: 1 
James Mcmillan, Dale Johnson 
Douglas Werth by Phone 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
• Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees 



















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional 
Discovery 
Civil Disposition Entered 
II Motion 
for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
'Iii Affidavit 
of James McMillan in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
II Notice of Hearing 
re Motion for Additional Finds of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion O 111712018 JO: 30 AM) Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Status Changed 
: Closed pending clerk action 
Hearing Scheduled 
(Motion 01/17/2018 10:30 AM) Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
'II Motion 
for Telephonic Hearing (without Objection) - Attorney Doug Werth Deputy Attorney General 
II Notice of Hearing 
Amended 
re: January 31, 2018 
Continued 
(Motion 01/31/2018 09:30 AM) Attorney Werth by CourtCall 
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Continued 
(Motion 01/31/2018 09:30 AM) Attorney Werth by CourtCall 
Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Miscellaneous 
*******END OF FILE #]***BEGIN FILE #2******* 
***BEGIN EXPANDO**** 
• Order Granted 
Motion for Telephonic Hearing 
Attorney Werth 
II Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment 
• Declaration 
of Rose Johnson 













BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
• Declaration 
of Dale Johnson 
• Memorandum 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 52(b) and Rule 60(b)(6) Motions 
Memorandum 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 52(b) and Rule 60(b)(6) Motions 
(Duplicated Original) 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages Attorney Werth 
by CourtCall 
Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages Attorney Werth 
by CourtCall 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Attorney Werth by CourtCall 
Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Hearing result for 
Motion scheduled on 01/31/2018 09:30 AM· District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Pages Attorney Werth 
by CourtCall 
Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Buchanan, Barbara A.) 
Attorney Werth by CourtCall 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment Hearing result for Motion scheduled on O 1/3112018 
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than JOO Pages Attorney Werth 
by CourtCall 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
• Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Pl Mtn to set aside Jdgmnt & Mtnfor ad findings 
Hearing date: 1/31/2018 
Time: 9:33 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Minutes Clerk: Sandra Rasor 
Tape Number: 1 
James Mcmillan 
Douglas Werth by phone 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001478 Dated: 
2/812018 Amount: $5.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt 
Miscellaneous 


















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001478 Dated: 
2/8/2018 Amount: $.08 (Credit card 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001478 Dated: 
2/8/2018 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001644 Dated: 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001644 Dated: 2/12/20181 
Amount: $2.50 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001644 Dated: 
2/12/2018 Amount: $.16 (Credit card 
Miscellaneous 
Payment: Technology Cost- CC Paid by: Johnson, Dale Receipt number: 0001644 Dated: 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
• Memorandum 
Decision & Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and to Set Aside Judgment 
Civil Disposition Entered 
for: Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho, Defendant; Johnson, Dale, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/13/2018 
Memorandum 
Defendant Idaho Department of Labor's Second Memorandum of Attorney's Fees 
(Faxed Duplicates) 
• Memorandum 




of Doug Werth in Support of Idaho Department of Labor's Second Request for Attorney's Fees 
• Memorandum 
Defendant ldaho Department of Labor's Second Memorandum of Attorney's Fees 
• Memorandum 
Defendant Idaho Department of Labor's in Support of Second Request for Attorney's Fees 
• Declaration 
of Doug Werth in Support of ldaho Department of Labor's Second Request for Attorney's Fees 
.Objection 
to Second Motion and Memorandum for Fees and Costs 
• Memorandum 




















BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Second Request for Attorney's Fees 
.Judgment 
for Attorney's Fees $3,510.00 
Civil Disposition Entered 
for: Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho, Defendant; Johnson, Dale, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
3/21/2018 
Amended Judgment - Other: 
Comment (Judgment for Attorney's Fees $3510.00 ( 4 pgs)) 
Party (Johnson, Dale) 
Party (Department Of Labor, State Of Idaho) 
ROA - Converted Event 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: McMillan, James 
( attorney for Johnson, Dale) Receipt number: 0003325 Dated: 3127/2018 Amount: $129. 00 
(Check) For: Johnson, Dale (plaintiff) 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
• Notice of Appeal 
Change Assigned Judge 
'II Bond Posted - Cash 
- (Receipt 3326 Dated 3/27/2018/or 100.00) 
Status Changed 
: Closed pending clerk action 
• Bond Posted - Cash 
(Receipt 3327 Dated 3/27/2018/or 200.00) 
• Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal 
.Letter 
to Attorney McMillan 
re: Balance owing on transcripts $125.00 
• Motion for Extension of Time to File Clerk's Record S.C. 
.Order 
Supreme Court Order Granting Extension of Time for Clerk's Record 
Case Summary 
• Miscellaneous 
Balance Due on Clerk's Record $165.85 - emailed to Attorney McMillian 
• Motion for Extension of Time to File Clerk's Record S.C. 
• Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc 
Order Granting (Second) Extension of Time for Clerk's Record 
PAGE 11 OF 12 Printed on 08/09/2018 at 3:45 PM 
Page 13
DATE 
BONNER COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
Other Party Unknown Payor 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 8/9/2018 
Plaintiff Johnson, Dale 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 8/9/2018 
Plaintiff Johnson, Dale 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-423 
FINANCIAL INFORMATIO:'li 
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 8/9/2018 
Plaintiff Johnson, Dale 
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 8/9/2018 
Plaintiff Johnson, Dale 
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 8/9/2018 
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. . . . . · 
JAMES McMILLAN 
A'ITORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
-
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
• : • •: •: • • : .' ~ ~•;: I••••• • •; --~~ ; ! :• .-: •, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17- (}.f d'Y 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Filing Fee: $221.00 
Category: A.A. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, (hereinafter "Plaintiff'') by 
and through his attorney of record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and 
hereby bring this Complaint for Damages against Defendant and alleges and 
complains as follows: 
COMPLAINT- 1 






I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. 1 Plaintiff was at all times relevant to this action residing in Bonner 
County, Idaho. 
1.2 It 1s unknown m which County or Counties the individual State 
employees reside; 
1.3 Defendants, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau Director, Mark 
Richmond, Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records Custodian, are State employees responsible for 
handling and/or preserving appealed matters, including the instant matter lost or 
destroyed recording/transcript. 
1.4 Defendants JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-V are unknown State 
employees who may have been responsible for handling and/or preserving of 
appealed matters, including the instant lost or destroyed recording/transcript. 
1.5 All acts and/or omissions relevant to this action occurred within the 
State of Idaho. 
II. FACTS 
2.1 On August 5, 2015, a hearing was held before the Appeals Bureau of 
the Idaho Department of Labor, based upon a denial of Plaintiffs Unemployment 
benefits. The employer failed to participate in the hearing. Plaintiffs attorney had 
requested subpoenas for employer witnesses and records, and had an additional six 
(6) witnesses willingly waiting to provide testimony. The Department Hearing 
Examiner, Mark Richmond, neglected to issue necessary subpoenas. Further, 
COMPLAINT - 2 
D:\Clicnts\Johnson, Rose\Changes Complaint March 2, 17.doc 
Page 16
Examiner Richmond agreed the six (6) additional witnesses' testimony would be 
"cumulative" and supporting of Plaintiffs claim and it was unnecessary to hear 
from each of them. The ultimate decision was unfavorable to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff 
timely appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
2.2 Procedural and factual faults existed between the actual hearing and 
Examiner Richmond's written decision, and IDOL Appeals Director Amy Hohnstein 
stated that she would personally listen to the hearing audio. As Appeals Director, 
she knew, or should have known, that the missing file would require a remand back 
to the IDOL and, therefore, that an Appeal to the IIC would have been be a 
needless use of time and money. 
2.3 Only in response to a records request to Georgia Smith, the records 
custodian, was Plaintiff informed via letter, dated August 21, 2015, that the 
Department of Labor had lost the recording of the hearing, and, therefore, a new 
hearing would need to be scheduled. On August 28, 2015, the Industrial 
Commission (UC) issued an order remanding the matter back to the Department of 
Labor, due to the lack of a recording or transcript of the prior hearing. Plaintiff had 
informed the Department that an audio was made and available for use; and, 
further, Plaintiff offered and later submitted both the audio and a transcription of 
hearing as evidence. 
2.4 A second hearing was held on or about October 22, 2015, and again 
Employer failed to participate. IDOL Examiner Janet Hardy took up the previously 
neglected subpoena requests, denying subpoenas for employer records and issuing 
COMPLAINT - 3 
D:\Clients\Johnson, Rose\Changes Complaint 'March 2, 17.doc 
Page 17
.e 
subpoenas for witnesses who were current management and other employees for 
the Employer: Paul Norton, Matthew Stevens, John Jachim, Julie Trumble and 
Sam Hughes, as well as for Plaintiff witnesses: Michael Wilson, Zachary Wilson, 
Richard Coate, Rich Morgan, Curtis King and Floyd Brown. A third hearing was 
required due to Defendant's negligence and avoidable delays. 
2.5 A third hearing was held on or about November 12, 2015. At this 
hearing, it was learned that the employer (counsel, Charles Lempesis, not of 
record), engaged in ex-parte communication with the Department, and, at the 
hearing, two (2) employer witnesses, Paul Norton and Sam Hughes failed to make 
themselves available as subpoenaed. All of Plaintiff's witnesses gave credible 
testimony, corroborating Plaintiff's claims. 
2.6 Again, the Department issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, on or 
about November 25, 2015. Plaintiff timely appealed the Department's decision to 
the Idaho Industrial Commission, on or about December 9, 2015, who ultimately 
reversed the Department's decision, and issued a decision in Plaintiff's favor, on or 
about April 29, 2016. The employer, up to that point, had failed to voluntarily 
participate in the proceedings, then filed, a Motion for Reconsideration through 
counsel, Charles Lempesis (who never filed a Notice of Appearance in the action) on 
or about May 19, 2016, followed by a Motion from the Department, on or about the 
same date. Plaintiff objected to both Motions; which were denied. 
2. 7 The Department of Labor's failure/neglect to preserve a recording of 
the August 5, 2015 hearing, the failure/neglect to issue necessary subpoenas timely, 
COMPLAINT - 4 
D:\Clients\Johnson, Rose\Changes Complaint March 2, 17 .doc 
Page 18
the failure to produce a transcript, (and refusal to utilize Plaintiffs available copy of 
audio and transcript) and resulting delay was a consequence of negligence by one or 
more Department of Labor employees. 
2.8 Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Tort Claim to the Department, and 
received a response indicating that it was being reviewed. Plaintiff eventually 
received a non sequitur response relating to the issue of the initial denials of the 
claim, but which did not address the Department's negligence in losing the 
transcript/recording, and resultant delay and additional expenses. 
2.9 As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts/omissions, 
Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but now 
exceeding $10,000; further, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to 
seek punitive damages, as provided by law .. 
III. NEGLIGENCE 
3.1 Plaintiff hereby incorporates sections I and II into each and every 
cause of action alleged below as if fully set forth at length. 
3.2 Defendants have a legal duty to properly preserve and handle any and 
all documents and recordings required for the timely resolution of unemployment 
claims. 
3.3 Defendants' failure to preserve, by its negligent or intentional loss of 
the official recording and transcript, and refusal to use the same produced by 
Plaintiff, was a breach of Defendants' duty of care to Plaintiff; 
COMPLAINT - 5 
D:\Clients\Johnson. Rose\Changes Complaint March 2, 17.doc 
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. . . 
3.4 Said breach of duty was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiffs 
damages; 
3.5 As a direct and proximate result and/or a substantial factor of 
Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, but exceeding $10,000. 
3.6 The plaintiff has been required to engage the services of an attorney 
for the purpose of bringing this action and is entitled to the recovery of reasonable 
attorney fees and costs of suit. 
IV. DEMAND FOR JURY 
4. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by not less than twelve (12) jurors. 
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment 
against Defendant as follows: 
1. For an award of special damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
2. For an award of general damages, including pain and suffering, mental 
and emotional distress, and other damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. For a judgment awarding Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorney 
fees incurred, pursuant to LC. § 12-120 et seq.; and 
4. For any and all other just and equitable relief as the Court deems just 
and proper under the circumstances. 
5. In the event of default, Plaintiff requests relief of $10,000.00 and his 
reasonable attorney fees and costs in bringing of this suit, of $5,000.00. 
COMPLAINT - 6 




DATED this_)_ day of March, 2017. 
JAMES McMILLAN 
~ttorney for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Shoshone ) 
DALE JOHNSON, being first duly sworn , deposes and says: 
That he is the Plaintiff herein; that he has read~ t~ regoing Complaint for 
Damages, knows the contents thereof and that thelact erein stated are true to 





SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me on this .iJ__ day of March, 2017. 
COMPLAINT - 7 







LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOUG WERTH - ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
doug.werth@labor.idaho.gov 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Defendant State of Idaho Department of Labor C'IDOL''), pursuant to the Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint with 
prejudice. The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claims 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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because he failed to timely file a notice of tort claim pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act, LC. §§ 6-901 et seq. ("ITCA"). 
This motion is supported by the Complaint filed herein, and the memorandum 
in support of this motion and the Declaration of Lisa Mason filed herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this /°} dayofJune, 2017. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By~~-
DOUGWERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / 7 of June, 2017, I caused to be served , 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
IXJ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
~ c:;.. 
DOUG WERTH 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOUG WERTH - ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
doug. werth@labor .idaho. gov 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Dale Johnson filed a complaint against IDOL and others alleging a 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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tort - negligence. As such, his claim is governed by the Idaho Tort Claims Act, LC. 
§§ 6-901 et seq. ("ITCA''). Idaho Code§ 6-9051 mandates that a tort claim against the 
State of Idaho be presented to and filed with the Idaho Secretary of State within 180 
days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. 
Plaintiff failed to timely file a notice of his negligence against IDOL with the Idaho 
Secretary of State as required by Idaho Code § 6-905. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
908, 2 Plaintiffs failure to comply with LC. § 6-905 is fatal to his negligence claim. 
Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint 
must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l). 
II. 
FACTS 
Plaintiffs Complaint against IDOL was filed on March 20, 2017. It alleges a 
single cause of action, negligence, and requests unspecified damages exceeding 
$10,000. Complaint, ,r 2.9. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' negligence caused a 
period of delay during his unemployment insurance ("UI") benefits proceeding. His 
initial appeal to the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") was remanded for 
1 "All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all claims against 
an employee of the state for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of 
his employment shall be presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred 
eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later." LC. § 6-905 (emphasis added). 
2 "No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless 
the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." LC. § 
6-908. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LR.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
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a new hearing before an Appeals Examiner because an audio-recording of the initial 
hearing could not be located. Complaint, ~~ 2.2 and 2.3. Plaintiff alleges defendants' 
negligence caused the delay, i.e., the remand, which caused him damages 
(presumably the attorney fees he incurred during the proceedings prior to remand). 
Id. 
Plaintiff became aware of his alleged claim of negligence and his alleged 
damages on or before August 28, 2015, when the Commission issued its order 
remanding his UI appeal for another hearing, which was in effect a "do over" order. 
Complaint, ~ 2.3. On December 9, 2015, after remand and another unfavorable 
decision by an Appeals Examiner, Plaintiff again appealed to the Commission. The 
Commission conducted a de novo review3 and ruled in Plaintiffs favor, finding that 
he was eligible for unemployment benefits. Plaintiff has not alleged as damages that 
IDOL failed to remit to him all of the benefits he was due after issuance of the 
Commission's decision. Nor could he. 
Despite the fact that he won his case when the Commission reviewed the 
matter de novo, Plaintiff inexplicably filed the instant action based upon the delay 
that resulted when the audio-recording of the first hearing could not be produced. 
Important to this motion, his Complaint alleges: 
2. 7 The Department of Labor's failure/neglect to preserve a 
recording of the August 5, 2015 hearing, the failure/neglect to issue 
3 In an appeal from the decision of an Appeals Examiner, the Commission conducts a de novo 
review usually based upon the record created by the Appeal Examiner. LC. § 72-1368. See 
also, Ortiz v. Armour & Co., 100 Idaho 363, 597 P.2d 606 (1979). Thus, the Commission, not 
the Appeals Examiner, is the ultimate fact finder. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
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necessary subpoenas timely, the failure to produce a transcript, (and 
refusal to utilize Plaintiffs copy of audio and transcript and resulting 
delay was a consequence of negligence by one or more Department of 
Labor employees. 
All of these alleged events and resulting delay, the basis for his negligence 
claim, were known to Plaintiff no later than August 28, 2015, when the Commission 
issued its order remanding his UI appeal for another hearing, Complaint, ,r 2.3, or at 
the most November 25, 2015, when the Appeals Examiner's decision on remand was 
entered. Complaint, ,r 2.6. 
Thus, construing the allegations of the Complaint in Plaintiffs favor, the ITCA 
required that Plaintiff file his notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary of State 
no later than May 23, 2016, the 180th day following November 25, 2016. See LC. § 
6-905 (notice of tort claim must be filed "within one hundred eighty (180) days from 
the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is 
later"). 
The Declaration of Lisa Mason establishes that Plaintiff filed his notice of tort 
claim with the Idaho Secretary of State on August 25, 2016, Mason Dec., ,r 4, which 
was more than three months after his deadline under LC.§ 6-905 had passed. 
III. 
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PURSUANT 
TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) BECAUSE THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
PROPERLY ALLEGE FACTS ESTABLISHING SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
A. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l): lack of subject-matter 
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jurisdiction. 
Motions to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) are proper 
when based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for a claimant's failure to 
comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA, specifically I.C. § 6-905. See 
Madsen v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 761, 779 P.2d 433, 436 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
A Rule 12(b)(l) motion "is rooted in the unique nature of the jurisdictional 
question." Id. A district court has "broader power to decide its own right to hear the 
case than it has when the merits of the case are reached." Id. (quoting Williamson v. 
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).) 
"Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or of fact, are for the 
court to decide." Id. (citing same). "Moreover, because jurisdiction is a threshold 
question, judicial economy demands that the issue be decided at the outset rather 
than deferring it until trial, as would occur with denial of a summary judgment 
motion." Id. (citing same) 
B. Plaintiff failed to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, specifically 
Idaho Code § 6-905, and because of this, his complaint must be 
dismissed. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905, all tort claims against the State that fall 
within the ITCA must be presented to and filed with the Idaho Secretary of State 
within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. The State is defined as "the state of Idaho or any office, department, 
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university or 
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other instrumentality thereof." Idaho Code 6-902(1) (emphasis added). Because 
IDOL is a department of the State, it falls within the purview of the ITCA. 
states: 
Idaho Code § 6-905 must be read together with Idaho Code § 6-908, which 
No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its 
employee unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time 
limits prescribed by this act. 
The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to: (1) save 
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of 
differences among parties; (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into 
the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any; 
and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses. Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295, 297, 
221 P.3d 521, 523 (Ct. App. 2009); citing Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 
816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991). 
Our Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the language of LC. § 6-908 
-that no claim or action shall be "allowed" -to mean that compliance with the notice 
requirement of the ITCA is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing an action 
under the Act. Madsen v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 761, 779 
P.2d 433,436 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 
P.2d 741 (1987); Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 888 (1982); Smith v. City 
of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 (1978); Independent School Dist. of Boise v. 
Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 
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1348, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993, 96 S.Ct. 419, 46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975).4 
The language in Idaho Code§ 6-905 is mandatory and when it is read together 
with Idaho Code § 6-908, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that failure to comply 
with the notice requirement bars a suit, regardless of how legitimate it might be. 
Driggers, 148 Idaho at 297, 221 P.3d at 523; see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 
745, 748, 890 P.2d 331, 334 (1995). 
C. Because a failure to comply with Idaho Code § 6-905 is a jurisdictional 
bar, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(l). 
Failing to comply with the notice requirement of the ITCA deprives this Court 
of subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claims. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Madsen upheld the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs suit against the 
Department of Health and Welfare should be dismissed because the action was not 
preceded by the filing of a notice of claim. Id., 116 Idaho at 761, 779 P.2d at 436. In 
finding the decision correct as a matter of law, the Idaho Supreme Court noted the 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the action could not be maintained due 
4 Notwithstanding the above precedent, which consists of seven cases, the Idaho Supreme Court 
made the following statement in Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 936, 303 
P.3d 617, 623 (2013): "On appeal, Alpine argues that LC. § 6-908 is a procedural, not 
jurisdictional bar, and that this Court can still consider Alpine's constitutional and equitable 
arguments. Alpine is correct." Id. No reference is made to the Idaho Supreme Court's prior 
precedent that a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter where an action could not be 
maintained for failure to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. No analysis is provided as to 
why the Idaho Supreme Court considered Idaho Code § 6-908 procedural as opposed to 
jurisdictional. Instead, all that is provided is a statement that appellant's argument was correct. 
However, given the prior precedent and the fact that the notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act 
is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing an action under the Act, the Court should find that 
the failure to file a notice of tort claim is indeed a jurisdictional bar and apply Rule 12(b)(l) 
standards in ruling on the motion. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) MOTION TO DISMISS - 7 
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to lack of compliance with the ITCA: 
Because the action could not be maintained without compliance 
with the Tort Claims Act, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
and properly dismissed the action as to the Department. Furthermore, 
since the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court 
correctly refused to grant Madsen's request either for default judgment 
or for summary judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly in this case, Plaintiffs failure to timely file a notice 
of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary of State deprives this Court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear his claims. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(l) should thus be granted. 
Finally, it should be noted that Plaintiffs Complaint on its face fails to properly 
allege facts establishing a necessary condition precedent and jurisdictional 
requirement of his claim, e.g., compliance with the ITCA. Plaintiffs Complaint 
alleges only that he "submitted a Notice of Tort Claim to the Department." 
Complaint, ,r 2.8. No other factual allegation is made. The Complaint fails to allege 
in any manner service of the tort claim notice on the Idaho Secretary of State, or that 
any such service occurred in a timely manner. In fact, Plaintiffs complaint does not 
allege when his tort claim was submitted. 
Because the Complaint fails to allege facts necessary for this Court's exercise 
of jurisdiction, it should be dismissed with prejudice under I.C.R.P. 12(b)(l). 




For all of the reasons above, the IDOL requests that the Court dismiss all of 
Plaintiffs claims with prejudice. 
DATED this I°/ day of June, 2017. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / 'j of June, 2017, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing bytiTerollowing method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
[]"U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
-----
DOUG WERTH 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner, 
Georgia Smith, Records Custodian, 
and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-V in 
their individual and official capacities 
as employees of the State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
I, LISA MASON, declare as follows: 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
DECLARATION OF LISA MASON 
1. I am the Administrator of Legislative and Executive Affairs duly 
appointed by the Idaho Secretary of State and work full-time in the Secretary of 
State's Office. In that capacity, I make this declaration based upon my own personal 
DECLARATION OF LISA MASON - 1 
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knowledge and am competent to testify to the matters herein. 
2. My duties as Administrator of Legislative and Executive Affairs include 
responsibility for compiling and maintaining the records and files of the Secretary of 
State's Office pertaining to notices of tort claims, summons and complaints presented 
to or served upon the Secretary of State on behalf of the State of Idaho and its offices, 
departments, agencies, officers and employees pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act, 
Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, at Idaho Code§§ 6-905 and 6-916. 
3. On June 16, 2017, I reviewed the files of the Secretary of State's Office 
and searched for any records or documents relating to the lawsuit of Dale Johnson v. 
State ol Idaho, Department ol Labor, et al., filed in the First Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho in and for the County of Bonner, Case No. CV-17-423 ("the Lawsuit"). 
4. In my review, I found that a notice of tort claim was filed with the 
Secretary of State's Office on August 25, 2016, by Dale Johnson and his attorney 
James McMillan alleging negligence on the part of the State of Idaho. A true and 
correct copy of this notice of tort claim is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. Further, in my review and search of the files and records of the Secretary 
of State's Office, I found that the Secretary of State's Office has not, to date, been duly 
served with a Complaint and Summons in the Lawsuit. 
6. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406(1), I declare under penalty of perjury 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 





/ 1 day of June, 2017. 
/ -., . 
/{~ 
LISA MASON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /'f of June, 2017, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
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James McMillan, Esq. 
Attorney at Law, P.L.L.C 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
Electronic Mail: mcmillanlaw@frontier.com 
August 22, 2016 Fll4ld ~ - ?.:;; eilll 
LAW ENCE DENNEY 
NOTICE OF TORT CLA Secretary of State 
TO: Idaho Secretary of State 
700 West Jefferson, Room E205 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID, 83720-0080 
Office of the Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ID 83 720-00 I 0 
FROM: Dale Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, ID 83801 
Claimant 
James McMillan, Esq. 
Attorney At Law, P.L.L.C. 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Attorney for Claimant 
The above-named Claimant hereby presents a Tort Claim, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
901 as follows: 
l. Conduct and Circumstances Which Brouiht About Injury or Dama2e: 
a. On August 5, 2015, a hearing was held before the Appeals Bureau of the Idaho 
Department of Labor, based upon a denial of Claimant's Unemployment benefits, at which the 
employer failed to participate. Claimant's attorney had requested subpoenas for employer 
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Hearing Examiner, Mark Richmond, neglected to issue necessary subpoenas. The ultimate 
decision was unfavorable to Claimant, and Claimant timely appealed to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
b. In response to a records request, the records custodian infonned Claimant via 
letter, dated August 21, 2015, that the Department of Labor had lost the recording of the hearing, 
and, therefore, a new hearing would need to be scheduled. On August 28, 2015, the Industrial 
Commission issued an order remanding the matter back to the Department of Labor, due to the 
lack of a recording or transcript of the prior hearing. Claimant informed the Department that an 
audio was made and available for use; and, further, Claimant offered and submitted both the 
audio and a transcription of hearing. 
c. A second hearing was held on or about October 22, 2015, IDOL Examiner Janet 
Hardy took up the previously neglected subpoena request, denying subpoenas for employer 
records and issuing subpoenas for witnesses \\TIO were current management and employees for 
the Employer: Paul Norton, Matthew Stevens, John Jachim, Julie Trumble and Sam Hughes, as 
well as for Claimant witnesses: Michael Wilson, Zachary Wilson, Richard Coate, Rich Morgan, 
Curtis King and Floyd Brown. 
d. A third hearing was held on or about November 12, 2015. At this hearing, it was 
learned that the employer (counsel, not of record) engaged in cx-parte communication with the 
Department, and, at the hearing, two (2) employer witnesses, Paul Norton and Sam Hughes 
failed to make themselves available as subpoenaed. All of Claimant's witnesses gave testimony. 
e. Again, the Department issued a decision unfavorable to Claimant, on or about 
November 25, 2015. Claimant timely appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, on or about 
December 9, 2015, who ultimately reversed the Department's decision, and issued a decision in 
Claimant's favor, on or about April 29, 2016. The employer, who, up to that point, had failed to 
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participate in the proceedings, (and to date, is still not on record), then filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration through its counsel, Charles Lempesis (who, to date, has not filed a Notice of 
Appearance in the action) on or about May 19, 2016, followed by a Motion from the 
Department, on or about the same date. Claimant objected to both Motions; however, to date, 
the Industrial Commission has failed to rule on either Motion for Reconsideration. 
f. The loss of the recording, failure to issue subpoenas timely, and failure to produce 
a transcript, (and refusal to utilize Claimant's made available copy of audio and transcript) and 
resulting delay was a result of the negligence of one or more Department of Labor employees. 
g. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts/omissions. Claimants 
have suffered damages as described hereinbelow. 
2. Description of Injury/Damage 
Claimant has been forced to incur additional attorneys' fees and costs in retaining counsel 
to represent them in the second and third hearings, which would not have been necessary but for 
the Department of Labor's negligence. Further, in the event that Claimant ultimately prevails if 
or when the Industrial Commission rules upon the Motions for Reconsideration, Claimant has 
suffered further damage in the delay in payment of benefits as a result of the necessity for a new 
hearing and subsequent appeal. 
3. Time and Place Iniury or Damaee Occurred 
It is unknown when the recording was lost. The first hearing took place on August 5, 
2015; the Department of Labor's Custodian of Records informed Claimant of the loss of the 
recording via letter dated August 21, 2015; and the remand was issued on August 28, 2015. A 
second hearing was held October 22, 2015 and a third hearing was held on November 12, 2015, 
the appeal was filed on December 9, 2015, and the decision from the Industrial Commission in 
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CJaimant's favor was issued on April 29, 2015. The decision on the Motions for Reconsideration 
remains pending. 
4. Names of All Persons Involved 
It is unknown which employee's action result in the loss of the recording. Georgia Smith 
is the Custodian of Records for the Department of Labor, Mark Richmond was the Hearing 
Officer who conducted the August 5 hearing, and Amy Hohnstein is the official from the 
Department of Labor Appeals Bureau with whom Claimant had been communicating. Janet 
Hardy was the Hearing Officer who conducted the second and third hearings. 
5. Amount of Damaees Claimed 
Attorneys' fees and costs incurred between the remand due to the loss of the recording 
and the filing of the Notice of Appeal following the second hearing are estimated to be 
approximately $5,000. Delay in benefits is an amount to be determined, and missed mortgage 
payments, and other bill payments, as a result of the delay have resulted in increased interest and 
late fees in an amount to be determined. 
6. 
7. 
Basis of Claim 
The acts and omissions of the State of ldaho amount to, but are not limited to, negligence. 
Actual Residence of Claimant 
Dale Johnson does now and has for the six months immediately preceding these events 
resided at 99 Northern S1 Road, Athol, Idaho 83801. 
DATED this lJ_ day of~ '4) /--- , 2016. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUfJICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATit OF IDAHO, IN .i-\.ND .PORTHE COUN'I'Y OF' BONN:KR 
DALI'] JOHNSON, an indiviclual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA'rE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR. Amy Hohnstein, Appeal~ 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing l'~xaminer, ,Janet 
Hardy., Appeals Hea1·ing Examiner 
and Georgia Sm.ith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN M'D JA~'E 
DOES I-Vin their individual flnd 
official ca,padties as employet~s of t.h.e 
State of Idaho; 
Defendants. 
Ca.sE; No. CV-17-0423 
MOTION ·ro CHANGE VENUI~ 
Defendant Sto.tr:1 o.f Idaho Dei;mrt:meJ1t of Lubor (11ID(H .. ')f spec4l.lly appeij.ring 
pursu.ant to its prior notice of spt?cia1 appearance filed hr~rein, m<Jves the C,,u.rt 
pursuant to l.R.C.P. -i0.1(a)(2) (mandatory ch.a.ng~.: of venue) and I.R.C.P-. 40.l(a)<lj 
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(dis(.,-retionary change -of venue) for tht~ Court's order changing vtmut~ he1·ein to thE~ 
Distrfot Court of Ad.a County, in. a.nd for thf) Fou.rth Judicial Di.stdd of thr-J State of 
Idaho. 
Pur.guant to the man~\at,r.,;ry chang~ f~f vez:iue provisions of I.H .. C.P. 40.l(a)(2), 
a.U ofth..e defendants residti in or about Ada C(,unty, Idaho. The nature of the claim. 
against- de.fr:!ndants iB thf:: tort of nagligenr..f.? and the al1eged. m~gligent acts of 
defendants all occurred. in Ada. County, Idaho. Tht~ acts of d.efortdan.ts co.mr,lained of 
did nnt occur in Bonn.er County, Idaho. 
Idaho Code § 5~402 p.r,,vides in pertimmt pa.rt: 
Act.ions fo.r the following ca:u~e:~ mmrt h<~ tried i31_ the coun:ty whE!re th~. 
cause or som~rt the rt..,,(_ ~.rnise, subject to thi:! like power of th1::~ court 
to cha11ge t.he. place of trial: 
2. Aga.mst a public officer, ,:,r person specially appoin.tr..:rl to execute 
his duties, for any act dom~ by him in virtue of his -offiee; or against. a 
person who, by hi~ comnia.nd o:r .i.n his a.id., does anything· touching the 
dut.ies of su.(',h. ot~r. 
(F~mphllis added.) 
Tim allegations. of thr~ Compfoint here -· asserting negligence based upon the 
alleged fact th.at defendants ll)st. r,r oth-E!rwi.se were 'l,mab!e to loeate the r~t'Ording of an 
unen:iployment be111;;tita appeal .involving -piau.1t.if.f, which ne(?ess1tated a rt>...mand for 
furtherpr.oceeding-s -- :involve alleged.actions of the IDOL and its e.mr,loyees and condu<.~ 
alJeged t.o ha.ve r.lC(!urred duri.ng a.dministrative proceediugs rm1ducted pursuant tot.he 
Employment Security Law. .As such, Idaho. Cocle § 5-402(2.) apphes to this action. 
MOTION TO CHANGE VE?'-H.TE - 2 
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In t:h1:! c.-ar-se of Summers v. Luke T~vem, lnc;_, 7H Idaho a77, 252 P.2d 8~H {1053), 
the Idaho Supremu Court q\mt~d favorably t:he:i .Montana Supreme Court opinion in 
St:ephen.'3 v .. Qi~trict Ogurt, 118 P. 268.(l\1.ont. 191.1.). wh:li::hconstrued a.statute with text 
similar to Idaho Code §· 5-402. Th<:! Montana Com·t .in Stt~phm1s observed that it8 
statute .intended that 
an action .~Eainst a public offir..t?r for .a tort alfog(~d t,~-, have been 
{~ommitted ·by hin1 in the exercise of his authority as st.tch offic~~r sho11ld 
ht.:; tried .in the <~ounty where ihe act was d.one. and t,hat, in cases whf.;re 
the place of trial is otherwise prope1~ly selected. by th<-: plaintiff, the 
defundant .. rut!L?.-.!1.J:1bsolut~! r.i~dtt to have it cha.ng~ir.lJ-f:Lth~ .. r.,!;mn!Y. .. W.-h~.!f:: 
~!Jch ad was commit:ted. 
Id., 118 P. at 271 (emphuis added), quofR..d by, Summers v. Lake Tavern, supra (withrrut 
emphasis added). 
1.be Court will obser.vf.i that hulk of Idaho cases whf.m~in a de.fondant's rnot;ion 
to change venue· pursuant to said statute were not granted, th6 it.ravamtm of the 
action touched upon or dire<.>tly affected mal propei-ty located within the initial venue 
selected by the plaint.:iff. Such i:~ not th!?- cas(? lwre. 
Becaust~ the allegt:!!d tortio\1s ach; of d1~fo111hmts would havioJ t.ak~m plac.:e in Ada 
Count}\ not Bonm!r County, this Court should enter its ord.ei· changing venue to Ada 
County pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40.1(2). 
In the alternative, based upon the fact:s set for.th in th<:: affid.twit filed herewithj 
and the allegatfons of Plaintiffs com.plaint, venue should be changed. pursua.nt to 
I.R.C.P. 4.0.l(aj(l)(B) for "the ,.:onve:nience. of witnesses and [hecause} the ends of 
justice would be promoted by the change." Id. AU of tht~ namt~d defendants. a.re 
MO'PJON 1.'0 CHANGF~ Vli~NUE · 3 
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located and employed in Ada County. IDOL's principal office is in Ada Cou.nt.y. All 
of the records custodians of IDOL are- located in. Ada County. 'J.'he actions complained 
of all O(.'Curred in Ada County, not Bcnmer County. In a.tfdition, the Court is a.sk&d to 
take judicial n.oti,ce o( the geogra.1>h.ic distanee and otierous travel logistics .for 
witnesses in. Ada C.o,inty b€ing forced to defend a case in Bonner Co\lnty. 
Based upoxt the fote.goi11g, IDOL respectfully requests that this Court to enter 
its order changing venue of the action to Ada County, Idaho. 
Oral argument .is requested. 
DA'l'ED this .. 1"~~ day·ofJuly, 2017. 
STAT.li: OF.ID.AHO 




Deputy Attorney General 
P,EI;rfil~QA'.I'E OF SERVI.CE 
I HF!RF~BY CERTIFY. that on th is _3._~of July, 20171 I .caused to be served 
a true and -correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Jame.~ McMillan 
Attorney .at Law 
·512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
MOTION TO CHANGE VE~1JE · 4 
[!I U.S. Mail 
[J Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
[] OVf:Jl'night Mail 
~ Facsimiic: (208) 752-1900 
£',., .. --~-·-7 
//. p"----~i___-.... ••"' 
l ) 'Pa_tr_i_ci_a_Fi ___ t-zp--a-tn-.-ck _______ _ 
Page 43
• 
Idaho Dept of Labor 7/3/2017 9:55:12 AM PAGE 7/009 Fax Server -
LA WU.ENCE G. WASDEN 
ATI'ORNEY 0-ENFJRAL 
DOUG WERTH --- ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorney Gei:1era.l 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
d · hf 1 ' 'd ' .. ouf4. wi~.rt .. -~- a.nw·, l '. am~.gov 
-
. . . . -· .. ~~! 
::· :. : ~ ',.··, :; _ _,' __ :\;·;<( ~->-(·,:::·--\:.' 
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~-c;,:,~;-~:;,;,,; 
IN THE DIS'fRICT COURT OF THE f.1RS'I' JUDICIAL DIS1~RIC'r OF THE 
ST.A.Tl~ OF IDAHO, IN .AND I-'OR THE COtTI'1.'TY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHl\i""SON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
VlS. 
STATE OF 1DAHOY D.F.!PAR'I'MENT 
OF LA.HOR, Amy Hohnstein. Apr,eaJs 
Bureau Director, Mark 'Riclunond, 
Appeals Hearing Exa1uiI1er, ,Janet. 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Exinniner, 
Georgia. Smith, Records Custodian, 
and rJOHN AND JAh'E DOES 1-V in 
their individual and official carJacit.i(!s 
as employees of the State of Idaho, 
Defendants. __ _J 
Case No. CV-17•0423 
DECLARATION OF A\r1Y 
HOHNSTEIN 
1, A..\fY HOHNSr1'EIN, declare 1.ui follows: 
1. J am the Determination Se-rvicet~ Ad.minisb:at01· fo1· the Idah-r, 
Department of.Labor C'IDOL"), duly appointed by the Dir.ectm~ of IDOL u, serve in 
said capacity, aml work full-timr~ in.Ada County, Idaho. In that ca1>0.cit-y, I .make this 
.DECLARA'r.ION OF AMY HOHNSTEIN· 1 
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·dedaration based upon my c,wn personal knowledge and am com_pet!\ln:t to testifj.• to 
t,be matters herein. 
2. My duties as Detennination Services Administrator include 
responsibility for supervising and managing· thf.: Appeals Bureau of IDOL, whieh 
unemployment benefit.~ appeals. 
3. 'lne Appeals Bur.~mu. is physically l<,;cuted in. Ad.a County, Idah,J, and its 
hearings, including an hearings that occ"1:1rrc:.:d relating to tb1 above-captioned actfo.~ 
are a:nd. were .conducted ·by heru·ing officers lucated in Ad.a County, Idaho. 
4. The records of said he.al'ix1gs, inoludirlg audio rec(jrdings, a.re maintaini:.;d. 
in Ada County, Idaho. Thr:! (:usti)nia.us of said 't't~cords ar.u loeated in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
5. The prin.cipa1 offices of IDOL are located in Ada County, Iflaho. 
6. All of the nam1:id defonc1a.nts wor.k i.n Ada County. Idaho, and reside in 
Ada County, Idaho, or its surrounding metropolitan an~a, which. is a ~-ubst:.mti.a.l 
distance from Bonner County, Idaho, 
7. Wit.h regard to thE~ a.lleg-ed acts and omissfons r,f d(~fonclants described 
in the C',om_plaint .filf:,d he:irtiin, with.out admitting the trutll of those .a.llegati.ons, all of 
tho.CJe alleged acts and. omissions of d.efen.dants, if they occurrud., would have occ-t..tr.red 
in Ada County, Idaho. None of said alleged acts and omissfom.1 on the pa.rt uf 
de-fe.ndants occurred in Bonner County, Idaho. 
8. It would he:, a great inconvenience for IDOL and the nam~d deftmda.nts 
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t.tJ he forced to defend this at-1.ion in Bonner County, Idaho. All the witm:sses known. 
to defendants. with the excer.,tfor1 of plaintiff,. and the recm·ds ,,f IDOL are located in 
Ada County, Idaho. ·1.'he ends of justice would be promoted by cht.ll'lging the venue of 
this action to Ada County, Idaho. 
9. Without admit-ting any negligence by defendants, venm:i of this action .is, 
proper in Ada County, Idaho, which is where the alle,ged tort of neghgenee would have 
arisen. 
10, Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9·1406(1)., I declare under pe.na]ty of perjury 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Ida.ho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
EXECUTED this· __ .3.__¥ day of ,July, 2017 .. 
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that. on this~ of ,July,. 2017., I caused to be s(~rved 
a true and r..or:rect (.'Opy of the for£~_goin.g by the following method to: 
James Mcly{illan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street. 
Wallace1 ID 88873 
[1JU.S. Mail 
0 Ha.nd Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
no · · M ·1 w vermgnt a1 
[ii Facsimilti: (208) 752• 1900 
DECL...:\.RATION OF._AMY HOHNSTF;JN. 3 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Z[Jl7AUG-I PM 3=35 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABORi Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
HEARINGS 
141001 
COME NOW the parties to the above-entitled case, by and through their 
respective counsel of record, and hereby STIPULATE AND AGREE to continue the 
hearings in this matter on Defendants' pending Motions, currently scheduled for 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE - 1 
Z,·~1.\JWlnaon, 'RJNe\SllpU!Ptimi ID Cbnlilllk (20!7 07 J 1-Jli.ilc).dnc. 
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August 2, 2017, on the grounds that counsel for Plaintiff has recently experienced a 
death in the family and requires additional time for the preparation of a Response; 
that Plaintiff is currently working toward arranging service the office of the 
Secretary of State, which may moot one of the pending issues before the Court; and 
that Plaintiff is attempting to gather additional documents which may be relevant 
to said Motions. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
{~ 
STTPULA TTON TO CONTINUE - 2 
l,:\djaa&Ualmaun, ~ip,1111.irH, ID Can1Wlkl (2017 (17, I ~c).W>i:: 
DA TED this 1st day of August, 2017 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
~ ~~ By:~_,_-·-
~. D_O_U_G_W_E_R_T_H_, ----
Deputy Attorney General, 
Attorney fo:r. Defendant 
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,CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 1st day of August, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
STIPULATION TO CONTJNUE - 3 
l:\C1,,,11"11Un1mMn. 1«n111\tltii:ut.11U111,uev,1at1U1 r;w1, n"/ :u-JMr:i.&Juc 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
~illan 
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COJJNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDfCIAL DISTRICT 
JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2017 AUG - I PM 4: 02 
CLERK OrRICT COUfil 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO; DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I~V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
HEARINGS 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 1st day of August, 2017, 
aind good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hearings in the above-entitled case are 
ORDER TO CONTINUE - l 
Z:'ICliwllJ'I.JnlutlOIL, ROQa\Oldarto 0,atiauc (2017 0'7 3 l-lM;J,41;11: 
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CONTINUED until the ~µ. day of Sey kwi~,l,.- , 201. 7, at I.;(, f½ 
DATEDtbisJ_dayofAugust, 2017, £ •. 0. ~ 
' ~~\__. ~~ '-~,. 
ORDER TO CONTINUE - 2 
Z:\Clio_...._ 8"'11\0mrto 0.111..., (:0017 OT JHM<),~ .. 




08/01/2017 15:03 FAX 208 752 1900 
. - Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law- 141006 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the __2_ day of August, 2017, I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ORDER TO CONTINUE - 3 
,Z;\Clii:::adJohnflllllli. Jtom~rl~ Ccmtlm» (2011 U1 ;11-JMc).doG 
~U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Z Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
~U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
__:£ Facsimile to: (208) 752-1900 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
5].2 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752" 1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
CHANGEOFVENUEAND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and through his counsel of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits his 
Objection to the Defendants' Motion for Change of Venue and Motion to Dismiss as 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
Z;\Clii::nla\Jblin11111, RuK\Objtaiau It! MOli~1 JO DIIIIHIM (2017 07 ] l • .JMc).doc 
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follows: 
1. Idaho Code § 6-915 specifically allows allows for a resident of the State 
of Idaho to bring an action in the County of his or her residence. Further, the same 
statute allows an action to be brought in any county in which a State subdivision is 
located. In this case, Plaintiff resides in Bonner County, and the Department of 
Labor has an office located in Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho. Therefore, venue 
is proper in Bonner County; 
2. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff has six (6) months 
to serve the Summons and Complaint. As such, to the extent that it is necessary to 
serve the Secretary of State, Plaintiffs deadline to do so does not expire until 
September 20, 2017 and, therefore, dismissal for failure to serve all of the necessary 
parties is premature; 
3. Idaho Code § 6-906 requires that a Notice of Tort Claim be brought 
''within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim. arose or reasonably 
should have been discovered, whichever is later." In this case, Plaintiff could not 
know the extent of his damages until the Industrial Commission's reversal of the 
Department's denial of Plain.tiffs claim on April 29, 2016. Otherwise, had the 
previous denial been affirmed, Plaintiff would not have suffered damages as a result 
of the delay in the determination of his claim. The August 22, 2016 Tort Claim was 
brought within 180 days of April 29, 2016 and, therefore, was timely. 
4. Alternatively, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a letter to a 
governmental agenl,Y containing substantially the information required by Idaho 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
Z;\CJjg1UiUolLnson,. R1111G\Obj~iftn m MaUan lo Oi1miA: (1017 07 Jl .. JMc;~do~ 
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Code § 6-907 provides sufficient notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Smith v. 
City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (1978). In this case, 
Mr. Johnson wrote to the Department and the Attorney General's office on two 
separate occasions clearly setting forth the substance of his complaint, and 
threatening litigation. See Declaration of Dale Johnson, Exhibits A and B, filed 
contemporaneously herewith. As such, the Department was "on notice that a claim 
against it is being prosecuted'' and it was thus apprised "of the need to preserve 
evidence and perhaps prepare a defense." Id. Therefore, even if this Court should 
hold that Plaintiff's claim accrued at an earlier date, Plaintiff's letters clearly meet 
the standard for notice under Smith, which were submitted well within the 180-day 
time period. Thus, this Court should not dismiss this matter for failure to comply 
with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Change of 
Venue and Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2017. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
OBJECTION ro MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
Z!\Cllcoll'Jobnson. ~\Objc:clii01~ ia Mo1•on '° DIINSPll!l 1201? 07 31...JMC},dO(j 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 30th day of August, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO .DISMISS - 4 
z:\CIWRl"'c!lulOft, Rma\Obj~i111, ID Modan to DUl,ri"' C2017 07 31-JMi;J,dii,c 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
McMillan 
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/''LC ,, ,;. --·•·, ~,-
,_, Lr\/\ ,Ji::; ii· '. · COURT 
JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
D~E JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
DECLARATION OF DALE 
JOHNSON 
I, DALE JOHNSON, am the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 18, 
competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and have personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth herein: 
1. Attached hereto as E:x:hibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter sent 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -1 
~\Clia1u.\Johllson, Rolll:l\l)tx:~imllalt orDllla Johmml (111 ,., u& lQ...JMc::).doc: 
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to the Idaho Department of Labor on or about August 18, 2015 after I was orally 
informed via telephone that the recording of the August 5, 2015 hearing had been 
lost. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a letter sent to the 
Idaho Attorney General's office on or about October 16, 2015 after I received written 
confirmation that the recording was lost. 
2. I did not become aware of the extent of my damages until I received the 
Industrial Commission's decision in my favor on or about April 29, 2016. 
Further your declarant sayeth naught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of the State 
of Idaho, that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 30 day of August, 2017. 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -2 
~:\Clii;:n.11\J'ob111an, ~1~i~ arD1111le Jobnson ~01, im :k)...JMl!:},dac 
5 (g'1d- f-v re ..\ 0 6 e 
~ 4f f { e iL tt1 ft{ 
DALE JOHNSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 30th day of August, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
D0ugWerth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
B0ise, Idaho 83785 
Attorney for Defendants 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -3 
Z;\Cli~11i\JOlN111on, ~e1Dlltllall orDa&a Jvl1mqn (2017 OB JQ ... J'Mc;),_ 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
___x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
McMillan 
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~ug.19.2015 06~29 PM D~le and ~ose Johnson 208 6'83 0821 PAGE. 1/ 2 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W, Main Street 
Boise1 Idaho 83735 
Alibrust 18, 201 S 
I . 
8119/2015 7:06;18 PM ltainsmlse1Qn Record 
Received lrom remote ID: 208 683 0821 
Inbound ui:er 10 APPEALSMA1L. l'OI.Jllng code 208334$440 
f!crsull: j0/352;0/0) Success 
Page ,eool(f: 1 • 2 
1g x3467 
2 pages faxed to 208-334-6440 
OOL Appeals .Bureau Chief, Amy Holstein; (others !:IS ru=eded); 
Ms. Holstein~ 
I reviewed the calls you had with my wi&, Rose. You said you would listen to the bearing I had with 
your hearingjudge Richmond and you thanked my wife for bringing our eoniplmnt to your attention; 
and you told her I now had to go to the Industrial Commission (J.C.) to (fa. what your deportmenr 
-employee .Nc:rewed up - (my word., f#ted hare)). 
When she called back and asked if you listened to the hearing. l shouldn't be amazed that you wouldn't 
-ivm answer the question, but I am angry thu.t you didn't You> inlltead, side..stcpped and tip--toed 
around it. and sounded a tad-bit aervous to ro.e. 
You (in Jayrnan1s tenns), tt>Jd my wife th11t any problems your department may have created, isn1t your 
problem anymol;'e, but is now a problem of the I.C.. and that, my dear lady, is wrong! It is your 
problem, and your refusal to address it, only ca.uses it to grow bigger; and likely can make you and 
your department, a witness or a co-defendant in a bigger issue, if that ii the dir~tion you force me into. 
$.o, here-is the question again, did you listen to the recording of my 8.5.201. S hearing with Riclunond 
(yes or no)? lf you didn't, then you lied to my wife when you stated that you would; and if you did, 
tben you are aw.u-e oft.he facts --'and there ~hould be no room fol" doubt in yow mind that Richmonu'i; 
denial of my UI claim was unquestionably inco:m~ct (to pul it mildly). This also means you are a 
witneu to my given undisputed testimony, as to on-going, hostile, potentially huz.ardous oondilions 
ill'lposed on employees and the public -- resulting in an unacceptable, intolerable work environment ... 
in a job that l (and so many others) had oooe loved to do. 
J~'lt a., a_ reminder; yo1.11" job1 and the Idaho DOL reason for c:Vc:D existing, is to ussist rne and others 
when unforeseen circutnstanccs enteT into the daily life~work c:nvirooment. 
I 
We are tired of being told thtt you can1t fix what your own department screws up; and that you simply 
•pass tb~ buck' when things are inconvenient. l have undeniably met the burden of proof in my hearing, 
and IF you listened to it then you already know this t.o be true. And, since you are 2nd in conunand1 
there is no doubt in my mind that you have the ability 10 address issues like this and fi.x them. 
I heard you tell rny wU'¢ tha.t your internal perwnncl problem are n.ot disclosed to the public; but, 1 wtll 
ar-J111e thQJ is nothing shon uf admitting that there is no tra111parency or accour,.tQhiliry to ths public! 
Further, l am not just the public •· I am a banned individual, exposing what l believe is a cbr and 
present disctcpancy {problen,) in 1your office personneJ. 
Aga.fn, Jam really quite tired ofhemng that you can't fix your oWll dcpartrnenl probltim that harm 
others. IF everyone. in the real world, spent all of their time making excuses why they can't do 
,\•omething. then nothing prr,ducttve wi/J ev/Jr g~t done I And, this ma1i:u you a continued part of lhe 
problem, not the solution. 
·1.: 
(, 
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In your refusing/ignoring my plea to assess and promptly address my claim on the proper facts (instead 
ofruchmond.'$ psyeho-babble BS). I am lead to ~li1::ve that your non-t-ransparent intema.l-investiaation 
positioning is no more than damage control, oot to mention he might be your buddy (and you might 
just ignore it) - and how would J ever know? In facl, I would be foolish to think (after nll of this), that 
it is not possible fot you (or your department) to have intluence lo alter thc:ir decision as well. (J do 
undetSl:and what 'good ol boys club' mellDS). 
the industrial Commi!lsion should nevei: have even been a ~uggestion; J did what was required of me. 
Why should the I.C. (or Td.61ho Supreme Cour~ etc.) be dragged into tnis Decision? X!!gr departm.ent 
was ~c:nted undisputed facL<;, arid tbu.t aocording to DOL rules and the law on constructive discbarge, 
I qualify for my um,mployment benefits. lF, as .Rk:hmood suggest:s1 ... that any company should be able 
to hire whoever they want (regardless of quo.litlcatioo. cornpctence, eic.), .. by that same gr;tuRt, then. 
the compan)lfbul1ine.v~ 4 also $'Ubject to af'l)'lall consequences re,,.u/tillgfrom llutir own such decision 
and actkm.f (and that. does incl'ft!de the Idaho Dept. 2,[IAbor. and/or IZIIY mher public servanr agency). 
Pleasi:: fix this immediately, without further delay. J r~Uy do not wish to become another Don Dew. 
I was sworn under penalty of perjury to tell the ttuth (whleh l did); [ require that be respected. 
'Perhaps your office sh.ould adopt a probationary monitoring period for all administrative officers that 
ha-ve been reported for probabli:: ~use exu;ting reason:,. 
Ifthiz is not imtnediattly addressed (I wou1d like q phone caU today), we muy need to take it to the 
next level of who knew what, when and why wasn't it add~ed, within your dept., prior to litigation. 
At this tune, I request th1u your FO!A or Idaho Public Records Act Officer telephone my wite. Rose 
('208-683-0821); lea~e n message if she is not AvlUlu.ble. l will require Richmond's hearing note$ and 
his employm=nt history, to include the length of time he has been hearing UJ matters in the Idaho DOL. 
Idaho must do better. 
1. Oood-fllith, fair-dealing and public policies are cxoeptlons to 
1at-will' employment. 
2. Ccmstructive Discharge is the proix:r relief val~t to prevent. explosion (as 0t1 JLWe 8, 2015) when 
working conditions become intole1able. 
3. No individual is teqltired to choose between having I.Wlployment lmder intoleni.bJc conditions vs. 
.1Jpc.01ployed and denied bmefit.s; futther1 no employer has a right to impose such zero options upon 
-~other·human being. 
I ' 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Office of Attorney General 
Cont~acts and Administrative Law Division 
Department of Labor 
317 w. Main Street 
Boise, . Idaho 83735 
-
~ttention: Craig Bledsoe; Deputy Attorney General 
~axed; 2 pages (208) 334-6125 
October 15, 2015 
Subject: Your letter dated October 9, 2015 
Craig; 
14]006/008 
Thank you for your unexpected communication. However, its obvious that 
it appears that you aren't fully clear on a few issues and facts. 
I don't need a rehearing of my UI claim. The facts and law require a 
rEversal of the denial, even without pO$$lble spoliation of evidence 
issues brought in. 
What your department needs to be concerned with is the complete 
collapse and inability ~ith IOOL's personnel to pe~fo.m competently 
and honestly, the duties charged to them. More specifically, Hearing 
Administrator, Mark Richmond and Appeal~ Oirector1 Arny Hohnstein. 
What the lDOL may have failed to inform you of, is that I have a copy 
of the hea~ing that was recorded in the office of Attorney James 
McMillan, on August 5, 2015, at the time of the hearing, and as the 
IDOL appears to have made their copy ,.mavailable, 111y .remaining one, 
complete with the bre"k with my attorney, ls admissible unoer the 
rules of e~idence. 
As of this date, neither the IDOL nor the IC ?1as even requested a copy 
of my hearing, though they have been long aware that it exiets. 
In fact, I would be more than happy to send you a copy for review, 
along with Richmond's so•called Findings of F~ct. 
After we received Richmond's Decision, my wife contacted Ms. Hohnstein, 
expres~ing our concerns of Richmond and lodging a ve~bal complaint. Ms. 
Hohnstein assured us that she would personally listen to the hearing. 
That•~ her jobt if ther~ is a potenti~l problem with personnel she is 
managing. 
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Ho\t,Tever, upon recommunicating with her a couple of days later, Ms. 
Hohnstein was asked if she had listened to the hearing, and she 
refused to answer the question. She only insisted that I file ~n 
appeal to the !C if I was dissati$fied with Richmond's Decision. At no 
time did she ever mention that the audio file was missing, only that I 
~@eded to appeal to the lC, 
So, trle requested a copy of the hearing file notes and audio through 
~he IDOL Recor.ds Dept., and shortly afterwar.ds, receiv~d • response 
from Georgia Smith that there were no notes and the audio was 
unavailable (missing). It was interesting that I had actvally told my 
wife after her call with Amy, that I was pr~tty certain the file would 
disappear, and it looked like I was proved right. 
Although I can't prove it, every time I listen to that phone call with 
Amy H., and th~ ~ay she was verbally squirming, my gut tells me she 
did listen to it, ~nd knew full well that we had a legitimate 
complaint against Richmond, 
Another question you need to ask, if she is a competent Director, why 
wouldn't she know that the IC would retus~ my appeal if the ~udio file 
was miss3.ng at that time? She would have to know that, given her title. 
And if sha didn't, wouldn't that make her unqualified :for the position 
of Appeals Bureau Chief, if she didn't know something as basic aa that? 
If you choose to accept my offe~ and request, rece1~0 and listen to 
the recording of the haaring there is no doubt in my mind that you 
will understand the reasons for my concern~. 
This will also shed light on my reason in refiling for a hearing. It 
was for at least two reasons: 
1, So, the IDOL i~n•t afforded the option to simply flush my ui 
claim down the toilat and thereby wash their hand~ of any personnel 
incompetence o:i:· ne(Jligence. 
2. If this entire fiasco was nothing more than a bunch of 
mistakes, the extra time affords the State of tdaho the benefit so 
they may fik it, honestly, and avoid any tort action that may be 
necessa~y because of IDOL 1 s negligent actions. 
Thank~ to due diligence and tena~ity of my wife, we understand more 
than enough about the IDOL'~ policies, proced~res and the e~idence 
laws, than I ever want.ect t.o. I'm a mechanical technician, and don't 
really desire to be thA paper-pusher that thay are forcing me to bo. 
!tis clear cut that the IOOL has both the procedural and legal 
mechanisms in place to reverse this blatantly wrong Decision of 
Richmond and to stop this de-railing- train! But, guess what! that 
falls on Amy Hohnstein's shoulders, and its thus far, perfectly clear 
that she is unwilling to do her job. 
07-19~2017 Records Request IDOL_A-0132 2 
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Perh~ps it has something to do with the fact that the StGtte of Idaho 
5ent both Amy and Richmond together this la5t summer to Washington, 
D.C., where they gave a joint presentation; perhaps the two of them 
are buddies, and she doesn't want to get her buddy in ~rouble. 
Whatever her reason is, her actions are not consistent with her job 
and duty to the People. That makes sense why I keep getting told about 
all the things you "can't" do. I'm sick of b~ing told what you ''can't'' 
do. The evidence is available -- all you ha.veto do is look at it, 
What little X have con~eyed here is just the tip of an iceberg. If you 
do the math, tro~ the time my hearing ended to the time Richmond 
rendered hi$ De~ision and taking into account h~.s other scheduled 
hearings, duties, et~ .• and then comparing the hearing to his Findings 
of e'act, one must conclude tt\at Richmond rendered his Decision before, 
during or immediately after the hearing ended~ and at no time did he 
ever refer to the hearing audio to back up his Findings of Fact. This 
tells me he was winging-it! And that's unacceptable. 
Note this: I te~tified under oath and had at least five (5} 
witnesaes willing and standing by to tsstify. My testimony was 
undisputed. My former employer didn't even show up. 
lf Richmond was going to pr.operly perform his job, than he had no 
choice, under law, but to grant my ui claim. 
I sure hope he doesn't handle all the cases he is giV$n thi8 way; it 
makes me wonder how much damage he has caused other people as well, 
Somebody needs to step up in the State of Idaho and start holding tax-
paid employees accountable instead of coddling them. Thts doesn't need 
to be ~on Dew 2 or Hillary-Gate, Idaho style! 
The hearing currently scheduled for October 22, 2015 isn't n~cess~ry 
and shoul~ be put on hold untiJ. my recording has been reviewed and 
properly addressed. eerhaps we can all avoid future legal actions, get 
this fixed p:roperly and each of go our separate ways. 
Ple,a&e call me if there is anything I can do to assist in expeditinQ 
thi,s to a fair cotlclusion. My number is 208-683-0821. 
Thank 
Dale o n5on 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, Idaho 83801 
07-19'-2017 Records Request IOOL_A.Q1~ 
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LAWRENCE G. \VASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOUG WERTH - IS13# a6t'i0 
Dep a.ty At.t-(~.n.ey General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
&,ise, Idaho 83735 
•relP-p'hone: (208) ~'32~3570 
rluu_g.wt1rth@jabo.r .. iy~1hr.1J?OV 
-
SiATE Of IO..t\HO 
COU}HY Sf lt8HNER 
FIRST JUDiC!Al DISTRICT 
2011 SEP -I PH 2= 35 
CLER' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUUICJ.AL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN .A1'.1D FOR THE COUNTY OF BO.N"NER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
S'rA'J.'E OF' IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau. Dire<,'tor, Mark Ri.chmond, 
A1>p0als. Hea.ring Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, A.ppeal.~ Hearing Examine.r 
and Georgie Smith, Ret-'Ords 
Cust.odian, and JOHN AND JA.i~.f!} 
DOES I-Vin their md.ivid.ual-and 
official r.apacities as employees r>f the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
CJ\Se No. CV -17 •0428 
SFXXJND M~~l\1.0RANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12(h)(l) 
.MOTION TO DISMISS 
In this- patently frivolous lawsuit, Plaintiff Dale Johnson ('Plaintiff') alleges 
Defendant Idaho Department of La.bot ("IDOL'') committed the to.rt. of negligence in 
SECOND MEMORA~"JJlJ},1 IN SUPPORT OF' I.RC.P. 12(b}(l) MO'l'ION TO 
DIS.MISS- I 
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failing t.tJ create o.r preserve a record !)f his first. a.d.ministrative hearing before Qn 
IDOL Appmals Examiner. 
Plaintiff de.scribes JDOVs a Uegedly negligent a<.ts in Par.a.graph 2. '7 of his 
Complaint: 
2.7 'l'he Departme.nt of Labor's fuilure/ne.glect io preserve a 
recording of the Augu.irt 5, 20.15 bearing, thr:: failure/neglect to i8sue 
ne<-..essar.y s.u.bpoena.s [for. that hearing] timely, ihe faiiure t.o p.roduca a 
tranSl'!ript., (and refusal to utilize Plaintiffs available copy of audio and. 
transcript) and __ rs1,1ulJ;in_g_~l1.-1-Y was a consequenc-.e of negHgeitee by one 
or· r:no~: Department of Labor employees. 
(l~;mphasis added.) 
Even aC'.cepti:ng tlu~se allegations as true, whic"h IDOL vigorc:,u.sly disp1.1res., the 
fullest ex.tent t)f the period of delay th.at oou.ld ·have proxima.toly ca.uF.;ed. <~>n1pe1:lsable 
damage to Plaintiff is the 1>eriod o.f time between the first hearing on I>lainti:ffs 
unempl<>yment benefits a.ppeal and the date of the set.·n.nd Appeals Examiner's 
written decision folL'>wing remand. --- - or, the period from August fi. 2015 {dat.e of first 
hearing) to November 25, 2015 (date. of issuan.t'e of seoond det>isfon). 
A':! C'.f Novemh<~r 25, 2015, Plaintiff knew the facts constitutin.g IDOL's alleged 
breaches of a daiined duty owed ttl him, a.nd knew or should have rr::asonably 
discovered the extent of the alleged injuries ca used by the d.elay in the pr.or..eedings. 
lt would have been an. <~asy task for Plaintiff to f.abulat,e the attorney fef:S he incu.rred 
betwt~n August 5-, .2.015 and. November 25, 2015-, 1md any of his other claimed 
damages (that, frankly, cuuld nc,t 1>a.ss muster under the wr:ill-worn 'Fproximate <"..a use" 
standard). 
SECOND MEMORA.1'1\i'TIUM IN SUPPOU.T OJ:!" I.R.C;P. l2(b)(l) MOTION 1'0 
DISMISS· 2 
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Plaintiffs despera:tr, claim that he could nlJt have kn.own ,;fhis dam-ages until 
the Industrial Comm.iss.ion ruf Pd in his favor is a non sequitur. Because fhe first 
.Ap11eals Examiner found that Plaintiff was not; entitfod to une:mploymf;nt benefits, 
Plaintiff would have be(:Jn i.nvolv1c~d in an appeal to the Industrial Commission 
regardfoss r,f a.ny m.i8Ring heH.r.ing tape~ or tr·a:nscr.ipt.s, lt very well coul<l b(; that the 
rema.nd henefit-ed Plaintiff been.us(~ he bad. an opportnnit.y to further d.evt~lop the 
:factual and legal bases for ll.i.'i cla.im. No one car1 say. Moreovei\ the "a.ppear' t.o the 
Industrial Commission was a de nouo prrx.:eeding in which the lmlustria.J Commission 
was to enter findings of fact with no deference given to thf.: Appeals Examiner's 
decision. In. addition. under tht~ Employment $E.~curity Law, J.C.§§ '12-1301. et seq., 
th~ Industrial Commission ·had disc.retion to take additional ev.idtmt>J: during the de 
nova "ap1>ellate" pro<.-eeding. LC.§ 72-13(i8(7). 
In sum, Plaintiff.,;; c.la.i.nt aro~e: no later than. Nove:m.bt,r 25, 2015, when the 
seeond Appeal,:; Examiner's .decif!lion was made. Plaintiff was required hy J.C.§ f>-905 
t<, present a notice of tort claim w.ithin 180 days of November 25, 2015. Plaintiff did 
m)t prEisent his notice to the Idaho s~f;,.1-etary of State until August 25, 2016, WE.~11 
beyond the mandatory l80 day t>resentmen:t period. 
1062, 1065 (1978) is misplaet~d. I•'ir.st, he fails t.o mention two aubseq_uent eases that 
distinguish Smrt.h and strongly ooU!l$Cl fur a dismissal of th.'c! instant case, E.g., 
SECOND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12{b;(lJ l\lOTION 'I.10 
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Dedara.tion of Dale JohnsoD. are unavailing because th<:, Idaho Secrtrta:t)' (jf Stati/s 
Office did not receive those fat:t.ere until September 1, .2017, after the 180 day tort 
claim win.dow had closed. SeE? Seeoud Declaration of Lis.~ Ma~()n. Becausc1 those two 
lt:!ftt-ers Wert:..! not pNisentr::d to the Idaho Secretary of State's Officf.l within the 180 day 
window, they cannot ea.tis.fy the presentment requirement of LC. §. 6·905. This .iB 
ma.de a.hundantJy clear by ~N\.V.,_L,L.Q.x~ Sweden Irrigation District. 161 ldaho 
89, ::183 P.-3d 1259 (2016), where the Idaho Supreme C-<mrt. h,~ld that "the presentment 
requirement ... is satisfied when the notice o.fto.rt claim is delivered to an. employee 
or agent: of th!:, governmental entity who th~m d~ilivers the notice tn..!h~-~~.r.~-9 . .r 
declaration wer<:: not. delivered to the Idaho Secretary o.f Stat(~ with.in. the 180 day 
period. 
Plaintiffs failure to timely present a notice of t.ort- claim to the Id.a ho Secretary 
of Stat.& der,rives. th:m {.:!ourt of s11hject.•matter _jurisdiction t:o hear "hi~ daim.s. Thus, 
it is respectfully submitted that J.DOL's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(bJ(lJ 
shtJuld be granted. 
SECO:l\liJ '.MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I.R.C.P. 12(h)(l) MO'NON TO 
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DATED this /sf-' day of September, ·2011. 
STATE OF lDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY CJENERAL 
By./J--~ -
DOUG\VERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
.QER.TIFI.CAT.E..QF...sERY1CE· 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /Jr ofSeptembe.r. 2017, I caused to be 
served a. true and oorreet copy of the foregoing by the f'ollowi ng .met}vJd -to= 
Jam.es ·M.CJ..'1illan 
Attorney at Law 
5.12 f'....edar Street. 
Wallace, ID 83878 
Ou.s . .Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
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LA WlU~NC.E G. WASH.KN 
ATTOftN.EY GENF;TUL 
DOUO WERTH - lSB# 3660 
Th!puty .Atrorne.r Oencr~lt 
ld.alw l.)01i~trt.mt~ nl of Labm· 
317 W. Main StmE!t 
Hc,iee. ldaho 88735 
TP-lephonc~ (208} aa2--;j570 
-
STNC: OF iDAH,9 
COUHTY OF B~HNER_ 
t:i~,ST IUOICIAL OIST~ICT I .;\ '-= 
IN TlHi} DISTlUCT COURT Of-" 'I'HR FlltST rJOHiClAL .D.TST:R!CT ()F TH.Ii; 
S'f..\TE Oli' l.DAHO, IN AND FOR 'rf·rn~ COUNTY OF' BONNF;R 
HAI.Jo~ ,JOHNSON. an individual, 
P1aintiff. 
va, 
S'"1,ATE OF IDAHO. DJ~PAR1'ME1'."1' 
OF LABOR, Am.y l·fohnsfoin, AppE!als 
Bureau Direct.or-, Mark Richmond, 
Af)IM!&fo I·foar.ing J•~xamine,r, Jltl1E,t. 
1:fardy, Appe,1:-tls I·foaring _.Exa.mi.11iir. 
Georgia Smith, Hec:m·d.s C\lst.odia r1, 
and .JOHN .A.1.VD J'ANFl HOES J :v in 
their individual and offidal capi!tr.iti<ts 
a;~ exnplGyOE,s-oftfa, Si:aw <>f.ld.aho, 
Dt~fend.un:I~. 
_______ .., _____ , ____ , ______ .... _.., _ __J 
1, l..J$A MASON, dccla~ as fullow_t;: 
oomp1:!~mr. ~> te.shfy t-C> the matt:er& hE:1-ein. 
Cww .No. CV--.17-042:J 
SECOND DJ<~CL:\RA'1'10.N OF· J..,ISA 
lVMSON 
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of Stat,~•u Offic~e i·n lfou;e, Idaho. ln t.hut capacity, my duti<:!S :iricludE: xt,spc,nsibHit.y for 
upo:u t.ho Sm:~1:ary- r,f Sta.te !)n behalf nf i:ht! St~3.l:t~ of .Id.aho an.d it.ii ,,.f:fi,~3E,, 
deparb:neuts, ager1cie5 .. office.rs an.d employ1~t!,~, pursuant to LC. §§ 0--&05 and. 6-916. 
3. On June 16, 201'7, ~nd ~sgain t.oday on Septen1ber. L 2917, I ruvfowed the-
()fnCP. or. August: 25, 201 G, by Dak: tfobnrnm. a.mi hh; ai:t~>.rney James 1i-·kMilhln al!e.g1ng 
neghg(:nce Oil th.e JUirt !)f tlwi Si.aU: of Iclaho ("the Noiiet of To.rt Claim"); and (b:) the 
laweuit. of Date ~lolu1.oon t•. State of Ida.ho,. De.partm~nt of I,,Jb,,r, et. ol., flied in th~ 
F:ir&l ,Judieiul Diotx-icl <lft!m Slat.e c,f kl.ah;), Htmner County C1;111~? Nn. CV.- J 7-423 n-he 
Lawsuit.'), A copy of t.hE, N1>iiCE; d 1'<>ri Claim .is 11.!:tac:hed. tt, my pri<'.lr dedarnt.i<'.111. 
d~i1cribed th,!rein, prior to it~ pn::itntm.eot cm August. 2fi, 2016. On S(!ptember 1~ 
.20l7. f)ep\ity .At¼tney GentH'l'l.! Doug Wertb forwarded to mti a OQP-Y of the 
T)E;dar.a.tion t>il)al~ ,Johnson fik,d in the Laws.ui!. dated A\;l;':Ubt 30, 2017, which hud 
attached to it copfo~; of a lette.r dated 1\ugust. 18. 2015, from Da!e ,fohnstm to Am.y 
SfXX)Nl) DECLARA'J'ION OP I.I-SA MASON · 2 
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Cr&.jg· B.iedooe ("Exhib-it TJ")_ 
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09/06/17 TIME: 1:30 PM 
vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE OF IDAHO, 
ETAL. 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: DOUGLAS WERTH 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Atty: JAMES MCMILLAN 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS 
CHARGE 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
130 J Calls Case 
Present: I JAMES MCMILLAN, DALE JOHNSON, DOUGLAS WERTH BY 
PHONE 
J I HAVE REVIEWED THE FILE AND PLEADINGS, MR. WERTH YOU MAY BEGIN 
DW ADDRESS DEFECT OR LACK OF SERVICE TO SECRETARY OF STATE (CITES THE LAW) 
UNDISPUTED THAT SECRETARY OF STATE HAS NEVER BEEN SERVED A COPY OF 
COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS BY THE PLAINTIFF, FATAL DEFECT, MR. JOHNSON'S 
RESPONSE (CITES ARGUMENT) SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT A PARTY, IT IS A MEANS 
OF AFFECTING SERVICE ON THE STATE OF IDAHO, PLAINTIFF HAS SERVED THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THERE ARE TIME REQUIREMENTS, REQUEST DISMISSAL 
OF ACTION 
2ND BASIS UNTIMELY FILE OF NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM, (GOES OVER PROCEDURE RE: 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS) HE WAS DENIED, HE APPEALED TO APPEALS BUREAU 
THAT OCCURRED APRIL 5, 2015. THE APPEALS EXAMINER RULED THAT MR. JOHNSON 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS, NEXT LEVEL HE APPEALED TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, SHORTLY AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE AUGUST 5 TH HEARING COULD 
NOT BE FOUND, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CHOSE TO REMAND IT SO THAT THERE 
COULD BE ANOTHER HEARING AND A RECORD CREATED, A DIFFERENT APPEALS 
EXAMINER HEARD THE APPEAL 11/25/15 THE 2No DECISION WAS ENTERED, ALLEGED 
DAMAGES CREATED BY LOSS OR FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORDING OF THE FIRST 
140 HEARING, (READS FROM COMPLAINT) ARGUMENT TIMES AND DATES ARE NOT IN 
DISPUTE, FILED WELL BEYOND THE 180 DAY PERIOD, 
148 LEAVE IT FOR QUESTIONS IF NONE I REST 
J JUDGES QUESTION 
DW NO PROVISION FOR COSTS AND FEES 
149 JM ISSUE OF SERVICE (ARGUMENT) WE HAVE UNTIL SEPTEMBER 20'M TO SERVE 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
MOVE ON TO COURT CLAIM, IN THIS CASE AT THE TIME THE INITIAL MATTER WAS 
DECIDED AND REMANDED IF THEY HAD AFFIRMED THE ORIGINAL DECISION. WE 
SUBMITTED TWO LETTERS, GIVEN ONGOING FINANCIAL HARDSHIP DUE TO DENIAL, 
ONGOING DAMAGES, WE WOULD ASK THE COURT TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS, 
THIS SHOULD BE BETTER CONSIDERED AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
157 J MR. WERTH 
DW ARGUMENT NOT INTENT OF TORTE CLAIM 
203 J I WILL TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT AND WILL HAVE WRITTEN DECISION OUT IN 30 
DAYS 
203 END 
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-STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY Of' BOHNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2011 SEP 11+ PH 3: 57 
CLERK OISTD"URT 
DEP 1' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 




) CASE NO. CV-2017-0000423 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER GRANTING 
) DEFENDANTS' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) 











THIS MATTER came before the Court on September 6, 2017, for a hearing on an 
LR. C.P. l 2(b )( 1) Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 21, 2017, by Defendant State of Idaho, 
Department of Labor. The Idaho Department of Labor also filed a Motion to Change Venue on 
July 3, 2017, which has not been noticed for hearing. Plaintiff Dale Johnson (hereafter, "Mr. 
Johnson") is represented by attorney James McMillan. Defendant State of Idaho, Department of 
Labor (hereafter, "IDOL") is represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. 
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I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On August 5, 2015, a de nova hearing was held before the Appeals Bureau of the Idaho 
Department of Labor regarding the denial of Mr. Johnson's unemployment benefits. 
Hearing Examiner Mark Richmond decided that Mr. Johnson was not entitled to 
unemployment benefits. Mr. Johnson appealed the Appeals Bureau's decision to the 
Idaho Industrial Commission. Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial 
(hereafter, "Complaint") (filed March 20, 2017), at ,r 2.1. 
2. On August 28, 2015, the Industrial Commission issued an Order remanding the matter 
back to the IDOL due to the lack of an audio recording or transcript of the August 5. 
2015, Appeals Bureau hearing. Complaint, at ,r 2.3. 
3. On remand, a second and a third hearing were held before the Appeals Bureau on or 
about October 22, 2015, and November 12, 2015, respectively. Complaint, at ,r,r 2.4, 2.5. 
4. On November 25, 2015, Hearing Examiner Janet Hardy again decided that Mr. Johnson 
was not entitled to unemployment benefits. Complaint, at ,r 2.6. 
5. On or about December 9, 2015, Mr. Johnson appealed this second Appeals Bureau 
decision to the Industrial Commission. Complaint, at ,r 2.6. 
6. On April 29, 2016, the Industrial Commission reversed the IDOL's decision and awarded 
Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits. Complaint, at ,r 2.6. 
7. On August 25, 2016, Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Tort Claim dated August 22, 2016, 
with the Idaho Secretary of State, alleging negligence on the part of the State of Idaho. 
Declaration of Lisa Mason (filed June 21, 2017), at ,r 4. Specifically, he alleged that: 
Claimant has been forced to incur additional attorneys' fees and costs in 
retaining counsel to represent them in the second and third hearings, which 
would not have been necessary but for the Department of Labor's negligence. 
Further, in the event that Claimant ultimately prevails if or when the Industrial 
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Commission rules upon the Motions for Reconsideration, Claimant has suffered 
further damage in the delay in payment of benefits as a result of the necessity for 
a new hearing and subsequent appeal. 
Declaration of Lisa Mason, at Exh. A, ,r 2. (Emphasis added). 
8. On March 20, 2017, Mr. Johnson filed a Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury 
Trial against IDOL and various employees. In his Complaint, Mr. Johnson asserts a 
negligence cause of action against the defendants and requests damages in excess of 
$10,000. Complaint, ,r,r 2.9, 3.1-3.6. 
9. On June 21, 2017, the IDOL filed an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss, asking this 
Court to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice, on the grounds that the Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. Johnson's claims because he did not timely file a 
notice of tort claim pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), LC. § 6-901 et seq. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
The standard of review for an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1) motion to dismiss 
is set forth in Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.3d 455 (2005), as follows: 
Whether a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) 
was properly granted is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. See Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 
678 (1998). Constitutional issues are also purely questions of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the court looks only at the pleadings, and all 
inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of 
Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (regarding 12(b)(6) 
motions); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) 
(regarding 12(b)(l) motions raising facial challenges to jurisdiction1). "[T]he 
question then is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in 
support of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. 
State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996) (regarding 12(b)(6) 
motions); Serv. Emp. Intern. v. Idaho Dept. of H & W, 106 Idaho 756, 758, 683 
P.2d 404,406 (1984) (regarding 12(b) challenges generally); Osborn, 918 F.2d at 
729 n. 6 (regarding 12(b)(l) facial challenges). "[E]very reasonable intendment 
will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215,217, 506 
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P.2d 112, 114 (1973). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately 
prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." Young, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159. 
1. There is a distinction between 12(b )(1) facial challenges and 12(b )(1) factual 
challenges. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990); 5B 
Wright & Miller,supra, § 1350. Facial challenges provide the non-movant the 
same protections as under a 12(b)(6) motion. Id. Factual challenges, on the 
other hand, allow the court to go outside the pleadings without converting the 
motion into one for summary judgment. Id. Here, the Commission does not 
dispute the facts pied by the Claimants but rather only the legal conclusions 
reached within the four corners of the amended complaint. Therefore, the 
12(b)(l) challenge is facial, and the standard of review mirrors that used 
under 12(b )( 6). 
Id. at 133, 106 P.3d at 459, and n.l. (Emphasis in italics in original, other emphasis added). 
Like in Owsley, supra, in this case, the IDOL does not dispute the facts essential to the 
question of jurisdiction pled by Mr. Johnson, and set forth above, but rather, only the legal 
conclusions reached within the four comers of the Complaint. Therefore, the IDOL's Rule 
12(b)(l) challenge is facial, and the standard ofreview mirrors that used under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that: "If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 .... " I.R.C.P. 12(d). In this case, 
matters outside the pleadings have been presented by both Mr. Johnson and the IDOL, and have 
not been excluded by the Court. Therefore, the IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss must be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[t]he court must grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). Additionally, "[w]hen a 
court considers a motion for summary judgment in a case that would be tried to a jury, all 
facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of 
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the party resisting the motion." Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 460, 210 P.3d 563, 568 
(Ct. App. 2009), review denied. (Emphasis added). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Dismissal for Lack of Service on the Secretary of State is Premature. 
1. Applicable Statute 
Idaho Code§ 6-916 provides: 
In all actions under this act against the state or its employee the summons 
and complaint shall be served on the secretary of state with a copy to the 
attorney general. This section shall not be construed to release the party making 
service of process from serving any named defendant other than the governmental 
entity in compliance with other applicable statutes or rules of civil proceeding. 
In all actions under this act against any employee wherein it is alleged that 
such employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment, a 
copy of the summons and complaint shall be served upon the governmental 
entity which is his employer. 
LC.§ 6-916. (Emphasis added). 
2. Parties' Arguments 
The IDOL contends that because the facts are undisputed that the Idaho Secretary of State 
has never been served a copy of the summons and complaint by Mr. Johnson, and service on the 
Secretary of State is a means of effecting service on the state of Idaho, the lack of such service 
by Mr. Johnson in this case is a fatal defect justifying dismissal of the Complaint. For his part, 
Mr. Johnson argues that under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff has six months to 
serve the summons and complaint; and as such, to the extent that it is necessary to serve the 
Secretary of State, the deadline to do so is six months from the date the Complaint was filed, i.e., 
September 20, 2017; and thus, dismissal for failure to serve the necessary parties is premature. 
3. Court's Analysis 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides, in part: 
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(b) Issuance; Time for Service 
(2) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 6 months after 
the complaint is filed, the court, on motion or on its own after 14 days' notice to 
the plaintiff, must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant. But 
if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for 
service for an appropriate period. 
(4) Serving the state and its agencies and governmental subdivisions. 
(A) State of Idaho. To serve the State of Idaho or any of its agencies, a party must 
deliver 2 copies of the summons and complaint to the attorney general or any 
assistant attorney general. 
(C) Additional service required by statute. In all actions brought under specific 
statutes requiring service on specific individuals or officials, service must be 
made pursuant to the statute in addition to service as provided in this 
subdivision (5). 
( 5) Admission of Service. Service may be completed by a written admission, 
acknowledged by the person to be served, that the person has received service of 
process. The admission must state the capacity in which service of process was 
received. 
I.R.C.P. (b)(2), (4), (5). (Emphasis added). 
Lisa Mason, the Administrator of Legislative and Executive Affairs, employed in 
the Idaho Secretary of State's Office, has testified in her declaration that as of September 
1, 2017, the Secretary of State's Office has not been duly served with a Complaint and 
Summons in this lawsuit. Second Declaration of Lisa Mason (filed September 1, 2017), 
at ,r 6. The fact that the Secretary of State has not been served with the Summons and 
Complaint is undisputed. It is also undisputed that the IDOL has been served and has 
entered a special appearance by and through Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. 
The Court finds that service on the Secretary of State is required under Idaho Code § 6-
916 and that Mr. Johnson has heretofore failed to effect such service. However, because this 
Court further finds that the six month time limit for service under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
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4(b)(2) is applicable to the service requirement ofldaho Code § 6-916, and that six months has 
not yet elapsed, dismissal of the Complaint on these grounds is premature. 
B. Dismissal for Failure to Timely File Notice of Tort Claim is Mandatory. 
1. Applicable Statutes 
Idaho Code § 6-905, provides: 
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all claims 
against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the employee within 
the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the 
secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim 
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later. 
LC. § 6-905. Additionally, Idaho Code § 6-908 provides that "[n]o claim or action shall be 
allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented 
and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." LC. § 6-908. (Emphasis added). 
2. Parties' Arguments 
Mr. Johnson, in his Complaint, alleges that: 
The Department of Labor's failure/neglect to preserve a recording of the August 
5, 2015 hearing, the failure/neglect to issue necessary subpoenas timely, the 
failure to produce a transcript, (and refusal to utilize Plaintiffs copy of audio and 
transcript and resulting delay was a consequence of negligence by one or more 
Department of Labor employees. 
Complaint, at ,i 2.7. The IDOL contends that all of these alleged events and resulting delay, 
which are the basis for the negligence claim, were known to Mr. Johnson no later than August 
28, 2015, when the Industrial Commission issued its order remanding his unemployment benefits 
appeal to the IDOL's Appeals Bureau for another hearing; or, at the latest, on November 25, 
2015, when the second Appeals Bureau decision was issued. The IDOL argues that Idaho Code 
§ 6-905 required that Mr. Johnson file his notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary of State 
no later than May 23, 2016, the 180th day following November 25, 2016; but that here, Mr. 
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Johnson filed his notice of tort claim with the Secretary of State on August 25, 2016, more than 
three months after the 180-day deadline. Declaration of Lisa Mason (filed June 21, 2017), at~ 4, 
For his part, Mr. Johnson claims that he "could not know the extent of his damages until 
the Industrial Commission's reversal of the Department's denial of Plaintiffs claim on April 29, 
2016 .... The August 22, 2016 Tort Claim was brought within 180 days of April 29, 2016 and 
therefore, was timely." Objection to Motion for Change of Venue and Motion to Dismiss (filed 
August 31, 2017), at ~ 3. Alternatively, he contends that he wrote a letter to Appeals Bureau 
Chief Amy Holstein, dated August 18, 2015, and to Deputy Attorney General Craig Bledsoe, 
Office of the Attorney General, Contracts and Administrative Law Division, dated October 15, 
2015; that these letters were submitted well within the 180-day time period; and that they contain 
substantially the information required by Idaho Code § 6-907, and provide sufficient notice 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, pursuant to Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 
1062 (1978). Id. at~ 4; Declaration of Dale Johnson (filed August 31, 2017), at Exhs. A and B. 1 
The IDOL responds to this alternative argument by claiming that Mr. Johnson's reliance 
upon Smith v. City of Preston is misplaced. According to the IDOL, two subsequent cases-
Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 339 P.3d 544 (2014) and Blass v. County a/Twin Falls, 
132 Idaho 451, 974 P.2d 503 (1999)-distinguish Smith and strongly counsel for dismissal of the 
instant case; and further, that Mr. Johnson's two letters were not presented to the Idaho Secretary 
of State's Office within the 180-day tort claim window, and thus, cannot satisfy the presentment 
requirement ofldaho Code§ 6-905. See Second Declaration of Lisa Mason, at~~ 4-5. 
3. Court's Analysis 
In CNW, LLC v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89, 383 P.3d 1259 (2016), 
the Idaho Supreme Court makes a distinction between the presentment and formal service 
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requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The salient facts of that case are as follows: CNW 
owned an office building in a business subdivision in Idaho Falls. Id. at 90, 383 P.3d at 1260. In 
mid-June of 2012, a sinkhole developed under the parking lot of CNW's building. Id. It was later 
determined that the sinkhole was caused by water from a canal infiltrating an abandoned sewer 
line and eroding the soil under the parking lot. Id. The canal was owned and operated by New 
Sweden Irrigation District (hereafter, "NSID"). Id. The abandoned sewer line was owned by the 
City of Idaho Falls. Id. On July 18, 2012, CNW's attorney contacted NSID's president, Lou 
Thiel, to discuss the sinkhole. Id. Mr. Thiel advised CNW's attorney to contact NSID's attorney, 
Jerry Rigby. Id. From July to October 2012, CNW and NSID communicated about the sinkhole 
exclusively through Mr. Rigby. Id. On October 18, 2012, CNW sent a notice of tort claim to 
NSID, which was addressed to "New Sweden Irrigation District c/o Jerry R. Rigby" and mailed 
to Mr. Rigby's office in Rexburg, Idaho. Id. After receiving the notice, Mr. Rigby forwarded it 
to NSID's secretary, DeLillian Reed. Id. CNW filed a lawsuit against NSID and the City of 
Idaho Falls on December 19, 2012. Id. On January 25, 2013, CNW served NSID with an 
amended notice of tort claim. Id. NSID moved for summary judgment on September 29, 2014. 
Id. On December 31, 2014, the district court granted NSID's motion for summary judgment, 
finding that CNW's letter of October 18, 2012, was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and that the 180-day time limit expired before CNW served the 
amended notice of tort claim in January. CNW appealed. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court in CNW, LLC vacated the judgment entered by the 
district court, ruling that CNW' s delivery of the notice of tort claim to NSID's secretary satisfied 
the presentment requirement of Idaho Code § 6-906, to-wit: 
1 This Declaration of Dale Johnson is not signed. The signature line reads only: "Signature to be supplemented." 
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The dispositive issue presented by this appeal is whether CNW complied 
with the requirements of Idaho Code section 6-906 when Ms. Reed received 
the notice of tort claim after CNW sent it to NSID in care of Mr. Rigby . ... 
Idaho Code section 6-906 provides, 
All claims against a political [subdivision] arising under the provisions of 
this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for any act 
or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his employment 
shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political 
subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose 
or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later. 
Irrigation districts are included in the definition of political subdivisions. LC. 
§ 6-902(2). "No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental 
entity ... unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits 
prescribed by" the ITCA. I.C. § 6-908. 
The purposes of the ITCA notice requirement are to "(l) save needless 
expense and litigation by providing for amicable resolution of the differences 
between parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the 
cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the [governmental 
entity's] liability, if any, and (3) allow the [governmental entity] to prepare 
defenses." Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 
(1991) (quoting Farber v. State of Idaho, 102 Idaho 398, 401, 630 P.2d 685, 688 
(1981)) .... 
Idaho Code section 6-906 requires presentment to the secretary but does 
not require formal service. Formal service is required elsewhere in the ITCA. 
See I.C. § 6-916. Because service is not expressly required by Idaho Code 
section 6-906 even though it is required in another context by Idaho Code 
section 6-916, we infer that the Legislature did not intend the presentment 
requirement of Idaho Code section 6-906 to include the formalities of service 
of process. This Court has consistently refused to interpret the notice requirement 
as requiring personal service by the claimant on the clerk or secretary. Hujf,2 103 
Idaho at 277, 647 P.2d at 733; Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 
1062 (1978). In Smith, this Court stated that "[w]e likewise reject the city's 
interpretation which would in effect require us to read into that language a 
negative pregnant that, except for those circumstances listed in the statute, 
personal submission of the claim by the claimant himself is the sole and exclusive 
method of compliance." Id. at 624,586 P.2d at 1068. 
Here, CNW complied with the requirements of Idaho Code section 6-906. 
CNW sent the notice of tort claim to NSID in care of Mr. Rigby, who caused the 
notice to be delivered to Ms. Reed. We find the facts of this case to be similar to 
those in Huff. CNW's delivery of the notice to NSID's secretary by way of counsel 
2 Huffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,277,647 P.2d 730, 733 (1982). 
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is conceptually indistinguishable from the plaintiffs delivery of the notice by way 
of a receptionist in Huff 
NSID relies on Turner3 for the proposition that notice should be delivered 
directly to the secretary. That was not our holding in Turner. In Turner, the 
city clerk never received notice of the claim; here, NSID concedes that Ms. 
Reed received the tort claim notice. Because the claim was actually presented 
to the secretary, the presentment requirement of Idaho Code section 6-906 
was satisfied. 
To hold otherwise would require a claimant to personally deliver the notice of 
tort claim to the secretary of the irrigation district. We have specifically held that 
we will not read a negative pregnant into the statute which would require such 
service. This Court has consistently stated that the ITCA notice requirement 
should be liberally interpreted. We hold that the presentment requirement of Idaho 
Code section 6-906 is satisfied when the notice of tort claim is delivered to an 
employee or agent of the governmental entity who then delivers the notice to the 
clerk or secretary. This holding is in accord with the purposes of the presentment 
requirement of the statute. 
161 Idaho at 91-93, 383 P.3d at 1261-1263. (Emphasis added). 
Because the Supreme Court in CNW, LLC found that the delivery of the notice of tort 
claim satisfied the requirements of the statute, it did not reach CNW's alternative arguments that 
the 180-day time period did not begin to run until December of 2012 or that NSID is estopped 
from asserting lack of notice as a defense. Id. at 93, 383 P.3d at 1263. 
The CNW, LLC case is instructive here because while that case discusses the presentment 
requirement in Idaho Code § 6-906, which governs the filing of claims against a political 
subdivision or employee, Idaho Code § 6-905, which governs the filing of claims against a state 
or employee, such as the IDOL, contains a similar presentment requirement. Under Idaho Code 
§ 6-905 "( a[ll claims against the state and . . . against and employee of the state for any act or 
omission ... within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with 
the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or 
reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." I.C. § 6-905. (Emphasis added). 
3 Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 339 P.3d 544(2014). 
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Here, it is undisputed the Idaho Secretary of State's Office did not receive Mr. Johnson's 
two letters--one addressed to Appeals Bureau Chief Amy Holstein, and the other to Deputy 
Attorney General Craig Bledsoe-until September 1, 2017, when Deputy Attorney General 
Doug Werth forwarded Lisa Mason a copy of the Declaration of Dale Johnson, which was filed 
in this lawsuit on August 30, 2017, and had attached to it as Exhibits A and B copies of both 
letters. Second Declaration of Lisa Mason, at ,r,r 4-5. At the motion hearing, counsel for Mr. 
Johnson argued that the act by Mr. Werth of forwarding the Declaration of Dale Johnson (with 
the letters attached) to Lisa Mason satisfied the presentment requirement of Idaho Code § 6-905. 
***** 
For the reasons previously stated, in determining the IDOL's I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to 
Dismiss, this Court applies the summary judgment standard; and thus, shall liberally construe all 
facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, Mr. Johnson. However, in 
doing so, this Court remains cognizant that "the plain language of the statute and previous 
holdings of this [Idaho Supreme] Court show that non-compliance with I.C. § 6-908 deprives ... 
[Claimant] of the right to assert the claims .... " Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 
930, 936, 303 P.3d 617, 623 (2013). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that: 
The ITCA mandates that if a claimant does not provide the government with 
timely notice of its claim, it loses the right to assert the claim. I.C. § 6-908. 
Timely and adequate notice under the ITCA is a mandatory condition 
precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no 
matter how legitimate. 
Id. (quoting Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 410, 258 P.3d 340, 345 
(2011)). (Emphasis added). See also Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 116 Idaho 
758, 779 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989), which provides: 
Our Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the language of I.C. § 
6-908-that no claim or action shall be "allowed"-to mean that compliance 
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with the notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act is a mandatory condition 
precedent to bringing an action under the Act. See McQuillen v. City of 
Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987); Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 
654 P.2d 888 (1982); Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 586 P.2d 1062 
(1978); Independent School Dist. of Boise v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 
(1975); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711,535 P.2d 1348, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 
993, 96 S.Ct. 419, 46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975). 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the district court 
concluded that Madsen's suit against the Department should be dismissed because 
the action was not preceded by the filing of a notice of claim. The court's decision 
was correct as a matter of law. Because the action could not be maintained 
without compliance with the Tort Claims Act, the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the action as to the Department. 
Id at 761, 779 P.2d at 436. (Footnote omitted). (Emphasis added). 
The facts are undisputed that Hearing Examiner Mark Richmond issued a decision on 
August 5, 2015, denying Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits; that Mr. Johnson appealed that 
decision to the Industrial Commission, but because an audio recording of that hearing could not 
be found, the matter was remanded back to the IDOL. The facts are undisputed that on remand, 
after a second and third hearing, Hearing Examiner Janet Hardy issued a second decision on 
November 25, 2015, again denying Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits; that Mr. Johnson 
appealed this second decision to the Industrial Commission; and that on April 29, 2016, the 
Industrial Commission reversed the IDOL's decision and awarded Mr. Johnson unemployment 
benefits. The facts are undisputed that on August 25, 2016, Mr. Johnson filed with the Secretary 
of State a Notice of Tort Claim dated August 22, 2016, claiming that he "had been forced to 
incur additional attorneys' fees and costs in retaining counsel to represent him in the second and 
third hearings, which would not have been necessary but for the Department of Labor's 
negligence." Declaration of Lisa Mason, at Exh. A, ,-i 2. Lastly, it is undisputed that the period 
of delay resulting from the lost audio recording of the August 5, 2015, hearing, was from August 
5th to November 25, 2015, when the second Appeals Bureau decision was issued. 
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The Court must liberally construe these undisputed facts in favor of Mr. Johnson and 
draw all inferences in his favor, in determining whether Mr. Johnson's negligence claim against 
the IDOL and its employees acting within the course or scope of their employment for any act or 
omission were "presented to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) 
days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is 
later." I.C. § 6-905. According to his own testimony, which is undisputed, Mr. Johnson was told 
by the IDOL of the loss of the recording by phone sometime before August 18, 2015, the date of 
his letter to Appeals Bureau Director, Amy Hohnstein. Declaration of Dale Johnson, at p. 2. ,i 1, 
and Exh. A. However, it was not until August 28, 2015, when the Industrial Commission issued 
an Order remanding the matter back to the IDOL due to the lack of an audio recording-when 
the effect of the loss of the recording became clear-that this Court finds that any claim against 
the IDOL and its employees for negligence resulting from the loss of the recording reasonably 
should have been discovered by Mr. Johnson, even if he was as yet unaware of the full extent of 
his damages. Employing the most liberal construction of the facts in Mr. Johnson's favor, the 
Court finds that by November 25, 2015, the date of the second Appeals Bureau decision, he 
reasonably should have discovered any claim for negligence resulting from the loss of the 
recording and the amount damages he had incurred in attorney's fees and costs for the second 
and third hearings on remand to the IDOL. Accordingly, by the plain language of Idaho Code § 
6-905, after liberally construing the facts in Mr. Johnson's favor, his notice of tort claim should 
have been presented to and filed with the Secretary of State within 180 days of November 25, 
2015, or by May 23, 2016. It was not until August 25, 2016, that Mr. Johnson filed his Notice of 
Tort Claim dated August 22, 2016, with the Secretary of State; thus, making it untimely, 
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Regarding Mr. Johnson's alternative argument, it is undisputed that the two letters 
attached to the Declaration of Dale Johnson were delivered to Deputy Attorney General Doug 
Werth by facsimile on August 30, 2017. See Declaration of Dale Johnson (filed August 31, 
2017), at p. 3, Certificate of Service. Mr. Werth then delivered the Declaration (with the two 
letters attached) to Lisa Mason in the Secretary of State's Office on September 1, 2017. 
Liberally construing these undisputed facts in favor of Mr. Johnson and drawing all 
inferences in his favor, the Court finds that the delivery of these letters fails to satisfy the 
presentment and notice requirements ofldaho Code § 6-905. First of all, as stated in CNW, LLC, 
one of the main purposes of the ITCA notice requirement is to "save needless expense and 
litigation by providing for amicable resolution of the differences between parties." CNW, LLC v. 
New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho at 91, 383 P.3d at 1261 (citation omitted). The facts 
in CNW, LLC are distinguishable in that the October 18, 2012 letter from CNW to NSID's 
attorney, which was then delivered by NSID's attorney to NSID's secretary, was sent within 180 
days of the development of the sinkhole in mid-June 2012 and before the CNW filed a 
lawsuit against NISD on December 19, 2013. In the instant case, Mr. Johnson's two letters 
were delivered to the IDOL's attorney, Deputy Attorney General Werth, on August 30, 2017, 
over five months after the lawsuit was filed. Mr. Werth then forwarded them on September 1, 
2017, to Lisa Mason in the Secretary of State's Office. Even under the most liberal construction 
of the facts in Mr. Johnson's favor, the Court finds that Mr. Johnson's delivery of the letters to 
the Secretary of State through Deputy Attorney General Werth during the course of litigation 
and in support of Plaintiff's objection to the IDOL's motion to dismiss is not what was 
contemplated by, and does not satisfy the presentment requirement of Idaho Code § 6-905, 
because such delivery does not serve the purpose of the ITCA to avoid litigation. Even assuming 
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arguendo, that the presentment requirement was satisfied, the letters were delivered the Secretary 
of State on September 1, 2017, which was well beyond the 180-day deadline ofMay 23, 2016. 
For these reasons, because "(t]imely and adequate notice under the ITCA is a mandatory 
condition precedent to bringing suit," Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho at 936, 
303 P.3d at 623, and the lack of timely notice by Mr. Johnson deprives this Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, IDOL's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice is granted .. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant State ofldaho, Department of Labor's I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss 
is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
2. Defendant State ofldaho, Department of Labor's Motion to Change Venue is MOOT. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this 'y day of September, 2017. 
Barbara Buchanan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, ~eby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this __p__:__aay of September, 2017, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
This matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
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I ~by certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this Jf:S.:_ day of September, 2017, to: 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
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Attorney at Law 
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vs. 
STA'l'E OF IDAHO, DEPARTMEN'I1 
OF LABOR., Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Diret.>tor, Mar:k Rjchmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
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Defendant State of Idaho., Department of Labor (';IDOL''), by an.d through its 
under.sign~d counsel, he_rehy submiu; this Memorandu1n of Costs and Attorney's Fees 
pursuant to Idaho Codo §§ 12·117 and 12-121, and Ida.ho Rule of Civil Prooodur.e 5,i, 
and hfJreby req1,1ests that the Court award IDOL the fees outlined below: 
33.. 7 hrJurs at $150/h.our.: 
ATTORNEY FEES RF:;QUESTED: $5,055.00 
To the best of my knowledge and belief; the fore.going it-ems ·are correct and 
at'e in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 .. 
DATF.J) this 2.'1'· d.ay of September, 2017. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATI'ORNEY GENERAL 
----·· ,....,.~-, By ./ \, ·-"----
DOUG WERTH 
Dcpu.ty Attomey General 
Q~RTl.f.1CATE . .Qk~SE.R.Ylc.E. 
I HEREBY CER;'fUY that on this~- o1' Septembe1\ 2017, I ca·used to he 
served a. true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James 1\-fcl\fillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 C-edar Street 
Wallace. ID 83878 
□ U.S. Mail 
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D Over-night Mail 
18,Facsimile: (208) 752•1900 
/'-/,,--
/ \ ------. . .... ,If 
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DEFENDANTS .IDAHO DF~PARTMF~N'I1 OF LABOR~$ MEMORANDT.JM OF 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 7 52-1900 
ISB#7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
f4I 001/012 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and through his couns
el of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully m
oves this 
Court for its Order pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedur
e 11.2(b) 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION~ l 
O.\ClloDII\Joi.- ltDso\Motlo• ll>t-4or11.,, (201709 .!11-.IIAt).dOC 
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RECONSIDERING its Order dismissing this matter, as well as an order permitting 
additional discovery pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), on the 
following grounds; 
1. Plaintiff has located an additional letter, dated December 6, 2015, 
addressed to the Governor's office and the Department of Labor director. In the 
lertter, Plaintiff stated that ''you need to consider this an official complaint/' and, in 
the body of the e~mail message to which it was attached, Plaintiff stated that it was 
a ~formal complaint." See Declaration of Dale Johnson, Exhibit A; 
2. Given that the Court relied upon evidence outside of the record, thus 
converting Defendant's motion into a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff 
requires an opportunity to conduct additional discovery in order to determine the 
existence and handling of this letter, and other documents submitted to the State. 
3. Further, Plaintiff believes further clarification and discussion with 
regard to the presentment and continuing tort issues, and well as the inclusion of 
additional information and documents from the underlying Department of Labor 
and Industrial Commission cases, could prove instructive to the Court herein. 
Plaintiff also believes that the issues concerning possible spoliation of evidence on 
the part of the Defendants warrant further discussion. See Johnson v. Lambros, 
143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the case law in applying 
Rule ll(a)(2)(B) [now ll.2(b)] permits a party to present new evidence when a 
motion is brought under that rule> but does not require that the motion be 
accompanied by new evidence.") and Arregui v. Gallegos.Main, 153 Idaho 801, 808, 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
~:\Clloa!NO,._ RoGI\Mac;.,."" -doOKlon (;1<111119 :18-lMo~d>o 
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291 P.8d 1000, 1007 (2012) ("When considering a motion for reconsideration under 
Rule 1 l(a)(2), the district court should take into account any new facts, law, or 
information presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the 
district court's interlocutoey order. However, new evidence is not required and the 
moving party can re-argue the same issues in addition to new arguments."); and 
4. Plaintiffs ongoing and continuing damages, not only up to the date of 
the issuance of the Industrial Commission's decisions reversing the Department of 
Labor and denying reconsideration, but up to the present day, are the direct and 
proximate result of continuing tortious acts on the part of the State and, therefore, 
Plaintiffs cause of action did not accrue until the issuance of the Industrial 
Commission's decisions which brought the matter to a close. See Farber v. State, 
102 Idaho 898, 401, 630 P.2d 685, 688 (1981). 
Oral argument is requested on this Motion. Further, pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(D), Plaintiff hereby states his intent to submit a brief or 
memorandum, and additional affidavits/declarations, in support of this Motion 
within the time allowed by Rule. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration and for additional Discovery should be GRANTED. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2017. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
D!\CUm,s\JollnaoA, J~Di,;\M61lao trwboonslde5.1Cili!II (2017 09 laii-JMc).4Dc 
Page 103
09/28/2017 13:26 FAX 208 752 1900 - Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law - 14] 004/012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 28th day of September, 2017, I caused 
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
D1\C:Jlm\JoJ-n, illll<\Motlon for -~mdon (2017 o, ;¥-/i'olc),""' 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7528 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
DECLARATION OF DALE 
JOHNSON 
'41005/012 
I, DALE JOHNSON, am the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 181 
competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and have personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth herein: 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter sent 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -1 
O:\Cll<lll1/J11bnoon. llo,ov;>,¢i.,.~oa 11rDola Jalmoon c:017 O'l l&-.JM<).doo 
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to the Governor's Office and the Director of the Idaho Department of Labor on or 
about December 6, 2015. In the letter, and the body of the e-mail message to which 
it was attached, I ma.de it clear that this was an "official comp la.int" !'formal 
complaint," and I expected it to be promptly forwarded to the appropriate office. I 
never received a response. 
2. In addition to the attached letter, as well as the letters submitted with 
my declaration in opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, my wife an I 
exchanged a number of e-mails with various State officials expressing our concems 
with regard to the lost recording. Further discovery is required in order to 
determine how this correspondence was handled, and to whom it may have been 
forwarded. internally; 
3. I continued, and continue, to suffer damages a.s a direct and pro:x:imate 
result of the Defendants' continuing negligent and tortious acts up to, and beyond, 
the issuance of the Industrial Commission1s decisions on April 29, 2016 and 
September 26, 2016. 
4. I reserve the right to submit a Supplemental Declaration and 
additional documents and information in support of my Motion for Reconsideration 
with the Brief or Memorandum hereon, once it is submitted 
Further your declaran.t sayeth naught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of the State 
af Idaho, that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2017. 
14J 006/012 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 28th day of August, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendant8 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -3 
D:\l;U....U.lllllGO. n-lD<olanltkin ofDlliolal•"°'' (2017 OIi ~11-JMo).doo 
U.S. Mail 
-~ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
___x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
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Attached for your records and investigation . 
...... ---------------
Amy Hohnstein said her office, the Idaho Dept. of Labor, Appeals Bureau, does its own 
investigations of personnel misconduct, etc-, and the Appeals Examiners (AHO Judges) are 
not accountable for actions - to the Idaho Judicial Council or to other similar 'watchdog' office -
- let alone to the Idaho people. 
As you, Mr. Otter, appointed Mr. Edmunds and he in turn approved of other IDOL hirings, such 
as Ms. Hohnstein, it is important that your offices are kept in the loop when your people do 
thirngs out of line and still take a paycheck from the pockets of the honest working/tax-paying 
public. 
This is a formal complaint. 
Dale and Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, Idaho 83801 
[Y, A' 
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State ofidaho; Public Officers of Accountability 
Butch Otter; Gov and Ken Edmunds; Gov Appointed IDOL 
Butch and Ken; Emailed on December 6, 2015 
The fraud and corruption that continues to rear its ugly head in the IDOL has to be severed; 
and since it appears you refuse to do it, it falls on my shoulders and those of my fellow-
taxpayers. Know this well, I didn't cause any of this, but I sure as hell ain't running from it 
Ken; you really need to purge your department of the growing negligence or incompetence 
problems, unless you are as guilty as they are~ or that you simply don
1t care about any 
dishonest IDOL actions. None-the-less, the buck stops on yours and Butch's desks and you 
need to consider this an official complaint of the handling of your department's personnel, 
Amy Hohnstein, Mark Richmond and Janet Hardy, to name just the ones I'm familiar with. 
And, Ken, don't tell me that I have to go through Amy again to file some stupid form as 
she has absolutely no business being a department chief of ANY tax-payer funded job. She 
has proved beyond any shadow of doubt to myself and others witnessing her actions just in 
my case alone -- that she is rude and either incompetent in her duties or a liar. It should 
cause you to think of how many other cases have been wrongly handled, as mine is just 
one out of who knows how many. 
I am more convinced now than ever that my first hearing audio was either lost or deleted 
deliberately (spoliated); and I am inclined to believe that your Ms. Hohnstein may have 
baa a hand in it. And this is only because there are way too many ( and still growing) 
coinciden.ces that is/was more likely 'not just an accident'. 
If by some chance I'm wrong~ then I'm truly sony. However evidence just keeps stacking 
up against her and the IDOL. They have 'cried wolf' too many times now for me to believe 
anything that comes out of her department anymore. 
1he third hearing, held on Nov. 12, 2015, was even more despicable than the first and 
where Hardy generated a decision, dated November 25, 2015, wherein she held up 
provable perjury as though it were credible testimony, makes irrational excuses as if they 
were actual fact, when there is very little (if any) fact in it at all and dismisses six (not 
counting mine) honest, credible testimonies as if they were irrelevant. 
I believe it may very well have been pre-determined in order to protect Ms. Hohnstein and 
Mr Richmond as I don't think Hardy was going to be allowed by her handlers to recognize 
the truth at the hearing; and her real job that day was to protect the IDOL and try to make 
the inevitable tort go away, and (as the secretary told my wife) to protect the money fund. 
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But Amy didn't protect anything; in fact she added to the provable damage by the IDOL. 
Why would they do that to themselves; don't you have attorneys, or do they have the sam.e 
work ethics? Shit, I can handle honest mistakes, but these aren't mistakes anymore - as 
honest mistakes are recogniz.ed as such and can and are, easily corrected. 
I lalow full well the tentacles that my fonner employer, his attorney and other socialites in 
their good-ol-boys club have in local, state and federal government. So don't think I'm 
surprised by anything that has transpired up to now. In fact, it would be naive of me to 
think anything else. 
You folks would be unwise to think that I'm just pissed off and moaning because I didn't 
get my way, when in fact, I'm as angcy as hell at the outright corruption that I've been 
forced to witness coming out of the IDOL and other government agencies. 
Be it !mown that the majority of all my wife and my communications are by text or audio 
documentation, as we have been forced to make sure evidence is available for any 
necessary court settings. 
So, my question to you, Ken, or Butch, is this: How much more damage are you going to 
allow to continue in the IDOL before you intervene? 
Hardy allowed ex-parte communication ofmy former employer's attorney (who wasn't on 
record), and he basically reminded Hardy that it was her job to defend his client and to 
basically appear on behalf of his client, since it was beneath him to appear himself. 
Then two (2) subpoenas to appear were basically ignored. Employer GM jumped on a 
plane for where~ever, though no motion to quash was presented. I believe that he knew it 
was clear he would perjure himself along with the other three (3) employer-witnesses (who· 
did show up), unless he made himself unavailable. 
Another one who didn't honor subpoena had already made statements as to the growing 
hostile, unsafe and intolerable conditions of my former employer. He had also been fired 
and then re-hired under more favorable conditions, to include more money and also told to 
'keep his mouth shut' as he told my wife and I. However, before his gagged re-hire, he had 
provided written and verbal statements confir.rning what me and multiple others testified to. 
However, after being rehired, he told my wife he was uncertain and nervous about any 
security in his job (my wife can testify herself to what he told her). He would though, I 
believe, be more afraid to perjure himself at a hearing than the ones who did testify and 
who did perjure themselves. That's likely why he wasn't available when Hardy called him 
at the phone number that he supposedly provided to her prior to the hearing. If it was him 
2 
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that actually called her as it is a bit suspicious since the number she rang was answered by 
a different name and it was only off by one digit from the prior number he had owned, 
Employer's HR Director proclaimed the CEO/GM would not show up because he W88 on a 
plane and supposedly it was scheduled in advance. If, however, that was the case, wasn't 
he required to submit in advance of the hearing, a proper motion to quash? Isn't that 
contempt of court? And why didn't Hardy remind them of that? 
Same with the letter of employer's attorney, who submitted it a day before the hearing. He 
tried to threaten and intimidate our attorney, inferred to Hardy what her instructions were 
for the hearing and said all the subpoenaed would be there ( a lie) and that he wouldn't be. 
Maybe their attorney was concerned bis son's name might come up and be recognized in 
testimony - as his son works directly under the problematic supervisor in this cause. 
Employer's three (3) employees gave perjured testimony (provable, not hearsay); and the 
worse offender was the head ofhr, who like employer's attorney, basically told Hardy that 
she was to deny my ui claim because I quit. The fact is that 1 terminated them, due to the 
growing intolerable working conditions. Hardy didn't seem to really like being told what 
her job was, and she even stopped him in bis tracks and warned him and us that we don't 
tell her what to do ( which for the record, I did not do in the first place). 
The hr boss then flat-out lied to her and us about documents that do not even exist; this is 
again, full-blown perjury, easily proved. 
The other two (2) employer witnesses provided false testimony, which I will also produce 
proof of as well to the IIC and then to a jury. Why Hardy would allow all this obvious 
fa]1se testimony is more than suspicious to me, quite simply, its B.S. This, and Amy and 
Mark sent to Washington, D.C. this last summer giving a joint lecture on detecting false 
testimony telephonically. Go figure•- they do the same thing that they tell others not to do. 
Nov. 12th was about a 4--hour hearing, so I won't detail all the juicy stuff as not to take all 
the fun from you finding out when you do your own investigation. Because, again, I will 
state, this is a formally submitted complaint. I will forward this information, along with 
everything else to show that everyone in Boise has been kept in the loop, to avoid surprises. 
It is important to note that Hardy detennined that all of the ·other testimony "didn't carry 
much weight''. Who the hell does she think she is? Not only did she determine that six (6) 
former employees' testimony did not carry much weight, but she gave complete credibility 
to individuals that I can, and will prove, lied to her face (voice). And employer employees 
who didn't lie to her, only didn't because they made themselves unavailable. Did Hardy 
3 
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actually believe that all seven (7) of us showed up just to feed her bull? Get real! Those 
people (and many more) were all wrongly injured by this employer in one way or another. 
To make matters worse, Hardy herself manufactured several false statements in her 
decision. These will be vigorously pursued and a jury will be asked to 'weigh in' on the 
questions and asked: "where the hell did she come up with those statements?" Richmond 
wiU be asked these questions as well. 
So, Hardy also took hostile testimony against me and then :flipped it like I was the 
originator of statements that I never made. So, how is that even justified or professional? 
Where do you find these people? All in all, I will state again, I am very pissed off at the 
IDOL for all the on-going violations they have perpetrated in my case. And this is only 
one case; it makes my mind swim. 
In Hardy's questioning subpoenaed witnesses~ she failed to ask each if anyone was with 
them - she'd asked this information from my attorney. Just a little thing, you might say, but 
it is the combination of the many things wrong that cause the growing problems. 
And I have every right to be angry with the IDOL. Toe unfortunate part is that at this point 
I would be in the right to conclude that this is just regular business as usual for the IDOL. 
If this is the case (which is very likely), then its as effective as a plugged-up toilet over-
flowing onto the floor; and it is time to unplug it and flush all those poisons down the drain 
and clean up the mess that it has made. 
I'm certain that at the very least the three (3) IDOL employees I have mentioned need to be 
terminated from the tax.~payer paid funds as well as barred from ever holding any other 
government jobs or private-sector jobs that deal with the govellllllent. 
Your response to my complaint will confinn whether you, Butch and Ken~ decide to 
honestly address the IDOL problems. Keep in mind this is not going away until those 
acting dishonestly are held accountable. Toe cost your personnel keeps heaping on me will 
be passed back to you 20 fold. 
Remember this is about truth and accountability. I'm sick and tired of people with gov jobs 
abusing them; time to step-up and require a higher standard for tax-paid employ positions. 
rely and pissed o~ 
bee: As needed 
4 
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LAWRENCE~ G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENF;R,AL 
S. Ki:'\Y CHRISTENSEN 
Chief ofContract..s & Administrative Law 
DOU(J WERTH, ISB# 3000 
Deputy Attorney Gene.ral 
:u 7 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 8!3735 
Tel~phone: (208) 332•3570 
<lo u.g, wer.th@iabor .idaho.!:{<.,v 
Attorneys .for Idaho Depart.m£:nt of Labor 
-,. T-,-•-,.i ,;--,;h- • 
ClJU' .. _ ... O[ I.Q.AltO 
F ms-.. ·· --~ul .Y r;,,.. BiNNJ:R 
I ,J DICIAL DISTRICT 
2017 SEP 28 PH 2: 56 
t"=I r.--:/}1 r '" ...... 
... ,._L,.,, .}· , -{1cr courn 
IN 'fHE DISTRIC'l' COURT OF THE FIR.ST JUDICIAL UISTR1CT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN ~-u,TD FOR 'fHE COUNTY OF BONl"oi~;R 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual~ 
Plaintiff, 
V'S. 
S'l'A'l,.E OE' ID.-:\.HO, DEPAR.'rMENT 
OP LABOR, Amy Hohnstf:.!in, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Ap_peals Hearing Examiner, -Janet 
Hardy, Appeal& Hearing Examiner 
o.nd Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, F.md JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual an.d 
official capacities as employees of the 
St.ate ofidaho, 
Defendants. · 
Case No. CV•l 7-0423 
DI!1FENDAN'I' IDAHO 
DFjPARTMENT OF LABORS' 
MgMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Rl!.'QUJ!~s~r FOR- A 'M'O~"i'"E\"'S 
'fl"l~F.!S 
DEFENDANT IDAHO n_gPAR'ln!IF~N'I1 OF1 LABOR..qJ MEMORANDUM. 
IN SlJPPORT OF REQU:f+;S'11 FOR A'1VJ10RNF;Y'S FF~ES · 1 
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I. lN1'RODUC1tION 
Plaintiff Dale JohnS(ln C'Pta.intiff') filed this action again.~t: De.oondant: State of 
Idaho, Department of Labor r'IDOL") and the othe:r above-m.1..med defendan.t.~. who all 
a.re employees of IDOL alle-ging negligence ba~~d upon delay .resulting ·from the fa.ct 
that an audio rtK-r,rding of his first hearing before an IDOL Appi1lt1s Exarn.iner could 
not he located and produced .for bjs de no·t-vJ appeal hear.ing t<, the Idaho Industrial 
Goa:>.missi.on ("Commission:.,). 
'11he period of the delay neoof!!sitated by the Com.mission's reniand and ihe 
second Appeals F~xaminer review was the period f.rnm i.ssuanee of the first Appeals 
Examiner's deciaion (August 5, 2015) until the date of issuan.c.-e of the second Appeals 
Examiner's deeision {Novemb~)r 25, 2015), or one hundred twelve (J.12) days. .4.fter 
that period~ the Commission conducted. a de novo review and issued. a decision in 
Plaintitrs favor, which was- not a.pp.eal&d to the. Ida.ho Sup1~.;me Court. Plaintiff has 
re<.-eived all of the unemploym,mt benefits u, whfoh he was entitfod, and he made n,1 
allegat.ion to the <.·ont.rary. 
Putting aside the obvious deficiencies in Plaintiffs imaginative cfa.im - fm· 
(such as, for exa.mple, its failw:t~ to und.e:rstancl the judicial im.munit)· Einjoyed by 
administrative hearing officers such as the Appeals E.x-am.iners,1 and its speculative 
damages), long before Plaintiff's cr,niplaint was .til<:;d it had become batted by 
1 See flt..eele v, M~~_gw.,, 956 P.2d 1:.IBil (Mont. 1998) (hEasring E,xamim,r and DOL att.omey 
entitled t-o abeolute judicial and quas:i-judicial in:1xnu,iity, 1~spe-cti.ve-ly1. 
DEF~ND.A.i'\J"T IDAHO DEPARTM.~;NT (Ht LABORS' MEMORA1\JDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF RE'QUEST F'OR .l\.'IirroRNJi}Y'S FEES· ·2 
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oper.at.ion ,;flda.bo Code~ 6-9052 an.cf Idaho Code§ H-908.3 Plaint-ifffaill~d t.o pres~nt 
his notke of tort claim t'.i the Idaho Secretary uf State as requirt~d by tht~se atatutes. 
No authority of any kind. was found or submitted to the Court by Plaintiff to support 
the unt.enahle r.laim that. the forwarding of two letters to the Idaho Sec-..retary of Staw 
by unde1:sigued counst?l mor1:~ than twEmty (20) months. a.fte:r hi~ alleged clai.m. arose, 
and afoor he .fik,d suit, muld satiafy the 180 day presentment req_uirem.t::!nt of the 
.Idaho 'fort Claims ~.\ct, C'ITCA"). The1-e is no legal b1u1it\ for a 'h-unc pro tuncn 
])wsentment of a tort claim notice and nr; .reasonable legal argum<;!nt can be t"..rafted 
for such an assert.ion .. A.:1 the Court rioted in it.'\i decision, such an assertion is contrary 
to the clear intent of the ITCA. 
If. S'fANDARD 
A court ma)· award a rJ.revaHing party attorney fees,. including parafogal fees. 
if provided for by any siatute or contract. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(l ). A district r-...our.t's 
.detenninacion. of the prevailing party is within the court's. discretion, and will be 
revlewedfor an ah-use of disc-,retion. Syringe Nt~iw:orks,. LLC v, Id.a.ho DOJ,l•t 0L,.!\d.m.!1L .• 
159 Idaho 81a, 830,267 P.ad 208,225 (201~) (}bringgll) (quotbig Hobson F'abrig_~i~ng 
;;i .. AU claims agai.nst the state arisfag under thE: provisions of this ac.,-t and. all claim& against 
an employee of tlie state for H.O.y act or omi~1on of the E:-mployce within the ec,,uree or. arope of 
hie 1:imployment ~t~.m.9.n1l.fil~d wif·h.!-b£.~'m'.Q1..§n: . .2!'.~.t..~ wjJhi.P. o~Jlypdr~ 
eighty (180) d.aY§ frpm tlw datn the daim ar<tAA or i;eu.§;Qqablv shog],g. l1;§ve .. MP.!l.d.i.~.md., 
whichever is later." J.C.§ 6w905 (em1>ht1si.s added). 
:1 "No claim or action shall be a.llmved ag·ain.'ii a governmEint.al entity or its 6mployee unless 
the da:i.m has been presented and filed within the t.ime lhni:ta prescribed by thi, act." J.C. § 
6-908. 
DEF'END.AN'T IDAHO DEPARTMJi~N··rr OF' LABORS' MEMORANDlThf 
IN SUPPORrr OF ru~QUf~S'1.~ FOlt ATTOR.i~FN'S FEES • 3 
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CoJJh .. v. S,Efl Const. •. ~LC~ 16,1 Idaho 45, 49, 294 P.~3d 171. 175 (2012)). ,.,\ district 
court also exe.rcit~s.i.ts diseretir,n in awnrding att-omcy fee:18, and that award is su.hj<1ct 
to review for an abuse ofd.is!',1·etio11. I311an.Tru.clingJx1~ .. .v.-Oje._r, 160 Id.a.ho 422,425, 
374 P.3d 585, 588 (2016) (qrwting lq.ahrLrr.aJlfil>. "Defil_v. A~;m.Jnc., 159 Idah<J 138, 
140. 3:57 P.3,l 863, 865 (2015)). ''Under-the-: abu.,re of dfat~retiou standard, '[s]o long as 
the trial court recogn.i2FJd the matt.er as discretionary, acted within the outer 
bou:n.d.aries of the court's diacl";:tion, and reached it~ .oonclus.ion. through a:n ~xorcise 
of reason1 this Court will .not disturb the d.eci.sfon on appeal."' S"t:·ringa II~ 159 Idaho 
at Bal, B67 P.3d at 226. (quoting Slaathaug ,F, Allstate.L~ .. CQ,J 132 Idaho-'705, 707, 
979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999)). 
Ill. DISCUSSION 
A. IDOL is the prevailing parties because it entirely succeeded on its 
motion to dismiss. 
The. fin.al judg:mr:!nt in ihis r..aro1:, diami,.r.;sed with _prejud.ic.!e Plajntiffs L'omplaint 
in its entirety. Under· the guiding principles of Rule 54(d;{l)(B) and und.e:r .th.& ov1c,raU 
view of the case, it cannot be disputEid tha.t IDOL is th1:! prevailing pa:rty. See Syringa 
ll, 159.Idaho at 831,867 P.3d at 226. 
B. In filing his Complaint~ Plaintiff acted without- a reasonable. basis in 
fact or"Jaw. 
IdaJ10 Code§ 12-117(1) provide-.s that in any proc-eediug where a state agency 
and a person a:re adverse pu.rti,.!S, the Court mu..~t award. the prevailing pa.rty 
reasonable attr,rney f~1:,s if the Cm.u·t. "fi.mls that. the n,JnJ>rev11iling par.t.y acted 
DEFENDA1'i~1, IDAHO DEI-'ARTM.EN'I' O.F LABORS' M.EMORA.NDUM 
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without a reason.able basis i.11 fact. or. law."' IDOL is an a.gen1~y within the meaning of 
ldaho Coda§ 67~5201(2), lruiho Code§ 12-117(5)(d). The action ixlitiated. by Plaintiff" 
quaH_:fies as a proceeding for pur_r.m~s oflcluho C<>de· § 12--1 l7{5)(c). 
At.tarn~y fees in this case are warranted ·under Idaho Cotle § 12-11 '7 against 
Plain.tiff }x:.,caus.e of his ,.:omplete· disrP...grtrd of t.h.e ITC.A. and itrs timely r;rt!Sfmtment 
of ootioo tort claim r.tiqu:i.rement. T.imely p.reso.ntment is a ma.nd.ato.r.y prerequisite t-0 . 
bringing suit a~'Uinst a. state agency. 'J'wo recent cases from. the Idaho Supreme Court: 
confirm that Plain.t.i.ff s fu.ilure to perform .a minimum of fa{:tual and legal due 
diligence i$ a valid. basis for awarding a.t.torney fees under Idaho Code.§ 12-1.17. In 
207 {2015), the legal dispute fueu:sed on th.e application nf a property tax exem.ption 
_provided by IdahfJ law. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the plain,. wmmhigtwus 
language oft.he statut-!'j did IlOt en.titlt? the appellant to the prc)perty tax exem.ptfon. 
Id., l 58 J.daho at 153, 345 P.ad at 212. Thi~ was contrary t-'; the E1ppellant's argument 
that ii q_uali.fied under t,be plain language of th.e exemption. Id .• 158 Idaho at 151, 
345 P.3d at 210. In addressing the respondent's request for attorney foes under Idaho 
Codf:! § 12-l 17, the Ida.ho Supreme Court held that the a_ppella.ni pursuP.d the· appeal 
unreaso11ably. Id.~ 158Idahoat l5r:lr 845.P.3d.at218. Ito.xi>lained.tha.t"[ijninstances 
whe~ parties to appea.1s before th.is Court have a.dvanef.:.d arguments based upon a 
disregard for plain langua~1, we have fm1:nd. them to have actf.id without a rea.s:1onablFJ 
bas.is in law,~ Id. (citing to Idah<, \V(;,oJ...tk™W-il'L. ln.~.:t..S:tm&, 154 Idah,, 716, 
DEf."ENDANT ID.ltHO DEPA~RTMEJ...;"T OP LABORS' .MEM.ORANDUM 
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724, 302 P.Sd 341, 849 (2012); fi§..~ _ _:v. Ci,tuf.&.Jchy.m, 141 Ida.hfJ 3•i9, 356., 109 
P.3d l.091, lOH8 (2006.)). 
Si1nllarly in Arnold v ... Cit..L9.f..Startlev, 158 Idah,; 218, a45 P.3-d 1008 (2015), 
the Arnnlds filed suit under tlte Op-en Meetings La.w·s private- right- of-octfon for "[a].ny 
pe:rsnn affucte<l by a violation of' th{! Open Meetings La.w. Arnoid. 158 Idaho at 220, 
345 P.3d at 101.0 (quoting Idaho Code § ($7-2347{6) (-r.~pealed 2016)). The Idaho 
Supreme C<nirt., Hb'Tf.)e.ing with t.b.e di~l;rict oou.rt, held. that the. Arnolds lac-ked 
st:anding t-'J cballeuge the violation of the Open Meetings Law (1111 early .m.eet.lng start 
time)-underthe plain, unam.biguoushm.guageofthe statute creating a cause of action. 
Id., 158 Ida.ho at 223. 345 P.3d at 1013. 'l~e Court then turned to the city's request 
for att-';r.n.ey fees under Idaho Code§ 12•117·. The Idah1) Suprt?me Cou.r.t explained 
that it did not typically award attorney rees in mat¼rs 1)f .firat hn.prossio.n, but also 
related that "the f;urpose of I.C. § 12.-117 fa to serve as a deterr.e.nt to groundless m:. 
arbitrary action and to provide a. remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financi.\l burdem; defending against ground]eS.."l charges." Id., 158 Idaho 
at 224.. 345 P.8d at 1014 ((..>itatio.n omitted) (quota.tion marks omitted) (alteration 
o.mitted) .. 'I'he Court acknowled.ged the theory advan<..-ed by the .Arnolds. and indicated 
that they may have reasonably pursued this theo.ry in the district <,'Ourt? but they did 
not r<~asonably pursue it in the Idaho Supre.me Court. Id. The plain language. of the 
statute was .. clear enough that [the Court] believe[_d] the Arn.<)ld.s• appeal wa.s. made 
with.out a. :reasonalJle basis in fa.ct or law." Id. As thF; Court ,r&jmark0d, "[a]sserting 
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that an appea.l involves a matter r;f fu-st i1n1>ressfr,n is not a 'fre~ pass~ to bring an 
appeal ba5ed on unrea&Jna.hle a1·gunient::~." Id. 
here, The plain language of the ITCA requ:in~s presentment of a notice of tort claim 
to the Idaho Secretary of State within. 180 days of the date a daim. ari,;;es. Plaintiff 
did nothing to fulfill tl:1:is requirement. He timely submitted no documents to the 
Secretary of State•s office, rJ.r any of its se(~retaries or othf:.r emplo).,.ees. BP..cause of 
this, no complaint sllmlld have been fil!~d by Plaintiff against- IDOL. 
Here, Plaintiff acted in this r,roceeding· '\\-ithout a reasonable basis in law or 
.fact. Well-established law, t.he plair1 language- of the statutes~ and the underlying 
fa.cts applied t:o Plaintiff-s complaint ineluctably lead tr, only one conclusion - that 
Plaintiffs case ww; barred. before he filed suit, As tmch, t:h~! purpose of .awarding 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, a.s discussed in ,8,r.n.9-li;l., is $atiafied h-ere, 
IDOL bore unfair and unjustified financial bu.rdens defending .a.gainst charges not 
grounded in law or fact. Moreover, an. award of attorney f-ees would serve as .a 
de.wrren.t to futun, groundless actions that a bar.red. ou their· face by the ITC.A. 
In suro.., Pla.intift' disregarded the plain language tjf the ITCA and wellMsettled 
ca.sela.w in filing a negligence daim that ·was not reasonahly grou1:uied in fact or law. 
IDOL is thus entitled to an. award of attorney's fees under Idaho Co<le § 12 .... 117. 
DJ:c;FE.NDA ... 1'J'I' IDAHO DEP.AR'l'MEN'l.1 Oli' LABORS' M.EMORANDUM 
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C. Plaintiff brought- or pursued this matt.er without foundation by 
disregarding the a.pplica.tion of'the ITC.A to his claims. Fo.r this: 
reason IDOL is entitled to attorney .ti.H,s under Idaho Code§ 12-1.21. 
Another basis fhr awarding attorm~y feei; to IDOL is Idaho Codr;: § 12-121. .As 
of March 1, 2017, Idaho Code§ 12·121 _provides th.at in any civil ru.rtio.n, "the judge 
may award reasonable attornt~y•s ft,es to th,~ prc::lvailin.g pur.t.y or partir::is when the 
jud.ge findfl! that the case was brought, pursued} ru· defox1d.ed friw,lm:uuy, unreasonably 
or with.out foundation." 2017 Idtth<, Seas. I..aws. Ch. 47;4 Bef.! f1lso Hoffgr v. Shappard, 
160 Id.ah<> 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 6H6 (2016} (~emiug]y rec.-;gnizing that whateYer 
law was in effect as of March 1, 2017, as tr, Idaho Code §. 12· 121 would apJ.>ly t-0 a.U 
cases t"hat had not bi:,c:ome final as of that <late). Under-this standa.rd. the Court Jook.s 
at "whether the fos.ing party'6.i position is so plainly .fallacious as tr, be deemed 
frivolous, \tnreaSQnable$ or without foundation.11 Do~le v. lnterst.ate Amusements. 
l~, 160 Idaho :307, 308--09, 372 P.3d 362, 363~64 (201.6) foitations r.imittC:!d) (internal 
qnota.tfon mark.~ n:tn.itted). 
For purposes of Idaho Code § 12-121, IDOL iij a pa.rty. Plaintiffs cr,mplaint 
initiated a civil actio.n. See Idaho R. Civ .. J.>. 3(h). Plaintiff, as disr;m~sed above, had 
no reasonable ha.sis in law c,-r. fact £61· bringing hi6 claim. H(:! frivolou$ly brought or 
pursued hi--s case a.gain.st IDOL w.ithout foundation and .in the face of the plain 
4 The f.tll text and procedural atatus r,f I·fouse HiU 97, which bec:amEi law on Marcl1 i, 2017, are 
avaiJahle. at h1tr,i'e-://Je§'ji;:lat.;m,.d~,h,}.g'lv'!:;i~e1mic",ni.nfn!201"iilf~.i~l.iH,wt.J.HOIJ.{rii. Hm.tm~ Bill 97 W8.!~ the 
re&uit •»~~.d. 160 IdahC'l 868, 380 P .3i1 f',&l ('JOH;). Ca11e- law prior to -tbe lfafff.".r. decision 
is !Jtill relevant hE~um~, a,~ the. Idaho I..egi$lai.m·e E;:,;:plained, "It is ihe in.tent of the Le-gial!1.ture, by 
enaetn:1ent. of thin legislai.fon, to reiMtaie and. nrnka no d1auge to lduho lsw c,n atwr1l.ey's fef:s s.e it 
t.-xis+..ed hefore the Idaho St.iprew.e C--0\u·t's decieic,n in Hoff.er y. Sham,anl.. .. ,. 2011 See11. l...-aws. Ch. 47. 
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language r.t-fthe ITCA. and well-establiahed law barring his.claim .. For these reasons, 
the State De.fe.nd.1.nts -shtJuld be aw.al'ded reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IDOL was the pre.va..iling party in this litigation. Given Plaintiffs disregard of 
the plain language in the ITCA, J.DOL sef~ks $5,055.00 i•n attorney's foel1, under Idaho 
Code§§ 12;117 nr 12--121. 
DA"fEDthis ·2g dayofSe_ptember, 2017. 
STATE OF ID.AH() 
OFFICE OF THE ATI'OP..Nl<~ GK~~:RAI. 
----·---· 
/]...\ ~- . 
By/ "' ... 
DOUG \\'ER'l1f 
Deputy Attorney Gen.e.ral 
CERTJl.lQA~[E Qf~.R.YJCE 
.I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on tbi.1 2 ~ of Sept.embe1·, 2017, I caus.e<l. to be 
sen-ed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the :following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar St,reet 
WaUa(~, ID sruns 
[] U.S. Mail 
[] Hand Deli.very 
0 Overnight Mail 
~ 1'"'ac:i~irnile: (208) 752--1900 
-· -•-•"" 
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CJJRT 
IN THE DIS~rRICT COUR'I.: OF 'J'HE F'J.R..~T JUDICIAL DIS'rRICT fJii' THE 
STATE Ol~ IDAHO. IN AND "ft'OR THE COUI\T{ OF' BONNgR 
DAI~E JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE Ole"' ID.AHO, DEPAR'll\1.EN'r 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstf.lin, Appeal!-\ 
Bureau Director, Mark ·.Richmond, 
.<\ppeals Hearing Examin4:fr, Jan£it 
Ha:r.dy, Ap11eals Heai-ing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Reco,~cls 
Custodian, a.nd JOHN AND cL-\NF; 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
o:ff'l.cial capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defun.dantR. j 
Ca8e No. CV-1.7-0423 
MEMO.R..i\~"DUM L'J OPPOSITION 
TO M.O'flON TO REGONSIDRR 
This Court properly dismi~d with prt3judi<.."e tbe complaint filed by Plaintiff 
D.alu ,Johnson t'Plaint.Hl'') alleging a daim of negligence against the above-captioned 
def~ndents, inf'Juding the Idaho Dr:,p-art.mfant of Labor ("IDOL"). It is abundantly 
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cl1car tfott Plaintiffs pr.esentatfon of his Notk-e of'ro:rt Claim with the Idahn &cretary 
of St.ate's Office ("JSOS") on .Aur;;1.tst 25, 201H, Mason Dec., ,T 4, was untimely because 
the date of preA<~ntation t.o the:! ISOS was xnor€ than '1r.me hundred t~ighty (180) days 
from tht! da.tt1 the daim al'()SE~ or rnaaouahly should have been discr;ve~d. whicb~ver 
. l " I c· § 6 no-1s a,ter. . _;_ )-.,.-, o, 
Tht! date J.>laiut.iff's claim a:rti~t~ o:r ·.re-aaonably should have been di'iscovered was 
either thr1 d.at.rj of the Industrial Commission's remand o.rder (August 28, 2015) after 
the first AppEmh ·1~xa.m.i'n<::1•'s deci.~.ion, (Ir the date of the secr,ncl Appeul8 Examiner's 
decirsiOll (November 25, 2015). No .lat.e.r than NoVF..!mber 25, 2015, Plaintiff was fully 
aware ()f the alleged negligence and .o.r the full t,xtent of att-<;rm~y fees and othei· 
alleged da.ma~?~ he incurred as a result of tht~ misslng transcript. Thus, Plainti:ff s-
Notit'f-: of Tort Claim wa.s untiinelv aud his suit i8 barred by· <,pei·ation. of the· Idaho 
Tort Claims Act ("ITC.A'.'). 
Plaintiff earlier. attempt.ea. to aw.i"id the ineluet.ahle consequem;tl of his 'belat.f:d 
presentation of daim to the ISOS by ar.gu..ing that two letters or emails sent to third 
parties. a.n<.l not the ISOS, :mfficed as pt-i:J-5sentation to the fSOS. The St..~rmd Aftldavit 
of Lisa Masm:1, the records custodian for !SOS, f..;stahlished the faL1, that neithet· l<:itter 
was actually presented, directly or tbrough a third party, tr, the .ISOS within the 180 
day period of Idaho CodE! § 6·905. 'I'hus, this Court properly rt~lied upon C~.W~J...LJ.~ 
v. New Sweden {Irig~Jir111 ... J).i!}.tri9.t, 16.J. Idaho 80, 388 P.ad 125~1 (2016), in con.eluding 
th.at Plaintiffs ct;mplaiut Wa5 b.ar.l"ed. bt'!Caus1<_. the ISOS did uot rnce.ive eithor l~~ttEn· 
MJ~n-IORA.NDUM. IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION •ro RECONSIDER •· 2 
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within th<;! m-andato.ry ti.me pc:Jriod of Id.a.ho Cod.a § H·~Of:i. 1 
ln his m.otio.n. to .!~!oonsider, Plaintiff fail.a tr, pres1:!r1t any new facts r.1r legal 
a.rgun:mnts calling into question t:his Cr,urts accurf.tt.e l(~gal analysis <,f this citt!ie. The 
motfon. should be denied without hearing. 
First, Plaintiff hus fonvardt?d to the Co-ur.t yet a third letter. which he 
appoJ·e-ntly wrote to Governor Otte.rand the dirt:eto.r of IDOL, and wllich-charitahly 
"·iewed. --.i~ nothing more than an angry rant. This letter does not have the m~ces!\iary 
t~lemenis to mab~ .it a notice o.hort daim, I.C. § 6--907. More important, however. the 
Th.ird n,~cl-aration of Lisa Mason t~stablishes that the I.SOS did :nr,t receive this third 
letter within the 180 day 1imitati(ln. periocl of the ITCA. Thus, this Gr,u:rt's analysis 
with :respe.et to P)a.intiff s two t?adier· k.,tters appli1:is with equal fo!'ce tt, h.i-s third 
letter. 'Plaintiffs presentment was tardy. 
&!co:n.d. Plai.o.t:if.f ~\sw;,r.ts that. hf1 "requiros an oppo.rtlmity to comluat adclit.fo1.1al 
di8C(>Ve1·y in order ts'; determine the ~,xis.telle(! axid handling of th.is [t-hir<lj letter, and 
other documents su.bmitt~d to th~ St-ate.'' Motion for Rt."Co:nsideration, p.2, ,r 2. T.he 
threshold quf:!stion rule.ting to tht; third letter and. a11y othe1· doc:umf::!nt is whether the 
lSOS received any such ]etoor o.r document within the 180 day p:n~sc:5ntment J;e-r.iod, 
Obviously, Plaintiff is in p<;ssr::s~ion of all the information he- needs to. make an. 
avE::rment r..onc~rning a.11 documents he sent to governmer1t ,~mployees and offid:~ls 
1 Thon~ also exists. ,serivus douht &.s t.o w hetl1e1: citl1er Jett.er c.,-ou!d oonstituti~ 1.1. notice c,f ti:.1:t 
claim under the ITC.~. but that i~ue need. nt-1; bE; addressed. be~u.se, in any evt->nt, the lt.tt.ers 
were not. timdy presenttid i.<1 the ISOS. 
MKMORANJ)(JM. IN 0.PPOSfi10N 'I'O MOTION ·ro R~JCONSIDFJR •. a 
Page 124
Id4ho Dept of Labor 10.2017 4:54:17 PM PAGE Fax Server 
since, after. all, hr:, is t:he one whr, WT1uld havi:-j st::nt them.. Mor~ove·.r, what dr;cumenis 
IDOL re1~ivi:,'fl and. when they wt~.re .received iij beside. the point; ·what .ruatters i1' the 
-rfott~ r..:f re<.,-.:.:ipt of any d.ocuments b_s trutISOS. Th1:i Thi.rd Ded-a.ration ,;f Lisa Ma.son. 
a.m;wers th€ t{!lt·want in,4u.iry and i10 am<>unt of d.isf',ovei-y by Plaintiff is going to 
changi:.: that. Sbt? has decla:r.ed uud.e.-r penfilty o:f perjury that the ISOS .1-e-ceive.d no 
such documents with.in th(~ 1·i:;levant time period. That fact is uncon.tr<>W:il'ted. So 
Plainiiff could sh<,w he sent 100 letters to IDOL and. even then; thoS<:, letters wo-uld 
b(.;~ ir:relevaut because none of them found th<::!fr way to th~! I.SOS within t'ht, time fra.me 
r(:<_t uired by th<:, I'l'CA. 
Thi.rd, Plaintfff asserts without. substantia.tion ormecifici,h>". that his damages 
were "ongoing and eon-tinu.ous" and that his negligence claim "did not. acer-u.e until the-
issuan(.-e of the Jr.tduat.rial Cornr.nission·s d~cisio11 which hi-ought the matter to a -close." 
Mot.ion for Recom3.idera.tfon, p,8, 1 4.--. Plaintiff ha.a. dted no mate:rials to support his 
naked dama~R assertion. l.R,C.P. 5t3(c)(3J .. Again, Plaintiff does not- need discovery 
t<..1 dl!t-ermine the f.:xteut of his allegc::d damagt~-s. It i8 undis1>uted that: (l) if a tort 
ocx:urr<:!d, it occurred wb.e.n the Industrial Ct)mm,iijSJ.On remf.mded Plaintiff's -matt.er. 
for ~mbsequent proc.-et~dings before an.App€ais Examiner; {2) all the fa.eta necessary t-o 
argue duty, bn:ach, proximate cause and. damagl~S were km,wn, o-r knowable, t-o 
Plaintiff when ht~ ttled hi:s; second a.p_peal to the Industi·ial Comm.ission.t 
2 The perfod of d-E:lay, fr.c,m which all d:>Jmagf.:S nece~3arily would hav~ had to fk.,~v, was i:he 
J,eri.ocl from th<t date of th1~ Plaintiff fil'st- a.pp(la} and the dat-e of his 2eoond ap_p~al At that 
time, .Plaintiff knew the full -e.xt.ent of his attorney fee:9 mid. <)ther <.,"QSts that 'l.vere in.cur.red 
h0cau.:*; of the delay. 
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f.'our-th, Plaintiff su_ggestij with.out any s1ibstantiatfo:o. or exp!aru.ttfon other 
further da.r.ifi.cation and diseussion with reg-arJ. to preae-ntm.en.t 1.md continuing tort 
issue~ [as} well as. the indusim:1 <>f [~l?.?.~i.fi~gj additional information an.d 
documi=.:nts f.rom the underlyh1g Dnpartrmmt of [.,u.bo.r t1.ml Industrial Cr,mmfosio:n 
1 8 (emphasis adtfod). ..A motfon for re(.-onsiderat:ion mu.st do murt! t.ha.n simply 
suggest that the.r~.., may he additional inform.a.tion that jjcou.Jd prove ir.t$tr11cth,•lL;, You 
<."ould ss.ty that 9.hout ~ny mot,irn for summ_a,ry- judgment. 
H91 294 P.ad 1111 (2012). the Idaho Supreme Court explained and re-uffi.rrot!d its 
prior reasoning in ~Jenkins v. Boi@_ C1A§ta.~J;.9.;r.f!.~.• 141 ld.i:.i.ho 223, 108 P.3d 380 
(2005), as fullows: 
In Jr,nkin~~ tht? plaiutiff requested o.dditional time to .respond to 
a mot.ion for su.mm.a1y judgment because the cuSif: was compfox and tht1re 
were oub~tan<ling mque·sts :for written discovery and depositions. Id. a.t 
238, 108 P.ad at 385. In Ole supporting 1iffidavit, t.he plaintiff's .attorney 
stat.r:!d that "he br~litwed the dfacovery woulrl produce addibonal 
documtmts an.d te~;tin1ony aupport:ing fhe Jenkins' theoricf=!, and. that he 
required the oppm·tunity t.o u.se the responses and tt~stimc.my in 
additional discovery in order to thoroughly respond to summary 
judgmrmt:" ld. This C-ourt held that the dist.rict court: did not abuse its 
discretion. in denying the motio11 bt->ea\tf.:e "the affidavit ... did not specify 
what <li~C"...Qv~ry was nemied'' tv prrJpe-rly respond tr, the summa.1-y 
judgment motfon, .. n.nd did. I1ot .set for.th how the evidence bt• expect.ed to-
gath~r through. furthr:ir discoven-- would be NJ.levant to preclude 
summary judgmtm.t:." Id. at 239, 108 P.-3d at- 386. Similarly, in Tay!Qr v . 
• :\IA .. Sm·v¥,;t~s Cor..vorat.io.n, the district court denif_;d a 11la.intitr.s Rule 
56{f) mol:io.tl. for additional timr:i to conduct discovery. 151 Idaho 552,572, 
261 P.ad 82B, 849 (:2011), The court rul(!d. that the pla.intiff had m()re 
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thtm a y~.!l:ll' to crJnd.uct. di.S(.'O?,,"e.lJ" and that tht! m,,tfon did not set forth 
what relevant: informati:on the pfaintif.fm.!f!di:!d o.rpr~wide a" reasonable 
basis to l,eli.ev€ additional di&."~very will p:roducc,· new or relevant, 
ittfr;rma.tion. not pnwiously c:HsclfJSt~d ... :· Id. This Court affirmed the 
district ctJurt•s decision, noting th-nt the plain.tiff had faiI.E?d. t.o .rn"tJUt ~the 
district col.ui/s finding that hr:: foikd to point to any informatir,n <Ar 
dtK!:umEnt. t:hat may be refr::vax1t to" his opposition to thi~ mob.on for 
summarr judgnu~ nt. ld. 
:fk>.i§fl.M.ml~ • .I-1.l.i.]i .-,uprq.., 154 Idaho at-104--05, 294 P.3d at 1116--17. See.also l.R.C.P. 
56{d) (mquiring a non.movant t.o show "by affidavit 01· declaration that, frit .. ?.P.f.~f.J.fi~d 
reasons. it cannot _pi·~~~nt. facts essrmtiul to justify it8 opposition")(emr,h.a:sis a.dd1:~d;. 
The cases r,f .JenlcinB a.nd Boise,}lod~ l..LC and LR.C.P. 56(d.) all ~.upport de.nial of 
Plaintitf s motion. 
F'olfowin.g the reasr,ning of Jenkins an.d Bois¢ 1\'lo.d~"-J.J...:t.Q, it is respectfully 
submitted that this Cr,urt shou.ld. acknowledge its cl.isc.retfon pursuant ti) l.R.C.P. 
56(d) to allow additional tim~ for a nonmoving party· to take discovery and, fo tht.: 
mmrdse of that discretion, dtmy Pfaintiffs mot.ion to r(K.'Ons.id.er. That rule as a 
threshold matt:er rr::qui.rns a r.tonmova.nt to sh.ow "by affidavit or deda.rat.ion that, fur 
-~P~tJfi~iLf.~~§QP.S., it cannot present .facts es&'!mti.al to justify its opposition." Id. 
(~mphasis added). t,k.o.k.iD.§, lki.i~L.~tr4~i.-.L.l!Q and l.R.C.P. 56(d} aU support denial of 
Plaintiff A- mc_.tfo.n . 
. finally, -Plaintiff in his rnotion for wc011si.de-·ration states fhat he ''believes that. 
the issues c<mcerxtlng pr,ssible spoliation of evidence on the part of the Def<1nd.ants 
warrant further di8cussio.n." MCJtfon for Reoon.side.ration, p.2, 1· 3. Again, .like the 
av-e.rments described a.bo\l"e, this i!S pu:re ,:;uppos.iti,Jn un1suppo.rt..f:.!d by anything of 
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substance. Pla.intiffiF> in the exa.ct same posit.um as the nonmoving party in Jenkins 
who me.rc~]y "believed the discovery would produce :addi.tiomll documents and 
testimony snpJJtJ:tting the Jenkins' the.Orie*, and that ht~ required the <,pportun.ity to 
use the resp(ms.ea and t!ftstimon:y in additional discove.ry in order to thoroughly 
.respond to summary judgm.ent.'1 \Vhat spoliation is Plaint-iffeve.n talking about:? The 
audio recording that we :all know was either n.ev--er <...'3.-eated or r..reated and thel'f!after 
lost- and. th.at forms the basis .fur his negligence claim? 
Tht~ Court\s memorandum decision and order fi;-ranting summary judgment tD 
Defendants is W~!ll-aupported hy l~w and f.a.ct. Plai:u.tiii'h.as not eh(lwn otherwise. His 
surmise and conjecttu-e is inrsuffi<;iei1i to justify a :reoonsidera tion of that decision a.nd 
order. 
Or.al argument is not requested. 
D.AT1'~I} this .• );.-t.,. day r,fCx-.tohei·, 2017. 
STATE OF ID.AHO 
Ol<'FI(;'E OF THE Anoa..·11,rn;y GENEP.-AL 
..............,._. 
Byev"\....,___.....__  . ___ ____,.._~ 
DOUO \VERTH 
Deputy ..Att.omey Genera1 
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IN 'rHE Dl'sTRIC"r COURT OF THE l4"'I.I(ST JUDICIAL DIS'l'RIC'I1 OF T.H.E 
STATE OF IUAHO. IN A..'1D FOR 'fHE COUNYJ.'Y OifBONNE;R 
D.ALE JOHNSON: a11 individual. 
Plaintiff, 
vs.. 
ST .. !\1'E Oic, ID.AHO, JJEPAR~''r 
OF LABOR. Arny .Holmlteir.., Appeals 
Bureau Dime.tor, Mark Richmon~ 
.Appeals .Hearing Examin~r. Janet 
Hardy, • .L\ppeala Hearing Examiner, 
Georgia Smifflt ReOOl'ds C'!J.fttodia.n, 
and (JOHN .A,.1'r.1D JA:.l\lE DOES J .. V in 
thei,: i.wlividual a.nd oflicial capa.citiue 
aa employees of. the State of I dab~ 
De.funda1l1ls. 
l, LlSA MASON. deellll'E as follows: 
Case No. cv:.17-0423 
THI.RD DFJCLARAtl'ION Of' LISA 
MASON 
l.. 1 u1ak.e this declaration based upon my own pentanal knowledge- and am 
2. . I am the Admix1istrator- of Legislative .and Ii.'xeeui:i.ve A.ffi;lin duly 
THIRD DJ.~CLARATION OF LISA MASON·· l 
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appoint.ed by the Idaho Secretar,r of Stat-e and work full-time in the Idaho SElCl'etary 
of StaL'ttis Office i.n Bui~. Idalw. Jn that ca.pa,ri.ty1 nfy du!:it!S iiicluda respo11sib.ilit-y :foe 
«u:nJ)iJ.i:ng and malu.iaining i.hff n1cotlis and filEis of the Beemtary of Siate's Office 
:pe:rta.ining to i.n.form.-alconBt:ituent gri.evance& such.as E:xhihjt_A he~to, noti~,s of tort 
claims that lwve been p:rewnt.ed to the Se<-..l'etary of Stat.e's OffiCE! pur&u:a.n.t t.o the 
Ida~ 1\,rt. Claims Aet,. and aummonaes and complain.ta.presented. to or served ·upon 
the Secretaey of State on behalf of the State rL Idaho and its offi,~a. d.t;par.tm.ents., 
3. On cl!Ul& 16, 2017, Sep.t9mber 1, 2017, and again today I 1'8vie-wEtd the 
files of. the -Secretary of State~ Offke and eearched for any records or d.o¢11ments 
relating to: (a) the Notice of Tort Cla:im tlmt was filed wu:h tl~ Secretary Klf State's 
Off100 on AUl'llKt 25, 2016, by Dale Juhiuwn and hi, at..tr.1rn,ey James McMillan alleging 
negligence on the pa.rt of the State of Ida.ho Fthe Notice of Tort Cla.im1;; (b) the 
lawsuit of Dale tloh,r,,aon "· State of Idaho. Depa.rtmen.t of ldJm-. ~t al.i filed in tho 
FfrstJudit.--ial Dietrictofthe Sta~ of.Tdaho,. Bonner County Case No. CV-17-423 ("the 
Lawsuit .. ); and (c) the letter- dewd December 6, 2015, from Dale Johns<.m mlclros~~d 
to; «state of Idah<,; Pub)fo. 0:ffioerg of Acoountahility But.oh Otter; Gov and Ken 
. Edmunds; Gov Appointe-d. IDOL" which- 1-&tt:er is attached hereto as Ex.hi.bit A 
C'Exhlbit A;. (A copy of the Notice ofi1ort Claim is attaehed w my .initial declaratioD. 
herein.) 
4. The Set.-retmy of Stat-is Ot'fio& did not reccivo any documents relating t.c, 
the N(,-t,:i.ne of Turf: Cla.il~ or have actual or oonstrw..ii;re k.oowlE;dge of any of the eve.nu. 
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d.e.~ribed themin, prior to the prese.n.t.ment of tJ:1e No-tioe r.1f'T!'.>rt Claim to it on August 
whfoh had aitached to-it a copy of a letter d:tite<l Deeen1ber 6, 2015, .fro.m I~le Jo.h.lli!Oh 
.addNiaeed to: ~state &f Idaho; Public Offlee:rs-of .Accountability B-utch Otter; Gov and 
Ken .Edmundu; Gov .Appdinted IOOf/' (".T•~xhibit .A'j. 
5. I have searched the reoord., of the Secretary o! State's Office and prior 
tc; October 4~ 2017, the oftioe. had not :reoeivsd Exhibit-A or any ~PY thereof. in .,-bole 
or in ·part.; and p:rwr to the pr&tie.ntmeo.t tQ the Seetetarv· of Sta.t"E~'I\\ Off.iCE: m:1 Aug\lst 
25, 2016 oithe Notice of1'orl Claim, the Secretar1 of Stat-o's Office had not; reooived 
within. the Notice of Tort Claim. 
6. The first doaument or other reootd c.f any kind received by the Secretary 
of StatE{s Off"ma rE!lo.ting Ut the 6'18nia described in the Notice of Tort Claim was the 
.A~t 25, 2016. 
7. As of October 4,201.7, the Secretary ofS.taoo's Offioa has not been duly 
ssr9'ed with a Complaint and Summons fo i:he .Lawsuit. (Jt any amended notice of tort: 
claim relating thereto. 
8. . 1 declare under penalty of. perjury pun;uant t<> thE laws of the Stute of 
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I HERF.BY CERTIFY th.at on t.lus 5-+t..,_ ()f October. 2017, I-caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the ~regoing by the tbllowing method to: 
James Mc..\fillan 
Attmne1 at. Law 
512 Cedu:r St:n~i: 
Wallace, ID 8.'i873" 
□ U~S.Mail 
8 Hand Deliv.e.ry Overnight Mail 
































DOUG WERTH - ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
doug.werth@labor.idaho.gov 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner, 
Georgia Smith, Records Custodian, 
and JOHN AND JANE DOES I-Vin 
their individual and official capacities 
as employees of the State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
I, LISA MASON, declare as follows: 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
THIRD DECLARATION OF LISA 
MASON 
1. I make this declaration based upon my own personal knowledge and am 
competent to testify to the matters herein. 
2. I am the Administrator of Legislative and Executive Affairs duly 
THIRD DECLARATION OF LISA MASON - 1 
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appointed by the Idaho Secretary of State and work full-time in the Idaho Secretary 
of State's Office in Boise, Idaho. In that capacity, my duties include responsibility for 
compiling and maintaining the records and files of the Secretary of State's Office 
pertaining to informal constituent grievances such as Exhibit A hereto, notices of tort 
claims that have been presented to the Secretary of State's Office pursuant to the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act, and summonses and complaints.presented to or served upon 
the Secretary of State on behalf of the State of Idaho and its offices, departments, 
agencies, officers and employees, pursuant to LC.§§ 6-905 and 6-916. 
3. On June 16, 2017, September 1, 2017, and again today I reviewed the 
files of the Secretary of State's Office and searched for any records or documents 
relating to: (a) the Notice of Tort Claim that was filed with the Secretary of State's 
Office on August 25, 2016, by Dale Johnson and his attorney James McMillan alleging 
negligence on the part of the State of Idaho ("the Notice of Tort Claim''); (b) the 
lawsuit of Dale Johnson v. State of Idaho, Department of Labor, et al., filed in the 
First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, Bonner County Case No. CV-17-423 ("the 
Lawsuit''); and (c) the letter dated December 6, 2015, from Dale Johnson addressed 
to: "State of Idaho; Public Officers of Accountability Butch Otter; Gov and Ken 
Edmunds; Gov Appointed IDOL" which letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
("Exhibit A"). (A copy of the Notice of Tort Claim is attached to my initial declaration 
herein.) 
4. The Secretary of State's Office did not receive any documents relating to 
the Notice of Tort Claim, or have actual or constructive knowledge of any of the events 
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described therein, prior to the presentment of the Notice of Tort Claim to it on August 
25, 2016. On October 4, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth forwarded to 
me a copy of the [Second] Declaration of Dale Johnson dated September 28, 2017, 
which had attached to it a copy of a letter dated December 6, 2015, from Dale Johnson 
addressed to: "State of Idaho; Public Officers of Accountability Butch Otter; Gov and 
Ken Edmunds; Gov Appointed IDOL" (''Exhibit A''). 
5. I have searched the records of the Secretary of State's Office and prior 
to October 4, 2017, the office had not received Exhibit A or any copy thereof, in whole 
or in part; and prior to the presentment to the Secretary of State's Office on August 
25, 2016 of the Notice of Tort Claim, the Secretary of State's Office had not received 
any letter or documentation of any kind relating to, or describing any of the events 
within, the Notice of Tort Claim. 
6. The first document or other record of any kind received by the Secretary 
of State's Office relating to the events described in the Notice of Tort Claim was the 
Notice of Tort Claim itself, which was received by the Secretary of State's Office on 
August 25, 2016. 
7. As of October 4, 2017, the Secretary of State's Office has not been duly 
served with a Complaint and Summons in the Lawsuit, or any amended notice of tort 
claim relating thereto. 
8. I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Idaho, including LC.§ 9-1406(1), that the foregoing is true and correct. 





Li#t EXECUTED this _'I.__.___ day of October, 2017. 
~~W?fUMn/ 
~ON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5-IA. of October, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
□ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
□ Overnight Mail 
i)gFacsimile: (208) 752-1900 
DOUG WERTH 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DOUG WERTH - ISB# 3660 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 
doug. werth@labor.idaho.gov 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
This Court properly dismissed with prejudice the complaint filed by Plaintiff 
Dale Johnson ("Plaintiff') alleging a claim of negligence against the above-captioned 
defendents, including the Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL"). It is abundantly 
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clear that Plaintiffs presentation of his Notice of Tort Claim with the Idaho Secretary 
of State's Office ("ISOS") on August 25, 2016, Mason Dec.,, 4, was untimely because 
the date of presentation to the ISOS was more than "one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever 
is later." I.C. § 6-905. 
The date Plaintiffs claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered was 
either the date of the Industrial Commission's remand order (August 28, 2015) after 
the first Appeals Examiner's decision, or the date of the second Appeals Examiner's 
decision (November 25, 2015). No later than November 25, 2015, Plaintiff was fully 
aware of the alleged negligence and of the full extent of attorney fees and other 
alleged damages he incurred as a result of the missing transcript. Thus, Plaintiffs 
Notice of Tort Claim was untimely and his suit is barred by operation of the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act ("ITCA''). 
Plaintiff earlier attempted to avoid the ineluctable consequence of his belated 
presentation of claim to the ISOS by arguing that two letters or emails sent to third 
parties, and not the ISOS, sufficed as presentation to the ISOS. The Second Affidavit 
of Lisa Mason, the records custodian for ISOS, established the fact that neither letter 
was actually presented, directly or through a third party, to the ISOS within the 180 
day period of Idaho Code § 6-905. Thus, this Court properly relied upon CNW. LLC 
v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 Idaho 89, 383 P.3d 1259 (2016), in concluding 
that Plaintiffs complaint was barred because the ISOS did not receive either letter 
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within the mandatory time period of Idaho Code § 6-905.1 
In his motion to reconsider, Plaintiff fails to present any new facts or legal 
arguments calling into question this Court's accurate legal analysis of this case. The 
motion should be denied without hearing. 
First, Plaintiff has forwarded to the Court yet a third letter, which he 
apparently wrote to Governor Otter and the director of IDOL, and which - charitably 
viewed - is nothing more than an angry rant. This letter does not have the necessary 
elements to make it a notice of tort claim, LC.§ 6-907. More important, however, the 
Third Declaration of Lisa Mason establishes that the ISOS did not receive this third 
letter within the 180 day limitation period of the ITCA. Thus, this Court's analysis 
with respect to Plaintiffs two earlier letters applies with equal force to his third 
letter. Plaintiffs presentment was tardy. 
Second, Plaintiff asserts that he "requires an opportunity to conduct additional 
discovery in order to determine the existence and handling of this [third] letter, and 
other documents submitted to the State." Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, 1 2. The 
threshold question relating to the third letter and any other document is whether the 
ISOS received any such letter or document within the 180 day presentment period. 
Obviously, Plaintiff is in possession of all the information he needs to make an 
averment concerning all documents he sent to government employees and officials 
1 There also exists serious doubt as to whether either letter could constitute a notice of tort 
claim under the ITCA, but that issue need not be addressed because, in any event, the letters 
were not timely presented to the ISOS. 
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since, after all, he is the one who would have sent them. Moreover, what documents 
IDOL received and when they were received is beside the point; what matters is the 
date of receipt of any documents by the ISOS. The Third Declaration of Lisa Mason 
answers the relevant inquiry and no amount of discovery by Plaintiff is going to 
change that. She has declared under penalty of perjury that the ISOS received no 
such documents within the relevant time period. That fact is uncontroverted. So 
Plaintiff could show he sent 100 letters to IDOL and, even then, those letters would 
be irrelevant because none of them found their way to the ISOS within the time frame 
required by the ITCA. 
Third, Plaintiff asserts without substantiation or specificity that his damages 
were "ongoing and continuous" and that his negligence claim "did not accrue until the 
issuance of the Industrial Commission's decision which brought the matter to a close." 
Motion for Reconsideration, p.3, ~ 4. Plaintiff has cited no materials to support his 
naked damages assertion. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). Again, Plaintiff does not need discovery 
to determine the extent of his alleged damages. It is undisputed that: (1) if a tort 
occurred, it occurred when the Industrial Commission remanded Plaintiff's matter 
for subsequent proceedings before an Appeals Examiner; (2) all the facts necessary to 
argue duty, breach, proximate cause and damages were known, or knowable, to 
Plaintiff when he filed his second appeal to the Industrial Commission.2 
2 The period of delay, from which all damages necessarily would have had to flow, was the 
period from the date of the Plaintiff first appeal and the date of his second appeal. At that 
time, Plaintiff knew the full extent of his attorney fees and other costs that were incurred 
because of the delay. 
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Fourth, Plaintiff suggests without any substantiation or explanation other 
than a nebulous suggestion of possible spoliation, discussed below, that he "believes 
further clarification and discussion with regard to presentment and continuing tort 
issues, [as] well as the inclusion of [unspecified] additional information and 
documents from the underlying Department of Labor and Industrial Commission 
cases, could prove instructive to the Court herein." Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, 
,r 3 (emphasis added). A motion for reconsideration must do more than simply 
suggest that there may be additional information that "could prove instructive." You 
could say that about any motion for summary judgment. 
In the case of Boise Mode. LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 
99, 294 P.3d 1111 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court explained and re-affirmed its 
prior reasoning in Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 223, 108 P.3d 380 
(2005), as follows: 
In Jenkins. the plaintiff requested additional time to respond to 
a motion for summary judgment because the case was complex and there 
were outstanding requests for written discovery and depositions. Id. at 
238, 108 P.3d at 385. In the supporting affidavit, the plaintiff's attorney 
stated that "he believed the discovery would produce additional 
documents and testimony supporting the Jenkins' theories, and that he 
required the opportunity to use the responses and testimony in 
additional discovery in order to thoroughly respond to summary 
judgment." Id. This Court held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion because "the affidavit ... did not specify 
what discovery was needed" to properly respond to the summary 
judgment motion, "and did not set forth how the evidence he expected to 
gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude 
summary judgment." Id. at 239, 108 P.3d at 386. Similarly, in Taylor v. 
AIA Services Corporation. the district court denied a plaintiff's Rule 
56(f) motion for additional time to conduct discovery. 151 Idaho 552, 572. 
261 P.3d 829, 849 (2011). The court ruled that the plaintiff had more 
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than a year to conduct discovery and that the motion did not set forth 
what relevant information the plaintiff needed or provide a" reasonable 
basis to believe additional discovery will produce new or relevant 
information not previously disclosed .... " Id. This Court affirmed the 
district court's decision, noting that the plaintiff had failed to rebut "the 
district court's finding that he failed to point to any information or 
document that may be relevant to" his opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment. Id. 
Boise Mode, LLC, supra, 154 Idaho at 104-05, 294 P.3d at 1116-17. See also I.R.C.P. 
56(d) (requiring a nonmovant to show "by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition")(emphasis added). 
The cases of Jenkins and Boise Mode. LLC and I.R.C.P. 56(d) all support denial of 
Plaintiffs motion. 
Following the reasoning of Jenkins and Boise Mode. LLC, it is respectfully 
submitted that this Court should acknowledge its discretion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
56(d) to allow additional time for a nonmoving party to take discovery and, in the 
exercise of that discretion, deny Plaintiffs motion to reconsider. That rule as a 
threshold matter requires a nonmovant to show "by affidavit or declaration that, for 
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." Id. 
(emphasis added). Jenkins, Boise Mode, LLC and I.R.C.P. 56(d) all support denial of 
Plaintiffs motion. 
Finally, Plaintiff in his motion for reconsideration states that he "believes that 
the issues concerning possible spoliation of evidence on the part of the Defendants 
warrant further discussion." Motion for Reconsideration, p.2, 1 3. Again, like the 
averments described above, this is pure supposition unsupported by anything of 
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substance. Plaintiff is in the exact same position as the nonmoving party in Jenkins 
who merely "believed the discovery would produce additional documents and 
testimony supporting the Jenkins' theories, and that he required the opportunity to 
use the responses and testimony in additional discovery in order to thoroughly 
respond to summary judgment." What spoliation is Plaintiff even talking about? The 
audio recording that we all know was either never created or created and thereafter 
lost and that forms the basis for his negligence claim? 
The Court's memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment to 
Defendants is well-supported by law and fact. Plaintiff has not shown otherwise. His 
surmise and conjecture is insufficient to justify a reconsideration of that decision and 
order. 
Oral argument is not requested. 
DATEDthis SK dayofOctober, 2017. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By~------
DOUGWERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this >~f October, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
□ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
~ Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
DOUG WERTH 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 8 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
-
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752~1900 
!SB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
OBJECTION TO MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM FOR FEES 
AND COSTS 
14)001 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and through his counsel of 
rE;icord, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits his 
Objection to the Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs and Memorandum of Fees
 
OBJEC'fION TO MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 1 
z:\Cllaoll\l,i,...., ~-• "'M<nlGn Bir,_..., C-,(2017 IO 11-li1,1c1,o1o< 
Page 146
10/1,2/2017 15: 13 FAX 208 752 1900 - Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law - 141002 
and Costs as follows: 
1. Plaintiff did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law, 
and this 
action was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundat
ion. Plaintiff, 
in good faith, raised legitimate issues as to when his cause of action 
accrued and/or 
was discovered, the continuing tort issue, as well as the presentm
ent issue, and 
Plaintiff's theories were supported by citation to the applicable sta
tutes and case 
law. A simple failure to prevail on said claims is not sufficient g
rounds for an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs; 
2. Defendants' counsel states that the hourly rate being cla
imed is 
determined via a 
1'complicated formula." Declaration of Doug Werth, ,r 11. 
However, counsel fails to set forth, disclose, or otherwise explain sai
d "formula" to 
Plaintiff's counsel or the Court, rendering it impossible to determin
e or verify the 
costs actually incurred as a result of this litigation; and 
3. The amount of time claimed for each task on Def
endant's 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs is unreasonable and exorbitant, esp
ecially in light 
of counsel's claimed experience in legal practice and Defendants' c
laims that the 
legal issues in this matter are clear and well settled. Defendants a
lso claim time 
expended in preparing their Motion for Change of Venue, upon which
 this Court did 
not rule and, therefore, upon which they did not prevail. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Moti
on and 
Memorandum for Fees and Costs should be DENIED. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
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DATED this 12th day of October, 2017. 
JAMES McMILLAN! 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 12th day of October, 2017, I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
At!torney for Defendants 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
__x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
?/mes McMillan 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 4 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVrl7-0423 
DECLARATION OF ROSE 
JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL 
DISCOVERY 
'41001 
I, ROSE JOHNSON, am spouse of the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 18, 
competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and have personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth herein: 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an electronic 
mail exchange between myself and Sarah Hughes, from the Governor's Office, dated 
DECLARATION OF ROSE JOHNSON -1 
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Octobel' 5 and 6 of 2017 respectively. In said ex.change, Ms. Hugues states that 
another state employee by the name of Nick Stout had stated as far back as 
January of 2016 that the issues raised in this ca.se were "going to be litigated."; 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a letter I received from a Samuel 
Eaton, who identifies himself as "counsel to the Governor.'' Mr. Ea.ton further 
attaches notes from Mr. Stout which indicate that this matte:,: was going to be 
litigated. Also, Mr. Eaton declines to answer questions regarding the handling of 
documents and complaints; as such, said questions will have to be propounded as 
Interrogatories in order to require answers to the same; 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of an electronic 
:mail exchange which took place between Ms. Hugues and myself on or about 
October 10, 2017. In said exchange, Ms. Hugues offers limited responses to a 
number of questions, and; again, said answers will need to be obtained through 
additional Discovery; and 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a letter I 
received from a Darlene Carnopis on or about October 11, 2017. In said letter, 
again, Ms. Caropis declines to answer specific questions that bear directly upon this 
case. 
5. I personally spoke with form.er AG Craig Bledsoe in 2015 about what 
appeared to be negligence within Amy Hohnstein's appeals department. I was 
falsely assured that the concerns would be adcb:essed. 
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6. Further, I personally spoke with kn.y Hohnstein in 2015 regarding the 
hearing of August 5, 2015 and specifically that she needed to listen to the audio due 
to the Decision of Mark Richmond did not match up at all with the hearing record 
(the audio of the hearing). 
Ms. Hohnstein said she would personally review the hearing. Later when I 
spoke with her about her findings, Ms. Hohnstein refused to say if she had listened 
to the audio; she only insisted appeal to the IIC if there was disagreement with Mr. 
Richmond's Decision. My husband told me he believ-ed the audio was destroyed or 
would in some manner not be available; he was right, as when we requested a copy, 
none was found. 
7. The question must be asked: Why did Ms. Hohnstein deny knowing 
there was no audio? 
8. Furlher, how did Mark Richmond write a Decision that he claimed was 
based on review of the hearing when there was no record to review? These are only 
two of many questions requiring answers. 
Further your declarant sayeth naught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjucy, pursuant to the law of the State 
ofldaho~ that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2017. 
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{;ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of October1 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defenda.nts 
DECLARATION OF ROSE JOHNSON -4 =-'"""--1u..:i.11 .. 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivel'ed 
___JL Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
141004 
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Good Afternoon Rose, 
I received your email and just got your telephone message. After doing some rese
arch and conducting 
a search of our archives I was able to find your correspondence, which was re
ceived and saved in our 
system. When the letter was received it was initially read by the special assistant 
responsible for the 
particular agencies that you referenced. our notes indicate that Nick Stout followed up
 with you in 
January of 2016 and that ultimately he wasn't able to address the issue any furthe
r because it was 
going to be litigated 
Let me know if you have any questions. 
From: daleandrosej [mailto:daleandrosej@yahoo.com] 
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2017 12:39 PM 
To: Sarah Hugues 
Subject: Record Request - Chain of Command and Document Handling 
To: Sarah.hugues@gov.idaho . 99v (records) 
Office of the Idaho Governor; 
This is an Idaho Chain of Command and Document Handling Records Req
uest 
On or about December 6, 2015, your office was sent the attached docume
nt. It was 
confirmed received. 
As there was no response, this is to identify what happened within your off
ice to that 
document. 
Please provide the complete chain of command. Who saw and who read th
e document? To 
who was it forwarded to for a response or comment, and when was this do
ne? And, why w:as 
there no response? 
Who in your office is responsible to assure Idaho tax dollars are not wasted?
 
A timely phone call or email will be expected to verify your office receiving 
this records and 
information request. 
20~83-0821 
Thank you, and God bless those who do right. 
Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
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Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, Idaho 83801 
-
RE: Publie Record Response 
Ms. Johnson, 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law 
C. L. UBUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
October 61 2017 
141 O 06 -
The Governor's Office herewith provides its response to your Idaho Public Records Act
 request, 
which was originally received and responded to October 5, 2017. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
After reviewing your request and conducting due diligence, I've attached copies 
of public 
records that are respoasive: 
1. Notes by Special Assistant's: Attached are the notes taken after receiving corresponde
nce 
from Dale Johnson dated December 2015. These notes indicate that Nick Stout (spec
ial 
assistant) followed up i,n Jamiary 0f2016 and ultimately wasn't able to address the issu
e due 
to litigation which he e~pJained to you on January 11
th 2016. 
2. Investigation: We have no records that are responsive to your request for an ''investigat
ion$'. 
3. Chain of Command: There are no records responsive to this request. We do not have a
ny 
records that outline a chain of command for constituent services, j'document han
dling 
procedures", nor anything indicating who "saw" and "read" a particular docwnent othe
r than 
Nick Stout, indicated above. 
4 • .Actions, Electronic Communicatiom, Telephone Calls Taken or Directed Taken: We
 do 
not have any records responsive to this request. 
5. Records: A public records request must meet the following definition under Idaho Code: 
"any writing containing information relating to the conduct or administration of the pu
blic's 
business prepared.. owned, used ar rel&ined. by any state agency ... " 74-101(13). Gene
ral 
requests such as: "Who in your office is responsible to assure Idaho tax dollars are not 
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it?" and "Who saw the document?•' are not requests for recorded writings that have been 
prepared, owned or retained. There is no way of knowing who "saw'; the coITespondence in 
December of 2015. 
6. No Response: As indicated above, our records show that you did receive a response. Nick 
Stoot made contact in January of 2016 to resolve the issue. His notes indicate (see attaehed) 
that there was litigation which prevented the Governor and this office from addressing the 
matter; which he explained to you at that time. 




Counsel to the Governor 
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Constiwcnt Snapshot -
CONTACT INPORMATION 
D•lfl and itose lommon (58750) 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, ID 83801·8300 
NOTES 
C~d 02/15/2016 by NStout 
Modlflod 02/15/2016 by NStout 
Case Is tn lltlgatlon. WHI dose. 
ere.tad 01/11/2016 by NStout 
-
Mindy Montgomery clarlfted the IDOL connection for us. Called Rose back and explalned to her the 
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Rose, 
I received your email correspondence and will try to answer your questions in tum. 
Who made the decision to forward the inquiry to Nick Stout? As that was in 2015 I am not able to tell 
you who made that decision because I do not know, however it likely went to him because he was 
assigned to address the particular agency you had grievances with at that time. For further Clarification, 
Nick Stout is now at the Industrial CommisSion, however he was a special assistant to the Governor, 
working in this office and not for that agency when your letter was received. We do not have any 
records responsive to the question as to ''who made the decision to foiward an inquiry to Nick: 
Second, I have no information about the implications or specifics of what kind of litigation was 
referenced during your conversation with Nick Stout. The Govemor does not process or forward 
complaint letters to the Secretary of State as tort claims. Your correspondence was never sent to the 
Industrial Commission, Nick is now at the Commission but at that time he was here at the Governor's 
office. 
In reference to your questions about the accountability of Kenneth Edmunds I would ask that you note 
this office's press release dated August 8, 2017 noting that he no longer works at IDOL. 
In reference to your question about who monitors tax dollars, that is a loaded question that implicates 
any number of state employees and does not rest on the head of a single entity. I cannot answer that 
question nor is it a record. This applies to "who made the decision to not require accountability and 
answers from Kenneth Edmunds' office?" as well. What Nick and the Governor considered at that time 
is both outside the scope of a records request and not within my knowledge. However, rest assured 
that your complaint was taken into consideration and appreciated by this office. 
I hope this answers your questions, 
Sarah A. Hugues 
Special Assistant 
Office of Governor C.L. "Butchff Otter 
(208) 334-2100 
Sarah.Hugues@gov.idaho.gov 
~---•---'"~•~-""••~•••~,.,e .. , ..... _ .. , ............ _. __ , ..... _ •••••· ....... ,.,·•·-···--····-·-........ _ .............. , .............. , .. - .. -.... ----
From: Dale and Rose Johnson [mailto:daleandrosej@yahoo.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2017 2:40 PM 
To: Sarah Hugues 
Subject: Idaho Chain of Command and Proper Document Handling - Records Request 
October 10, 2017 
To: Sarah.hugues@gov.idaho.gov (records and information specialist) EXH1B17r 
I C 
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Office of the Idaho Governor Butch Otter; 
This response is to be officially added of the Idaho Chain of Command and Document 
Handling Records Request below referenced. 
Sarah, 
This is follow up of our conversation. Please confirm receiving. 
141011 
Thank you for your reply of 10/6/2017. However, given the initial (December, 2015) 
correspondence at issue was directed to the governor and the (former) IDOL director Ken 
Edmunds, I need to know who made the decision to forward an inquiry to Nick Stout (at the 
IIC). 
Further, if litigation was expected, why was the December, 2015, correspondence of 
warning, forwarded (improperly) to Nick Stout instead of to the Secretary of State for 
processing as a Tort Claim'? Not only are the IDOL and the IIC two (2) separate agencies, but 
the responsibility of the Governor is to avoid added costs or tort actions of agency neglect, 
etc., not to increase potential damages. 
Also, the communication I had with the IIC was not on this issuej but was on separate agency 
roles and responsibility. 
Your nesponse: " .. .initially read by the special assistant responsible for the particular agencies that you 
referenced." and also, "Our notes Indicate that Nick Stout followed up with you in January of 2016 and that 
ultimately he wasn't able to address the issue any further because it was going to be litigated," 
Who made the decision to not require accountability answers from Kenneth Edmunds' office? 
For the record, there was no litigation at that time, and it was hoped litigation would not be 
necessary - and that honest errors could and would be promptly and fairly addressed. That 
obviously did not happen. 
And again, who in the governor's office is responsible to monitor and assure Idaho tax dollars 
are not wasted by the agency directors or other governor-appointed heads? 
I will appreciate hearing back promptly from you in hope to conclude this matter as it relates to 
the Governor's office involvement. 
If more than 3 days are needed to provide this complete information, please notify me • 
telephone is most expedient, 208-683-0821. 
Thank you, and God bless those who do right. 
Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
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JQ\HO 
DEPA~TM£NT OF LABOR 
C.L. "Bure,.( OTTEA, GOYlil~b 
!>Aul J. SPAW4KNQICL, iN'l"ntM D111&c·ro11 
October 11, 20 I 7 
Rose Jehnson 
99 Northem Sky Road 
Athol, ld~ho 8380 I 
Dear Mrs. Johnson, 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
EXAMINATION/COPYING OF AGENCY RECORDS 
This letter is in response to your emai I dated Thursday, October 5. 2017, which you described as an 
"14aho chain of Command and Document Handling - Public Records Request'." Your ematl requested 
.. the complete chain of command.,. and appears to request answers to the fol lowing questions: 
• Who saw al1d who read the document sent December 6, 2015? 
• To whom was it forwarded for response ot oomment, and when'? 
• Why was there no response? 
• Who in you.r office is respons-ibte to assure Idaho tax dollars are not wasted? 
The(lepartment has constilted with an attorney as outl.ined in Idaho Code§ 74 .. 103-(4). 
In response to your req11est for the chain of command. ptease find altached a copy of the Idaho 
Department of Labar's organizational charts closest to the t1me.frame you requested. 
With respect to the remainder o.f your request, you appear to be requesting answers to certain questions 
instead of records maintained by the Departmen1.. As such. we would need additional infonnation from 
you in order to know what records you are seeking. ff you could reframe your questions into a request 
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Right to Appeal: You halr'c 180 days from the date of tlte date of certificate of rnail'ing of this 
letter tn which LO appeal this dectsion. Pursuant to Jdaho Code § 74- I l 5( I ), you have the right to tile a 
petition in the district court of the county where the records. or some part of them. a,e focated. 
requesting the court to compel disclosure onhe records. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I her-eby certify that the <.wig-inal of this letter was sent via email to daleandrosej@yahoo.com on this 
) Ith day of October. 20:17. 
Page 162
10/2p/2017 16:00 FAX 208 752 1900 
. . - Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law -
JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752~1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
Dale Johnson, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
141001 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Dale Johnson, by and through his counsel of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Additional 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O.F 
MOTION FOR RECONSlDERA TION - I 
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Discovery, and argues as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Factual and Procedural History. 
On or about August 5. 2015, the Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Bureau 
held a hearing on Plaintiff's appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits, 
subsequently issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff recognized the 
decision of Mark Richmond was grossly contrary to the facts presented at the 
hearing, and his supervisor, Amy Hohnstein (Appeals Director) was contacted. 
Ms. Hohnstein informed Rose Johnson that she would personally review the 
audio of the hearing of August 5, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Hohnstein refused to 
acknowledge whether or not she listened to the audio or not, and directed Plaintiff 
to Appeal if he was not satisfied with the decision. At no time was Plaintiff 
imormed by Ms. Hohnstein that the audio file record was missing. 
Plaintiff then requested a copy of the hearing and was informed via IDOL 
records, Georgia Smith, that it was missing and she apologized for the problem. 
Plaintiff's attempt to appeal the decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission 
was remanded, due to the recording of the hearing being missing and no transcript 
being available from the Idaho Department of Labor. 
Plaintiff's wife, Rose Johnson, had transcribed the hearing and offered the 
recording and transcript to Department of Labor officials who rejected it, stating 
that it was not "official" as it was not from the IDOL. 
After remand, another hearing was held on or about October 22, 2015, which 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSJ.DERA TION - 2 
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was conducted more or less in the nature of a status conference, and subpoenas for 
Plaintiff's witnesses, but not for the production of documents, were granted. The 
fun hearing was then held on November 12, 2015. However, despite being 
subpoenaed, one witness who was then a current employee of Plaintiff's employer 
appeared to have given an incorrect telephone number, and Paul Norton, an officer 
of Plaint:ifrs employer failed to appear. Plaintiff was informed at the hearing that 
Mr. Norton had previously informed the Department of his unavailability, which 
was not passed on to Plaintiff or bis counsel when said communication occurred. 
After the conclusion of the hearing the decision from the Department of 
Labor was ultimately issued, and was, again, not in Plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff 
appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, and, ultimately, the Industrial 
Commission found in his favor in a decision issued on or about April 29, 2016. Both 
the employer (who, up until that point, had not participated in any of the 
proceedings below) and the Department then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 
which was denied on or about September 26, 2016. 
During this time, Plaintiff sent various written communications to a broad 
variety of State officialst including the Governor's O:ffice 1 the Attorney General's 
Office, and the Director of the Department of Labor. In response to this 
correspondence; an employee of the Governor's Office by the name of Nick Stout 
noted as early as January of 2016 that this matter was likely to be litigated. 
Ikclaration of Rose Johnson, Exhibits A and B. It is unknown where, or to whom, 
in State Government this corre,,pondence was directed. The State has, thus far, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR R.ECONSIDERA TION - 3 
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declined to respond to specific questions posed regarding this issue. Declaration of 
Rose Johnson, passim. As such, Plaintiff's only recourse is the ability to propound 
discovery in order to require the answers to these questions. 
In the interim, after receiving the initial favorable decision from the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, but prior to receiving a decision on the Motions for 
Reconsideration, Plaintiffs counsel sent a formal Notice of Tort Claim to the 
Secretary of State's Office. In response, Counsel received a letter from the State's 
insurer, which entirely failed to address the issues raised, and failed to dispute the 
timeliness of the claim. Affidavit of James McMillan, Exhibit C. Plaintiff then 
W!timately filed the instant case, which Defendants moved to dismiss, which was 
ultimately granted by this court. In doing so, this Court held that Plaintiffs cause 
of action accrued on the date of the second hearing, and that the prior 
correspondence was not properly presented to the Secretary of State. See 
Memorandum Decision on file herein. For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, this 
Court should RECONSIDER its grant of its Motion to Dismiss, or at the very least 
VACATE its decision and allow for ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY in order to 
determine whether or not Mr. Johnson's prior correspondence may have been 
properly "presented" in order to satisfy the requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act. 
Standard of Review. 
"A. motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court 
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than 
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fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. ll(a)(2)(B). 
"When considering a motion for reconsideration under Rule l l(a)(2), the district 
court should take into account any new facts, law, or information presented by the 
moving party that bear on the correctness of the district court1s interlocutory oder. 
However, new evidence is not required and the moving party can re-argue the same 
issues in addition to new arguments." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 
808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.8d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the 
case law in applying Rule ll(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when 
a motion is brought under that rule, but does not require that the motion be 
accompanied by new evidence."). 
In its Memorandum Decision, this Court applied a Summary Judgment 
standard. Memorandum Decision, on file herein. In ruling upon Summary 
Ju.dgment, the Court must consider whether or not ,cthe pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is ... [a] 
genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Defendants are "entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards 
applicable to summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe 
facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party. and to draw all 
reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's 
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function to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial. There is [an] issue for trial [ifJ there is sufficient evidence favoring the non.-
moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 
409, 410, 797 P .2d 117, 118 (1990) (emphasis added, internal quotations and 
citations removed). The First Circuit, construing the Federal rule upon which the 
Idaho rule is modeled, furthel' explained the term "genuine" as being ''sufficiently 
open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor either side." 
National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1995). In the 
same case, it further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the 
outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Id. Further, "a motion for 
summary judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting 
inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different 
conclusions.', Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 
6$7, 661 (1982). For the reasons set forth herein.below, this Court should 
RECONSIDER its decisions granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss and either 
ALLOW FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil, or 
outright DENY Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs hereby re-assert their arguments made in briefing and at oral 
argument upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and urge this Court to consider the 
same in ruling upon this Motion. The remainder of this Memorandum will focus 
upon addressing portions of the findings and conclusions set forth by the Court in 
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its Memorandum Decision Granting Motion to Dismiss for which further argument 
may be instructive to the Court. 
1. Accrual of Plaintiff" s Cause of Action for Negligence. 
Initially, this Court held that Plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of 
the second Appeals Bureau decision (November 25, 2016) and, therefore, began the 
one-hundred-eighty (180) day period on that date. Memorandum Decision at 15. 
However, said decision was not favorable to Plaintiff. Therefore, while attorneys• 
fees from the second hearing could have been determined at that point, the 
significant additional financial damages resulting from the delay in the payment of 
benefits could not have been determined at that point, as it had not yet been 
determined that Mr. Johnson was going to be entitled to benefits. Said damages 
include, but are not limited to, incurring significant debt and interest charges in 
order to meet his ordinary living expenses. Moreover, since, at the time of the 
second unfavorable decision, the only damages which Mr. Johnson could determine 
with any degree of certainty were attorneys' fees and costs, the law is somewhat 
unclear as to whether Mr. Johnson, as a then.non-prevailing party, would have 
been entitled to bring a cause of action solely for attorneys' fees as damages. It was 
not until he received the Industrial Commission's decision on or about April 29, 
2016, that Mr. Johnson discovered that he suffered damages in the form of a delay 
in payment of benefits. Declaration of Dale Johnson,, 2. 
Unlike in the case of an intentional tort, a cause of action for negligence does 
not accrue until the Plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct and proximate 
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result of said negligence. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 
P.2d 41, 46 (1984) ("it is axiomatic that in order to recover under a theory of 
negligence, the plaintiff must prove actual damage."). Until the favorable 
Industrial Com.mission decision of April 29, 2016, Plaintiff had no way of knowing 
it: in fact, he would be entitled to damages as a result of the delay in the grant of 
benefits, let alone the extent of said damages. The Idaho Court of Appeals has also 
held that "a claimant 'discovers' his claim against the governmental entity only 
when he becomes fully apprised of the injury or damage and of the governmental 
entity's role. The question of when the claimant should have discovered the 
governmental entity's role is a question of material fact which, if genuinely 
disputed, is inappropriate for determination on Summary Judgment." Carman v. 
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553, 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988). Laying aside, for a 
moment. the fact that, even at this point, absent further di~covery, the full extent of 
the governmental entity's role is unclear, Mr. Johnson did not and could not have 
become fully apprised of the injury or damage until the issuance of the favorable 
Industrial Commission decision at the earliest. Therefore, this Court should 
reconsider its determination that Plaintiffs cause of action accrued at the time of 
the unfavorable Department of Labor decision in November of 2015. 
While there are instances in which the Idaho Appellate Courts have held that 
the cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence, such as Ralphs v. City of 
Spirit Lake 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) and Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 
126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162 (Ct. App. 1994), these cases may be distinguished on 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 8 
2:W:li<oll\Johllllm Rmo\111-• (MIHlan 1111' RDoolllMlonlio,v (Lll..i) C2D17 10 2.!•.JMo).doo 
Page 170
10/~5/2017 16:02 FAX 208 752 li Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law - ~009 
the basis that they involved personal injuries in which the nature of the injury was, 
to a great extent, clear at the time of the incident, or shortly thereafter. The 
Plaintiff in Ralphs was clearly aware that he had been attacked and injured at the 
time of the occurrence, and the Plaintiff in Mallory was clearly aware that she had 
fallen and injured herself at the time of the occurrence, and could have filed 
immediately. In this case, however, Mr. Johnson could not have filed a claim 
.seeking damages for the delay in payment of his unemployment benefits either 
immediately upon discovering the loss of the recording, nor upon the issuance of the 
second unfavorable decision, as he did not know that there would ever be any 
benefits paid until the Industrial Commission made that determination. 
This case is more akin to the situation in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 3981 630 
P.2d 685 (1981). The ongoing nature of the proceedings are more analogous to an 
ongoing "project", or continuing tort rather than a single injury that may have 
become aggravated at a later date. In Farber, the Court stated that: 
The purposes of LC. § 6-905 are to (1) save needless expense and 
litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the 
differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full 
investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the 
extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare 
defenses. Unless the contract and all of the acts performed pursuant to 
the contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the state to 
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare a defense to 
any claim. Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a 
complete and definite claim for damages arising from the continuing 
tort, then the state may attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly 
ascertainable facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, settlements 
would either be based on pre-completion, speculative damages, or 
would have to await the completion of the project. A strict or literal 
interpretation of the notice requirements of the ITCA would result in 
denying the legitimate claims of those who have suffered injury at the 
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141010 
Farber, 102 Idaho at 401-02, 630 P.2d at 688-89. As in Farber, if the Court were to 
have required Plaintiff to bring a claim immediately upon the second unfavorable 
decision, and the claim were to settle, said settlement would likewise be "based on 
pre-completion, speculative damages or would have to await completion" of the 
appeals process. Which would frustrate the policy behind the Idaho Tort Claims act 
as laid out by the Idaho Supreme Court in that decision. 
Therefore, this Court should reconsider its decision with regard to the date on 
which the period in which to file the Notice of Tort Claim accrued, and DENY 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Plaintifrs Prior Correspondence and Presentment. 
Alternatively, even if this Court should continue to determine that the cause 
of action accrued at an earlier date, this Court should accept the prior 
correspondence sent to the various State agencies as sufficient to provide Notice 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act or, alternatively, permit additional discovery in 
order to determine whether or not said correspondence was handled in such a 
manner as to effect a valid presentment, or should have been handled in order to 
effect a valid presentment. This Court held, in its original decision, that it was 
c'undisputed" that the prior correspondence was never directed to the Secretary of 
State, and essentially interprets Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 889 P .3d 
544 (2014) as creating a strict requirement that the Notice, whether entitled as 
such or not, be received by the Secretary in order to satisfy the terms of the ITCA. 
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See Memorandum Decision at 12. However, the Court does recognize that, if the 
N@tice is subsequently presented to the Secretary, the Presentment requirement is 
satisfied. CNw, L.L.C. v. New Sweden Irrigation, District, 161 Idaho 89, 383 P.8d 
1259 (2016). 
However, Turner and CNW leave two important questions wianswered: (1) 
If the Notice is received by an employee other than the Secretary prior to the 
e~iration of the 180 day deadline, but said employee does not deliver it until 91:w:. 
the expiration of the deadline, is the presentment requirement satisfied upon 
receipt of the employee or the Secretary; and (2) do State or Subdivision employees 
have a duty to present claims that could reasonably interpreted as Tort Claims, 
providing notice of potential litigation, to the Secretary for processing? In C.Nw, the 
claim was immediately presented to the Secretary, and so the Presentment 
requirement was held to be satisfied. In Turner, the claim was presented to the 
Mayor and a City Councilman, elected officials who arguably have no duty or 
authority to address the claim. This case falls in between CNW and Turner - Mr. 
Johnson's correspondence was presented to State employees who have a duty to 
direct received correspondence to the appropriate person or department, but was 
not directed to officials who have no duty or ability to process the same. As such, 
Plaintiff would contend that, in light of the policy behind the ITCA as set forth in 
Farber hereinabove, that the answer to both questions would be in the affirmative. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has allowed documents to stand as satisfying the 
Notice requirement, even if they do not follow a specific form, so long as their 
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contents substantially comply. Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621·22, 586 
P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (1978). In this case, the Johnsons received an e~licit 
admission from a State employee that their prior correspondence indicated Mr. 
Johnson's intent to litigate this issue as early as January of 2016. Declaration of 
Rose Johnson, Exhibits A and B. At that point, the State was clearly on notice of 
potential litigation, and had the opportunity to begin to prepare for the same. 
Having received and acknowledged this notice, Plaintiff would argue that the State 
employee then had a duty to pass said correspondence on to the Secretary of State 
for processing as a Tort Claim, as to hold otherwise would lead to absurd results 
and .fTustrate the purpose of the statute. For example, if State or Subdivision 
employees were held not to have a duty to send what they recognize as possible tort 
claims to the appropriate authority, the State could essentially immunize itself from 
tort liability by directing its mailroom staff and receptionists to hold all notices of 
tort claims for 181 days, thus creating a de facto personal service requirement. This 
was clearly not the Legislature's intent. 
Therefore, in order to address the Presentment issue fully, Plaintiff requires 
the opportunity to conduct further discovery. Plaintiff must confirm where, and to 
whom, the correspondence attached in his declarations were directed; and Plaintiff 
needs to determine what, if any, policies may already be in place for handling and 
directing correspondence which they acknowledge to be threats to litigate. Only 
then can it be determined that none of said correspondence either was, or should 
have been sent the Secretary of State's office in this case. As evidenced by the 
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attachments to the Johnsons' declarations, the State is unwilling to answer specific 
questions in this regard to the Johnsons directly. Which leaves formal Discovery as 
Mir. Johnson's only avenue to compel the response to these questions, in order to 
p11epare a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
Finally, given the fact that the State clearly admits that, as early as January 
of 2016, it had notice that litigation was possible, its false assurances that Mr. 
Johnson's complaints would be properly addressed, and Mr. Johnson's reliance upon 
said assurances as set forth in his Declaration, the State should be held to be 
ESTOPPED from asserting lack of notice as a defense. 
III. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration and for additional Discovery should be GRANTED. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 25th day of October, 2017, I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Baise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
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512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 7 52-1800 
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ISB# 7523 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECLARATION OF DALE 





I, DALE JOHNSON, am the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 18, 
competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and have personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth herein: 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an updated 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -I 
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'\l'ersion of the letter sent to the Governor's Office and the Director of the Idaho 
Department of Labor on or about December 6, 2015 which was attached to my 
Declaration dated September 28, 2017. The current attached version was :re-
submitted to the temporary-acting and incoming directors, (Paul Spannknebel and 
Melinda Smyser), following the abrupt resignation of Kenneth Edmunds. The IDOL 
and the SOS offices con.firmed receipt. Subsequently, my wife, Rose, recently 
followed up with the Department and other State agencies, and the responses 
thereto are attached to her Declaration filed contemporaneously herewith; 
2. I did not begin to discover the direct, immediate, full impact of the 
damages su:ffured as a result of the delay in my receipt of benefits witil the issuance 
of the Industrial Commission's decision dated April 29, 2016, as I did not know until 
that date what the Commission's decision would be, and a decision affirming the 
denial by the IDOL Appeals Bureau would have meant that the damages incurred, 
of UI benefits lost1 would likely have not been recoverable. Further, I did not 
realize the full extent of said damages until the Industrial Com.mission denied the 
Motions for Reconsideration, of both the IDOL and my former employer, on 
.September 26, 2016, as a grant of reconsideration would have likewise meant the 
damages incurred, of unemployment benefits lost, would likely not have been 
recoverable, through that avenue. 
3. IDOL negligence is not the same as unemployment benefits denied. 
Negligence is a to:rt act separate from a process of unemployment. 
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4. I continued, and continue, to suffer damages as a direct and proxim
ate 
result of the Defendants' continuing negligent and tortious acts. Furthe
rmore, 
absent further discovery. I am still unaware of the full extent of the involvement 
of 
the State and its employees in the loss of the recording and accompanying d
elays. 
5. When I submitted the letter of com.plaint attached to the Declaration 
filed in opposition to Defendants' Motion t,o Dismiss, in addition to m.y Dec
laration 
filed on September 28, 2017, and heteto, I expected, and had every right to e
xpect 
and rely upon the State and its employees to direct said complaints to
 the 
appropriate officials in order to process it correctly. Said letters and electr
onic mail 
messages are clear that I intended to litigate in the event that the State d
id not 
settle, and a State employee by the name of Nick Stout, then with the Gove
rnor's 
Office, acknowledged as early as January of 2016 that litigation was expected. 
6. Mr. Stout's memo of January 2016 (Exhibit# fu was generated from 
my honest effort to inform the state that I would prefer to settle this matter with
out 
additional costs or time wasted to all parties and burden to tax payers. I receiv
ed no 
respoDBa to my letter of December, 2015. This is separate from. the fact Au
gust and 
'September, 2015 letters to IDOL and/or to the former AG Craig Bledsoe re
cognized 
and filed to IDOL legal dept. 
I had every right to expect a notice of l'eceipt from the state. It was not known 
to me that Mr. Stout had submitted his internal statement of ''Case is in litigatio
n. 
Will close11 • Thie was false as my communication was to resolve a
nd avoid 
litigation. I was not aware ofthis until October; 2017. 
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The file contains a letter to Georgia Smith @ IDOL records dept. and
 which 
supports my right to expect that documents are in fact properly forw
arded. You will 
note Exhibit #..f,, Ms. Smith's letter of September 16, 2015, bottom right corner, it 
says "Idaho Department of Labor Legal''. 
I believe this further supports my right to expect and require my pap
erwork 
to be forwarded to the proper department for processing. 
7. Absent further Discovery, and because I had every right to bel
ieve that 
all the proper departments do communicate with each -other, I c
ertainly cannot 
conclude that the Secretary of State's office did not receiv
e any of my 
correspondence, nor -whether or not there is a policy or practice
 in place that 
requires that demands, formal complaints and/or threats to litigate
 that meet the 
requirement of a Tort Claim sublllitted to othel' officials be directed to the
 Secretary 
af State. Therefore, I require the opportunity to seek the disclo
sure of thie 
information. 
Further your dedarant aayeth naught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of
 the State 
of Idaho, that the foregoing is true and correct . 
. DATED this 25th day of October, 2017. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of October, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W, Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attomey for Defendant8 
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State ofldaho; Public Officers of Accountability 
Butch Otter; Gov and Ken Edmunds; Gov Appointed IDOL 
Butch and Ken; Em.ailed on December 6, 2015 
-
October 12, 2017 
IDOL Acting Director 
Paul Spannknebel 
The fraud and corruption that continues to rear its ugly head in the IDOL bas to be severed;
 
and since it appears you refuse to do i~ it falls on my shoulders and those of my fellow~ 
taxpayers. Know this well, I didn't cause any of this~ but I sure as hell ain't ru.nnin,g from it
 
Ken, you really need to purge your department of the growing negligence or incompeten
ce 
problems; unless you are as guilty as they are, or that you simply don't care about any 
dishonest IDOL actions, None-the .. }esst the buck stops on yours and Butch's desks and you 
need to consider this an official complaint of the handling of your departm.entts personne
l,, 
Amy Hobnste~ Mark Richmond and Janet Hardy, to name just the ones I'm familiar wi
th. 
And, Ken, don't tell me that I have to go through Amy again to file some stupid form es 
she has absolutely no business being a department chief of ANY tax-payer funded job. S
he 
has proved beyond any shadow of doubt to myself and others witnessing her actions just
 in 
my ease alone - that she is rude and either incompetent in her duties or a liar. It should 
cause you to think of how many other cases have been wrongly handled, as mine is just 
one out of who knows how many. 
I am more convinced now than ever that my first hearing audio was either lost or deleted
 
deliberately (spoliated); and I am inclined to believe that your Ms. Hohnstein may have 
had a hand in it. And this is only because there are way too many (and still growing) 
coincidences that is/wwi more likely 'not just an accident'. 
Ifby some chance rm wrong, then I'm truly sorry. However evidence just keeps stacking 
up against her and the IDOL. They have 'cried wolf too many times now for me to belie
ve 
anything that comes out of her department anymore. 
The third hearing, held on Nov. 12, 2015, was even more despicable th.an the first and 
where Hardy generated a decision, dated November 25, 2015, wherein she held up 
provable perjury as though it were credible testimony, makes irrational excuses as if they
 
were actual fact~ when there is very little (if any) met in it at all and dismisses six (not 
counting mine) ho.nest, credible testimonies as if they were irrelevant. 
I believe it may very well have been pre.determined in order to protect "Ms. Hohnstein a
nd 
Mr Richmond as I don't think Hardy was going to be allowed by her handlem to recognize 
the truth at the hearing; and her real job that day was to protect the IDOL and try t.o mak
e 
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But Amy didn't protect anything; in fact she added to the pr
ovable damage by the IDOL. 
Why would they do that to themselves; don't you have att
orneys, or do they have the same 
work ethics? Shit, I can handle honest mistakes~ but these
 aren't mist.alces anymore - as 
honest mistakes axe recognized as such and can and are, eas
ily corrected. 
I knew full well the t.entacles that my form.er employer, h
is attorney and other socialites in 
their good•ol~boys club have in local, state and federal go
vernment. So don
1t think rm 
surprised by anything that has transpired up to now. In fa
ct, it would be naive ofme to 
think anything else, 
You folks would be unwise to think that I'm just pissed o
ff and moaning because I didn't 
get my way, when in fact, I'm as angry as hell at the outright
 corruption that rve been 
forced to witness coming out of the IDOL and other govern
ment agencies. 
Be it known that the majority of all my wife and my com
munications are by text or audio 
documentation; as we have been forced t.o make sure evid
ence is available for any 
necessary court settings. 
So, my question to you, ~ or Butch, is this: How muc
h more damage are you going to 
allow to continue in the IDOL before you intervene? 
HaFdy allowed ex~parte communication ofmy former emp
loyer's attorney (who wasn't on 
record), and he basically reminded Hardy that it was her j
ob t.o defend his client and to 
basically appear on behalf of his client, since it was beneat
h him to appear himself. 
Then two (2) subpoenas to appear were basically ignored. E
mployer GM jumped on a 
plane for where-ever, though no motion to quash was pre
sented. I believe th.at he knew it 
was clear he would perjure hhnself along with the other t
hree (3) employer-witnesses (who· 
did show up), unless he made himselfwiavailable. 
Another one who didn't honor subpoena had already made 
statements as to the growing 
hostile, unsafe and intolerable conditions of my fonner em
ployer. He had also been fired 
and then re-hired under more favorable conditions, to include m
ore money and also told to 
'keep his mouth shut' as he told my wife and I. However, before his g
agged re-hire, he had 
provided written and verbal statements confin.ning what m
e and multiple others testified to. 
However, after being~ he told my wife he was u
ncertain and nervous about any 
security in his job (my wife can testify herself to wha
t he told her). He would though, l 
believe, be more afraid to perjure himself at a hearing tha
n the ones who did testify and 
who did perjure themselves. That's likely why he wasntt a
vailable when Hardy called him 
at ,the phone number that he supposedly provided to her pr
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that actually called her as it is a bit suspicioua sinc
e the number she rang was answered by 
a d.Uferent name and it was only off by one digi
t from the prior number he had owned. 
Employers HR Director proclaimed the CEO/G
M would not show up because he was on a 
plane and supposedly it was scheduled in advan
ce. If, however, that was the case, wasn't 
he required t.o submit in advance of the hearing
, a proper motion to quash? Isn't that 
contempt of court? And why didn't Hardy remi
nd them of that? 
Same with the letter of employer's attorney, wh
o submitted it a day before the hearing. He 
tried to threaten and intimidate our attorney, inf
erred to Hardy what her instructions were 
for the hearing and said all the subpoe,,J.Ud wou
ld be there (a lie) and that he wouldn't be. 
M.aybe their attorney was concerned his son's n
ame might come up and be recognized in 
testunony - as his son works directly under the pr
oblematic supervisor in this cause. 
Employer's three (3) employees gave perjured t
estimony (provable, not hearsay); and the 
worse offender was the head of hr, who like em
ployer's attorney, basically told Hardy that 
she was to deny my ui claim because I quit. The
 fact is that I terminated them, due t.o the 
growing mtolexable working conditions. Hardy
 didn't seem to really like being told what 
her job was, and she even stopped him in his tracks an
d warned him and us that we don't 
tell her what to do (which for the record, I did n
ot do in the first place). 
The hr boss then flat-out lied to her and us about docu
ments that do not even exist; this is 
a.gain, full-blown perjury, easily proved. 
The other two (2) employer witnesses provided
 false testimony. which I will also produce 
proof of as well to the IIC and then to a jury. W
hy Hardy would allow all this obvious 
false testimony is more than suspicious to me, qui
te simply, its B.S. This, and Amy and 
Mark sent to Washington, D.C. this last summe
r giving a joint lecture on detecting false 
testimony telephonically. Go figure -- they do the
 same thing that they tell others not to do. 
Nov. 12th was about a 4--hour hearing, so I won
1t detail all the juicy stuff as not to take all 
the fun from you :finding out when you do your ow
n investigation. Because, again, I will 
sta1e, this is a formally submitted complaint. I wil
l forward this information, along with 
evecytbing else to show th.at everyone in Bois
e has been kept in the loop; t.o a.void surprises
. 
It is important to note that Hardy determined th
at all of the ·other testimony ''didn't cany 
much weight". Who the hell does she think she
 is'? Not only did she determine that six ( 6) 
former employees1 testimony did not carry much w
eight, but she gave complete credibility 
to individuals that I~ and will prove" lied to her
 face (voice). And employer employees 
who didn't lie to her, only didn't because they mad
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actually believe that all seven (7) of us showed up just to feed h
er bull? Get real! Those 
people (and mmv more) were all wrongly injured by this e
mployer in one way or another. 
To make matters worse, Hardy herself manufactured seve
ral false statements in her 
decision. These will be vigorously pursued and a jury will 
be asked to 'weigh in' on the 
questions and asked~ •1where the hell did she come up with th
ose statements?" Richmond 
will be asked these questions as well. 
So,. Hardy also took hostile testimony against me and then
 flipped it like I was the 
originator of statements that I never made. So~ how is that e
ven justified or professional? 
Where do you find these people? All in all, I will state aga
in, I am very pissed off at the 
IDOL for all the on .. going violations they have perpetrated
 in my case. And this is only 
one case; it makes my mind swim. 
In Hardy's questioning subpoenaed witnesses, she failed to
 ask each if anyone was with 
them. she'd asked this information :from m.y attorney. Just
 a little thin& you might say, but 
it is the combination of the many things wrong that ca.use th
e growing problems. 
And I have every right to be angry with the IDOL. The un
fortunate part is that at this point 
I would be in the right to conclude that this is just regul
ar business es usual for the IDOL. 
If this is the case (which is ve:ry likely), then its as effective 
as a plugged-up toilet over-
flowing onto the floor; and it is time to unplug it and flush
 all those poisons down the drain 
and clean up the mess that it has made. 
I'm certain that at the very least the three (3) IDOL emplo
yees I have mentioned need to be 
teonina.ted from the tax-payer paid funds as well as barred from
 ever holding any other 
government jobs or priva.te,-seotor jobs that deal with th
e government. 
Your response to my complaint will confirm whether you
, Butch and Ken, decide to 
h011estly address the IDOL problems. Keep in mind this is
 not going away until those 
acting dishonestly are held acoom1table. The cost your per
sonnel keeps heaping on me will 
be passed back to you 20 fold. 
Remember this is about truth and accowitability. I'm sick and
 tired of people with gov jobs 
abusing them; time to step-up and require a higher standa
rd for tax-paid employ po!!!itions. 
eJ 
99 North Sky Road 
~Id ~rw 
<'f2f./~ IN~-/7 
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Sep.16.2015 10:44 AM Dale and Rose Jonnson 
l'lWJ::. l/ 
Idaho Department uf Labor; 
Reoords Custodian, Georgia Smith 
317 w. Main Street 
Boise. ID 83735 
Fax #: 208-334-6125 
September \6, 20l5 
IDAHO PUBLIC RECOBJ)S REOUESI 
Cu.'ltOdian of Unomployment Hearing Records; Georgia Smith or oth
er appointed person; 
My husband and l req\lire a complete chain of command and custody di
sclosure in regard 
to the audio reco.-ding of UI hearing of August 5, 2015 re: Docket #4210003
604-2015 
and the subsequent 'Written decision of August 6. 2015 authored by Mar
k Richmond. 
l was informed by an lDOL Administrator that the appeals dept. is requir
ed to have a 
records 'sign-off' or otMr record-keeping system so to keep recordi:; easU
y locatable. It is 
an official duty for preserving files; and this is even more so where eases ha-
ve been 
contested and all involved have been made aware that liUgation may be
 needed to resolve. 
Therefore, please provide a oomplctc disclosure of dates and. times and who's
 hands, eyes 
and ears~ touched, handled, viewed or beard the a\ldio of the UI hearing
 of Aug. S. 2015, 
and ~ficalty on what date and time lt "became lost, deleted Ol' otherw
ise unavailable." 
Also, please verify: l} How many con1erences, workshops ot: sern.inars 
Ms. Hohnstein 
ho.'i attended with H~ng Officer~, Mr. RichmQnd Qt Ms. Hardy, in the las
t two y~; 
alsot 2) the topics, locations and dates of each event; 3) the cost for each
 event (per 
ptrson, as a group, etc.) and lastly, 4) the tnaimer of participation (role pl
ayed) each of 
the named attendees provided at ea.ch event (speaker, attendee. etc.) 
Oood-faith and fair-dealing are the only things m:y husband ever expect
ed or asked for .. 
Please provide the rcquest.cd r~rtls in a timely fashion. If you have 
questions. plemJe 
feel free to give me a call at 208-683-0821. 
RoseJ 
99 Nnrthcm y Road 
Athol, Idaho 8380 l 
07-19-2017 Records Request EXHIBIT 
C 
RECEIVED 
SEP 16 2015 
IDAIODEPT. ~ ~ L!GAl. 
IDOL_A-0004 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
-
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-
l1 OCT 25 P:1 I;: 57 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
Dale Johnson, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Billl'eau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Shoshone ) 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES 
McMILLAN IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
JAMES McMILLAN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
AIFFIDA VIT OF JAMES McMILLAN - 1 
Z:ICI ___ VlloliM<C,01, 10 ll-Jhlo>.doo 
'41001 
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1. I am over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify to the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff and, as such, I am familiar with the 
facts of this case. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the decision 
of the Idaho Industrial Commission, reversing the Decision of the Appeals Bureau; 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the decision 
of the Idaho Industrial Commission denying Reconsideration; 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the letter I 
received from the Idaho Department of Administration Risk Management Program 
in response to the Notice of Tort Claim that was filed in August of 2016. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2017.b::6 
/C~- ~ 
~r---~-----------E SM c MIL LAN 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me on the 25th day of October, 2017. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMILLAN - 2 
Z:\Cllenu\lolo,mn. -.,, or lMoQ\>11 10 -~doo 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing at Silverton 
My Commission Expires August 5, 2022 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 25th day of October, 20171 I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
B0ise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
AiFFIDA VII OF JAMES McMILLAN - 3 
Z:ICH.,,IA\lollll<all.~.r1M<!(:t017 Hl2,-ll\4,;),,ln, 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
___JL Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




Sll, VERWOOD, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
IDOL# 421004217 .. 2016 
DECISION AND ORDER 
FILED 
APR 2 9 2016 
'41004 
.Appe.al of a Decisio,i Issued by the Idaho Department of Labor finding Claimant 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. REVERSED. 
Claimant, Dale G. Johnson, appeals through counsel to the Industrial Commission a 
Decision. issued by an Idaho Department of Labor (~'Department") Appeals Examiner ruling 
him ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appeals Examiner concluded 
that: 1) Claimant voluntarily left hi.s job with Employet, Silverwood, Inc., without good 
cause connected with that employment; and 2) Employer's account is not chargeable for 
experience rating purposes. Claimant sought an opportunity for a new hearing and to argue 
his case in a brief. (Claimant's Request. filed January 20, 2016.) These matters were 
addressed in Orders issued on February 19, 2016, March 8, 2016 and March 29, 2016. 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record, 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-1368(7). ~er Grade, Inc. v. ldah,Q De;p't of Commeroe md 
Labor. 144 Idaho 386. 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007). The evidentiary record in this case 
contains the transcript of the hearing the Appeals Examiner convened on 
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November 12, 2015 and the exhibits made part of the rec:ord during that proceeding. Those 
exhibits consist of the Notice of Telephone Hearing [pp, 1 through 3] and Exhibit: (pp. 1 
through S6], Claimant Exhibit B·3 through B-5~ Claimant Exhibit B-10 through B-15, 
Department Exhibit C-1 through C-11, and Employer Exhibit D. Because the Commission 
vacated the Appeals Examiner's Decision in this case under Docket Number 421004217-
2016 and remanded the matter back to the Appeals Bureau for a new hearing, the 
Commission excluded from its consideration the documents denoted as "Addenda to the 
Record as Supplemental Information Provided by the Claimant in connection with Appeal 
Hearing held August 5, 2015 - Docket #421003604-2015." The brief Claimant filed on 
March 18, 2016 and the Department's response filed on April 4, 2016, were also 
considered. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A preponderance of the evidence in the record yields the following Findings of Fact: 
t. Employer hired Claimant on April 28, 2008 for a position in the 
maintenance department of an amusement park Employer operates. At the 
time he was hired, Claimant was a journeyman plumber with several 
years .experience in. the military where he le.ar.ned pneumatics, hydraulics, 
and other skills useful in the maintenance of amusement park rides. 
2. When Claimant started working for Employer, Denny Higdon was the 
director of maintenance. Under Higdon, the job was pleasant or even fun. 
The members of the department worked as a team, felt respected by their 
manager, and understood that their families were as important as their 
jobs. Members of the maintenance department under Higdon perceived 
that turnover among the staff WM minim.al to nonexistent. (Transcript. 
pp. 42, 128, and 138.) 
3. Claimant primarily worked on roller coasters. Because one of the roller 
coasters, · called the ••Aftershock" was so sophisticated, Claimant and 
other members of bis team arranged so that one member of the roller 
coaster team was near the ride continually to address problems quickly. 
Therefote1 service requests from the ride did not go through the 
dispatcher. (Transcript, pp. 9· 10.) 
DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
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4. In 2013, Employer replaced Higdon. Matthew Stevens became the 
director of construction and maintenance. (Transcript, pp. 34, 82.) 
Stevens managed the different departments through department managers. 
Stevens designated Danny Wanamaker to supervise Claimant and the 
others who wo.rked on roller coasters. 
S. On April 4. 2014, Claimant provided a written statement to Employer's 
hwnan resources department describing the growing tensions in the 
msintenance department Stevens was creating. Claimant described 
Stevens as a bully and a dictator who threatened his subordinates with 
their jobs. instilling fear. Claimant stated that Stevens was unqualified 
for the director's position and his bullying authority created an unsafe 
workplace. Claimant pointed out that coming from a construction 
backgtound, Stevens did not know how to manage in an amusement park 
environmen~ and he was unwilling to learn from the subordinates who 
had more experience in the industry. (Exhibit: pp. 9-10.) 
6. Riek Coate, a maintenance inspector technician, filed a written statement 
with Employer,s human resources department on April 1, 2014, 
complaining the Stevens was condescending and demonstrated an acerbic 
attitude. Stevens did not show Coate any respect for the experience 
Coate had or tried to learn anything from Coate about how the park 
operated. Coate complained that Stevens threatened jobs rather than 
demonstrated leadership. (Transcript, pp. 127-130; Exhibit: pp. 34~35.) 
7. Others similarly complained that Stevens threatened their jobs when he 
pointed out that Idaho is an ''employment at will'' state. Claimant and his 
coworkers agreed that Stevens· did not care about them or their morale. 
(Transcript. pp. 20-22.) Nevertheless, .no one in human resources 
responded to any of the complaints Claimant or anyone else raised. 
8. Stevens discharged . several of the members of the maintenance 
department in 2014 and early 2015. (Transcript. p. 57.) Many of these 
discharges purportedly occurred after complaints were made about 
Stevens. (Exhibit; pp. 38,. Transcript p. 130.) 
9. As a result of the seemingly retaliatory discharges, the maintenance 
department lost more than half of its maintenance experience. Stevens 
replaced them with younger workers with far Jess experience. 
(Transcrip1t pp. 4243.) 
10. On March 23, 2015, Claimant wrote an eight-page letter addressed to 
Employer• s human resources department. safety management, general 
m~~r and owners detailing the disturbing developments in the 
maintenance department since Stevens took over. Claimant described the 
DECISION AND ORDER· 3 
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suspicious circumstances under which Stevens had discharged his most 
experienced coworkers and the apparent favoritism shown in hiring 
replacements. Claimant pointed out the lack of experience and leadership 
shown in the group leaders, inequities in the pay structure, and 
inconsistencies between Employer's stated policies introduced during 
orientation and the practices in the maintenance depattment. Claimant 
detailed safety and maintenance problems that Stevens was not 
adequately addressing, raising concerns about safety of the staff and 
guests. (Exhibit: pp. 12-19.) 
11. ln response to the letter, Paul Norton, the son of the owner and the park's 
general manager, met with Claimant. However, Norton did not take any 
action with respect to Claimant's grievances or words of waming about 
the condition of the maintenance department. (Transcript: pp. 41-42, 46.) 
12. Claimunt continued on with his job duties to get the park ready to open. 
The tension in the maintenance department persisted, as did the tyrannical 
management. According to Claimant, Stevens spied on maintenance 
workers by biding in trees and bushes to watch them work. 
13. On the moming of June St 2015, Claimant was nearing the end of his 
inspection of a ride known as the "Aftershock', when Stevens approached 
him. The conversation began cordially when Stevens commented that 
everything was running well. Claimant cautioned that it was early in the 
season and too soon to know the extent of the work that would be 
necessary. but they would take ca.re of matters as they came up. Stevens 
replied that the: call log showed fewer calls than before and Claimant 
explained that not all of the calls go through the dispatcher to be logged. 
Stevens stated that the practice would have to change. Claimant took 
issue with the o.bservation Stevens .made about the Sl.lperior perfol'Q;!.ance 
of the wood roller coaster. Claimant disagreed with Stevens about the 
brake work. The discussion became heated as the two debated over how 
maintenance was done, what should have been done. and who was 
responsible. (Transcript, pp. 13·20.) 
14. After several minutes, Claim.ant stopped listening and went back to his 
inspection. Once he completed the inspection, Claimant went through the 
park to gather his tools. Then, Claimant went to the human resources 
office and asked for the papers to stop his employment. When the 
associate asked why, Claimant stated that because Stevens was an 
incompetent fool. (Transcript: pp. 20, 26 .. 28.} 
15. Later that day, Claimant wrote a formal letter of resignation addressed to 
the owner and geiwral manager. Claimant ex.plained his side of the 
dispute with Stevens. Claimant expressed his belief that Stevens 
approached him with the express intention of starting a fight. Claimant 
DECISION AND ORDER-4 
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a. 
stated that he regretted that he could no longer offer his services to the 
park, but the incompetem:y he experienced under Stevens had killed his 
passion for the work. (Exhibit B3.) 
16. Employer paid Claimant the most wages in the first four of the five calendar 




When Claimant started working for Employer's maintenance department on 
April 28, 2008, Denny Higdon was the director of maintenance. Claimant and his 
coworkers described their jobs under Higdon's management as pleasant or even fun. The 
members of the department worked as a team, felt respected by their manager, and 
understood that their families were as important as their jobs. However, all of that changed 
in 2013 when Employer replaced Higdon. 
Matthew Stevens became the director of Employer's construction and maintenance 
services. Stevens managed the different departments through department managers. 
Stevens designated Danny Wanamaker to supervise Claimant and the others who worked 
on roller coasters. Claimant and his coworkers were unimpressed with Stevens as a 
manager, concluding that coming from a construction background, Stevens did not have the 
skills or experience for an amusement park environment. On April 4, 2014, Claimant 
provided a written statement to Employer's human resources department describing 
Stevens as a bully and a dictator who threatened his subordinates with their Jobs, instilling 
fear. Claimant asserted that Stevens' management style created an unsafe workplace. 
Claimant's coworkers provided similar stat.ements. However, nothing changed. 
On March 23, 2015, Claimant wrote an eight-page letter addressed to Employer's 
human resources department. safety management, general manager and owners detailing 
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Page 195
10/2'5/2!)17 16: 12 FAX 208 752 1900 Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law 
14J 009 
_.-:.....-------J•---------1----~-
the disturbing developments in the maintenance department since Stevens took over. 
Claimant described the suspicious circumstances under which Stevens had discharged bis 
most experienced coworkers and the apparent favoritism shown in hiring replacements. 
Claimant pointed out the lack of experience and leadership shown in the group leaders, 
iincquities in the pay structure; and inconsistencies between Employer's stated policies 
introduced during orientation and the practices in the maintenance department. Claimant 
•detailed safety and maintenance problems that Stevens was not adequately addressing, 
raising concerns about safety of the staff and guests. In response to the letter, Paul Norton, 
the son of the owner and the park,s general manager, met with Claimant. However, 
Claimant's meeting with Norton did not yield any changes in the maintenance department. 
If anything, Stevens appeared to become more dictatorial and bullying. 
On the morning of June 8, 2015, Claimant was nearing the end of his inspection of a 
ride known as the "Aftershock" when Stevens approached him. The conversation began 
cordially when Stevens commented that everything was rllWling welL Claimant cautioned 
that it was early in the season and too soon to know the extent of the work that would be 
necessat)'t but they would take care of matters as they came up. Stevens replied that the 
call log showed fewer calls than before and Claimant explained that not all of the calls go 
through the dispatcher to be logged. Stevens stated that the practice would have to change. 
The discussion became heated as the two debated over how maintenance was done, what 
should have been done, and who was responsible. After several minutes, Claimant stopped 
listening; and went back to his inspection. Once he completed the inspection, Claim.ant 
went through the park to gather his tools. Then, Claimant went to the human resources 
office and asked for the papers to stop his employment. When the associate asked why, 
DECISION AND ORDER·· 6 
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Claimant stated that because Stevens was an incompetent fool. Later that day, Claimant 
wrote a formal letter of resignation addressed to the owner and general manager. Claimant 
explained what had happened with Stevens that morning and expressed his belief that 
Stevens approached him with the express intention of starting a fight. Claimant stated that 
he regretted that he could no longer offer his services to the park, but the incompetency he 
experienced under Stevens had killed his passion for the work. 
Employer did not participate in the Appeals Examiner,s hearing. There was no 
evidence or testimony that would place in dispute Claitnanfs account of the chain of events 
leading to his separation, the description of the working conditions provided by his former 
coworkers, or any of the other evidence Claimant offered in support of his decision to quit. 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides, in part, that a claimant is eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits if he or she quits for good cause related to employment. 
If an employee voluntarily quits his or her job, that employee bears the burden of proving 
that the tenns and conditions of that employment provided him or her with good cause to 
quit Moore Y, Melaleuca, 1nc., 137 Idaho 23, 43 P.3d 782 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Administrative Code both define what 
constitutes '•good cause" for quitting employment for the purpose of establishing eligibility 
for unemployment benefits. IDAPA 09.0l.30.450.03 provides that good cause is 
established when the claimant demonstrates that his or her real, substantial, and compelling 
circumstances would have forced a "reasonable person'' to quit. Stated another way, "good 
cause" exists when the essential conditions of the workplace environment are so 
extraordinary that an average person standing in the c)aimant's place would prefer 
joblessness to continuing the employment relationship. See Ewins._ v. Allied Security, 138 
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Idaho 343, 347 .. 43, 63 P3d 469, 473-74 (2004); Burroughs v. Employment Sec, h,gencx. 86 
Idaho 412,414, 387 P.2d 473, 474 (1963). Purely personal reasons a.re not "good cause" 
for quitting a job. 
The issue in this case is whether the uncontested circwnstances Claimant described 
QOnstitllted ••good cause" for quitting as that tenn has been interpreted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The bulk of the evidence in this case focuses on Stevens as a ''dictator" or 4>ully.'; 
Clearly, the tteatment he experienced from his supervisor had a negative impact on Claimant. 
But, short of conduct prohibited under the Civil Rights Act, Idaho law does not protect workers 
from a manager's bullying, dictating, or incompetency. In·short, the behavior Claimant and bis 
coworkers endured from Stevens is rarely "good cause" for purposes of establishing eligr.'bility 
for unemployment benefits. 
For example, the claimant in Buckham v. Idaho Elk's Rehabilitati9.n Hospital. 141 Idaho 
338, 109 P.3d 726 (2005) also quit his job because of a hostile supervisor. Buckham left his job 
as the dietary manager of the hospital after his supervisor gave him the ''cold shoulde~ and 
started criticidng bis work in a number of areas. Buckham alleged that his supervisor's rudeness 
and shortness towards him, especially in front of bis coworkers, created a level of hostility that 
forced him to quit. Although Buckman established just how uncomfortable he was with the 
working enviroument his supervisor created, those circumswnces were not sufficient to establish 
that he quit with "good cause." Yb 341, 109 P.3d 729. 
Other jurisdictions have held that conflicts between an employee and bis or her 
supervisor do .not COBStitute good cause for leaving employment. See, Brotherton v. Mrnppn, 
S22 P.2d 1210 (Or.App. 1974); Uniw~ld Products, Inc. v. Jpdusg:ial Rel. Qom'n. 277 So.2d 827 
(Fla.App. 1973); IW:kowit,J V. I&Yme, 41 A.D.2d 791, 341 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1973); James v. 
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Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 489, 296 A.2d 288 (1972). However, Claimant 
has alleged he quit over more than just his personal conflicts with his supervisor. 
Claimant points out in his letter of March 23, 2015 that bis supervisor's lack of 
experience compronlised both the safety of the workers in the maintenance department and 
Employer's guests. (Exhibit: p. 16.) Claimant restated that concern on April 4, 2015 when he 
explained that the fear Stevens had instilled m Claimant and his coworkers created an unsafe 
workplace. (Exhibit: p. 9.) Claimant asserts that on the day he quii be told Julie Trumble, 
Employer's human resources assistant that Stevens was going to get someone killed because of 
his lack of knowledge. (Tnmscript, p. 21.) 
Under the law governing eligibility for unemployment benefits, courts across the country 
have long held that when an employer imposes a "substantial unilateral change in the terms of 
employment" that change can constitute "a necessitous and compelling cause for an employer to 
tenninate her employment,,, Brunswick Hotel & Conference Center, LLC v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review Pa. Cmwlth., 906 A.2d 657, 660 (2006). This is the standard the 
Idaho Supreme Court has applied in similar ca.,es. In Clay v. Crooks Industries. 96 Idaho 378, 
529 P.2d 774 (1974), the Idaho Supreme Court held that job conditions become less favorable, 
and therefore unsuitable, if conditions originally offered are later retracted. Similarly. in K,yle y. 
Beco Corp .• 109 Idaho 267, 707 P. 2d 378 (198S), the Idaho Supreme Coun found that a 
claimant quit with good cause when he discovered that his wages had been reduced from $7.50 
or more to $3.3S per hour. 
When Employer hired Stevens, the tenns and conditions of Claimant's employment were 
substantially changed. Claimant had no input in those changes, Claimant bas demoostratecl that 
his working conditions were negatively impacted when Stevens became his supervisor to the 
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point that the workplace became unsafe. Claimant complained. many times to Employer's human 
resources department and to Employer's owners, specifically describing his ooncems, to no 
avail. Moreover, Employer did not have a director of safety, leaving it to the human resomces 
department to address such matters. (Transcript, p. 4 7 .) 
.A preponderance of the evidence in this record establishes that Claimant had good cause 
to quit. In spite of Claimant's written complaints, Employer made no effort to resolve 
Claimant's concems a.bout the safety of his working conditions. Therefore, Claimant is eligible 
for unemployment benefits. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-13S1(2)(a), an employer's experience rated account is 
chargeable for benefits paid to a claimant who is discharged for reasons other than misoonduct 
connected with employment or quits with good cause connected with employment. In this case, 
Employer paid the most wages to Claimant dwing the last four base quarters. (Exhibit: pp. 27• 
28.) Because Claimant quit his job with good cause, Employer's account is chargeable for 
experience rating purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
Claimant voluntarily quit with good cause related to employment. 
II 
Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is 
REVERSED. Claimant is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Employer's 
DECISION AND ORDER-10 
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account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. This is a final order under Idaho 
Code § 72 .. 1368(7). 
DATED this ~day of A{Jcil 
sistant Conlmiqi9µ. Seer~ .; · · 
I,•••.', .. 
. . . :· '.,•,' :· . 




INTHIS DECISION BUT DIO NOTSIGN 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby celtify 1hll an the~~ of -(J(::-.') , 2016, a tme and com<! 
copy of Decision and Oniel' was served by re~ United States mail upon each of 1he 
following: 
DALE G JOHNSON 
C/O JAMBS MCMILLAN 
512CEDARST 
WALLACE ID 83873 
SILVERWOOD INC 
27843 N HIGHWAY 95 
ATIIOL ID 83801 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAlN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
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Requesr for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Com
mission finding 
Claimant eligible for unemp/uyment benefits. The request for reconsidera
tion is DENIED. 
On May 19, 2016, Em.plo:yer, Silverwood, Inc. ("Employer"), by and thr
ough its attorney 
Charles B. Lempesis, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission•s April 29, 2016 Decision and Order finding Claimant, Dale
 Johnson (''Claimant"), 
eligible for unemployment benefits. It is undisputed that Claimant qu
it his employm.ent on 
June 8, 2015. On May 19, 2016, the Idaho Department of Labor ("ID
OL'), by and through 
Deputy Attorney General, Doug Werth, timely filed a Motion for Rec
onsideration of the same 
Commission Decision and Ordet. IDOL filed its Amended Motion for
 Reconsideration on 
May 20, 2016. Claimant filed his Objection to Silverwood, Inc. 's and I
daho Department of 
Labor's Motions for Reconsideration and Claimant's Motion to Dismi
ss on June 2, 2016. 
Motions for reconsideration shall be in writing and specifically i
dentify the legal 
ju$ti:fioation upon which the motion is based. The Request for Recon
sideration must be :made 
141016 










. . - Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law I 
within twenty (20) days from the date of filing of the Commissio
n's Decision and Order~ and 
served on all inteiested parties. R.A.P .P. S(F). 
In its Motion, Employer requests reconsideration beoause
 Employer was previously 
unrepresented by counsel, and its lack of participation at .hea
ring was due to the belief that IDOL 
would appear, bec:ause Claimant's account of events is factuall
y incorrect and unfairly demeans 
Employer and Claimanes supervisor, and because Cla.imant quit
 solely of his own accord for 
personal reasons without attempting to resolve the conflict 
of June 8, 2015. Employer included 
.with it.s Motion three documents not present in the record: the D
eclaration of John Jachim and 
The typed statements of Daniel Wanamaker and Chris Lempe
sis. 
In its Motion for Reconsideration, IDOL contends that the 
Commission was either 
unaware of or wholly ignored substantial and material tacts in the
 record, and ~ the law does 
not support the finding that Claimant had good cause for quitting 
his job with Employer. 
In his Objection and Motion to Strike, Claimant contends tha
t Employer's Motion should 
either be spicken for including new evidence or denied on the m
erit.s, and that IDOL 's Motion 
seeks a faetual reevaluation with a different outcome, and should be de
nied for failing to produce 
a legal basis for reconsideration. 
A3 was contemplated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Th
e Industrial Commission is 
~powered to 'decide all claims for review filed by any intere
sted party in acco~ce with its 
own rules of procedure not in conflict [with other law].'" ]ac
etl v. Idago State DeJ)fll'llIHmt of 
YmQl. 141 ldlilho 688, 693, 116 P.3d 18, 23 (200S) (citing Id
aho Code §72~1368(7)). The 
Commission "Nill first consider the issues of admission of Em
ployer's proposed evidence and 
Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike before addressmg
 the merits of the dual Motions. for 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION~ 2 
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Reconsideration from Employer and IDOL. 
Employer's Proposed Evidence 
Employer includes three new items of evidence with its Motion, referred to throughout as 
"letters". ''declarations" and '"statements". All three provide rebuttal testimony of e
vents and 
circumstances leading up to Claimant's separation. Mr. Jachim states that Employer ''did
 not 
appear during the last Appeal hearing and feel[ s] had the infonnation in this declara
tion been 
supplied the outcome of the appeal would ha"'e been different." (Declaration of Joh
n Jachim, 
p.1,) 
Under Idaho Code§ 72~1368(7), the record before the Commission shall consist of t
he 
record of the proceedmgs before the Appeals Examiner, unless it appears to the Comm
ission that 
the interests of justice require that the interested parties be permitted to present add
itional 
evidence.. The Commission, once in possession of a moving party• s explanation of wh
y the 
proposed evidence was not J)Nseli.ted before the Appeals Examiner, must exercise its dis
cretion 
to determine if the interests of ju$tice require the presentation of additional evi~. R.A.P ,
P. 
7(C): :!impson v. Trinity Mi~ion Health and Rehab of Mid!and L.P •• 150 Idaho 154, 244 P.3d 
1240 (2010). The Commission,s detemtination of whether to consider additional eviden
ce is 
within the Commission's exclusive discretion. A12peals Examiner of Idaho Pemimnent of l,,M
or 
v. J.R Simplot Co .• 131 ldaho 318, 955 P.2d 1097 (1998). HJdaho Code§ 72•1368 ~allows the 
Commission to recejve new evidence that was unavailable at the thne of the hearin
g before the 
appeals examiner [but) '[t]bis section is not carte blanche allowing ... [a party] the 
unbridled 
right to present a substantially new case, absent some showing as oo why the evidence had
 been 
unavailable earlier."'' Flowers v. Shenango Screenprintj;gg, Inc., 150 Idaho 295, 298. 246 P.3
d 
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668,671 (2010) (citing Teevan V. Office of Attorney General 130 Idaho 79, 81,936 P.2d 1321, 
1323 (1997) (quoting Rogers v. Trtm; House, 99 Idaho 746, 750, 588 P2d 945, 949 (1979))). 
However; when new evidence is presented to the Commission for admission during an 
unemployment appeal, the Coll'.l.lllission has discretion to either conduct its own new hearing or 
remand the matter back to IDOL for a new hearing. Idaho Code§ 72-1368(7)(2016). No party 
in this matter has requested a new hearing, Assuming that the evidence and the ciroumstances 
are as Employer contends,. it would be inappropriate to simply tfJke the statements at face value 
without giving Claimant an opportunity to examine the declarants in some manner. 
The burden of proof is on a moving party to demonstrate why the proposed evidence was 
not presented before the Appeals E,cammer at the time of bearing. R.A.P.P. 7(BX5). Employer 
offers an explanation for its lack of participation, including its decision to " ... not vigorously, 
initially1 protest the unemployment for the Claimant" and its belief that IDOL would appear 
during the hearing and respond to Claimant's appeal. The record reflects that Employer 
provided information at the beginning of the investigation and Employer's Exhibits 1-6 during a 
pre-bearing conference. It was only upon the Commission's reversal of the Appeals Examinerss 
Decision that Employer submitted the proposed statements. During the November 12, 2015 
appeal hearin~ Mr. Jachim testified: 
And Silverwood would like to go on the record as saying that we -- other than the 
initial response to the Department of Labor, which you sent us a letter, we filled 
in the information - up until this date we have made no objections. We agree 
with the detenninations of the Department of Labort because we fill [sic] that 
those are true and accurate, but Silverwood theme park has in no way done 
anything w~ in fact, all the other hearings and appeals we have chosen not to 
participate in, because we think it's very clear that tbis employee quit their job. 
Whatever the Department of Labor determines to be the course of action, we aro 
not arguing with that one bit. Not one bit. 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION· 4 
141019 
Page 206
· 10/2·5/2017 16: 14 FAX 208 752 1900 Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law 
. 11'.......-----------1,____ 
141020 
(Transcript, p. 67, 11. 10-22.) 
There. were sufficient opportunities for Employer to submit these stat:ement.s into the 
evidentiaty record before and after the November 12, 2015 hearing, yet it failed to do so .. 
Employer was put on notice regarding the importance of timely submitting evidence before the 
appeal hearing by informational materials provided by IDOL. (EXhlbit p. 1.) The materials 
contain language that ''The Appeal Hearing MAY be your only chance to present witnesses and 
give evidence about your side of the issue. Except in rare circumstances, you will not be allowed 
to present additional evidence on further appeal.'~ 00 Under the beading "Evidence", the form 
states that ••Any documents that YOU want considered at the hearing must be submitted 
immediately to the Appeals Bureau and all other interested parties of the case." @u ewphasis in 
original.) The next page provides the procedure by which a party may submit evidence by filing 
a Request to Reopen the bearing, including situations when a party fails to appear or has 
evidence not available to it at the time of the hearing. (Exhibit, p. 2.) 
While the Commission. has the discretion to oonsider new evidence on reconsideration, it 
declines to do so with respect to the proffered docwnents. First, they are unauthenticated and 
unswom. Second, even if they are what they purport to be, they are riddled with hearsay. As 
stated by the Court in Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsµbishi, 145 ldaho 1, S, 175 P.3d 163, 
167 (2007), the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act permits the Commissi011 to exclude 
evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutioPal o.r statutory 
groundst or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or .te()Ognized in the 
courts of Idaho. IDAPA 09.01.06.026.13; lC. § 67-5251. The Commission is not, however, 
bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. l<L (citing Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50. 156 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION w S 
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P.3d 545, 55~551 (2007)). 
Hearsay is defined as ''a statemen~ other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearin& offered into evidenoo w prove the tIUt:h of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 
80l(i;:). A statement can be an oral* written, or intentional nonverbal assertion. I.R.E. 8Ol(a). 
The.i:e are exceptions to the Hearsay Rule that may allow into evidence certain statements that 
otherwise would be barred. The statementa of John Jaclum, Daniel Wanamaker, and Chris 
Lempesis do not qualify for any of the stated exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Ba.,ed on 
Employer's assertion in its Motion that Claimant misrepresented the facts lead.in& up to his 
voluntary quit, it appears that Employer believes that the interests of justice would suggest the 
inclusion of the proffered evidence to avoid a ••honific mischaracterization of events $Id 
practicesH at Employer*s facility. I.R.E. 803(24)(C) contains a catch-all hearsay exception that 
addresses such evidence that does not clearly align with the other, more specific hearsay 
exceptions if the general purposes of the Rule and the interests of justice requile that the 
evidence be admitted. However, this same statute explicitly bars the admission of hearsay 
statements ''unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance 
Qf the trial or bearing to provide the ad.verse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
the proponent,s intention to offer the statement ap.d the particulm of it. including the name and 
address of the declarant." Id. 1n the instant case, Employer did not provide notice to Cwmant of 
its intent to include these three statements with its Motion for Reconsideration, nor did it give 
Claimant an opportunity to address the proffered asserti~ or cross examine the declarants, To 
in~lude such new evidence during this late stage in the proceedings would not serve the interests 
of justice. 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION -6 
Page 208
10/2'5/2017 16: 14 FAX 208 752 1900 • Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law --- 141022 
We have reviewed the record and can find no evidence that Employer was deprived of 
due process. The Notice of Hearing and docwnents were sent to Employer's addreBS of record. 
Some of Employer's representatives were subpoenaed to appear as witnesses at the appeal 
hearing, including Employer's Director of Hum.an ResOUfCes John Jachim, HR representative 
Julie Trumble, and Claimant's supervisor Mathew Stevens. (Department Ex1nmt, C9.) These 
three people provided testimony under the questioning of Claimant's Cowisel and the Appeals 
Examiner. (Transcript) Daniel Wanamaker's employment and position were brought up at the 
hearing, but he was not called as a witness. (Transcript, p. 35; p. 56.) Employer provides no 
explanation why Mr. Wanamaker and Mr. Lempesis were unavailable to provide their statements 
at an earlier stage in the appeals process. Employer failed to provide the proposed evidence at 
hearing and failed to request that the hearing be reopened to allow for the submission of the 
m,aterials. Employer's justification for the delay in providing the same is unpersuasive. A party 
choosing to not participate is not a compelling justification that the interests of justice require the 
admission of new evidence. Employer's three additional documents will not be entered into the 
record. 
Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ('•LR.C.P.") 
only apply to civil actions. LoweO' v. Board of Countt Com'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 
1079, 793 P.2d 1251 (1990). The Court explained that l.R.C.P. 3(a) "clearly declares that 'a 
civil actio.n is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."' Id. at 1081, 1253. There is no 
such filing for civil action here. Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike is not a typical filing 
accepted by the Coll'llllission on reconsideration in Unemployment Insurance C"UI") 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION~ 7 
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proceedings. Indeed, "[a]ny party may file a notice of appeal on its own behalr on an Ul case 
(R.AP.P. 3(A)). regardless of the content. A reply to a motion for reconsideratfon is not 
considered under the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under Idaho EmplO)'llleat 
Security Law. 
Claimant contends that Employer 0 bas waived any right it tnay have had to seek 
reconsideration"' by failing to participate or appear in the proceedings prior to the insmnt matter. 
Claimant's statement is incorrect. Under R.A.P.P. 8(F) and its related Comment; a motion for 
reconsideration will be taken under advisement so long as it conforms to Commission procedure 
for timeliness, is submitted in writing. and identifies a legal justification for the motion. 
Claimant's attempt to strike Employer's entire Motion because of the attached proposed 
evidence is unfoumled in Idaho UI law, Employer's Motion confurms to the requirements of the 
Rule and will not be summarily wsregatded by the Commission, but rather will be considered on 
its merits. Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike is DENIED. 
Reeomideration 
The issue befo:re the Commission is whether the underlying Decision in this case should 
be reversed. The Commission held that Claimant had met bis evidentiary burden to demoDStraie: 
that he quit with good cause related to his employment and that Employer's BQCOunt was 
chargeable for experience.rating pUiposes. 
A motion for reconsideration mwit be properly supported by a recitation of the factual 
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving pt.Uty takes issue. However, the 
Conmrlssion is not inclined to re-weigh eviderux: during reconside~tion simply because the case 
was not resolved in a party's favor. Where the findiDgs of the Commission are suppomd by 
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sµbstantial and competent evidence, they will not be disturbed. J!ean v. Em,Ployment Security 
Agency, 81 Idaho 551, 554, 347 P.2d 339, 341 (1959). Substantial and competent evidence is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept t.o support a conclusion. Uhl v. B™1,ard 
Medical Products, 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). Motions for reconsideration 
sh~l specifically identify the legal justification upon which the motion is based. R.A.P .P. 8(F). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has considered the conunent to R.A.P .P. 8(F), agreeing that "[t]he 
intent is to pcovide a format for legal critique, but discourage reactionary motions when a party 
merely wants the Commission to 'think it over again,"~ Kennedy v. Hagadone Ho,miytlity Co., 
159 Idaho 157, -, 357 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2015). 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the entire record 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-1368(7). Spruell v. Allied Meadows Com .• 117 Idaho.277, 279, 
787 P .2d 263, 265 (1990). In their respective Motions, Employer, and IDOL request the 
Commi:ision disregard the underlying Deci::1ion that Claimmrt quit his position with Employer on 
Jun,~ 8, 2015 for .. good cause in .connection with the employment" pursuant to IDAPA 
09~01.30.450~ and instead affinn the Decision of the Appeals Examiner finding Claimant 
ineligible for benefits. 
Employer contends that ••[t]he failure to fully consider the facts in this contes~d matter 
would result in a horrific mischaracterization of events and practices and unfairly demeans the 
character and reputation of Silverwood, Inc. and that of Matt Stevens. The statements and 
te~ony made by Claimant were both slanderous ·and perjurious."
1 Employer characterizes 
1 As discussed 1upra, Bmploy11r's attempt to submit its version ofevents I~ to Claimmt's voluntmy quit ofhis 
employment at ibis late stage of the appellate ptocess is unpersuasfve, 
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Claimant'S: decision to quit as purely personal and related to a personality conflict, something 
well--established as insufficient to es~lish good cause in Idaho UI law. 
In. its motion, IDOL states that the Commission accept'Cd "as undisputed all of the 
allegations and statements of purported fact made by Claimant [ ... ] and bis witnesses" despite 
testimony provided by Mr. Jachim. Ms. Trumble, and Mr. Stevens at the November 12, 2015 
hem:in& which. "paints fUl entirely different picture ftom the testimony of Claimant's witnesses 
who weie disgruntled former employees.'' IDOL relies on the November 12, 201S hearing 
transcript to support its contention that the Commission erroneously disregarded the siatemems 
. from Mr. Jachim, Ms. Tramble; and Mr. Stevens in its Deoision. 
~ployer's Appearance at Bearing. Employer contends that it did not appear or 
provide evidente at hearing because it believed IDOL would tend to its interests. This argument 
.is not well taken. Even if IDOL appeared at the Nov~ber 12, 2015 bearing, its role is not to 
adv~ an employer's position in UI proceedings or to provide input on events to which it was 
nµt , participant The contention that Employer sbowd be given special treattnent at this stage of 
appeal because it decided to opt out of the earlier proceedings is unpersuasive. 
Support for a Finding or Good Cause. In the underlying Decision, the Commission 
found that Claimant met his burden to demonstrate he had good cause to quit because "the tenns 
•and conditions of Claimant's employment were substantially changed" when Employer hired Mr. 
Stevens, and that Claimant complained about the unsafe working conditions under Mr. Stevens 
to Employer on multiple occ:asions without having bis concerns addressed. Employer and IDOL 
disagree that Claimant's employment tenns and conditions substantially changed such to justify 
his decision to quit. IDOL particularly contends that '"the law does not support the finding that 
ORDERDENYING RECONSIDERATION -10 
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Claimant had 'good cause' for quitting, specifically that the conditions of Clai
mant's ' 
employment did not substantially change and Claimant •'did not try to address the concerns
 or 
issues he had with Stevens on the day he quit.,, 
Employer and IDOL both contend that Claimant quit over what essentially amounted to a 
personality conflict with his supervisor. IDOL points to numerous cases wher
e the 
Of ... Commission has observed that a personality conflict. standing alone, is not suffici
ent to 
establish 'good cause• [ ... ), and that a Claimant cannot expect work to occur without 
friction or 
stress." The Commission agrees that a personality conflict with a coworker does not 
rise to the 
level of 'good cause~ under Idaho law. However, the record also reflects that Claimant's con
flict 
with. Mr. Stevens was more than a personality conflict or a rejection of Mr. St
evens' 
management style. As developed in the testimonies of Claimant and his fonner cowo
rkers, 
Claimant had significant concerns that his safety and the safety of the public were 
bejng 
C9JJ1Promise4 by the decisions Stevens made concerning maintenance work. In short. the rec
ord 
reflects that Claimant had legitimate concerns about the safety culture at Silverw
ood, Jno., 
concerns that he could not get a response to from management. 
At the August 5, 2015 Appeals hearing, included in the record of the Appeals Examiner
 
as Claimant's Exhibit Bl / Addendum #2, Claimant testified to events at work when Mr. S
tevens 
asked him to perfonn tasks that Claimant believed would place him and others in haml's w
ay. 
Claimant's first letter, dated April 4, 2014 and addressed to Human Resources and Safety 
Management, referenced Claimants conce.ms about the safety of working' at Emplo
yer's park; 
''Under oo circwnst.ance do I wish to be unnecessarily killed or kill someone else for 
any reason, 
nor. I am sure, do any of my co-workers - however. that is the real possibility at this ti
me - and 
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at a higher level than at any other tune when we were working under our former Maintenance 
~tor." (Exhibit, p. 10.) C.lainwrt. testified on August 5, 2015 that "{a]s time progressed and 
he proved that his knowledge level of acl:Ual ride maintenance was so low tha4 uh, it was nothing 
short of an, a safety h87.al'd for everybody a.rouwi.,, (Addendum #2, p. 14, ll. 6-8.) 
Of the six fonuer employees called to testify at bearing, four discussed their safety 
experiences while working for Employer under Mr. Steven's supervision. Their teeollections 
parallel Claimant's account of events during the year prior to his voluntary quit. Rich Morga
n, 
who worked for Employer from 2001 until 2014, was the mainteuance manager. (Transmpt, p. 
113.) He testified during the November 12. 2015 hearing that ~\ .. there was some carpontcrs 
wolking on a building and I says, hey, you know, those guys need to be hamessed and tied~ 
because 1t's over six foot high and one supervisor -- or manager says, it's okay, we have it 
handled." (Transcript, p, 117, ll. 16-20.) Claimant testified on November 12~ 2015 that Mr. 
Morgan tried to smooth things over between the employees and Mr, Stevens, but that "{h]e 
couldn't explain any better to Matt Stevens how things worked than I could" (Transcript, p. 52, 
U. 9-10.) Mr. Morgan's employm~t was later temlinated. (Transcript, pp. 118~120.) 
Rick Coate, who worked for Employer from 2003 until 2014. was a maintenance 
inspector teclmicilUl- (fraMcript, p. 126.) Mr:. Coate te~fied at the November 12, 2015 hearing 
that he did not.have any negative encounters with Mr. Stevens, but that he stroggled witb what 
he cbamcterized u Mr. Stevens• "lack of .management ability and his lack of knowledge of the 
industty.', (Transcript, p. 129, 11. 8-9.) Mr. Coate filed a complaint with HR on April 6, 2014. 
(Bx,bibit. p. 34.) The complaint alleges that when Mr. Stevens told Mr. Coate that he could paint 
in a ~ tent, Mr. Coate responded that the fiberglass he was working wilh was temperature 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION w 12 
~027 
Page 214
10/2'5/2017 16: 15 FAX 208 752 1900 Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law 
f4l 028 
_.i..-___ .... ___ fl ... E......-. ______ ___,l,..__ _ _ 
,sensitive. and that Mr. Stevens reacted angrily. (Exhibit, p. 34.) MT. Coate was questioned at 
'hearing by Claimant's attorney and testified that after he made bis complaint, there was no 
response from n:i.anagement, and Mr. Stevens' communication with Mr. Coate completely 
ceased. (Transcrip4 p. 129.) Claimant's April 4, 2014 letter presents a similar account of this 
encounter; "There was an issue involving fiberglass and Matt Stevens didn't think it was done 
'right~, so he calied in anothel' pro. who said Rick;s work was good. Shortly thereafter, Rick 
Coate was fired." (Exhibit, p. 13.) Claimant testified to a similar experience: 
They forced me to put together parts that were, um, environm.entalwsensitive ~ 
uh, in a dusted zone, because they have a carpenter shop, blowing sawdust all 
over it, Then I couldn't get my job done; [ ... ] I started having problems with it 
when I put it back together. I tried to fl.um it out - all the best I cottld - all the 
hydraulics that carry ~erybody up to the top of the towers. 
(Addendum#2,p. 26, 11. 24-26; p. 27, 11. 5-7.) 
Floyd Brown worked in maintenance for Employer from approximately 2008 until 
February 201.S. (Transcript, pp. 135-136.) He alleged during the November 12, 201S hearing 
that he had multiple disagreements over safety with Mr. Stevens, testifying that 
A [ .•. ] they wanted me to press the spherical bearings out, (unintelligible) theIDt 
and press them back in. Well, I told him you cannot do that. Once you press out 
a spherical bearing it is compromised. It has to be replaced. He kept saying,. no, 
do it this way and I told him I'm not going to do that, because my name is on the 
repair and factory recommendation is you replace those spherical bearings every 
two years and I had already ordered those spherical bearings the year before to do 
so this year and so when he - Dan O
1Ham.blin took off for a week. I went ahead 
and I did what I had. to do on safety concerns. So~ I replaced those spherical 
bearings and then, right after that is pretty much when I got fired. 
[ ... ] 
Q; Okay. And were Mr. Johnson and other employees aware of replacing the 
bearings and tenn.ination shortly afterward? 
A. Yes, sir. Because l went and talked to Dale about it first. Mr. Johnson. Dale. 
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Because.he 11m more experience than.I do and I asked him about that and he said, 
no, thank God he had changed and. then, we called the professional -- called the 
factory and the factory said. no, if you press them out they have to be replaced. 
They are -- they are compromised once you press those spherical bearings out. 
Q. Okay. 
A. You caimot press them back in, so we did. 
Q. And these -- and this directive from the factory, were either Mr. O'Hamblin or 
Mr. Stevens ~e aware of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And the pillars of the Corkscrew, too. BeQause the pillars -- if I remember 
correctly1 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 pillars were moving in the ground. We brought 
that to the ~ttention of Chris Lipi~ I mean they were movi:ng on the trade. to hold 
llP the track and I wouldn't sign off on it and so we brought Chris Lipis out there 
and everybody else and a bunch of mechanics signed off on that piece of paper, 
which I still have,. that we wouldn't sign off on i~ becaue those pillars•· it was 
dangerous - too dangerous to .run. Well, Matt Stevens made us run it anyway. 
Q, So, :Mr. Stevens ovemtled you and the other employees when it came to 
operating an unsafe ride? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(TJ'3Jl8Cript; pp. 1421 11. 13 .. 25; 143, IL 1, 8-25; 1441 11. 1-14.) Mt. Brown went on to testify that 
Mr. Stevens tennmated the original maintenance staff and hlstead employed workers ftom a 
temp service, which escalated his concerns about safety and work perfonnance. {Transcript, p. 
145.) Claimant's March 23, 2015 letter addressed to Human Resources, Safety Management, 
General Manager, and Owners similarly states that ''Floyd Brown was recently terminated for 
maintaining ~'s l]linimum safety requirements.11 (Exhibit, p. 13.) Clabnant was 
asked at the August S, 2015 hearing if there were " ..• any examples of. uh, where you were going 
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to do something safer, more effectively; and either Stevens or somebody he put above you, 
overruled you?" (Addendum #2, p. 28, ll. 24.) 
Well, um, my rebuild on the hyd(aulie and pneumatic systems for the rides and 
stuft'was, uh, something I would have liked to have seen a little safer. I can't get 
the parts. l'm told to put other parts on different things. We put pans on wooden 
roll~-9oasters that weren't manufacture authorized Ub, we put wheels and brake 
fins on them. We rebuilt brakes that we had no business rebuilding [sic] ... and 
then we were told to put them back on. 
(Addendum #2, p. 28, 11. 5.11.) 
Curtis King was a certified welder for Employer from 2013 W1til he quit in January 2015. 
Mr. King testified at the November 12, 2015 hearing that he quit because Mr. Stevens promised 
him more money that never materialized, and that the working conditions were "just about 
unbearable.,. (Transcript, p. 156, U. 10-14.) He testified that Employer used uncertified welders 
on structural portions of rides despite a requirement to use certified welders. (franscript, p. 1S7-
158.) Mr. King tcmfied that, as a result, many of the welds were done improperly, and that it 
was concerning enough to bring the issue to Mr. Stevens' attention. (franscript, p. 158-159.) 
A. Well, the structural .... the size oftbe rides there is 10,000 people a day on an 
average that comes through the patk. I was afraid that somebody might get hurt 
~r. that it might COIJJ,e apart, whether there were people on the rides or people 
belowthe rides that -- that could end up injured or even dead. 
Q. Okay. And after you made Mr. Stevens aware of the improper welds, were 
they ,.,. were they repaired? 
A. No, sir. Some of them were, but not all of them. 
(franscript. p. 160~ ll. 12-21.) Mr. King could not testify as to whether or not Claimant bad 
knowledge of the improper welds on the rides. Claimant was asked at the Augt1$t 5, 2015 
APJ'eals hearing if all of the welders at the park were licensed. Claimant responded: 
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They' re supposed to be when they touch anything that the public goes on. It 
can't be done by anybody that's \lllcertified. And one of the group leaders is 
.l;IJlcertified. and failed twice in trying to be certified. And I've witnessed that 
man personally mysel( welding on parts that he had no business welding on, 
legally. 
~031 
(Addendum #2. pp. 15, 11 11-16.) Mr. Stevens testified at the November 12, 2015 hearing that 
only certified welders worked on the .structural components of the rides. (Transcript, pp. 88.) 
Mr. Morgan also testified that there were uncertified welders welding on ridCIS where only 
certified welders should have been allowe.d to weld, and that he had been trying to get mOie 
people certified to deal with the problem. (Transcript, p. 123.) He also testified that they had 
trouble keeping their one certified welder ''because Mr. Stevens promised him something and 
woutdn•t give it to him and be said that's -- you know, I found another job.H (Transcript, p. 124, 
ll. 4-6.) 
Claimant testified to the difficulties presented by the high turnover following the 
supervisory placement of Mr. Stevens. When the Appeals Examiner asked Clailllant for 
examples of interference with his job after Mr. Stevens hired people with less experience than 
the ones who had bee,n fimi, Claimant responded, 
Well~ I can't communicate with these people. I mean, they don't know what 
you•re talking about, I mean they have to ... everybody has to start &om scratch 
and leam all over. [.'..] The safety issues were going through the roof, because 
there was a lot more mistakes be:ing made, on a regular basis, ~ than there ever 
were. 
(Addendum #i, p. 17. 11. 1"6, 18-20,) Mr. Stevens testified on November 12, 201S to the 
specialized knowledge that Claimant possessed as compared to bis own regarding certain rides at 
tile park: 
I mean you got to understand that Dale was working on that thing for seven years.-
so when he would talk abo1,1t the ride he knew exactly the t:enninology for each 
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piece and part to it. Coming in, you know, new - there is only, you know, like 
four of those in the world and coming in new to the job I didn't know every 
aspect of the ride at the time[ ... ]. 
(Transcript, p. 84. LL 19-25.) The Appeals, Examiner asked Claimant durlllg the August 
5, 2015 hearing why he believed his conflict with Mr. Stevens rose to the level of good 
cause suftldent to force him to leave his job; Claimant responded: 
So I don't know where qualification comes in when personal issues are presentt or 
at least apparent to, you know, why the num was hired. At the same tim.e, I 
should never have been subjected to laek of knowledge. I have absolutely zero 
ability to go above me, if nobody knows more than me. And I'm not necessarily 
the person that needs to run things. And why should be public be subjected to 
that as well? That's a safety issue for them as well as me. 
'41032 
(Ad,dend11m #2~ p. 24, 11. 17-19, 24~26; p. 25, 11. l•S.) When asked if Mr. Stevens wu willing to 
listen t.o or take advice from Claimant, and other, more experienced! employees on the 
maintenance crew, Claimant testified in the negative, stating that "[Mr. Stevens] bucked all the 
ex.periencedemployees; in fact. he firedmostofthem." (Addendum #2t p. 21, 11. 2>26.) 
Under IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03, good cause must reach the standard of reasonableness as 
lY)plied to the average man or woman~ and whether .good cause to quit exists depends on whether 
a reasonable person would consider the circumstances resulting in the unemployment to be real. 
su.bstantiaL and compelling. Such reasonable person, as opposed to a supersensitive person, 
would have felt compelled by necessitous circumstances to quit the employment to constitute 
good cause. Teevan v. Office of Attom!U' General, 130 Idaho 79, 936 P.2d 1321 (1997). The 
Claimant must also establish that the circumstances were related to his working conditions, job 
task!!.. or employment agreement. IDAPA 09,01.30.450.02. Finally, Claimant must also 
demonstrate that he explored viable optiObS to preserve the employment relationship prior to 
quitting, as "the policy of the law is to encourage the employer and the employee to adjust their 
differences and thus avoid interrupting the employment" Hart v. Dear.y High $shooL 126 Idaho 
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SS0~553, 887 P.2d l057, 1060 (1994) (citingCustgm MytPacking Co. v. Mg 85 Idaho 374, 
384. 379 P.2d 664, 670 (1963)). '"Good cause, within the meaning of 1.C. § 72wl366(5) is not 
susceptible of an exact definition. Rather, the meaning of these words must be determined in 
each case from the facts of that c~.,, Ellis v. Northwes(fr.uitA Produce, 103 Idaho 821. 822, 
6S4 P.2d 914, 915 (1982). 
It is well--est.ablished that "it is within the Commissioa,s province to decide what weight 
should be given to the facts presented and the •conclusions drawn from those facts." Zapata v. 
J.R. Simttlot CQ.. 132 Idaho 513, 514, 975 P.2d 1178~ 1179 (1999); see Harrjs v. Indepcp:tgt 
School Dist. No, 1, 154 Idaho 917, 303 P.3d 604 (2013); Fi&,_v. The Home De_pgt, 151 Idaho 
509t 260 P.Jd 1180. (2011); Knowlton v. Wo.odRiyer MediC@! ~- lSI Idaho 135, 2S4P.3d 
36 (20.11); ~vens-Mc~ V. Potlatch Corp •• 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008); Jar1 x~ 
Swift &Co., 93 Idaho 546,467 P.2d 589 (1970); Diffegpaffer v. Clifton, 91 Idaho 751,430 P.2d 
497(1967). 
The Conumssion agrees with IDOL that the terms and conditions of Clahnant's 
employment were not substantially changed when Mr. Stevens was hired by Employer. 
However. upon t"eview ofthe record, the Commission still finds that Claimant had good cause to 
quit bis employment. Claimant testified that he had disagreements with Mr. Stevens over several 
months. (l'ranscript. p. 32.) Mr. Stevens testified that the only employee he had confrontations 
with was Claimant (Transcript, pp. 86•87.) He also testified that the only complaints he ever 
received were fiom Claimant. (Transcript, p. 91.) If this were a case of a pure personality 
conflict between Claimant and bis supervisor, we would agree that Claimant had not met his 
burden demons1l'ating that he bad good cause to quit his employment, However, the record 
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presents many examples of safety complaints lodged with upper management by employees at 
Silverwoo.d, Inc., regarding the management style and decisions of Mt. Stevens. (Exhibit. pp. 9-
10, 12-19, 34--35, 36; Transcript. pp. 40, 49•50, 63-65, 96-97, 109, 117-118, 123, 129-131, 131· 
.132, 141, 158-159.) It also indicates that there were confrontations between Mr. St.evens and 
other employees relating to safety, schedulin~ and general trea1ment of the staff. (Exhibit. pp. 
33~36; Transcript, pp. 115-117, l60N161.) Claimant himself testified at the August S, 2015 
hearing that th.El argwnent between Mt. Stevens and hiIDself began over an issue with the brakes 
on a specific rollercoaster. "I told him that the brakes probably work a little too good now, 
because they stQp too much fastet. I says, 'They work great if you want to give somebody 
whipl~' and that seemed to make him madder." (Addendum #2, p. 11, ll. 23-26.) Based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, Claimant's awareness of his coworkers' struggles to be heard by 
niall8gement regarding their safety concems and the subsequent terminatiom of some of those 
employees combined with his personal distrust of his supervisor to elevate his· reasons for 
quitting above that of a simple personality conflict As Claimant stated on Jw.e 24, 201S, "I quit 
because there was Q:O possible way to communicate with these people. There ~ no way to 
have an open conversation about what it [sic] going on with safety." (Exbt'bit, p. 7.) The 
circumstances lea,ding to Claimant's voluntary severance of his employment would be · 
considered real, substantial, and coropelUng to an average person standing in the Claimant;s 
place. Burroughs v. EmJ;!loyment Security Ae;enc!, 86 Idaho 412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963). 
Employer contends that Claimant . made no attempt to preserve the employment 
relationship on the day he quit Employer also notes in its Motion that there were actions taken 
regarding his complaints prior to June 8, 2015, specifically that Silverwood, Inc., "did an internal 
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investigation ..• and found [the accusations] to be unfowided and therefore. required no further · 
action. u This understanding is reflected in the record, in that Claimant lodged bo1h written and 
verbal concems over a year long period with little 1l!SpOQSe from Employer. (Exhibit pp.9-19; 
Transcript pp. 30. 32.;33t 39-42, 46-50, 63•64, 66, 78.) It is undisputed that Claimant did not 
detail his problems to Ms. Trumble on June 8. 2015, but he testified at the August S, 2015 
hearing that he told her, "I'm gonna have to, I'm gonna have to leave because he's going to get 
.somebody hllrt or killed. And I don't want it to be me.» (Addendum #2, p. 13, ll. 16-18.) 
Additioually. the record reflects several attempts on Claimant's part to pursue a continuanoe of 
the employment relationship prior to the date of his sq,aration, including verbal and writtm 
complaints to HR and reaching out to the owner of the park~ Claimant testified that he submitted 
his March 23, 2015 " ... letter to the owner, since HR didn't respond to my last one, or anybody 
else's. that 1 still had more growing concerns abom the safety. and the, um, trutbability .. factor of 
the individual that they hired to run the place, or at least the. miintemmce department." 
(Addendum #2, p. 9, 11. 7•11.) When Claimant's Coumel asked if any of Claimant's com:ems 
about Mr. Stevens were addressed by Employer, Mr. Jac:him replied, .. Again, your request for 
subpoena. was denied. We are not going to discuss that." (TI'aQscript, p. 65, 11. 21-22.) Mt. 
Jachim all~ed at the November 12~ 2015 hearing that an email was sent to Claimant in 
MatCh 2015 relating to the outcome of Employer's internal investigation, yet Employer declined 
to produce a copy of the email for the, Appeals Examiner.2 The record similarly reflects that Paul 
Nonon, the owner's son/General Manager of Silverwood, Inc .• spoke with Claimant after the 
March 2015 letter was sent to Employer. (Transcript. pp. 44-4S.) Claimant summarized this 
i ~ ono day later he wu responded to and I havo a copy of the o-mail - wbk:b. again, we are not goillg to 
mlose- by the owner oflhe c;ompany." (Translript, p. 66, 11. 9,11.) 
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conversation, as when he brought up some issues, 
... that were a little bit of more concern than others. wn, about the conditions of 
some of the rides; um, and the degree of danger that we were in with those rides, 
versus [ ... ] not Um, they were under the impression that we were out to kill 
somebody,[ ... ] which wasn,t the case. There was nobody on the maintenance 
crew that I know o~ that was knowingly and willingly interested in getting 
anybody injured or k:Hled because most of the people I warked with. their family 
and friends came to this place. 
-- -------
~036 
(Addendum #2, p. 9.11. 24-26; p. 10; lL 1-7.) When asked what the results were of his attempts 
to preserve the employment relationship. Claimant responded that "The meeting with the 
{General Manager] was non-committal. I got the feeling that he was just trying to do damage 
control There were no changes made." (Exhibit, p~ 5.) Claimant testified that there was no 
followup to that meeting. (Transcript, p. 46;) Idaho law does not require a claimant to pursue 
every viable option prior to quitting employment. Reedy v. M. H. King Co., 128 Idaho 896,920 
P.2d 915 (1996). The Commission's conclusion that Claimant complained many times to 
Employer's human resources department and to Employer's owners, specifically describing his 
concerns, and that Employer made no effort to resolve those concerns, is supported by the recprd 
and will not ~ disturbed. 
Conclusion 
Employer and IDOL both contend that the events leading up to Claimant's decision to 
quit amowt to nothing more than a personality conflict with and insubordination to Claimant's 
new supervisor. However, Claimant's position that he and Mr. Stevens had a significant barrier 
to productive communication combined with Claimant's concerns about the safety of the 
working conditions elevates the circumstances leading to the voluntary quit beyond a personality 
conflict with his supervisor. The weight of the evidence of record and the testimony presented at 
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h~ng demonstrates that Claimant perceived safety issues stemming from management 
decisions made by his .supervisor, and that upper management was not addressing those issues as 
to alleviate the concf,mlS of Claimant or his coworkers. 
Toe Commission determined in the underlying Decision that Claimant met bis burden to 
show he quit with good cause related to employment and that he attempted to preserw the 
employment. relatiomhip prior t.o quitting. The Commission reviewed the entire record in 
reaching its conclusions, including the August S, 2015 and November 12, 2015 hearing 
transcripts, procedural hist.ory, and exhibits. The Commission bu authority to determine what 
evtdence is persuasive. Although the underlying Decision finds that Claimant quit with good 
came relating to employment, such a finding does not imply that the disputed ·oirewastantes 
surrounding the separation were ignored. Rather, all testimony provided at hearing was 
considered dwing the deliberation of the case. There has been no new factual or legal basis 
presented as to why the Commission's Decision should be reversed. Employer's disagreement 
with the outcome of the case, based on facts it now alleges are incorrect, is insuffi~ient legal 
basis to overturn the underlying Decision. Employer had several opportlmities to cOtTeet what it 
clearly believes are factual mismatements by the Claimant, yet failed to do so in a timely fashion. 
Claim.ant's position has. been consistent regarding his safety concems, and the evidence 
dem:o~es an effort on his part to negotiate for change regarding the management and safety 
practices of Mr. Stevens. Both Employer and IDOL desire the Commission to reexamine the 
record and come to a different conclusion; .however, we find that substantial, competent cvidenc:c 
supports the prior finding of C~'s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. 
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Accordingly, Employer and IDOVs requests for reconsideration are DENIED. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7), this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated. 
ORDER 
Based upon ~e foregoing analysis, Employer and the Idaho Department of Labor's 
Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthi.s~k-flldayof 6,J·/;t~ ,2016. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thoinas E. Limbaugh. Com.missioner 
~-Q_ 
ThomasP.Baskin,Co~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the yt-#1 day of ~Lkv: 2016~ a true and 
correct copy of ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATI N was served by regular United 
States mail upon each of the following: 
DALE G JOHNSON 
C/O JAMES MCMILLAN 
S 12 CEDAR S1REET 
WALLACE ID 83873 
SILVERWOOD INC 
C/O CHARLES B LEMPESIS 
1950 BELLERIVE LANE #110 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STA'l'E HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
kc 
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State of Idaho 
Department of Administration 
Risk Management Program 
C,L. •1111'CR" 01TER 650 West State Steet Room 100 
Oovanor P.O. Box 83720 
Robcri L Gedcl• Boi:,e, ID 83720-0079 
Director Tc:lqihone (208) 332-1869 or FAX (208) 334-SJIS 
February 06, 2017 
JAMES MCMILLANt ESQ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
RE: State Agency: 
State File #: 
Date of Loss: 
Dear Mr. McMillan, 
Department of Labor 
2016-0826-001 
8/28/2015 
We have completed our review of the tort claim you submitted on behalf of your clien~ Dale 
Johnson. 
While the Risk Management Program does handle tort claims filed against the state itself and 
state agencies, it does not handle claims involving workers compensation~ wiemployment 
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LA \VUJ~NCE 0. WASDEN 
A'ITOR.."JEY GENERAL 
DOUG Wft~RTH.--- ISB# 3660 
De_puty Attm·ney Ck:neral 
Id.a.ho Department of Labor 
317 W. Maio. Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
·relephone: (208) 332~3570 
doug., wer.fh.@lat,,,r.idaho.gov 
STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC·T 
201lNOY-I Pt1 31 I. 
COURT 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'l'HE F!RS'J.l JUDI.CI.AL DISTRICT OP THE 
STA'rF; OF' IDAHO, IN AND Ii"OR rrHE COU:t\1TY OF BONNEit 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
PlaintH't: 
vs. 
S'l'ATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bure1m Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hf'..aring Exaniinet, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Reoords 
Clt&todian, and JOHN A1'iil JANE 
DOES I -V in their individual and 
official caparjties as effl:ployees of the 
State of Idaho, 
_____ ne_fendants_. ___ J 
CaSfJ No. CV-17-04,23 
SECOND MEM.ORANDUM J.N 
OPPOSITION 'fO MO'l'ION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Thia memorandum i"'l submitt~d by the Idaho "Department r,f Labor {"IDOL") 
in response to the "Memorandu:m. in Support of Motion for Reoonsideration and 
Motion to AUow Additional Discovery" (""Plain.ti.fl's M.omorandum'', .filed herein by 
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Plaintiff Dale ,Johnson r.PJ.ainiil'r). 
Plaintiff's notif'..e of tort d.u.im was not timely preaented. to the Ida hf, Secretary 
of State•s Office. Because of this fatal tlaw~ the Court properly dismissed his 
Compla.int und. the.re i"' no sound reawn1 fpr the Court to reooMider it.s docl.slon. 
Plaintiff a negligence claim "arose r,r .reasonably should have bt:en dis<.t0ve~d. » 
I.C. § 6•005, on or before the d·aoo of the second .Appeals E:xamir.1er's decision, 
November .25, 2015. O.n tllat daw, Plaintiff was fully awure of IDOI.:s alleged 
negligence - the missing transcript and all of the other facts relating to supposed 
impror,rieties oc-cnrring during the Appeals Examiners' proa:edings. Plaintiff also 
was awan; on that date of. tho attomey fees he:.: incurred because of that alleged 
negligence and. the .reaultant delay in having bis appeal ht~ard hy the Id.a hr, Industrial 
Commis.,ion ("Commission'"). Plainti£rs Notice of Tort Claim was not pre.sented to 
the Idaho See.ret.ary of State,s Office within one hundred eighiy (180) days of 
Nr,vemher 25. 2015, and. thu.,, his la.wsuit agai.nst JDOLi$ bar.red by operation of the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act fITCA"). 
Plaintitl"deS{.Tibes IDOL's alleged negHgence in Paragraph 2:7 of his Complaint 
as fr,llows~ 
The Dt..'l)ar.t.D:u.mt of La~r's failure/neglect to pn,serve a rer..ording· of tl1e 
Atlgu.1t 5, 2015 hearing~ the failurelneg1ect to issue necessary subpoenas 
timely, 1 the failure to produce a transcript, (and refusal to utilize 
1 Plaintiff never explain.• how the faihtre of an: Appeals Exarnine:r to iasue liUbpoem1a f:(,uld. 
poa.,.ibly h~ caused him injury when the f.ailurtl to :is,me subpoenas d.id xsot contribute t(i 
any delay and when, notwjthetanding the f'.ailure Y, is.ll3-1te eubp11tmas, Plaintiff preve.ilEid 
before the Commission. PHhapa it ie. because this t>art of Plaintilf s clf.drn w. !XKir.B of a oori 
itequi·t·ur than tlte rernainr;IP,r. 
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Pla.intiff e available copy of audio and transcript lcre.ated by Plaintiffs 
wifej) anrl .rr;!sultin~ delay was- a r,0nsef4ue.nce. of nfjgligen.ce by one or 
more Department r,f Labor employees. 
It is ~ignifk.ant to not.e that Plaintiff alleges no a1leg<:!dly negli.ge.nt actions by IDOL 
occurring after tht, aecond Appeals Enmi.ner.·s decision on November 25, 2015. 
Also of import is Plaintiff Ill admi88ion in his memorandum supporting 
reconsideration tlla.t he in fact suffered actual da1nage before Novembf.!r 25. 2015: "at 
t.he time (jf the se<.'Ond unfavorable d.ooision. [November 25, 2015], the only damages 
which -P..fr .. JohnWJn could determine with any degree of certainty were attorne}'"S' fees 
and oosts." Plaintif.ra Mt.imor.undum, p.7. 
Int.he analogous area of statutes oflimitatir,n, J.dah.o eases hold that the clor-,k 
start.'!! to run on .filing a claim ·when j'some damage" has OC('..nrred. Steph§rul..L 
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 4-1~ 46 (1984},. quoti111J W. Prosser. Handbook 
of the Law of Torts§ 30 (4th ed. 197lj. 
On or bl!fore November 25, 2015, P1aintiff knew of the a.ct.ions of IDOL th.at he 
alleges were negligent, and he also had actual knowled.ge of "some d.a.m.a.ge .. -· the 
att-otney fees he incur.red during the second Appeals F..xamin-er proceedings, The fact 
that he may have hecom.e aware of additional dam.ages occurring thereafter is of no 
mome11t. Thi~ poi.nt was .mad~ clear in R.ahlht~ v •. CityJ:i(Spirit .. Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 
227•28, 560 P.2d 1316, 1317•18 (1977), where the Idaho Supreme Court reject.ed a 
simila1· argument: 
He-re, it is clr:1ar that rJn fhe date of the incident phli.ntiff Ralt)hs was 
aware that he ·had ber:1r1 attacked, e.ssa.ulted and battered, that the Chief 
of Police was alleged.1y negligent in ·permitting t:he attack and ihat the 
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city of Spirit Lake was neglig\!nt in employing a man of Newt,m'a alleged 
char.a<..-t.<.:ristieii a.lld in failing t<l discharge him. Thf.! funt that- plaintiff 
Jtalphs be<:am~ at a later time awe.re of additio.nal iirjuriea or drimsges 
is noi suffid.ont to excuse his earlier knowledge of the alleged wro~..ful 
act of the physical assault upon him caused by the theu existing alleged 
negligenoe of Newton and the dty of Spirit Lake. 
Plaintiff tries to circumve-nt the incontrovertible fad that his .negligence claim 
"aJV>se ,,r .re8.S9na:bly should hove- been disr..ov·ered" on or befo~ No·v-emhe.r 25, 2015, 
by qtteJ.D.pting to squ~eze his claim with.in the narrow category of cases in wh.icb a 
·~continuing tort" has ber,n found. Plaintiffs Memwandum, p.9. A close reading of 
these cases demonstrates that Plaintiff is comparing apples t.o ora.ngcts. 
First, C_l!rtis .. v ... Fi:rth, 123 Idaho 5~8, H04, 850 P.2d 749, 755 (1998), is 
inapposit<➔ lJ1~cau8f! that case involved a claim of intentional inflfotio:n of emotional 
dist.res..~ with "a series of acts over a period of time, ra.ihor than one sing.le act causing 
severe emotional distress." Here, all of the alleged wrongful cond11et by IDOI~ 
00<.-urred ,;n or before November 25, 2015. See ComJ>laint, ,r .2. 7 (quoted supra}. 
'fhe nar.rr,w· holding of Qqr.ti.!11 is- furt.her d.einonstrated by the Court of Appeal.s' 
2009), in which n plaintiffs <.-onti.n.uing tort a.rgWlltmt prov,:id unavailing: 
The Cm::tii court caut.ioned,, however, that the continuing tort 
doctrin.e "dOEis not throw open the dooie to 1mrmit filing tbt!-Be actions at 
any time.'1 Rather~ 
[t]he courts which have adopted this continuing tort theory 
have generally stated that the statute of1il)lita:tion.s is only 
held ill. e.beyance until the tortio11s ~s cease. A.t that point. 
t;he statute begins to run. If at some fJr>int afte.r the r3ta_tute 
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has rt.m t.he t.or.tio:us acts bt?gin again, a 11ew r..au.,e of action 
ma:y arise, hut only as to thosE! d.a.mage@ which havt! 
accrued s.inoe the new tortiollB oonduct began . 
. CJ,Utis, 123 Idaho at 604,850 P.2d at 755 (cit~tione omitted). 'fhe dist:rict 
oou.rt here held that hecau.se Johnson's allegations in.<licated that 
McPb<:e's misconduct ooa~.ied in mid---2008 and did not 1-e1nune until 
2005, the initial f.lerifid of misconduct should be deemed to have ceased, 
and Johnson's r.ause of action accrued, iII 2003. We ag.re0 with th& 
district court's analysis. Ber.a u.im the-re was a distinct and substantial 
interruption of the alleged tortfous a<.."tivity 1hr .m01-e than a year., the 
alleged misbehavior in 2005 1}annot be $Uid to have been part ,,r an 
unceasing stream of tortious acts- tbat beg'fln in 2003. Therefore, the 
continuing tort doctrine does not apply to save froin the statute ,Jf 
limitatir,n Johnsonfs claims that are- prediettted upon preADet.-ember 7, 
2003 conduct .. 
Any a1legFJd~v negUgent <.'Onduct by IDOL ceased rm Novf.l.m.ber 25, 2015. 'l'ha.i 
fact cannot be denied a:nd bas not hr~.11. cfJntrovart.ed. There was no tortioa.s <'..onduct 
that CfJnt.inued there.after, and Plaintiff himself admits that he suft'er.ed ~some 
damage" by that date. This is not a -continuing t.ort l".ase. 
Plaintiffs notice of tort claim was presented to the Idaho Secretary of Stat~•s 
Offioo on August 25, 2016, more than one hundred eighty (180) day.e aft-er NQvember. 
25, 2015, wbir.h, ·again:, was the date his negligence claim "arose or rea8cmahly sm,uld 
have been dis<-.overed.'' I.C. § 6-905. 'l1he timely presentment r,f a not.ice of tort clai.nl 
is o. neccssaty· prc•contlitfon to filing a negligence claim against the Sta.ta. I.C. § 6--
908. Because of these :.f'e:ct.-s, and the clear man data of the ITCA, this Court properly 
di~issed Plaintiffs oomp1a.int. 
Plaintiff. facing f,he inevitable legal oonsequen.ce of his abject fail\lre to timely 
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p.rosent a notke of t.or.t claim t.,, tb.fa Idaho Se..crt!ta1-y of St:at..E!'s Off'l<.:e, ar.gu.es that his 
prfor <.'On.~titueut oomplaint to Id.a.ho's Governor and the Director of IDOL in a lotter 
dated Decem~r 6, 2015, should suffice. Mer this Court's decision dismissing 
Plaintiffs C,Jmplaint, Plaintiff or his wife or,mmunicated with varfous state offices 
attempting w invent a sh.red <If fa.ct s~pr;o.rting .Pbtintifi's baseless presentment 
the()ri()..s. "From what is essentially an int.emal note to file entr:ired by a c<Jnstitu.ent 
services. individuai at the Gow:rno-r's office, Plaintiff a~;serts that his constituent 
r.omplaint should have the legal force of a noticr~ of tCJrt claim. 
Therr::. are a numb1;:r of glaring and fatal defects with this argument. 1'1rst,. the 
staff member's note to file dated February 15, 2016, said rJnly .cease is in litigation. 
Will close." Dr:iclaration of Roee Smith. Ic~xhibit. B. Thls note sim1>ly reflected that 
·ptaintift's grievance was indeed in litigation before the Commission: on Pl.a.intiff s 
appeal from the Appeals ·Examiner's decision. Reason and oom:mon. sen.~e dt> .not 
support oontlating a now to ftle such as thls with the presentment of a tort claim 
nr,tice to the Idaho Secretary of State's Office. To do so would be contrary tt.1 the 
purposes of the ITCA Sect,nd, Plaintiffs December 6~ 2016, grievance letter to th,, 
t,"Overnor and the direct.or fails to meet the sta.tutf,ry-requirements of a. notice of torl 
claim; it does not even come cfose. I.C. § 6-907.. Third, Plaintiff advance& no Jaw 
supporting the novel assertion that an offioo of state gove-mmei1t or thf.l direetor of a. 
state agency has a duty to furwa.rd con.~tituent letters - or even bona fide notices <Jf 
tort cla.im - to the Idaho Set.-reta.ry of Stat~•s Offit-e, or fur the ovtm more radi<'..al and 
preposterous suggestion that a deputy ati:o.rney gem,rtd has an obligation to assist an 
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:individul'.ll ill perfoding a negUgent.!e daim against, a st.ate agency that is his di.ent. 
Onr:f \\"Ould think that responsibility proJ:l~rly rested with P1aintiff f.ir his a ttor.ney. 
f.'inally, no .mattf:,r how bard Plaintiff shakes hi, barren arguments in the hope 
tltat fruit may fall, thFJru is one fact he has not and cann.ot. controvert: namely, that 
the Idaho Secretary of State\t Offioe never received any letter or other docume:nt 
reJating to this matter until August. 26, 2016, when it N..'f~ived Pl.air:1tiff"s noti<.>e oft()rt 
claim. No matter how much supposition and t"..onjecture Plaintiif can attempt to 
mu.ster about state t=.tmplhyees oflDOL, the g.overn<.n~•.s office, and elsewhere, or ab,mt 
who did what with docu.ments lie sent. t'OmJ;laining of the handling uf his 
unemployment, benefits matter, only the Idaho Sac-..retary r,f. State's Office matters, 
because that is where tho ITCA mandates tort claim notit"8S to be presented. 
The 'rhird Declaration of Lisa Maw.,n renders irrelcwant end immat.erial all of 
Plaintil'fs supposition and (.-onjecture because she statks under penalty o£perjury that 
·nothiIJg was recei'1ed by th~ Idaho Secretary of State's Office relating tf, thie case 
p1i.o.r to August .25, 2016. Her dE:rlaratio:n state1; 
3. On Jwii; 16, 2017, Sept.em.her 1. 2017, and again t.oday I 
:reviewed the files of the Se<:.retary of State's Office and sea.r--...hed.for any 
records or df.fc11ments relatiing to: (a) the NtJtii-..e r>f Tort Claim that was 
filed with the Se<:retary of State's Off'rce <Jn. August 25, 2016, by Dale 
Johnson and. hi, attorney .James McMillan .alleging negligence- on the 
part of the State of Idaho ("the Notice ofTo:rt Claim"); (p) the lawiuit of. 
Dale ,Johnson v. State of Idaho, Department of Labor, et al., filed in the 
First Judicial Distii.ct of the State of Idaho, BrJnner County Case No. 
CV-17•423 (''the L8.wsuit"); and (c.) the Jetter rlatod Deoomber 6t 2015. 
ii-om Dale John.wn add1"&Ssed t.o: ''State rJf Ida.ho; Public Officers of 
At'OOUll.tability Butch Otter; Gov and Ken Edm u11da; Gr,v Ar,pointed 
IOOL" which letter i.~ attach&d he-.reto as Exhibit A ("Exbibit A''). (A 
(..'OPY cjf the Notice fJf Tort Claim is attached to my initial declar.atfon 
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herein,) 
4. 'fhe ~r..ret.a.ry of State's Office did r.tot. t'fJc-...eive any 
doeu.ments relatiug t1; the Notite of Tort Claim, or have actual or. 
r.:o:nstructive knowledge of any of the evefi:tF.i described theteina prior to 
the 1-iresentment of the Notice of T<.n.+t Claim tu it on AugUst 251 2016. 
On October 4, 2017~ ~puty Att-<,mey Gen~,ral Doug Werth forwarded to 
me a copy of the {Seeond] Declaration of Uale Johnt;0n dated September 
28~ 2017, which had attached tJ.> it a copy of a letter dated Decemhe-r 6, 
2015, from Dale Johnson addr.essed to: •JStam of Idaho; Public Offieers 
of ,Aeo<Juntability Butch Otte.r; Gov and Ke.n Edmunds; Oov Appoint.ed 
IDOL" ("E1'llibit A"). 
5. I have SE!&rched the records of the Secretary of Stat.e's 
Office and 11rinr to Oet.ober 4. 2017, the office had not roceived Itxhibit A 
or any copy thereof, in whole m· in part; and pr.for to the presentment to 
the Secretary of State'-s Office on Augu.,t 25, 2016 of the Nr,tioo ,,f T<,rt 
Claim, the Sec.reiary of State's Offi<-..e had not received any lett-r::-r or 
doeutnentation r,f any kind relating to, or descrih.ing any of thr1 events 
within, the Notice <>fT,,rt Claim. 
6. The first document Qr r,ther .mcord oi any kind received by 
the Sec.retary r,f State's Office relating w the events described in the 
N,Jtice of Tort Claim was tho Notice of Tort Claim itself, which "-'1:Hi 
received b)' the Secretary of St:ate"s Offi.l'..e on August 25, 2016. 
Declaration ,,f Lisa Mi,son, pp.2•3. 
T·here is no g&nuine issue of materla.l iar..-t 0<.mct>..ming the facts. ~ted under oath 
in Lisa Mason's declaration.. 
A party oppr,sin_g summary judgment c'may not :rest upon the mere allegations ot 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwi.Sf: 
provided in this rule, must set.tbJ:th specific:fa.ots showing that there is a genuine issue 
f()r. trial." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Further, summary_judg.ment proceedings a.re decided ha.se<l on 
a.dmi':lsible evidence, fatlLm.Health. Llif v. I.o:u.g, 161 J.daho 50, 54, ::183 P.Sd i.220, 
1224 fO}l.6), n,;t su1>P<laition. and conjecture. 
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There is no ge.n.uine issu.e of ma tori.al fact oon.Cf'o.ming th.e fact., recited under oa.th 
in Lisa Ma.-son's declaration, and the untimely presentment of.his notice oft.ort claim. 
Consequently, Johnson's motu.m for recon.sidemtion and request for discovery should be 
denied. 
DATED tms_l ff- <lay of November, 2017. 
STATE OP !DARO 




Deputy Attoiney General 
CER1'lFICA'f-E O.J!i!.~RYICF;. 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on tbi.19 / .$ r·· of November, 2017 • I caused to be 
sar.ved a true and. correct copy of the furegoing by the fr,Uowing method to: 
Ja.mes McMillan 
Attorney a.t Law 
51& C'..-edar. Street 
Walla.oo, ID 83873 
□U.S.Muil 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATI'ORNEYATLAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7528 
Attomey for Plaintiff 
31ATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2017 NOV - 7 PH I,: 21 
COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I~V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State ofldaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
PRESENT FURTHER 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE 
lai00l/002 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintilrs Counsel will present evidence, 
witness' testimony and/or oral argument in support of Plaintiff's pending Motions, 
and will cross-examine Defendants and any of their witnesses at the hearing. 
hereon, if necessary herein. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2017. JAMES McMILLAN, 
r~. 
NOTICE-1 
.w;IMI'..._ •~ .. Mlllla• .. •<lll9(Jll71fl~ 
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~ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 7th day of November, 2017, I caused t.o 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
_U.S.Mail 
_ Overnight Mail 
_ Hand Delivered 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










11/08/17 TIME: 3:30 PM 
vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE OF IDAHO, 
ETAL. 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner Defendant / Respondent 
Atty: DOUGLAS WERTH Atty: JAMES MCMILLAN 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
CHARGE 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
330 J Calls Case 
Present: I JAMES MCMILLAN, DALE JOHNSON, DOUGLAS WERTH BY 
PHONE 
J MR. MCMILLAN? 
332 JM WANTED TO RESERVE RIGHT TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY AT THIS POINT 
NOT NECESSARY OUR MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY ... 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURTS GRANTING DISMISSAL 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
CAN BRING IN NEW EVIDENCE BUT NOT NECESSARY 
TWO ISSUES 
WHEN DID DEADLINE BEGIN AND IF AT AN EARLIER DATE WHETHER EARLIER 
COMMUNICATIONS COULD QUALIFY AS SUFFICIENT TORTE CLAIMS 
334 GOES OVER PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE 
337 ISSUE WHEN DID MR. JOHNSON DISCOVER 
ARGUMENT 
DISCOVERY RULE IN TORTE CLAIM ACT AND STANDARD IN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IS DIFFERENT, 
339 ARGUMENT 
LOSS OF RECORDING FROM FIRST HEARING, DUTY TO PRESERVE RECORDINGS 
ESPECIALLY WHEN APPELLATE DEADLINE HAD NOT PASSED 
340 WHEN DAMAGES WERE CAUSED 
2No HEARING NECESSARY BECAUSE OF LOSS RESULTED IN ATTORNEY FEES 
ARGUMENT 
343 WHEN HE DISCOVERS WHAT DAMAGES WOULD BE THAT IS WHEN 6 MONTHS STARTED 
RUNNING 
WHILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS OUTSTANDING STILL DIDN'T KNOW IF HE 
WOULD HAVE DAMAGES OR NOT, FILED AFTER HE KNEW HE WAS ENTITLED TO 
344 BENEFITS, WE SUBMIT THAT IS WITHIN TIME OF TORTE CLAIMS ACT 
ALTERNATIVELY THEY HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS AGENCIES, THEY MADE 
IT CLEAR THEY INTENDED TO SEEK RECOVERY OF THERE OTHER COSTS DUE TO 
DELAY, THEY HAVE PUT IN RECORD REQUESTS EVEN THOUGH SOME RESPONSES 
THEY WILL NOT GIVE OUT ALL INFORMATION, 
CASE NO. CV-17-423 
COURT MINUTES 
DATE: 11 /08/17 Page 1 of 3 
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346 AT VERY MINIMUM SHOULD VACATE DISMISSAL AND ALLOW US TO PROPOUND 
DISCOVERY, WHO SAW THEM, WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO SEE THEM, DUTY ON 
EMPLOYEES TO FORWARD THEM TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE, 
347 SEVERAL CASES ON PRESENTMENT (CITES CASES) 
REGARDING CONTENTS AS LONG AS IT PUTS THE AGENCY ON NOTICE IT CAN 
QUALIFY CONTENT WISE AS A NOTICE OF TORTE CLAIM, THERE WAS A STATE 
EMPLOYEE RECOGNIZED THIS COULD BE LITIGATION AND DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH 
THEMSELVES, 
349 ARGUMENT 
CONTENT WISE WE HAVE MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE OF TORTE CLAIM, 
WHETHER A PRESENTMENT MAY HAVE OR SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE, PERSONAL 
SERVICE UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOT REQUIRED, RECEPTIONIST IS 
RESPONSIBLE TO PASS IT ALONG, 
ARGUMENT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE 
EMPLOYEES TO TURN OVER TO WHO IT SHOULD GO TO, URGE THE COURT TO 
ACCEPT APRIL 29TH AS THE DATE WHEN MR. JOHNSON DISCOVERED CAUSE OF 
352 ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE 
J YOUR ARGUMENT IS CLEAR, NO QUESTIONS, MR. WERTH 
353 DW POSIT SET OF FACTS TO THE COURT 
WHAT IF DEPUTY CLERK LOST A TRANSCRIPT 
IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE RESPONSE TO A CLAIM OR ATTEMPTED CLAIM, PROTECTED 
BY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
THIS LAWSUIT IS A FALLACY CONSTRUCTED ON A FALLACY 
THIS CASE OFF THE MAP 
REQUEST TO PRESENT EVIDENCE DEPARTMENT STRONGLY OBJECTS TO THAT, NO 
355 BASIS FOR MINI TRIAL IF THAT IS THE CASE WOULD NEED MORE NOTICE, 
355 ARGUMENT WHETHER OR NOT DUTY IS A QUESTION OF LAW, NOTHING TO DO WITH 
DEPOSING 100 EMPLOYEES, NO STATUTORY OR STATE AUTHORITY, 
NO DUTY TO GO OUTSIDE THEIR AGENCY TO PRESENT DOCUMENTS TO SECRETARY 
OF STATE'S OFFICE, NO DUTY FOR THAT 
356 THIS IS REALLY A SIMPLE CASE, STATUTE REQUIRES TORTE CLAIMS BE PRESENTED 
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE, THEY RECEIVED NOTHING RELATED TO THIS 
MATTER UNTIL THEY RECEIVED NOTICE OF TORTE CLAIM, 
358 ARGUMENT REGARDING CASES CITED BY PLAINTIFF 
NO SUGGESTION THAT ANY SECRETARY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE 
RECEIVED ANYTHING, THAT IS WHAT IS BEFORE THE COURT, THE COMMUNICATIONS 
WITH DEPT OF LABOR DO NOT MEET THE STATUTES REQUIREMENTS, WITH RESPECT 
TO ARGUMENT CONCERNING WHEN THIS CLAIM AROSE I WOULD SAY THE CASE 
DISCUSSING DAMAGES FROM ASSAULT, REASONING ON POINT WITH THIS 
PARTICULAR CASE, 
FURTHER ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN ITS ORIGINAL DECISION, NO FACTS REBUTTING 
AFFIDAVIT OF LISA MASON ABOUT SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE RECEIVING 
ANYTHING REQUEST THIS COURT DENY 
408 JM ISSUE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY WAS NOT RAISED BY DEFENDANT AND NOT REASON 
FOR 
QUESTIONS OF WHEN THE 180 DAYS STARTED 
409 2ND NEGATIVE DECISION DENIED, NEGLIGENCE IN THE ERROR, DID NOT KNOW 
WHETHER HE WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN AWARDED BENEFITS 
FURTHER ARGUMENT 
414 VACATE AND SET ASIDE WE CAN DO DISCOVERY 
414 WE SUBMIT 
414 DW RESPOND BRIEFLY 
THE INDUSTRIAL DIVISION REVIEW IS DE NOVO, SEPARATE FROM WHAT OCCURS 
BEFORE APPEALS EXAMINER 
415 J MOTION PENDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
415 DW SET FORTH IN MY BRIEF THE APPROPRIATE FACTS IN LAW, URGE COURT TO LOOK AT 
CASE FISHER V CITY OF KETCHUM CITED IN MEMORANDUM, (GOES OVER CASE) 
CASE NO. CV-17-423 
COURT MINUTES 
DATE: 11 /08/17 Page 2 of 3 
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416 ARGUMENT 
419 JM FURTHER ARGUMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
EXORBITANT 
422 J MR. WORTH ANY RESPONSE 
DW BUT FOR THE PLAINTIFF FILING OF THIS CAUSE OF ACTION, IT HAD FOLLOWED THE 
REQUIREMENTS OR READ PLAIN LANGUAGE WOULD NOT HAVE FILED THIS CAUSE OF 
ACTION, 
423 J I WILL TAKE BOTH MATTERS UNDER ADVISEMENT AND ISSUE WRITTEN DECISION ON 
PL MOTIONS AND DEPENDING ON THAT MAKE DECISION OF COSTS AND FEES AND 
HAVE DECISION OUT IN 30 DAYS 
424 END 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES I-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 
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) AND ORDER DENYING 
) DEFENDANTS'REQUEST 











THIS MATTER came before the Court on November 8, 2017, for a hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery, filed on September 28, 
2017; 1 and on a Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees by Defendant State ofldaho, Department 
of Labor, filed September 28, 2017 Plaintiff Dale Johnson (hereafter, "Mr. Johnson") is 
represented by attorney James McMillan. Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor 
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(hereafter, "IDOL") is represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. Mr. McMillan and 
Mr. Johnson were present in the courtroom. Mr. Werth participated by telephone. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IDOL seeks an award of attorney's fees based upon Idaho Code§ 12-117 and§ 12-121. 
IDOL contends, first, that "Plaintiff disregarded the plain language of the ITCA [Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, LC. § 6-901 et seq.] and well-settled caselaw [sic} in filing a negligence claim that 
was not reasonably grounded in fact or law. IDOL is thus entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-117." Defendant Idaho Department of Labors ' [sic J Memorandum in 
Support of Request for Attorney's Fees (filed September 28, 2017), at 7. IDOL further contends 
that "Plaintiff ... had no reasonable basis in law or fact for bringing his claim. He frivolously 
brought or pursued his case against IDOL without foundation and in the face of the plain 
language of the ITCA and well-established law barring the claim. For these reasons, the State 
Defendants should be awarded reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121." Id. at 8-9. 
In its Memorandum of Costs, IDOL submits the following request: "33.7 hours at 
$150/hour: ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: $5,055.00" Defendants Idaho Department of 
Labor's Memorandum of Costs (filed September 28, 2017), at p. 2 (emphasis in original). See 
also Declaration of Doug Werth in Support of Idaho Department of Labor's Request for Costs 
and Attorney's Fees (filed September 28, 2017), at Exhibit A. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The defendants are the prevailing party. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) provides that "[i]n determining which party 
to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound 
1 Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery are determined in a separate 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
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discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought 
by the respective parties .... " LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, with IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss having been granted, and Plaintiff's 
Complaint for Damages having been dismissed with prejudice, the Court in the exercise of its 
discretion finds that the Defendants, IDOL and its employees, are the prevailing party. 
B. The defendants are not entitled to fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117 or§ 12-121. 
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, in relevant part: 
[I]n any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency . . . and a person, 
. . . the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
LC.§ 12-117(1). (Emphasis supplied). 
In City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012), the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: "We review decisions applying other attorney statutes for an abuse of 
discretion, see, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 848, 243 P.3d 642, 664 (2010) 
(reviewing an award under LC. § 12-121), and we now make clear that I.C. § 12-117 is subject 
to the same standard ..... " Id at 908,277 P.3d at 355 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the 
award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include 
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
LC.§ 12-121. (Emphasis supplied). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) provides: 
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Pursuant to the statutory amendment effective March 1, 2017, attorney fees 
under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court only when it 
finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in writing and 
include the basis and reasons for the award. No attorney fees may be awarded 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 on a default judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). (Emphasis supplied). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 
12-121 ... will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Idaho Military Historical 
Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,629,329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (citation omitted). 
Similarly, "[t]he district court's determination as to whether an action was brought or 
defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Id. (citation omitted). 
In Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 
(2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the standard for making that determination: 
This Court has held that an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is not 
a matter of right, and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion, 
"is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Owner-Operator 
Ind. Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public Util. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401, 408, 871 P.2d 
818, 825 (1994). When deciding whether the case was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the 
litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even 
though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. See Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812 
P .2d 73 7 ( 1991 ). The award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court and the burden is on the person disputing the award to show an abuse of 
discretion. See Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). 
Id. at 524-525, 20 P.3d at 708-709. (Emphasis supplied). 
In Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 
(2014 ), the Supreme Court clarified its ruling in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., as follows: 
Unfortunately, the standard articulated in Nampa Meridian can lead 
to the result that a party who makes claims or defenses that are clearly 
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frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation may avoid the consequences 
of that conduct and cast the burden of attorney fees on the other party, even 
if the overall view of the case establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct 
requiring the lawsuit. Arguably, a single, triable issue of fact may excuse a 
party from the aggregate of misconduct that necessitates or dominates the 
conduct of the lawsuit. This Court does back away from and clarify the 
overly strict application of Idaho Code section 12-121 set forth in Nampa 
Meridian. Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements 
of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
Apportionment of costs and fees is common even for district courts, and this step 
back from the language of Nampa Meridian is consistent with the general 
principles of apportioning costs and fees. 
Id at 632, 329 P.3d at 1080. (Emphasis supplied). 
2. Court's Analysis 
In its September 14, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order, this Court stated: 
The facts are undisputed that Hearing Examiner Mark Richmond issued a 
decision on August 5, 2015, denying Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits; that 
Mr. Johnson appealed that decision to the Industrial Commission, but because an 
audio recording of that hearing could not be found, the matter was remanded back 
to the IDOL. The facts are undisputed that on remand, after a second and third 
hearing, Hearing Examiner Janet Hardy issued a second decision on November 
25, 2015, again denying Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits; that Mr. Johnson 
appealed this second decision to the Industrial Commission; and that on April 29, 
2016, the Industrial Commission reversed the IDOL's decision and awarded Mr. 
Johnson unemployment benefits. The facts are undisputed that on August 25, 
2016, Mr. Johnson filed with the Secretary of State a Notice of Tort Claim 
dated August 22, 2016, claiming that he "had been forced to incur additional 
attorneys' fees and costs in retaining counsel to represent him in the second 
and third hearings, which would not have been necessary but for the 
Department of Labor's negligence." Declaration of Lisa Mason, at Exh. A, ,-i 2. 
Lastly, it is undisputed that the period of delay resulting from the lost audio 
recording of the August 5, 2015, hearing, was from August 5th to November 25, 
2015, when the second Appeals Bureau decision was issued. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants ' IR. C. P. 12 (b )( 1) Motion to Dismiss 
(filed September 14, 2017), at 13. (Emphasis supplied). 
For his part, Mr. Johnson has claimed that he "could not know the extent of his damages 
until the Industrial Commission's reversal of the Department's denial of Plaintiff's claim on 
April 29, 2016 .... [and that] The August 22, 2016 Tort Claim was brought within 180 days of 
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to Dismiss ( filed August 31, 201 7), at ,r 3. 
Looking at the undisputed facts as set forth above, this Court finds that Mr. Johnson's 
filing of his Notice of Tort Claim within 180 days of the Industrial Commission's decision on 
April 29, 2016, and subsequently, this action, does not rise to the level of conduct that is 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. This was a very unusual case-one need only 
consider the sequence of events: On August 5, 2015, the first hearing before the IDOL Appeals 
Bureau was held, and a decision was issued denying Mr. Johnson unemployment benefits. On 
appeal of that first decision, the Industrial Commission remanded the matter back to the IDOL 
for lack of an audio recording. Then, a second and a third hearing were held. The second 
decision denying benefits was issued by the Appeals Bureau on November 25, 2015. Finally, on 
appeal of that second decision, the Industrial Commission, on April 29, 2016, reversed the 
IDOL's decision and awarded Mr. Johnson benefits. As such, the Court finds that it was not 
unreasonable for Mr. Johnson to believe-albeit incorrectly-that April 29, 2016, was the date 
the clock began to run on the filing of his Notice of Tort Claim; and because a decision was 
issued on that date, there was a reasonable basis in fact for Mr. Johnson's mistaken belief. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that an award of fees under either§ 12-117 or§ 12-121 is improper. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees is DENIED. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this J1_ day ofNovember, 2017, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
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THIS MATTER came before the Court on November 8, 2017, for a hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery, filed on September 28, 
2017; and on a Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees by Defendant State of Idaho, Department 
of Labor, filed September 28, 2017. 1 Plaintiff Dale Johnson (hereafter, "Mr. Johnson") is 
represented by attorney James McMillan. Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor 
(hereafter, "IDOL") is represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. Mr. McMillan and 
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Mr. Johnson were present in the courtroom. Mr. Werth participated by telephone. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
Mr. Johnson has moved for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss, entered on September 14, 2017. 
The motion for reconsideration is being made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l .2(b ). 
The standard for determining a motion to reconsider under current Rule 1 l .2(b )( 1) 
[which is former Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B)] is set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 982 (2009), which provides 
that: "A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Id. at 560, 212 P.3d at 990 (citation omitted) (emphasis suplied). In Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 
Idaho 266,281 P.3d 103 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court further stated: 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B). On a 
motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible 
evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. 
See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 
1184 (2009) ( citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N Idaho, 118 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a motion for 
reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply 
the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the 
original order that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order 
was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to 
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original order was 
governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion 
for reconsideration. Likewise, when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review 
used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. If the decision 
was within the trial court's discretion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. 
On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for 
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must 
1 The Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees by Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor is determined in a 
separate Memorandum Decision and Order. 
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determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat summary judgment. In this case, the trial court was asked to reconsider 
the granting of a motion for summary judgment, so the summary judgment 
standard applied both to the trial court deciding the motion for 
reconsideration and to our review of that decision on appeal. 
Id. at 276,281 P.3d at 113. (Emphasis supplied). 
In determining IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss, matters outside the pleadings were 
presented by both Mr. Johnson and IDOL, and were not excluded by the Court; and therefore, 
IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss was treated as a motion for summary judgment under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 
P.3d 455, 459, and n.1 (2005); I.R.C.P. 12(d). Pursuant to Fragnella v. Petrovich, supra, this 
Court must apply the same standard of review on reconsideration that it applied when deciding 
the original motion to dismiss. 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113. The Court recognizes that the 
decision whether to grant or deny Mr. Johnson's Motion for Reconsideration is discretionary. 
II. DISCUSSION 
On reconsideration, this Court has considered the oral and written arguments of counsel, 
and the declarations and affidavits filed in support and opposition to the motion for 
reconsideration, to-wit: (i) Declaration of Dale Johnson, filed September 28, 2017; (ii) Third 
Declaration of Lisa Mason, filed October 5, 2017 (duplicate original filed October 10, 2017); 
(iii) Affidavit of James McMillan, filed October 25, 2017; (iv) Supplemental Declaration of Dale 
Johnson, filed October 25, 2017; and (v) Declaration of Rose Johnson, filed October 25, 2017. 
In considering the sworn statements in the foregoing declarations and affidavits, and the 
documents attached thereto, this Court has liberally construed all facts and drawn all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Mr. Johnson. Having done so, this Court finds nothing in those 
declarations and affidavits that alters the finding in its September 14, 2017, Memorandum 
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Decision and Order that Mr. Johnson failed to satisfy the presentment and notice requirements of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), LC. § 6-901 et seq., specifically, Idaho Code § 6-905. 
After liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. 
Johnson, this Court also affirms its finding that Mr. Johnson's notice of tort claim should have 
been presented to, and filed with the Secretary of State within 180 days of November 25, 2015, 
or by May 23, 2016. It was not until August 25, 2016, that Mr. Johnson filed his Notice of Tort 
Claim dated August 22, 2016, with the Secretary of State. Therefore, his Notice of Tort Claim 
was untimely. "Timely and adequate notice under the ITCA is a mandatory condition precedent 
to bringing suit," Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 936, 303 P.3d 617, 
623 (2013). The lack of timely notice by Mr. Johnson deprives this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court in the exercise of its discretion affirms its decision granting 
IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this case with prejudice. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration.to Allow Additional Discovery are denied. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery are DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDE9°. 
DATED this_\')_~ day of November, 2017. 
Barbara Buchanan 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this Jl day of November, 2017, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83878 
Telephone: (208) 752" 1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752"1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS
TRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B
ONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT 
141001 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and throug
h his counsel of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby 
respectfully moves this 
Court for its Order pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Proce
dure 52(b) and 60(b) 
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MAKING ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and 
SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT on its grant of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
and denial of previous Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds: 
1. In its denial of Plaint:i.ffls previous Motions, the Court did not set forth 
findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to its denial of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Additional Discovery, therefore the record is incomplete as to the reasons and 
bases for denying said motion, should appellate review be necessary; 
2. The representations and arguments made by Defendant Idaho 
Department of Labor in its Brief and Motion for Reconsideration before the 
Industrial Commission show actions on the part of the Department that further 
prolonged the conclusion of the proceedings regarding Plaintiff's unemployment 
benefits, and inclusion of the same in the record herein may prove instructive to the 
Court with regard to the issues raised herein. Affidavit of James McMillan, 
Exhibits A and B filed herewith; 
3. Further, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when Plaintiff 
should have discovered his cause of action, rendering the issue a matter for the Jury 
as trier of fact, rather than the Court as a matter of law. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Order Denying 
Motion for Attorneys' Fees, on file herein (in which this Court ruled that Plaintiff's 
choice of date was reasonable); and 
4. Such other reasons as may be more fully discussed in Plaintiff's Brief 
in Support of this Motion, once it is filed pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(D). 
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Oral argument is requested on this Motion. Further, pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(D), Plaintiff hereby states his intent to submit a brief or 
memorandum, and additional affidavits/declarations, in support of this Motion 
within the time allowed by Rule. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment should be 
GRANTED. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2017. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of November, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
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512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
 DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B
ONNER 
Dale Johnson, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Shoshone ) 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES 
McMILLAN IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT 
JA.MES McMILLAN, being first duly sworn on oath, de
poses and says: 
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1. I am over the age of eighteen and am competent to testify to the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I am the attorney for the Plaintiff and, as such, I am familiar with the 
facts of this case. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
Department's Brief before the Industrial Commission; 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 
Department's Motion for Reconsideration before the Industrial Commission. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2017~-
~ (~ __. ........ __ ;:..._ _______ _ 
J ES McMILLAN 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me on the 29th day of November, 2017. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMILLAN - 2 
Z:\CIIOIII~ RGooWl!dav~ of JM< (2017 11 29-.IM<~ .... 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing at Silverton 
My Commission Expires August 5, 2022 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 29th day of November, 2017, I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
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There is no doubt but that this is a volunr.ary quit case. The decision of the appeals 
examiner i!Lccurately set forth the legal principles governing these cases, and those principles will 
not be repeated at length here. Johnson has the burden of proving ''good cause" for quitting his 
job, which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Edwards v. Independence 
Service!, Ing .• 140 Idaho 912, 104 P.3d 954 (2004). 
Before he quit1 Johnson was not in jeopardy of .losing his job. Employer's human 
resources director. John Jochim, testified: 
Q. So. now would you agree that Mr. Johnson had good cause to quit 
his employment? 
A No~ he did not. In fact, I have a copy of his latest employee 
evaluation. which nothing was rated under meets expectations. This -- this 
gentleman had no fear for bis job to be terminated The only things in this 
performance review that Mr. Stevens asked Mr. Johnson to work on was to think 
before he spoke and to work on his delivery of communication, because other 
employees felt intimidated by Mr. Johnson. 
Tr., p.671 1.24 - p.68. 1.8. 
The gist of this case is that Johnson did not believe his supervisor was capable. and did 
not like it when. his supervisor told him what to do; presumably because Johnson's knowledge of 
his job was far superior to that of his supervisor. Johnson quit because of his disdain for his 
supervisor in general, or his supervisor's management style in particular. 
The governing standard in voluntary quit cases is whether claimant's employment created 
rea1, substantial, and compelling circumstances that would have forced a "reasonable person" to 
quit. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03; Meyer v, Seline Mot,ile Homes, 99 Idaho 754. 589 P .2d 89 
(1979); Teevan v. Office of Attomev Genex:al1 ]30 Idaho 79,936 P.2d 1321 (1997). The reasons 
given for quitting cannot be imaginary, trifling, or whimsical. and are not to be judged with the 
mindset of a supersensitive person. Burroughs v. Employment Security Agency. 86 Idaho 412. 
387 P.2d 473 (1963). Subjective reasons that are personal to the claimant are insufficient 
BRIEF RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, p. 2 
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IDAPA 09.01.30.450.02; Boodry v. Eddy ~akeries Cgnmany. Inc., 88 Idaho 165, 397 P.2d 256 
(1964). 
The cases are legion where the Industrial Commission has found that a personality 
conflict with one's supervisor .... which clearly was the case here -- does not create good cause for 
quitting. In deciding these cases, the Commission has often observed that a personality conflict, 
standing aJone, is not sufficient. Canon v. Emploment Division, SSO P .2d 463 (Or.Ct.App. 
1976), that a Claimant cannot expect work to occur without ftic;tion or stress, Coffey v. 
Employment Division of Lane Coun~. 567 P.2d 615 (Or.Ct.App. 1977); Buckham v. Idaho J;lk's 
Rehabilitatjgn Hospital, 141 Idaho 338, 109 P.3d 726 (2005); Brotherton v. Morg@!l. 522 P.2d 
1210 (Or.Ct.App. 1974); Uniweld Products, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla.CtApp. 1973); and 
that being 
unhappy with one's employer or supervisor is legally insufficient. Buckham, supra. 
The instant case falls squarely within those cases involving a personality conflict between 
a claimant and bis supervisor. Johnson did not respect his supervisor and knew better than hi
s 
supervisor. He had a heated argument with his supervisor and walked away from his job in a 
buff. It is respectfully submitted that this is not "good c::ause
11 and Johnson properly~ denied 
unemployment benefits. 
B. JohnSOllts Sube,,ena Due.es Tecum for Other Co1Uplaints Made A,einst His 
S11perYisor Was Properly Denied 
Johnson argues that this cue should be remanded yet again because the appeals examiner 
denied his request for a broad-sweeping subpoena duces tecum. Johnson sought from his 
employer all records of complaints and disciplinary action against. his supervisor from 2013 to 
present. R., Exhibit C7. The appeals examiner properly denied th.is request because the 
requested documents were not relevant. She wrote: 
BRlEF RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. p. 3 
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The bwden of showing the claimant quit this employment with good cause 
COMected with employment rests on claimant. However, that burden must be 
supported by evidenee and/or testimony as to what the claimant knew or 
understood at the time he quit. As the decision of the Appeals Examiner will be 
based on what the claimant knew and can support at the time he quit, any 
additional evidence or documentation the claimant received subsequent to his 
decision to quit would be irrelevant. 
R., Exhibit C8. 
As noted above, the issue is whether the circumstances at work were such that a 
11reasonable person" would have felt forced to quit. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03; Meyer; supra; 
Teeyan. supra. It goes without saying that the reasonable person standard must be applied only 
to the facts known to the Claimant. In other words; a Claimant cannot manufacture "good cause" 
with facts of which he had no knowledge. For this additional reason, the Johnson's subpoena 
request was properly denied. 
C. Johnson's Apparent Request for Remand Beeause Wim,esses Hughes and Norton 
Dltf Not Appear Is Unfounded 
Although not raised as an issue, or supported by argument or authority, Johnson requests 
that this case be remanded because two witnesses did not appear. This is the extent of his 
argument: 
Finally, the failure of Paul Norton and Sam Hughes to appear pursuant to the 
Subpoenas issued by the Department further warrant a remand for a new hearing 
in this matter. 
Claimant's Brie~ p.6. 
This argument is disingenuous. It is apparent from the record that the appeals examiner 
bent over backwards to accommodate Johnson. Johnson's attorney suggested to the appeals 
e:icaminer that the testimony of these witnesses was not earth shattering and that other evidence 
existed to make the sarne points th.at Johnson would have made with their testimony. Johnson 
agreed to rest his case without continuing the proceedings in order to obtain their testimony. Tr., 
BRIEF RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, p. 4 
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p. 150, 1.19 - p.151 1 1.6; p.151, 1.11 - p. 152, 1.3. Johnson should not be allowed to create error. 
This case should not be remanded for this reason. 
For the foregoing reasons. and those set forth in the decision of the appeals examiner, it is 
respectfully submitted that Johnson was properly denied unemployment benefits. 
~-1 
DATED tbis-!f-day of Me:rch 2016. 
DouoWERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT Of LABOR. ) 
) 
Respondent ) ______________ ) 
COMES NOW the Idaho Department of Labor (''IDOL") and moves for reconsideration 
of the Commission's decision filed in the above--captioned matter on April 29, 2016. 
Reconsideration is requested for the reasons set forth below, 
A motion for reconsideration of a Commission decision may be filed within twenty (20) 
days of the date of filing of the decision: 
IDAHO DEPARTMb"'NT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTION FOR 
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A decision of the commission shall be final and conc::lusive as to all matters 
adjudicated by the commission upon filing the decision in the o.ffice of the 
commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from the date of filing the 
decision, any party may move for reconsideration of the decision or the 
commission may reheat or reconsider its decision on its own initiative. 
J.C. § 72-1368(7). 
141014 
1. The Commission should reconsider its deeisiou because the Commission was 
una1'Vare of, or wholly ignored, substantial and snaterial facts in the record. 
Toe Commissi<>Dt in its decision, accepted as W1disputed al] of the allegations and 
statements of purported fact made by Claimant Dale G. Johnson ("Claimant'') and his witnesses: 
Employer did not participate in the Appeals Examiner
1s hearing. There 
was no evidence or testimony that would place in dispute Claimant's account of 
the chain of events leading to his separation, the description of the working 
conditions provided by his fonner coworkers, or any of the other evidence 
Claimant offered in support of his decision to quit. 
Decision and Order, p.7 (emphasis added). This statement of fact is clearly erroneous. On page 
8 of its Decision and Order, the Commission also states "[t]he jssue in this case is whether the 
uncontested circumstances Claimant described constituted 'good cause' for quitting." The issue
 
was incorrectly framed. There was evidence presented by Employer, and that evidence did 
contest Johnson's allegations. Three witnesses from Silverwood, Inc. ("Employer") testified: 
• John Jochim, Director of Human Resources at Employer, Tr., pp.62•72; 
• Julie Trumble, H~ Resources Representative at Employer1 Tr., pp.73-80; and 
• Mathew Stevens, Director of Construction and Maintenance at Employer, Tr., 
pp.82-91. 
John Jochim testified about complaints made by employees relating to Mathew Stevens. 
He testified that the complaints were all made within two weeks after one employee was fired. 
Jochim described the complaints; which were due to the fact that Stevens ran a tighter ship than 
bis predecessor: 
fT]hose complaints were about Mr. Stevens and their perception of how he was 
treating them and maybe some of his -- the way he would speak to those 
individuals - ... 
- more frankly, asking them to do their jobs and they did not like that, as their 
previous manager allowed them to wodc six hour days. Previous manager 
allowed them to leave to go home, and shovel their snow. With the new 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTION FOR 
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management style they got different expectations and when he voiced those 
expectations, certain employees didn't agree with those. 
Tr., p.63, 1.18 - p.64, 1.4. 
This testimony paints an entirely different picture from the testimony of Claimants 
witnesses who were disgruntled fonner employees. 
Further1 in stark contrast to those same former employees' description of Stevens, Jochim,
 
who as the Director of Human Resources would be in a better position to know, testified: 
Q. . .. Did they [the employees who complained as quoted above] 
express any concerns of the manner in which [Stevens] was confronting Mr. 
Johnson or the other workers? 
A. In no manner that - in fact, those were in one of the earlier appeals 
and that the Department of Labor ruled nothing that was in there was unusual or 
hostile. 
Q. Did you receive -- you mentioned you have been working there 
since 2010. Did you receive any complaints -- similar complaints about Mr. 
Stevens' predecessor? 
A. Mr. Steve!)§' predecessor did receive those same complaints. In 
fact. bis predecessor when he came in did the exact same thing, cleaned house and 
broyght in his own staff. That's not wiusual when there is a change of 
management. Not unusual at all. 
Tr., p.64, 1.23 ~ p.65, l 11 ( emphasis added). 
Contrary to the assertion that Claimant's concerns were wholly ignored, Jochim testified 
that Employer looked into those concerns and conducted its own internal investigation. Tr .• 
p.65. 11.12w 16. The owner and general manager of Employer communicated directly with 
Claimant and instructed him to notify someone if there were any issues: 
A. ... Mr. Johnson spoke with the owner of the company via e-mail 
and the general manager of the company in March, was instructed that if there 
wu any other issues he should notify somebody. Three -- almost three months 
went by with [Johnson] not indicating that there were any issues and, then, 
suddenly quit his job. Plain and simple. From the time that he -~ 
Q. Did you ever -- did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Johnson 
from back in March of 2015? 
A. Yes. And exactly one day later he was responded to . . . . It was 
less than 24 hours he received an email response back. 
Tr., p.65, 1.24 - p.66, 1.13, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTION FOR 
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The Commission's decision mentions discharges of 
employees during Stevens• 
management, describing them as 
11purportedly11 occurring after complaints were made about 
Stevens and as "seemingly retaliatory discharges.
11 Decision and Order, p.3. It would seem 
reasonable to conclude that Employer did not openly disc
uss the reasons for tenninating its 
employees and that the Director of Human Resources would be 
in the best position to know the 
actual reasons for those tenninations. Jochim testified tha
t there was one employee who 
resigned to take a better job in the Seattle area, and three or fo
ur employees who were let go for 
performance issues: 
Q. . .. During the -- between when Mr. Stevens was hire
d and when 
Mr. Johnson left, how many resignations were there from 
the -- from the 
maintenance department? 
A. We had one resignation who accepted a better offe
r in the Seattle 
Q. And how many were terminated? 
A. I would have to look specifically, but I think three 
or four, all 
based on perfonnance issues. 
Tr.~ p.6811 11.17•24. 
Jochim also testified during the year and a half period prior to S
tevens' hiring, n[a] very 
similar number" of employees either were tenninated or 
resigned. Tr.11 p.70. 11.3-7. J0¢him 
elabotated: 
[[]he number of tenninations or resignations during the 
time of Matt Stevens' 
employment is not unusual from any director of maintenance
 that we have had. 
Mr. - his predecessor Mr. Higdon had some of the same simi
lar issues that ifbe 
didn't feel an employee was meeting his expectations h
e would - he would 
dismiss the employee .... 
Tr., p.70, ll.8-13. 
The second employee of Employer who testified was 
Julie Trumble, its Human 
Resources Representative. She described what happened wh
en Claimant quit on June 8, 2015: 
[Johnson] came in, he put his radio on the counter, told one
 of my coworker that 
he was done and, then, my coworker asked if there was anythin
g that was wroog 
or that we could assist with. Then Mr. Johnson came into
 my office and I asked 
him what was going on, he said that he was quitting and I asked
 what was wrong 
and if there was anything 1 could do and he said that he w
as going to quit before 
he got fired and he just said he felt that that was going to be hap
pening. 
IDAHO DEPARTMt."NT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTIO
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R., p.74, 1.23 .. p .. 75, 1.7. It is noteworthy th~ according to Joch
im, Johnson made no mention of 
safety issues when he quit or during the prior three months
. See Testimony of Jochim, Tr., p.66, 
Jl.3-5. 
Regarding the "at-will" comment that Stevens purportedly
 made, Trumble testified that 
during a group meeting with everyone in Johnson's departm
ent, Tr., p.75, 1.24 - p.26, 1.2, 
Stevens expressed his expectation that everyone be on the sam
e team: 
Q. . . . Do you have any knowledge of whether [John
son) had ever 
been warned that his job was in jeopardy? 
A. The only thing that I knew was that the departmen
t -- oh, the 
department director had made it clear that everybody was 
to be on the temn or in 
the same program and if not they probably wouldn't be with the
 company .... 
Tr., p.75, l.12-19. 
It is clear from the record that Claimants job was not jn jeopa
rdy. Jochim testified: 
In fact. I have a copy of his latest employee evaluation, which no
thing was rated 
under meets expectations. This - this gentleman had no f
ear for his job to be 
terminated. The only things in this perfonnance review that
 Mr. Stevens asked 
Mt. Johnson to work on was to think before he spqke and to w
ork on his delivery 
of communication, because other emploxees felt intimidated by
 Mr. Johnson. 
Tr., p.68, 11. 1-8 (emphasis added). 
Consistent with the testimony of Jochim, Trumble testified t
hat there were three or four 
employees who either resigned or were terminated during Stev
ens' first year and a half, which 
was consistent with the number of departures under his predecesso
r during a similar period of 
time. Tr .• p.78, 1. 12 - p.79, 1.2. 
As with the testimony of Jochim and Trumble, the Com
mission's decision makes no 
mention of the testimony of Mathew Stevens; the target 
of the invective from Employer's 
disgruntled former employees. Stevens described the co
nversation that occurred prior to 
Johnson quitting: 
A. . .. [ J]obnson was complaining about something on the
 ride and so 
I went and talked to him and he stated something to the effec
t that he knew that 
something was wrong and I asked him why he didn't jus
t repair it and. then, it 
went on to the fact that I called him on the fact that he was st
ating to the -- to the 
guys that every time something would come up or a repai
r was needed he would 
state to them that he knew it was bad. And this went to
 other rides, too, and 1 
call~ him on the fact that l didn't understand why he didn't 
just repair it or tell 
somebody about it if you knew about it 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTI
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Q. And was--
A. In one instance -- in one instance we bad a -- Timber Terror, one of 
our coasters, we found out that all 1he brake mechanisms had a shaft tha
t was 
busted and after we found -- found the problem Dale was telling Danny [his
 
immediate supervisor] that he already knew that there was an issue there and the
y 
had ran it that way for a couple years without saying anything, according to him .. 
. . . But at that point I said, you know, everybody is a genius in hindsight 
and if he's aware of something you needed to tell me about it, so that we could
 get 
it fixed, because safety is definitely our largest priority. 
Tr., p.82, 1.17 - p.83, 1.17. 
The Commission decision, on the question of Stevens' experience, does 
not mention 
Stevens' own testimony, where he testified he ''had vast experience of constru
ction, mechanic -
mechanics and management" and that he '
1absolutely1' had ride maintenance experience. having 
constructed a ride from the ground up. Tr., p.85, 11.3-16. 
Further, there was no mention of Stevens' testimony in the Commission's decis
ion. which 
included testimony that Stevens got along with the maintenance employees, Tr
., p.86, 11.16-20, 
that of the replacements for employees that left some had more experience, and 
some less 
experience, than the replaced employee. Tr .• p.87, U.23-25, or that Claimant's repl
acement had 
more than double his experience. Tr., p.88; 11.2-3. 
Also, seemingly glossed over is the fact that Stevens was not Claimant's 
immediate 
supervisor, and that Stevens wanted employees to first work with their imm
ediate supervisor to 
resolve matters: 
Q. Have you ever directed that (employees] go through a group leader 
or other supervisor under you? 
A. Absolutely. Their first chain of command is their direct 
supervisor. I prefer them to work with their direct supervisor and that's in 
every 
location in the park. And if they still don't have it worked out, then, they need
 to 
come directly to me. 
Tr .• p. 90, ll.11-17. There is nothing unusual about this management structure. 
The foregoing testimony aptly demonstrates that it is clearly ettoneous to s
tate that 
"(t]here was no evidence or testimony that would place in dispute Claimant's
 account of the 
chain of events leading to his separation." Decision and Order, p. 7, 
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The decision of the Commission also makes the fmding that "service requests from the 
ride [Aftershock] did nqt go through the dispatcher" because the ride was sophisticated and 
maintenance staff needed to remain near the ride. Decision and Order. p.2. This is clearly 
erroneous because the reason all service requests were not routed through the dispatcher is 
because Johnson did not want to route the unimportant error codes. Johnson testified that the 
reason some of the requeslS did not go through the dispatcher was because, in Johnson's opinion; 
they were minor en-or codes that didn't need to be entered; 
So, when we saw certain error we knew, oh; no big deal~ just tum it. lt doem
1t 
necessarily need to be established in a call that goes over dispatch. Otherwise we 
would have an overwhelming anioW1t of calls for the ride that really isn't 
inconveniencing the ride at all. The time that we would actually have to do work 
on the ride we would stop the ride, we would actually tum it off, move the 
operators out of the way and; then, we would do whatever we needed to be done 
and, then, we would go back to our computer in the Cormex and we would 
document what we needed to do to the ride before we could tum it back on.'' 
Tr .• p.13, ll.5-15. Johnson only entered with dispatch the problems he folt were significant. If 
anything, this cavalier approach to reporting errors raised, instead of lessened, safety concerns. 
Johnson was upset because Stevens instructed him to enter all the error codes. Johnson testified: 
"As I was trying to explain this to [Stevens] he kept cutting me off and he says this is 
unacceptable, everything has got to go through dispatch." Tr.t p.13. 11.17-19. Such a 
disagreement with a supervisor two levels above an employee can hardly be said to be "good 
cause" for quitting. 
Here is another example where the so-called safety jssue has been turned on its head. 
During the discussion before Johnson quit without any attempt to resolve his differences with 
Stevens, Johnson was upset because Stevens told Johnson he had to work on the brakes of one of 
£he wooden roller coasters or somebody was going to be killed, and Johnson disagreed with him. 
According to Johnson: 
[W]e were getting into the fact that we had some work to do on the brakes on one 
of the wooden roller coasters. [Stevens] said they they were so bad that that we 
were going to kill somebody. That wasn't true either .... [Stevens] kept yelling 
at me me are you kidding, are you fucking kidding, do you really think I'm going 
to beli.eve this. You know those brakes were bad and they were going to get 
somebody killed and I said that's a lie, Matt. We weren't going to get anybody 
killed. 
Tr., p.15, 1.7-p.17, I.I. 
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A third example of Johnson's so-called "safety" concerns being misconst
rued centers 
upon the fact that Stevens wanted Johnson to go by the maintenance books, and
 Johnson 
believed the books were not always right: 
Over the time that (Stevens] had been there he demanded that we go by the b
ook -
- all the maintenance books, which l said wasn't a big time -- wasn't a big 
problem. 
Q. Okay. Was that part of your conversation with him on the 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q, Okay. 
A. I was explaining to him that going by the book -- to the best of my 
ability that l remember going by the book wasn't necessarily always right, eve
n 
though that's the rule that we go by, 
Tr., p.18. ll2-l3. Good cause is not established by the fact that an employee is
 instru~ to go 
by the book. Any deviation from the book is one for management to make sinc
e it likely would 
raise concems regarding potential liabiHty, 
Perhaps most telling is Johnson's own characterization of the maintenance an
d safety 
issues during Stevens' tenure: 
Q. And during the time [Stevens] was there compared with before, did 
you notice -- you stated you were in maintenance. Did you notice more 
maintenance issues arising, more safety issues arising? 
A. Well. he had two guys running the department and~- both of those 
and they were starting to have building break-ins out of them, which is illegal.[?
] 
Q. Well, were there more problems with the rides that you were 
seeing after he had been there? 
A Well, as far as more problems -- well, we were more cluttered. It 
took us longer to get things done. I had to do things give [sic] times jnstead of
 
once, because partS were being ordered wrong, because, you know
 -- they 
changed all the vendors on us, so it took us years from the time I was there to 
teach vendors th.al we were doing business with by the time Matt -- it too
k us 
years to work. out the kinks on how to order our parts, because we had specialty
 
needs. It wasn't a construction company. I couldn't just go down to the 
local 
Home Depot or Lowe's or BuUder's Emporium and get parts that I needed. 
l had 
to go at times around the globe to different countries in order to get parts tha
t we 
needed. It was at times challenging to say the least. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AMENDED MOTION FOR 
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Tr., p.43, 1.5 - p.44, 1.2. Those were the maintenance "issues" that Johnson could identify
 when 
asked a direct question. These issues do not create 
11good cause" for quitting. 
Then, in his final act of insubordination, Johnson turned his back on Stevens while 
Stevens was discussing work matters, and walked away: 
WelJ -- and, then, basically we kind of changed the subject after that and he 
started to try and talk about the wheel carriers, that we (unintelligible) as time 
goes on and by then I was ignoring everything he said. I wanted to pWlch him in 
the face and knock his teeth out and rather than getting those stars on my belt, I 
just turned around, ignored him, and went back to work. 
Tr., p20, 11.2*9. 
The Commission should reconsider its deoision in light of the above, and other evidence 
in this case. It is respectfu])y submitted that a thorough review of the evidence in th
is case does 
not support the finding that Johnson had "good cause
11 for quitting. 
2. The Commissio11 should reconsider its deeision 'because the law does not support
 the 
finding tba1 Claimant bad "good cause" for quitting. 
The Commission, basing its decision upon the mistaken belief that Jolmson's factual 
allegations were uncontestedt concluded that: 
When Employer hired Stevens, the tenns and conditions of Claimant's 
employment were substantially changed. Claimant had no input in those changes. 
Claimant has demonstrated that his working conditions were .negatively impacted 
when SteVens became his supervisor to the point that the workplace bec.aJ:ne 
unsafe. Claimant complained many times to Employer's human resources 
department and to Employer's owners, specifically describing his concerns, to no 
avail. ... 
Decision and Order, pp.9~ 10. The evidence does not support the conclusion that the
 conditiom 
of Claimant's employment substantially changed. The evidence showed only th
at his 
supervisor's supervisor expected the maintenance employees to do things by the boo
~ and 
expected that they would work more than six hours a day. There is no testimony that the 
nature 
of Claimant's position changed, that his responsibilities changed, or that his salaty
 or benefits 
changed. The Commission's passing reference to safety is belied by Claimant's own test
imony 
where., when asked what had changed regarding maintenance or safety, said things w
ere more 
cluttered and Employer changed vendors, Tr., p.43, 1.5 - p.44, l.2, that in Johnso
n's opinion 
S1evens' lack of experience was his number one concern as opposed to something specific,
 Tr., p. 
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38, ILl0-11, that "[p]eople were getting frredjust because they were being fired because he didn't 
like them is the best we could come up with," Tr., p.38, 11.14-16, and that Stevens interfered 
with his co-workers' ability to do their jobs because "I think the fear that he instilled in 
everybody that was around us was a definite interference." Tr., p.39, ll.6-7. This is the same
 
supervisor that Johnson complained was not seen by him until after having been on the job for 4 
months. and who directed his employees to address concerns with their immediate supemsor
 
before going up the chain of conunand. Further, the Director of Human Resources testified that 
Stevens' predecessor had the same complaints made against him as those made against Stevens
. 
Tr., p.65, U.6-11. 
This testimony of Johnson does not support a finding that 
11 safety" created "good cause" 
for his decision to quit instead of punching Stevens in the nose. First, Johnson and the rest of the 
maintenance crew were responsible for safety. If there was an unsafe condition, it was theirs to 
fix. That was one of the criticisms and expectations that Stevens had of Johnson: that if Johnson 
saw that something was wron& he was to either fix it or tell someone about it It was Johnson, 
who was comfortable in not following "the book." and who took it upon himself to decide which 
errors were serious enough to merit reporting to dispatch and which were not. Further, othe
r 
than Johnsonts discussion of bis co-workers being afraid of being fired, Johnson failed to 
demonstrate safety concerns amounting to good cause. There is no specific, credible evidence
 
showing that Johnson's conditions of employment placed him at risk. If there was a risk. 
Jolmson would have been in the best position to address it. 
"Substantial unilateral changes" in employment relate to more specific matters such as 
retracted offers of conditions of employment, Clay v. Crook Instustries, 96 Idaho 378, 529 P .2d 
774 ()974). or substantial reduction of wages ($7.50 to $3.35). Kyle v. Beco Corp .• 109 Idaho
 
267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985), as opposed to Johnson's general dissatisfaction with Stevens. 
This case; properly viewed, is one in which there was a personality conflict between the 
claimant and his supervisor. (Here, it is not even Johnson's immediate supervisor.) Time and 
again. this Commission has observed that a personality conflict. standing alone, is not sufficient
 
to establish "good cause," Carson v. Employment Divisio[!, S50 P .2d 463 (Or.Ct.App. 1976)
, and 
that a Claimant cannot expect work to occur without friction or stress. Coffey v. EmploYment 
Diviso9, 567 .P.2d 615 (Or, 1977); Buckham v. Idaho Elk's Rehab. Hospital. 141 Idaho 338, 109 
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P.2d 726 (2005); Brotherton v. Morgan. 522 P.2d 1210 (Or.Ct.App. 1974); Uniweld Produce
s, 
Inc. v. Industrial Relations Commi,5sion, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla.Ct. App. 1973). 
The fact that a job may be unpleasant or difficult is not good cause. Hoyt v. Morrison 
Knudsei:i,. 100 Idaho 659, 603 P.2d 993 ( 1979); McMunn v. Dept. of Public Lands. 94 Idaho 493
. 
491 P.2d 1265 (1971) 
Good cause is not established with evidence of irreconcilable differences with others at 
work, or where a Claimant is nterely frustrated or dissatisfied with working conditions. Portz v. 
Pipestone Skelg~ 397 N.W.2d 12 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986). 
For good cause to exist "there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and 
necessitous circumstances. 11 Buckham. 14 l Idaho at 340, 109 P .3d at 728. If the testimony of 
Johnson and Stevens concerning the "heated" argument on the date Johnson quit is parsed, a 
reasonable person would not have felt "compelled" by ''extraneous" MM! "necessitous" 
circumstances to quit. Buckham explains further: 
Establishing good cause requires the circumstances surrounding the claimant's 
departure to be ''real, substantial and compelling." Jensen v. Siemsen. 118 Idaho 
1 t 4, 794 P.2d 271, 274 (1990). Here, the Industrial Commission noted Buck:ham's 
discomfort with his work environment, but found the issues he raised, including 
the delay in allowing Buckham to return to work, the tension between him and his 
supervisor, the hiring of a part-time manager widl simiJar responsibilities, the 
certification requirement, and Buckham's discomfort with the withholding of an 
employee's paychecks. were insufficient-even in aggregate-to compel an 
average person to resign. Because the Industrial Commission's determination was 
based on substantial and C()mpetent evidence-or, more precisely, the weakness 
of evidence of compelling circumstances-this Court upholds the Commission's 
ruling. 
Buckham.141 ldaho at 341, 109 P.3d at 729. 
Applying this case law to the case at bar, it is clear that the reasons proffered by Johnson 
for quitting are insufficient to meet his burden of proving good cause. 
Moieover, Johnson, aJso under existing case law, was required to explore viable options 
before quitti.n,g. Ellis v. Northwest Fruit & Produce, 103 Idaho 821, 654 P.2d 914 (1982); 
Higgins v. I.any Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi. 145 Idaho 1, 175 P.3d 163 (2007). As outline
d 
above, Employer investigated Claimant
1s earlier grievance, the owner met with and 
communicated by email directly with C1aimant and told him if additionaJ issues arose that he 
was to make them known. In the three months before quitting, Johnson made no complaint.,. 
Then he had a "heated" argument with bis supervisor, acted in an insubordinate manner, and the
n 
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quit Johnson did not try to address the concerns or issues he had with Stevens on the day he 
quit. 
It is respectfully submitted that having a personality conflict with a new supervisor, and 
believing that the new supervisor doesn't know what he or she is doing, is hardly the sort of real~ 
substantial and compelling circwnstance that would establish good cause for quitting. 
Based upon the foregoingt IDOL respectfully requests that the Com.mission reconsider its 
Decision and Order herein and enter an amended decision and order affirmjng the decision of the 
Appeals Examiner. 
DATED this £ty of May 2016. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ---
By /1:J ~ 
DOUOWERTH 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2.0 ~ of May. 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Idaho Department of Labor Motion for Reconsideration was served upon the following 
person by depositing $8id copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid. addressed 
as follows: 
JAMES M MCMILLAN 
S12 W CEDAR ST 
WALLACE ID 83873 
SILVERWOOD INC 
27843 N HJGHW A Y 95 
ATHOL ID 83801 
I .,.. 4...----....... 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
-
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
e 
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T COUltT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I•V in their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV•17-0423 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and through his counsel of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law and Set Aside Judgment as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case follows an appeal to the Idaho Department of Labor (hereinafter 
"Department") and Idaho Industrial Commission (hereinafter "Commission), and is 
based upon the Department's mishandling of the documents and recordings on the 
record before the Department, which necessitated a remand to the Department 
before the Commission could hear Plaintiff's appeal, upon which he prevailed on 
April 29, 2016. After corresponding with various State agencies, copies of said 
correspondence being attached to the Declarations of Dale Johnson, filed in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in support of Plaintift"s Motion for 
Reconsideration, Plaintiff submitted a formal Tort Claim to the Idaho Secretary of 
State's Office on or about August 25, 2016, within 180 days of service of the 
In.dustrial Commission's initial decision, but prior to the Commission's decision on 
Reconsideration, which was likewise in Plaintiff's favor, and which referred to the 
transcript of the Department's hearing, drafted and supplied by Plaintiff, for which 
the "official" record was lost. After receiving a non~sequitur reply from the State in 
response to the Notice of Tort Claim, Plaintiff filed the instant suit. Defendants 
have been represented by the same counsel herein as during the Industrial 
Commission proceedings, who was likewise copied on the reply to the Tort Claim, 
and who has been advisiDg the Department regarding Plaintiff's Public Records 
Requests. See Declaration of Dale Johnson, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Subsequently, Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff's claim 
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accrued not when he was informed that he prevailed, but at one of several earlier 
dates. Plaintiff had not yet had the opportunity to conduct Discovery, but, since the 
Motion relied upon evidence submitted that was outside of the pleadings, this Court 
treated the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Memorandum 
Decision, on file herein. In its Decision, this Court chose November 25, 2015, the 
date on which the decision by the Department denying the Plaintiff's claim was 
issued, as the date of accrual of the Tort Claim, and granted Defendant's Motion. 
Plaintiff timely moved for Reconsideration, and for additional discovery 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff did 
not discover his cause of action until April 29, 2016, as that was when he learned 
the extent of his damages and thus discovered that he had a cause of action for 
Negligence; and (2) alternatively, Plaintiff should have the opportunity to conduct 
Discovery in order to determine whether or not his prior correspondence with the 
Department, and other State agencies, was either directed to, or should have been 
directed to, the Office of the Secretary of State. This Court denied the Motion for 
Reconsideration, as well as Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Discovery. However, 
the Decision thereon did not set forth or discuss the reasons for the denial of the 
Motion for Additional Discovery. See Memorandum Decision, on file herein. 
1 
Without this opportunity for Discovery, Plaintiff has been attempting to 
investigate by seeking the disclosure of records under the Idaho public records law, 
see Declarations of Dale and Rose Johnson, filed contemporaneously herewith. The 
1 During the course of the Hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant's counsel also mentioned the 
issue of Judicial Immunity, whlch was not referenced in any of Defendant's Motions or Pleadings and, thus, not 
properly before the Court, and also incorrectly claimed that the Department had no duty to preserve the record of 
Plaintiff's hearing, in spite of the provisions ofldaho Code§§ 72~ 1343 and 1368 
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responses have not been directly responsive to Plaintiff's requests, and they appear 
to have been :filtered through Counsel currently representing the Department 
herein. Id. At a minim um, Plaintiff seeks additional explanation and clarification 
of the Court's decision denying his Motion for Additional Discovery, in order to 
allow for a more complete Appellate record, if Appellate review should become 
necessary. 
II. ARGUMENT 
1. This Court's Summary Denial of the Motion for Additional Discovery 
Does Not Set Forth Sufficient Findings and Conclusions on the Record. 
"Findings on issues before a trial court must necessarily be made by the court 
pursuant to Rule 52(a) before [the Idaho Supreme] Court may perform its appellate 
function of ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law." Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 36, 624 P.2d 413, 418 (1981). 
In this case, the Court simply summarily denied Plaintiffs' request for additional 
discovery, essentially deferring to a finding that it was within its discretion to deny 
reconsideration; but without making additional findings as to why it determined 
that re-opening this matter and allowing additional discovery was not warranted. 
See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, on file herein. In order to determine 
whether or not appellate review is appropriate and/or provide a complete record for 
appellate review, should Plaintiff decide to seek the same, it is necessary for this 
Court to elaborate further upon its prior decision; and set forth the reasons why it 
reached the conclusion that it did. Therefore, additional findings of fact are 
necessary, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
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2. Defendantts Conduct Warrants Setting Aside or~ Alternatively, 
Amending or Altering the Judgment Herein Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) 
and/or 60(bl-, 
Throughout the history of this case, Plaintiff has attempted to seek the 
disclosure of various documents and information that would reveal how, in fact, his 
prior correspondence with the Department should have been handled, which bears 
directly upon Plaintiffs alternative theory that there may have been a 
"presentment" of a tort claim based upon said correspondence. Declaration of Dale 
Johnson, ii 1; Declaration of Rose Johnson, 1 10. At Oral Argument on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for Defendants, who also represented the 
Department during Plaintiffs Appeal to the Industrial Commission, and who has 
been advising the Department with regard to Plaintiffs records requests, stated 
that Plaintiff's request for the opportunity for discovery could result in "hundreds" 
of depositions being scheduled, Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 5. Further, in 
response to a records request by Plaintiff, the Department quoted a fee in the 
amount of approximately one-hundred-fifty dollars ($150), which indicates that it 
would require the production of records in excess of one-hundred (100) pages and/or 
two (2) hours of staff work (but without an itemization of the number of excess 
pages or hours). Idaho Code § 72-104(10). Moreover, the Department's responses 
have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion over Plaintiff's requests. 
Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 1; Declaration of Rose Johnson, Exhibit B. Taken 
together, this indicates that there may be significant relevant evidence available, 
that may possibly expose the Defendants to further liability, in Defendants' 
possession, that may only be compelled to be disclosed via the Discovery process. 
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Furthermore, during the course of Plaintiff's claim before the Department of 
Labor and subsequent appeal to the Industrial Commission, the Department, 
represented by its current counsel, further caused Plaintiff damage by prolonging 
the proceedings, by (1) objecting to a request for a hearing and subpoenas before the 
Industrial Commission; (2) moving to reconsider the Industrial Commission's 
decision; and (3) its obstreperous conduct in responding to Plaintiff's numerous 
records requests, thus limiting Plaintiff's potential knowledge as to the extent of the 
gevenunental agencies' involvement in causing Plaintiffs damages. Carman v. 
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553, 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) allows this Court to set aside a 
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief." Further, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e) allows this Court to "amend or alter" the judgment herein, in order 
"to correct errors both of fact and law that had occurred in its proceedings." and 
'
1[!provide] a mechanism to circumvent appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho · 
598, 608, 570 P.2d 276, 281 (1977). A Motion filed within the time limits of Rule 
59(e) may be considered pursuant to either rule. Id. 
Initially, under Rule 59(e), and based upon the information presented to this 
Court thus far, Plaintiff again urges this Court to amend or alter its ruling that the 
cause of action accrued on November 25, 2015. While this date may satisfy the 
"some damage'' rule for the accrual of a cause of action for negligence that the 
appellate Courts have interpreted as an expansion of the strict "occurrence" 
language contained in Idaho Code § 6-219(4), it is important to realize that this 
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statute of limitations does not provide for tolling until discovery of the cause of 
action, whereas Idaho Code § 6-906 expressly includes the "discovery rule." In this 
case, Plaintiff did not, and could not, have discovered that he was damaged by the 
delay in his unemployment benefits until the Industrial Commission ruled in his 
favor. When Plaintiff should have discovered his cause of action is a question of 
fact, to be presented to the Jury, rather than a matter of law, to be decided by the 
Court at the Summary Judgment stage. See, e.g., Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 
455, 210 P.3d 563 (Ct. App. 2009).
2 
Also, the Department's objection to Plaintiffs request for subpoenas and a 
hearing before the Industrial Commission on April 4 (which included reference to 
testimony that the Commission did not find credible, and which was refuted by 
Plaintiff), in addition to its Motion for Reconsideration during the Industrial 
Commission proceedings, caused further damage and delay to Plaintiff and, 
therefore, this Court should follow a Continuing Tort analysis in reviewing this 
case. 
Alternatively, or in addition to, the foregoing, Defendants' conduct following 
the Motion for Reconsideration provides grounds to set aside the judgment and re-
open this matter under Rule 60(b)(6). Deprived of the ability to conduct Discovery, 
the only manner in which Plaintiff may further investigate the existence of possible 
additional evidence in this case has been to submit public records requests to the 
Department. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,i 9. As set forth in the Declarations of 
2 It should be noted that, in its decision denying Defendant's request for fees and costs, this Court found that 
Plaintiff's argued accrual date of April 29 was reasonable. 
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Plaintiff and his wife, the Department, apparently acting pursuant to the advice of 
the same counsel as is representing it in the instant case, has consistently delayed 
its responses, claimed a lack of understanding, and has sought fees for the 
requested copies, without specifying the number of pages in excess of one-hundred 
or hours in excess of two that would justify these additional charges. Id., Exhibit A. 
Coupled with the representations of Defendant's counsel that allowing discovery 
could result in depositions of a large number of witnesses, this conduct provides 
sufficient grounds under Rule 60(b)(6) to re~open this case so that Plaintiff may 
determine the existence and extent of the evidence or potential evidence in 
Defendants' possession. 
Plaintiff further incorporates by reference the arguments and citations set 
forth in his Objection to Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Reconsideration, and all 
accompanying briefs, memoranda, affidavits, and declarations filed in support 
thereof, as though fully set forth herein. 
III. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment should be 
GRANTED, and this matter should be duly scheduled for a Jury Trial, as demanded 
in the original Complaint. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2018. 
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CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of January, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
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.JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney fo:r Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
Dale Johnson, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I.Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
!State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17,0423 
DECLARATION OF Rose 
Johnson 
I, Rose Johnson, am the wife of the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 18) 
competent to testify to the matters set forlh, and have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth herein: 
1. Since August 2015 and continuing to this date, my husband has 
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attempted to resolve this :matter and has received no cooperation from the IDOL. 
2. I spoke with Amy Hohnstein and informed her that the written 
Decision; dated August 6; 2015, of IDOL Hearing Examiner Mark Richmond, was 
not even close to the record and testimony of August 5, 2015. 
a. Ms. Hohnstein said thank you for bringing the issue to her 
attention and that she would personally listen to the hearing audio. 
b. A day or so later, I called Ms. Hohnstein back and her attitude 
was more hostile; she refused to say whether she had listened to the audio and said 
to file an appeal to the IIC if there was disagreement with the Decision. 
3. My husband, Dale Johnson., the Plaintiff in this case, told me to order a 
copy of the hearing, but not to be surprised if they say they can't find it. He thought 
the IDOL would destroy it because of the politics involved with his fo:rmer employer. 
I told him I hoped he was wrong. But, it turned out that he was right -- no audio 
record could be found. 
4. I spoke with Craig Bledsoe (the IDOL AG at the time); he said he 
would look into the situation. He appears either to have not, or, if he did, he did not 
share any proper information with my husband or his attorney. I spoke with the 
offices of Idaho's Risk Management, Governor's office, Kenneth Edwards and 
numerous others. 
a. Craig Bledsoe left the AG office from what I later was told, in 
early 2016. From what I underst.and Doug Werth took over that position. 
5. I spoke with Doug Werth (not realizing he would later be intricately 
involved in my husband's case). I shared with him the need for accountability and 
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may have even used the term spoliation when discussing the IDOL's destruction of 
an audio file. He, at that time, basically said the state always tries to do right. I 
likely told him that I have not seen tha.t evidence. 
6. My husband's attorney filed an appeal to the IIC and they remanded 
the appeal. They had to, as there was NO RECORD TO REVIEW, and the IDOL 
was already clearly aware of this fact. 
7. Two (2) more hearings were conducted at the IDOL level, October 22, 
2015 and November 12, 2015. This time the Hearing Examiner was Janet Hardy. 
a. My husband's former employer and IDOL did not appear; but 
they didn't have too; Ms. Hardy ''tended their interests", including, but not limited 
to: denying my husband's requested subpoena for records to prove number of 
complaints filed to employer and prove fll'ings and self-terminations since 
employer's hiring of Maintenance Director (Stev-ens). 
b. Janet Hardy allowed ex-parte communication by a politically 
connected lawyer, Charles B. Lempesis, associated with employer, but not on 
record; the communication included unwarranted threats to bring sanctions against 
my husband's lawyer. Mr. Lempesis sent Ms. Hardy, an 11 page fax, of which at 
least 5 pages have never been produced, and which were not given to my husband's 
attorney, according to some of my research and IDOL responses to my records 
requests. 
8. After the loss, and potential spoliation, of the August 5, 2015 hearing 
record, it appears that the IDOL then attempted to conceal their actions, forcing my 
husband to appeal, knowing full-well the matter being appealed would be 
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remanded, due to the fact that the IIC would have no record to review, and this 
caused further damages. 
9. The IDOL knew that I recorded the hearing of August 5, 2015, and yet 
denied the only available record, even when I transc:ribed the audio. IDOL, Amy 
Hohnstein and Janet Hardy said it was not official copy and therefore not of any 
use, even though the IIC subsequently referred to it in the Decision of September 
26, 2016 in the denial of IDOL and employer's motions. 
a. The IIC referred to my transcript several times in their Decision 
of September 26, 2016, showing the IDOL used false, incorrect or unsubstantiated 
elaims • the UC denied the IDOL motion for reconsideration of May 19, 2016. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of my request to 
the Department regarding their policies, and the Department's response. The 
Response sets forth the Department's policy with rega:rd to employee discipline, and 
the Statute regarding public records, but does not set forth the Department's policy 
as to how complaints and correspondence that could possibly qualify as Tort Claims 
are handled or even the base question I asked about accountability policy; 
11. Attached also is Exhibit C, internal memoranda about my records 
requests. The requests appear to have been reviewed by Doug Werth, current 
counsel for Defendants, and counsel for IDOL during the IIC appeal. 
12. Attached also is Exhibit D, a response to my follow-up public records 
request, declining to provide any further information, claiming that the prior 
response was sufficient (which it was not). It i.s my belief that this was a result of 
the Department1s consultation with Defendants' counsel herein, to deny any proper 
D!ECLARATION OF ROSE JOHNSON -4 
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information in the pursuing of the matters involved in this case. 
13. Denial of lawful records requested coupled with this court denying 
proper discovery, (aka denying due process), blocks the wa.y to compel disclosu:re 
and to :require necessary, specific :responses directly relevant to my husband's case. 
Further your declarant sayeth naught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law of the State 
of Idaho, that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2018. 
DECLARATION OF ROSE JOHNSON -.s 
~011 
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{;ERTIFICATE OE SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of January, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
DougWerth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
DECLARATION OF ROSE JOHNSON -6 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
__x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334w6125 
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Dale 111'1(1 Rose Johnson 
Marina eUlal: Records Request 
Melindil Smyser: goveroot@wy.ldah0.9ov: Cheryl Ausmim 
[EX'l'ERNALJ Policy 
Monday, Oecember 16, 2017 9:24:48 PM 
December 18, 2017 
Office of the IDOL Director, Melinda Smyser, c/o Cheryl 
redirected to Marina Pillai, Records 
cc: Governor Otter, Melinda Smyser and Cheryl Ausman 
December 18, 2017 
Ms. Pillai, 
-
As you requested, see the below. Also, please note that I am an individual 
and expect a reply directed to me as such. 
Please also note, I do not believe any proper excuse exists for the IDOL to continue 
delaying my simple request. If the Director has no accountability (standard) policy, 
simply make that statement. That said, if you have questions or expect (need) further 
delay, call me at (208) 683-0821 to discuss it. 
Thank you. 
Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, Idaho 83801 
cc: Cheryl Ausman, Melinda Smyser, Governor Otter and Georgia Smith 
On Monday, December 18, 2017 2:13 PM, Marina Pillai <Marina.Pillai@labor.idaho.gov:o- wrote: 
Good afternoon Mr. and Ms. Johnson, 
The Idaho Department of Labor is in receipt of the request you sent on December 8, 
2017 to Cheryl Ausman regarding the Departmental policies pertaining to employee 
disciplinary action. We are prepared to respond, however in order for us to keep 
proper track of these requestsj pl<~ase re-send your request to the records request 
inbox: m~~-~~~@labor.i.dabQ.gQv. Please send all future requests to this 
address as well. 
Feel free to let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
Thank you, 
Marina Pillai 
Marina Pillai I Technical Records Specialist 2 
'41013 
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Unemployment Insurance / Compliance 
Idaho Department of Labor 
120 South 3rd Street I Boise, ID 83735 
208-332-3573 ext. 4430 
Fax: 208-334-6437 
Marina.Pillai@labor.idaho.gov 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law -
---------~~,.,,,,,,,,,,, .. , .. ,. ........................... ·-·····----.... ··-····--------··'· .,,,,,, .... , ... , ... , ..... , ...... -................................... __ _ 
The Information contained in this e-mail from the Idaho Departm'llnt of Labor may be privileged, con1'1den~al or otherwise protected from 
disclosure. People whO snare such lnfonnatlon with ,.in1;11,1thonzad individuals may 1'ace penalties under etate and federal law. If you 
receive this e-mail in error, plea1;1e reply to the sender that the e-mail has been n;1ceived in error and delete this message, 
On Friday, December 8, 2017 6:59 PM, dateandrosej <daleandrosej@yahoo.com> wrote: 
December 8, 2017 
Cheryl; 
141014 
Does the Director have a policy, and if so, what is it, regarding internal accountability? 
I have no problem with people making honest mistakes. I am not speaking of simple 
human error; - I am more wondering about issues that fall outside the scope of 
mistakes or accidents. 
Mistakes are easy to fix; you just fix them. This is what the tax..payers have every 
right to expect from their public servant employees, which demonstrates true 
transparency. 
Your timely response will be appreciated. 
Rose Johnson 
208-683-0821 
~-- Original message ---4 
From: Cheryl Ausman <Cheryl.Ausman@labor.idaho.gov> 
Date: 12/8/17 4:28 PM (GMT-08:00) 
To: Dale and Rose Johnson <daleandrosej@yahoo.com:> 
Subject: Second and more important question you called about today 
Rose, please reply with the question you have about the Director's policy. I want to make 
sure I get it correct and don't miss any part of it. 
Thank you! 
Cheryl 
Cheryl Ausman I Administrative Assistant 
Director's Office 
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The information contained in this e-mail from the Idaho Department of Labor may be 
privileged, confidential or otherwise protected from disclosure. People who share 
such information with unauthorized individuals may face penalties under state and 
federal law. If you receive this e-mail in error, please reply to the sender that the e-
mail has been received in error and delete this message. 
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IDAHO 
DEPARTME,NT oi: LABOR 
C.L. ''BuTcu" OnEA. Go~R 
MEl.l..,DA S. SMVSSR, DIRECTOR 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
EXAM:lNA TION/COPYING OF AGENCY RECORDS 
December 19, 2-017 
Dale G .. Johnson 
Rose .Jolmson 
99 N~rthem SkyRoad 
Athol~ ID 83801 
Email: ~leandrosej@yahoo.com 
On December 8, 2017, the Idaho Depaitment of Labor was in receipt of your request for tnfonnatio11, ~cifically as referenced below: 
• .Poes the Director hav:~ a policy, and if so, what is it, regarding internal accountability? Particularly ~ policy regarding issues that f:all outside the scope of human error. 
Plea$e find enclosed the policies considered to be responsive to your request. 
The search. redaction,. and review of this request, if applicabk:, did not incur any cost or fees. 
Sincerely, 
Darlene arnopis 
Oesi,gnated Custodian of Records 
CER11f"ICATEOF MAILING 
I hereby .certify that the original of this letter was sent by emai'I to daleandrosej@yahoo.com, this 19th day of December, 2017. 
·';:-'\ /""' 
,,...,,.-"'),''")~ ~ .1' -
CENTRAL OFFICE• 317 W. Main St.• Boise, Idaho 83735• Tel: 208-332-3570 • Web: labor.idaho.gov M EQvOI, r,pportUt1lty:€mplaver orr,t'Strvice .PrlWld~r. Rtg:,;aTKlbl• ,:i~com,m,datlons art ,:it,0111;111/e upon ~qui:-~t. Dial 7rl far ktollo./flilQY Servfcr. 
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SharePoiht 
m . . Neil P,,..groph" · l1,ccmlr1g Unit£ APPE2500 
2SOO CAUSE rDR DIS~WLINAllY ACTIONS OR 5EMAA'l'ION ~ROt,11 STATE SERVICE (R 9/as) 
Th~ Director mny di!iimllili, SWfJt:!l'ld1 demote, or reduce tho P"Y ~1 l:'IIIY c:Ji,t.$ified employee cf tho D,,1~1.1rtrrlf/f'IT ft,r imy c,f !'he r(lllowing ~itl\l~t1i\ 
A. F.11.lure (o perform the dutlo~ ~1l(1 c.111rry out the cbtigat1011, impos~d by the 5tJL~ con~tltuti011, s:t.,te i;;t.1ru~q~ or ,·ulc:~ or ,he ingl!"ncy or th4 fdaho DIVMon 
of HUlfflDn ~lW(fJ'S. 11nd ldi,ho Personnel Con,mir,$lon. 
jj_ fnt;1ffld,ctN:y1 m('.(11llpeter1cy, or neg"gcnc;c- i11 pqrfQrrn1"9 dutlc.•:'t, or Job perfcrm:incn th;et t~II.; to ml!tet t:Stl'lbli~hed p!.!rfcn11ilnr.r. ;i;t;ind11rds. 
C. ~liyJl<:~I OI melltal in(opab~ily (or por/orming •ir-lgn,d d,1tl••· if• ron,anablo •~cQmmQ~atlo~ ,ulmal b• m•d• far lho disabling condition, 
O, Roturial to fltt:ep1., reasonable and pn;-,per 4'!\\Slr.,nrr,enl ll'om ;,m ;:iuthnri7,t!d :-;:up1~1vli;,~lr, 
E. lin$llborcfin!ltion er c<Jndu~t 1,inbecomln~ ti ~bl(e ll!'fflployee or condur.t dttrll'll~l'ltrd to 900d otder 1md d'u:cipBn?I in the JfJlll'flCy, 
r,_ lntoxicatitm or being und1rr the lntlut-m!t" of oltohot, or the.• ml~us.q r~f merkl~11tim1i ot co1ma1•e1d :;ubsti1nc1~, whll~ en duty, 
G. tamlor,<, 11,glige11t, or l111propor 1M er unlawful con1M1m011 o! itat, jlfop,r\y, ,quipm•n~ or food,. 
flu .. of •11v i11tlu-.11e• Wl,lch vialat., lho principl,~ of lh~ merit iys!t,111 It, ~" unompl· la socun, a pmnu:rtlan rir prlvl~~;s !or lr,dMduol ,dviint1ge. 
I. Convlctloh "' tl'mt:i:d misctinduct in cffic~. or i:;911vlctio.n o1.an~ fefcny, c;ir convlCtion of any cthtr ,rimt lnvolvf1,g rncmtl turpiludei. 
1. AccepCzmcc: of gifts: in 1?1tthi119' far lr1flUel'I~'!' ct ffMlr.. given in the ornplcy11,•~ 11ffl<;1;.il ~;.ipntr.lty, 
K. H•bitu•I pattom of 1~11\ll'e tc r•1>art far duty ,t tl,o •o,;ign~d timQ ,,nd place. 
1. Habitual linp,op,1r ~ of ~il!k leoVr.. 
t,11, U11auth01ii..J ~,cla.,IJ<o of ccnlidond•l lnlorm•tlon ftom orr.:i,I tocard,. 
N. Absence withDut leave. 
a, I\A~tlltvtTient or decep1lo11 In &p~lkutian far •mploym<nt, 
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2J/14•PROOR.f!SSTVE l)JSCll'l.lNE (111110,i/ 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law -
Prlrn. Mam.1~r~ h,coml11g Linlci 
The purpose ofprogrcuivc discipline is ro change ool!Bvior w1d improve pc1iormBnce. Mana,_tcrs n11d n1pel'\•isQr$ .~hould ueili7.c 
l>l'Osrcssivc discipline when addrcsi;in11 most ~crforrnancc igsuo,. f'rogrcs.ive disLiµlinc b1cps may ~ommcnce wilh 1m ornl w11.min11. 
follow~d by 3 wriua1 warning ,,r reprimand if'th~ behavior or prnblcm continues. lfncccssncy, disciplinary artian is tile next step, which 
nmy lni,.1"',JI;! :J,llq,pe.n~un wHbuul pny~ l't..'<Lu1,;l;Lm in pay. JL.,nutim1 1 rn' dis111i~~ul, dqn.::t\dllllf uµ.:,n the cin;;um::1t1m~c!. Pcnu:i,1t1cl maiulajns n 
proi;ri:ssivc dis.iplirn: h~ndbook li,,r 11111l1ilijc•·~ ,mrl 1111p1: .. visors 1111 tho l'or,"mnd Bur~•" EPIC oiLc. 
In cascs oficrious mis,ondui:t, ii may b~ 11ppropr,ale to d1,mis~ "" ~•nplnye• 111· 1.,ke C)lh~i Jisol1ili1111ry .idiu,, withoul l.):(1i11y du·ough the 
seeps, of progrenivc discipline. 
A,1y oroJ or written warning sl1oulJ identify the following: 
J. eitpe~t~d wotk boh11vi,)1' and 11ny applic11blc Dcpartmtm. rule or policy. 
2. O~tc(fi) an~ nq!lltO 1)1'tho vfolati01l(i), iMlud,ng specific .mam11Ies, nnd the negative im1>act. 
3. E~p,:,;ted COITCCtive ~!'iion(s), 
4. Pot0ntinl con5;q,1e11cc5 ifbchnvior ocmlinn~•. 
Any lime a supcrviwr gtv~'II an employee an 01111 w11TT11n)!, M•e ~h,11,l<I "'"~" utw~~ i:t111i:01•11ing the discussion, inchtcliag di~ d:itetsl and 
1tahlrc ofrbc concern, 011d die expected corrective action/s). The s111,orvi,or shl>uld 11••1> ,11,·irtun nDCL'!l fo1• fotUl'c r~fcrence. 
Auy w1·ittc11 Wlll'llillJl Ol' re11rimaud given oo 111 employee should include q st;1tcmcnl ,11c~ ijS "F~ih1re 11, mcol 11trf1>1'lllllliCo ~land.,·J.~ m11y 
rc;ult ii• diKi11l1n•ry •cll(m up lu onJ i11.:l11di11g Ji~1ni!l'llll" and ~lso indicate D copy will be placed in Ill; c:111ploye~•s Jl~l');opn~I Ille, ,\ 
rcapo1111C, ifm,y, alon1.i wilh lhcw11rni11g or teprim•CH) will be fcwwanfod t,i Pcrsonilcl through the [)ivisim1 Ad111ini11rator for in~hisk,r, in 
die ~mploycc's official personnel file. 
http~//epic/sites/Manuals/Pages/Personne I/ APPE2504.aspx 
'41018 
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L~nt 1•,~::!llhr~ .IIT. 1.1/t?/20tPi 1;-l7 ~1vl by· .I $)'!.tem Accoont J,E,:ltr thlr, p•llJ<!l 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law 
No~t r•ar~gr,ph,, 
~SSE cu~ ~FIOCill FOR Dl~t;JPUNA~Y REASONS /\ND INVOLUNTARV TRANS~,R l~/03) 
-
A penn.,nent cbm•Hii,d •1t1~i,\yft' is t'l'ltltl~ fo due prcce?iis bi,fctre thr. Dup;utmcnt nialc..~ ;iny '111'c;i1.~()fl "~ IIYJl!'<,I~ di!i~iplinf:' (ihcluding di:.mil'iir.rJI, 
.tlJ~ptnslol~. dt"ntot'ori, 0( r'edUtflcm tn pay! Dr make ;in lnvolimta1,y trsm;i;fm. Qml •'Jr wrltt.•tl <01J11~1,•IM19 or l'~prhT1and5 i'lrt' not covr.rtrd by th~ Ou11,1 Pr,')Cl'f~tt. 
priuc'°du~. but may be .ttldr~i.-c' thrcugh the problem~:'iClvlng l)(CC•JdU•'I:', (R!!'f~r"11Ci!!! beglnnlng at P,1r;,gl'.11ph ~9Uu .l Due prc,e~ r19qu1rclSi that tllw 
l'!tnplOyt:t! recei\/e noti~ and an oppc1turdty tQ at.pond bti~'>l'f Ji tJ~l~i1>r1 I~ trwde to impcse ..1n~ di:;c:iplimu:,r .sci.ion er makP, ;,i,i irwolu1u~ry tJ;Jtl~11!r. 
http1://epic/sites/Manuals/Pages/Personnel/ APPE25 50.aspx 
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Section 74-106 - Idaho Stat.gislature -
• Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 74 
TRA.NSFARENT AND ETHICAL GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 
14)020 
Page 1 of 7 
Print Friendly 
74-106. RECORDS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE PERSONNEL 
RECORDS, PERSONAL INFORMATION, HEALTH RECORDS, PROFESSIONAL 
DISCIP.LINE. The following records are exempt from disclosure: 
(1) E:xcept as provided in this subsection, all personnel 
records of a current or former public official other than the 
public official's public service or employment history, 
classification, pay g,i;-ade and step, longevity, gross salary 
and salary history, status, workplace and employing agency. 
All other personnel information relating to a public employee 
or applicant including, but not limited to, information 
regarding sex, race, marital status, birth date, home address 
and telephone number, applications, testing and scoring 
materials, grievances, correspondence and performance 
evaluations, shall not be disclosed to the public without the 
employee's or applicant's written consent. Names of applicants 
to classified or merit system positions shall not be disclosed 
to the public without the applicant's written consent. 
Disclosure of names as part of a background check is 
permitted. Names of the five (5) final applicants to all other 
positions shall be available to the public. If such group is 
less than five (5) finalists, then the entire list of 
applicants shall be available to the public. A public official 
or authorized representative may inspect and copy his 
personnel records, except for material used to screen and test 
for employment. 
(2) Retired employees' and retired public officials' home 
addresses, home telephone numbers and other financial and 
nonfinancial membership records; active and inactive member 
financial and membership records and mortgage portfolio loan 
documents maintained by the public employee retirement system. 
Financial statements prepared by retirement system staff, 
funding agents and custodians concerning the investment of 
assets of the public employee retirement system of Idaho are 
not considered confidential under this chapter. 
(3) Information and records submitted to the Idaho state 
lottery for the performance of background investigations of 
employees, lottery retailers and major procurement 
contractors; audit records of lottery retailers, vendors and 
major procurement contractors submitted to or pe.rfo~med by the 
Idaho state lottery; validation and security tests of the 
state lottery for lottery games; business .reco;r;ds and 
information submitted pursuant to sections 67-7412 (8) and (9) 
and 67-7421(8) and (9), Idaho Code, and such document5 and 
information obtained and held for the purposes of lottery 
security and investigative action as determined by lottery 
https ://legislature.idaho .gov /statutesrules/idstat/title 7 4/t7 4ch 1/sect74-106/ 12/15/2017 
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i;-ules unless the public interest in disclosure substantially 
outweighs the private need for protection from public 
disclosure. 
(4) Records of a personal nature as follows: 
(a) ~ecords of personal debt filed with a public agency or 
independent public body corporate and politic pursuant to 
law; 
(b) Personal bank records compiled by a public depositor 
for the purpose of public funds transactions conducted 
pursuant. to law; 
(c) Records of ownership of financial obligations and 
instruments of a public agency or independent public body 
corporate and politic, such as bonds, compiled by the 
public agency or independent public body corporate and 
politic pursuant to law; 
(d) Records, with regard to the ownership of, or security 
interests in, registered public obligations; 
(e) Vital statistics records; and 
(f) Military records as described in and pursuant to 
section 65-301, Idaho Code. 
(5) Information in an income or other tax return mea$ured 
by items of income or sales, which is gathered by a public 
agency for the purpose of administering the tax, except such 
info;i:-mation to the extent disclosed in a written decision of 
the tax commission pursuant to a taxpayer protest of a 
deficiency determination by the tax commission, under the 
provisions of section 63-3045B, Idaho code. 
(6) Records of a personal nature related directly or 
indirectly to the application for and prov;i.sion of statutory 
services rendered to persons applying for public care for 
people who are elderly, indigent or have mental or physical 
disabilities, or participation in an environmental or a public 
health study, p;i:-ovided the provisions of this subsection 
making records exempt from disclosure shall not apply to the 
extent that such records or information contained in those 
records are necessary for a background check on an individual 
that is required by federal law regulating the sale of 
firearms, guns or ammunition. 
(7) Employment security information, except that a person 
may agree, through written, informed consent, to waive the 
exemption so that a third party may obtain information 
pertaining to the person, unless access to the information by 
the person i$ restricted by $Ubsection (3) (a), (3) (bl or (3) 
(d) of section 74-113, Idaho Code. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 74-113, Idaho Code, a person may not 
review identifying information concerning an informant who 
reported to the department of labor a suspected violation by 
the person of the employment secudty law, chapter 13, title 
Il:.,, Idaho Code, under an assurance of confidentiality. As used 
in this section and in chapter 13, title 72, Idaho Code, 
"employment security information'' means any information 
descriptive of an identifiable person or persons that is 
received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to or 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title74/t74chl/sect74-106/ 12/15/2017 
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collected by the department of labor or the industrial 
commission in the administration of the employment security 
law. 
(Bl Any personal records, other than names, business 
addresses and business phone numbers, such as parentage, race, 
religion, sex, height, weight I tax identification and social 
security numbers, financial worth or medical condition 
submitted to any public agency or independent public body 
corporate and politic pursuant to a statutory requirement for 
licensing 1 certification, permit or bonding. 
(9) Unless otherwise provided by agency rule, information 
obtained as part of an inquiry into a person's fitness to be 
granted or retain a license, certificate, permit 1 privilege, 
commission or position, private association peer review 
committee records authorized in title 54, Idaho Code. Any 
agency which has records exempt from disclosure under the 
provisions of this subsection shall annually make available a 
statistical summary of the number and types of matters 
considered and their disposition. 
(10) The records, findings, determinations and decisions of 
any prelitigation screening panel formed under chapters 10 and 
23, title 6, Idaho Code. 
(11) Complaints received by the board of medicine and 
investigations and informal proceedings 1 including informal 
proceedings of any committee of the board of medicine, 
pursuant to chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, and rules 
adopted thereunder. 
(12) Records of the department of health and welfare or a 
public health district that identify a person infected with a 
reportable disease. 
(13) Records of hospital care, medical records, including 
pre:scriptions, drug orders, records or any other prescription 
information that specifically identifies an individual 
patient, prescription records maintained by the board of 
pharmacy under sections 37-2726 and 37-2730A, Idaho Code, 
records of psychiatric care or treatment and professional 
counseling records relating to an individual's condition, 
diagnosis, care or treatment 1 provided the provisions of this 
subsection making records exempt from disclosure shall not 
apply to the extent that such records or information contained 
in those records are necessary for a background check on an 
individual that is required by federal law regulating the sale 
of firearms, guns or ammunition. 
(14) Information collected pursuant to the directory of new 
hires act, chapter 16, title 72, Idaho Code. 
(15) :eersonal information contained in motor vehicle and 
driver records that is exempt from disclosure under the 
provisions of chapter 2, title 49, Idaho Code. 
(16) Records of the financial status of prisoners pursuant 
to subsection (2) of section 20-607, Idaho Code. 
(17) Reco;r;ds of the Idaho state police or department of 
correction received or maintained pursuant to section 19-5514, 
Idaho Code, relating to DNA databases and databanks. 
htUps://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title74/t74ch l /sect74-106/ 12/15/2017 
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(18) Records of the department of health and welfare 
relating to a survey, resurvey or complaint investigation of a 
licensed nursing facility shall be exempt from disclosure. 
Such records shall, however, be subject to disclosure as 
public records as soon as the facility in question has 
received the report, and no later than the fourteenth day 
following the date that department of health and welfare 
representatives officially exit the facility pursuant to 
federal regulations. Provided however, that for purposes of 
confidentiality, no record shall be released under this 
section which specifically identifies any nursing facility 
resident. 
(19) Records and information contained in the registry of 
immunizations against childhood diseases maintained in the 
department of health and welfa:t'e, including information 
disseminated to others from the registry by the department of 
health and welfare. 
(20) Records of the Idaho housing and finance association 
(IHFA) relating to the following: 
(a) Records containing personal financial, family, health 
or similar personal information subrni tted to or otherwise 
obtained by the IRFAi 
(b) Records submitted to O:t' otherwise obtained by the IHfA 
with regard to obtaining and servicing mortgage loans and 
all records relating to the review, approval or rejection 
by the IHFA of said loans; 
(c) Mortgage portfolio loan documents; 
(d) Records of a current or fo~mer employee other than the 
employee's duration of employment with the association, 
position held and location 0£ employment. This exemption 
from disclosure does not include the contracts of 
employment or any remuneration, including reimbursement of 
expenses, of the executive director, executive officers or 
commissioners of the association. All other personnel 
information relating to an association employee or 
applicant including, but not limited to, information 
regarding sex, race, marital status, birth date, home 
address and telephone number, applications, testing and 
scoring materials, grievances, correspondence, retirement 
plan information and performance evaluations, shall not be 
disclosed to the public without the employee's or 
applicant's written consent. An employee or authorized 
representative may inspect and copy that employee's 
personnel records, except for material u~ed to sc~een and 
test for employment or material not subject to disclosure 
elsewhere in the Idaho public records act. 
(21) Records of the department of health and welfare 
related to child support services in cases in which there is 
reasonable evidence of domestic violence, as defined in 
chapter 63, title 39, Idaho Code, that can be used to locate 
any individuals in the child :support case except in response 
to a court order. 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title7 4/t74ch l /sect74-l 06/ 12/15/2017 
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(22) Records of the Idaho state bar lawyer assistance 
program pursuant to chapter 49, title 54, Idaho Code, unless a 
participant in the program authorizes the release pursuant to 
subsection (4) of section 54-4901, Idaho Code. 
(23) Records and information contained in the trauma 
registry created by chapter 20, title 57, Idaho Code, together 
with any reports, analyses and compilations created from such 
information and records. 
(24) Records contained in the court files, or other records 
prepared as part of proceedings for judicial authorization of 
sterilization procedures pursuant to chapter 39, title 39, 
Idaho Code. 
(25) The physical voter registration application on file in 
the county clerk's office; however, a redacted copy of said 
application shall be made available consistent with the 
requirements of this section. Information from the voter 
registration application maintained in the statewide voter 
registration database, including age, will be made available 
except for the voter's driver's license number, date of birth 
and, upon a showing that the voter comes within the provisions 
of subsection ( 30) of this section or upon showing of good 
cause by the voter to the county clerk in consul tat ion with 
the county prosecuting attorney, the physical residence 
address of the voter. For the purposes of this subsection good 
cause shall include the protection of life and property and 
protection of victims of domestic violence and similar crimes. 
( 26) File numbers, passwords and information in the files 
of the health care directive registry maintained by the 
secretary of state under section 39-4515, Idaho Code, are 
confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person other 
than to the person who executed the health care directive or 
the revocation thereof and that person's legal 
representatives, to th€ person who registered the health care 
directive or revocation thereof, and to physicians, hospitals, 
medical personnel, nu:i;sing homes, and other persons who have 
been granted file number and password access to the documents 
within that specific file. 
(27) Records in an address confidentiality program 
participant.' s file as provided for in chapter 57, title 19, 
Idaho Code, other than the address designated by the secretary 
of state, except under the follo~ing circumstances: 
(a) If requested by a law enforcement agency, to the law 
enforcement agency; or 
(b) If directed by a court order, to a person identified 
in the orde:r. 
(28) Except as otherwise provided by law relating to the 
release of information to a gove:rnmental entity or law 
enforcement agency, any personal information including, but 
not limited to, names, personal and business addresses and 
phone numbers, sex, height, weight, date of birth, social 
security and driver's license numbe:i;s, or any other 
identifying numbers and/or information related to any Idaho 
https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title74/t74ch 1/sect74-106/ 12/15/2017 
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fish and game licenses, permits and tags unless written 
consent is obtained from the affected person. 
(29) Documents and records related to 
discipline that are maintained by the 
veterinary medicine under the provisions of 
alternatives to 
Idaho board of 
section 54-2118(1) 
(b), Idaho Code, provided the requirements set forth therein 
a.re met. 
(30) The Idaho residential street: address and telephone 
number of an eligible law enforcement officer and such 
officer's residing household member(s) as provided for in 
chapter 58, title 19, Idaho Code, except under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) It directed by a court order, to a person identified 
in the court order; 
(b) If requested by a law enforcement agency, to the law 
enforcement agency; 
(c) If requested by a financial institution or title 
company for business purposes, to the requesting financial 
institution or title company; or 
(d) If the law enforcement officer provides written 
permission for disclosure of such information. 
(31) All information exchanged between the Idaho 
transportation department and insurance companies, any 
database created, all information contained in the 
verification system and all reports, responses or other 
information generated for the purposes of the verification 
system, pursuant to section 49-1234, Idaho Code. 
(32) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the release of 
information to the state controller as the state social 
security administrator as provided in section 59~1101A, Idaho 
Code. 
(33) l?ersonal information including, but not limited to, 
property values, personal and business addresses, phone 
numbers, dates of birth, social security and driver's license 
numbers or any other identifying numbers or information 
maintained by the administrator of the unclaimed property law 
set forth in chapter 5, title 14, Idaho Code. Nothing in this 
subsection shall prohibit the release of names, last known 
city of residence, property value ranges and general property 
information by the administrator for the purpose of reuniting 
unclaimed property with its owner. 
(34) Any personal information collected by the secretary of 
state, pursuant to section 67-906 (1) (bl, Idaho Code, for the 
purpose of allowing individuals to access the statewide 
electronic filing system authorized in section 67-906, Idaho 
Code. 
History: 
[74-106, added 2015, ch. 140, sec. 5, p. 351; am. 2016, ch. 
343, sec. 2, p. 982; am. 2016, ch. 359, sec. 9, p. 1056; am. 
2017, ch. 146, sec. 2, p. 353.) 
How current is this law? 
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Thank you Doug. 
-
Geor@$mJJ:b 
egug Werth; Cheryl Ausman: t1adna Pllli!I 
MeHndi! smmc 
RE: Cexl'l:P.NAL] Record!> or Policy Request 
luesday, December 12, 2017 2:00:59 PM 
-
Marina, please prepare the necessary 10-day letter for mailing and ask HR to email the links to and 
of our existing policies and processes that speak to terminating employees. 
Melinda, we will make sure to discuss and review with you before responding. 
Georgia Smith I Deputy Director 
Communications & Research 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 West Main Street I Boise, ID 83735 




From: Doug Werth 
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 20171:29 PM 
To: Cheryl Ausman <Cheryl.Ausman@labor.idaho.gov> 
Cc: Melinda Smyser <Melinda.Smyser@labor.idaho.gov>; Georgia Smith 
<Georgia.Smith@labor.idaho.gov> 
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Records or Polrcy Request 
This should be forwarded to Georgia, who can take care of it from there (most likely by sending it to 
Marina). The Johnson's should be going through the proper channels for public records requests. 
Doug 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
Phone: 208-332-3570 Ext. 421 o 
Fax: 205-334--6125 
CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT: This electronic message contains information from the State of Idaho, 
Office of the Attorney General, and is confidential or privileged. The information is intended solely for thi:, 
use of the individual(s) or entity(ies) named above. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify 
us immediately by telephone at (208) 332 3570 ext. 4313, or by e--mail reply and then immediately delete 
14)027 
this message. Thank you. EXHIBIT 
I C 
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Fram: Cheryl Ausman 
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 12:44 PM 
To: Doug Werth <Doug Werth@labor idabo.go1i:> 
Cc: Melinda Smyser <Melioda.Srnyser@labor.idaho gov>; Georgia Sm
ith 
<Georgia Smitb@labor.jdaho gov> 
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL] Records or Policy Request 
Doug, please see below. How should l proceed? 
Thanks 
Cheryl 
From: daleandrosej [mailto·daJeandrosei@vaboo com] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 12:41 PM 
To: Cheryl Ausman <Cberyl,Aµsrnao@iabor idabo gov>; Melinda Smys
er 
<Melinda Scoyser@!aboridaho.gov> 
Cc: Dale and Rose Johnson <dat~androsej@yahoo.com> 
Subjer;t: {EXTERNAL] Records or Policy Request 
December 12, 2017 
Cheryl, 
-
Dale did receive the 10-day delay letter, on the separate issue th
at we spoke about earlier. 
Thank you for the follow-up on it. That said, please send the b
elow (records or policy) 
requested promptly by pdf email. 
Again, thank you. It is time to pull the plug on expanding Idaho




Sent from my Galaxy Tab A 
Decembers 201 z 
Cheryl; 
Does the Director have a policy, and if so, what is it, regardin
g internal accountability? 
I have no problem with people making honest mistakes. I am 
not speaking of simple 
human error; - I am more wondering about issues that fall ou
tside the scope of 
mistakes or accidents. 
Mistakes are easy to fix; you just fix them. This is what the ta
x~payers have every 
right to expect from their public servant employees, which de
monstrates true 
transparency. 
Your timely response will be appreciated. 
f4J 028 
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Rose Johnson208-683-0821 
Sent from my Galaxy Tab A 
- Original message -------
From: Cheryl Ausman <CheryLAusman@!abor idaho.gov> 
Date: 12/8/17 4·28 PM (GMT-08:00) 
-
To: Dale and Rose Johnson <da!eandrosej@yahoo.com> 
Subject: Second and more important question you called about ~ 
Rose, please reply with the question you have about the Director's policy. I want to make 
sure I get it correct and don't miss any part of it. 
Thank you! 
Cheryl 
Cheryl Ausman I Admini::itrative AS$istant 
Director's Office 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 West Main Street I Boise, ID 83735 




Sent from my Galaxy Tab A 
141029 
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Dece1nber 23, 2017 
Rose Johnson 
99 Northern Sky Road 
Athol, Idaho 83801 
-
Email: daleandrosej@yahoo.cmn 
Dear Mrs. Rose Johnson, 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law • '41030 
IDAHO 
DEPARTM,NT OF LABOR 
C.l. "BuTcH" OTTER, GOVERNO~ 
MELINDA. S. SMYSER, DIRECTOR 
On December 8, 2017, the Idaho Department of Labor was in receipt of your request for 
information, specifically as referenced below: 
• Does the Director have a policy, and if so, what is it, regarding internal accountability? Particularly 
a policy regarding issues that fall outside the scope of human error. 
You have already received copies of the policies considered to be responsive to your request, which 
have not changed since they were originally sent to you on December 19, 20 t 7. 
Sincerely, 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile; (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
C STATE Of tOAHO 
rtrR·sOTUJff.!J OF ,oNNER 
r ·. uutC!AL DIS TIUCT 
2818 JNI I 8 lit 9= 03. 
~~~OUft.t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
Dale Johnson, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Ha:cdy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 




I, Dale Johnson, am the Plaintiff herein, am over the age of 18, competent to 
testify to the matters set forth herein, and have personal knowledge of the matters 
set forth herein: 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of my request to 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -I 
2:\Cli~nlll)I", R.11114\llnlllaU•nmry l'ldt WORD r,mn Dec; DPCI Jnlwmn.. rni.u:IIZ.i!oc 
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the Department regarding documents filed, and who received them, and the 
Department's most recent response. The Response requires a minimum of $150 for 
me to obtain records and internal IDOL communications which pertain to me, but 
does not set forth the number of pages, staff hours, or cost per page, or otherwise 
support what appears to be an exorbitant cost, or possibly indicating the existence 
of many hundreds of pages of records that have not been disclosed in the course of 
this case; 
2. My wife, Rose Johnson, requested Department accountability policy 
and aTe in her Declaration, filed herein as Exhibits B, C and D. 
3. Without the ability to conduct further discovery, I am limited to 
sublnitting public records requests, which appear to be filtered through Defendants' 
counsel, Doug Werth, and continuously denied, at least for the amount of time to 
prevent me to properly examine it for information that may be factually relevant to 
my case, and with no mechanism to compel disclosure in such a manner so as to 
require specific responses, directly relevant to this case. 
4. Counsel for Defendants, at Oral Argument on my Motion for 
Reconsideration, also raised, fo:r the first time, the issue of Judicial Immunity, 
which was not the basis of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, nor raised in any of 
Defendants' pleadings. 
5. Counsel for Defendants also argued, at the same hearing, that 
somehow my request for discov~ry and the possible need to depose a few individuals 
was somehow a request to depose around 100 people. This, in combination with the 
extraordinarily high cost for a :response to my public records request1 further 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -2 
):;\c:Ucl'&IIUuhniutt, RWll,DflltlMftWlr)r I ?tit WuftD l'i.1rm Dc\.l Dale ,klhnrmn. · nr¥ixcd::i.d!M: 
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indicate that th.ere may significant relevant evidence that the Defendants are not 
disclosing in this case; 
6. Alternatively, I believe that this was an attempt to persuade this court 
to belie11e that my case is somehow out of control and give it an appearance of being 
somehow frivolous. which it is not. 
7. Just so this court is aware, I have m.ade every honest effort to resolve 
this matte:r long before today. My wife and l have almost begged the state not to 
t\lrn a molehill into a Mt. Everest. 
8. Under the apparent advice of Defendant's counsel, as to know who has 
had input in my case, I continuously receive delay letters and partial information, 
including no :registry or record kept to track files. 
9. The difficulties that I have had in obtaining records concerning myself, 
in combination with the representation of the Department. below by the same 
counsel as is rep:resenting the Department in this case, and the manner in which 
my clailn was handled, lead ro.e to believe that there may be evidence of fraud and 
other potentially torti.ous acts on Defendant's part, which may only be obtained 
through discovery or subpoena, and which would require this case to be re-opened. 
Further your <kc/.arant sayeth n.aught. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the law1. 
of Idaho, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2018. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of January, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
DECLARATION OF DALE JOHNSON -4 
Z:\Clicna.\luMloll1 Kmie.\Drl.ltli\wll,IDJ I '1111 WnAD lill'ttl 1>S P11\c JoMIM11n • ralli!dl,ll!tt 
_U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
-~ Hand Delivered 
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
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IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT o,: LABOR 
C.L.. "8uTCM" Orr!R, GovERMOR 
MtLINDA S. SMvs,al'f, DIRl!tCTOR 
January 2, 2018 
Dale G. Johnson 
99 Northem Sky Road 
Athol, ID 83801 
NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL TIME REQUIRED 
FOR RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
EXAMINATION/COPYING OF AGENCY RECORDS 
Email: daleandrosej@yahoo.com 
On December 26, 2017, the Idaho Department of Labor was in receipt of your request for the following records between August 15, 2015 through September 5, 2015: 
• The docket registry and entry page-who filed what and when; 
• All Notices of Appeal and Notices of Appearance to the Idaho Industrial Commission filed by 
employer, Idaho Department of Labor and/or claimant; 
• All motions, affidavits and other pleadings to the Idaho Industrial Commission by the Idaho 
Department of Labor, Employer and/or claimant; 
• The disclosed identity of all Idaho Department of Labor legal staff having any involvement with 
your Unemployment Insurance case; and 
• All internal communication, including email.s, notes, etc., concerning your case. I.ncluding, but not 
limited to Ken Edmunds, Michael Johnson, Amy Hohnstein, Craig Bledsoe, Doug Werth, and all 
other legal staff and the office of the Governor of Idaho and any other person having 
communications or contact concerning your Unemployment Insurance case. 
The Department has consulted or has had an opportunity to consult with an attorney regarding your 
request. 
The public records and/or information you requested to examine and/or copy are not immediately available. 
A lolilger period of time is needed to locate, retrieve, and/or review the records or infonnation requested. A 
response shall be made by the Department within ten (l 0) working days of the received date of your 
request. 
While your intention in submitting your amended public records request may have been to reduce the 
cost to you for the records request, your amended public records request is in fact much more 
burdensome and will require more department resources to fulfill than your prior request. In my 
estirnation, the fee for your amended public records request wHI be$] 50, at a minimwn. Inasmuch as 
(:ENTRAL OFFICE• 317 W. Main St. • Boise, Idaho 83735 • Tel: 208-332-3570 • W.,: la 
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you have not paid for your prior public records request because you believed the c;harge of $95.05 was 
"unnecessarily high," the department will wait until it receives a deposit from you in the amount of $150 
before working further on your amended public records request. Bear in mind that the actual cost to you., 
in the end, may be much higher than $] 50. Please let tne know how you wish to proceed. 
Sincerely, 
CER11FICATE OF MAILING 
I 
I hereby certify that the original of this letter was sent by email to daleandrosfj@yahoo.com, tJiis 2nd 
day ofJanuary, 2018. i 
j1;\j•:::·::,J;:: .. , \':· '··· 
.,.,'1 I 
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LA \VRENCg G. \V_ASDEN 
A'J"l'OR.NFJY GENERAL 
DOUG \:VERT.H - ISB# H6GO 
Deputy Attorney Gen.end 
Idaho Dt~partmi:mt of Labor 
317 -w. lVfain Street 
Boise, Idaho 8373;5 
'I\.dr;;pho:tie: (208) 882--3zi70 
-STATE Of IDAHO 
COUNTY Of BONNER 
f!HST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2018 JAN 2ft PM 3: 51 
CLERK T COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF '.T.'HE FIRST ;ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF ID.AHO, IN AND ft'OR THE COUN1"'Y OF BONNEI=t 
DALE tTOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff: 
STA 'I'F.! 0 F 11JAH0, DEPAH.TMENT 
OF LABOR, Anw Hnhnsttdn, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Ma.rk Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing E!xmn.in.er, -J~tnr:,t 
f:lardy, APJ.H:!~1ls Hearing ExaJninet, 
Georg·i.a Smith, R<Hxn·ds Custodian, 
and tJOHN AND iANJ~ DOES I-Vin 
th(~ir ind.i vi(lual and official capacities 
as employees of the State of Idaho, 
Dden<lants. 
Case No. GV•-17--0423 
DRFENIJANTS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OP'POSI'TJ.ON TO PLt\.NTIFF'S 
RULE 52(h) A1~D RULE G0(ll){H) 
J\JO'l'IONS 
Thi~ n:i.atter is b1c::fore the Court o.n a second round of p.ost-judgrnent motions 
filed hy Plaintiff Dale ~Tohm;o.n (".Plaintiff') pursuant to th1;:1 ld.1:-tho Rufos of CiviJ 
Procedu:.r(1 - namdy, h.if, Ru.Ie GO(h)(H) r.n.otio.n to set aside jud.gm.ent and his Rufo 52(b} 
11EFENDAN'I'S' 1\r1gJ\tIORANDUM IN OPPOSI':PION 
TO PL,ANTIFF'S IUJLg 52(b) AND RULE 60(b)(!;} MOTIONS . 1 
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Order Gnrn.ting .Defr:nd.~u.1ts' LR.C.P. 12(b}O.) 
Motio.n to Dismiss 
Ivfotion to R.1:~com:iifo.r and l\.fotion to A.llovv 
Addition.al .Discovtiry 
1l1f,Hn 'F"' y1r)·u·•11 Dl° ·••<·1· -.:i ·1i, <It'-~ •·)· -t>"'1-,.,. l'l->i"l'"~-,-1.,:r .t\..~_, ... " .. tCJ.l.<f.Z .t l - ... ,.__.. :., .. { .. ,J. C.'i..A,H,.t ' -"'- tA.~.,J. J .... ~.- .... .. ~- J..l ... fa:,-
Pla:intilf s IUotfrm for Reconsid.erntio:n at1d to 
A.How Addition.al Discovrn:-y 
Nkition fo.t i\.dd.itional P.in.d.i.ngs of Fact and 
Conr-hisiom--; of Law and .l\Ioti{m to Set Asidf:, 
;fudg.me:ut 
Plaintiff files nwmorandum. r:tnd. dt)darations 
in sup_r.H1.rt of his Motion _for Additional 
Fin.dingH of Fact a.n<l Conclu~.ions of Law a.n.d 
l\,fotion to fait .Asidt~ ;Judgn:wnt 
H. 
A, BecanBE Plah~tW'..f:!.iJ.Q.~l to timelv appggl from the otder cfonving· hi%Lg1g(jg_:o, _ _t~2 
:reconsi4er, the __ _Coltrt-'s. i_nd2"ment: hasj)ec:ome_fi:nal: .. .his _R.uk~ __ 52{h) rnotion..for 
additio1J~~Lt-Jn~ings i~ 'lu1:time1y _antlJ~:HJ~out Ill.£!rit 
DEFENDANTS' .MKVfORANI.H.JM IN OPPOSfTION 
11'<() "'1:)T ,:-..N-1"Cj1"1T;'"l'•"~ "jHH ,'t"'. ~>)/)_·\ .i~ }rn, "!)TH Ji' ft{\{1-}\.t'{,') 1\.:,1'(•.,,.,·nt\N:~ .. J 1.\...• _ l....<.\, ....... t.Lr .. "-·· 1.l ........ J..!. t>.:.,\_,),1 .. :l..t~!\...t .:.1.\.-•"-'"'"-~ , ... ,,,~L:,\" _ ... ?-.t ..•. t,.>.1o. ~-'° ... ~ 
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'11
111° t.1'•m·· µ t'·~·i<• •,l'" 8'fll"i:.•:,: j°!~·,·,rn "Il"' 1.··.1·.,~1 J0 '•c'1.0 ·1'l''''•>i· ,n· ,v,-,dr.-,• ;.1 "'n •C,f•t1'1.·.,1, -,.:, ... '\,.: •• .,., , , .>. , .... {>. ( ·,t· j.h.,.t.C'I.. L .. ,~ '-"' J . V l.t ,_;_ - 8 l ,;;,•.\l ,, VA ,_,,...._ _.,,_t,:_;: ... J.~ (A .. of_'( •• , .. , ..... (.17> 
te.rminatt~d by tht~ fifo1g o.f n. timt::1Y..l11J?.ttc;m which, if grant,?.d, ;::odd affi.ict 
any findings of fiwt, co.ndusion:, of hnv or an.y judg·n:w:n.t in th;,! aebon 
l~):xc~er>f ...... ,oi"i•·n"'~ l~"('(~•:\·r f)~"l 1"3. (-~{) ')f tl)p rd~~}t(· 1;~t~lc~s o·E-"' ,,~vi'~ f>r•' . .,,(:t(lll1',,~ •·pA, '-'°' .,,,..,._.b., ,,., .. h ... ,,._,_-,.~:- ..... "'•H'.•-·•·· ... ,. _ _,., .... .• ·.<.._ .• .1 ._,.,,· .• -'-.. '-n.•.1 __ .. \,l{,.· . ...... :. '-"-
J:l':H)l:l0llS t<:igarding cnsb.~ or attf}.rney'~; f;,i\:,8), in ivhieh casf:i th,,! Hppeal 
pm'iod .for s.U jtH.lg·ments or ordm.·s conn:u.H.ne~~s to run tipon tht~ date of 
{!•--e. -~1•).·rk-~~ ti.lir1rr ~1'--lJtl .. \ ,.·,n -tJ1;) C)~(~e•!-> <leti,ti--10.~ Al'{.,ll 111ction . .. ,.1. t. .t ... ·. · •~ . . f., ,.,,( _. ,I> V .. ,. , ...• >. I .t .·, ., f , .. 1 .> .. ,), .. .. , 
t:ir.'t'."" .. ·,i_.,'_.r ' ''''}t·1·')'l'' l''l'l~,- t.-,--1vri1,n<·•~ ..... ,, '''t1"''1'">1 r·-,·,w:( d Y,J. ·1:ri,ii·"·<-,.i,'[.• .• ,,.,.,t;{l''' .£,A,._l,' ~tl_(l._1·:,·· .. 1·(,,t),,,.·.·1•. - -" , >.fat '·'-'1 ,,.,,: ,Y ,.~,. ,.,.u,.a.U.· t.t.b. <.t~_pt.•k _:.h:d.1.J A• .<.(.•, ., 1<,-.u.l;> . .l.l ~- t .. it,_.<.~l .,,l __ :;, 
D.KFENDANTS' MKMORANDUNI IN OPPOSITION 
'fO f'LA.N'fH'F'S Hl.TLB f)i(b) AND RULE'. fiO(h)(6,11VlOTIONS · 4 
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On a paJ~ty's rnotion fikd __ _:tl◊)t:ltft. . .than. _ _14 __ d,:r~'s ___ Rfri~-e . .t..he __ (::nb:v __ f)f 
i1!fJg_n:1t:11.t~ t-h€- CG\lrt 1n.a.Jr a.rn.e.n.d .lts fi.ruiii:lgs~ r,r 111~1k(: r:=.clditior1a.l 
.find.in.§IS, aJ1d n:rny an:w:nd tht~ jud.gtxw:n.t ~ccordingly. 
:m.ntio.n n::,ed.ed. to b(i filed w.ithin fourtee:r1 (H) days of Septm:nhe.t' 14-, :W17, th{~ dah~ 
( 
judgment. was entered. It was not.. 
act:uahty H rnotiou pursuant to H:ufo fi2fa).. Se.l' lRC .. P. 7(b)(1)(B) (motions r.n.ust 
r_r·l""·· <.,•<).!J.}'_t·· !· .. ~:. "()t'· ''"'ll'i>•(.,A ;.,.) R(·.,,i-_,:: f1'r1d.i1H)'M 01· ,,,.,v,1·,1~·i()'",:; ,,,l,.,~f' .,,,,_l~l'•tl' ,>·t1_ -.1.'t , ... • .-.. .otJo. , ~~-'-.J: ,.,._ ... A. .. •'tS. '-'" 1.. •<>~ ... ;. ·'- .,.~, ..._ .. ~-.;:. ,. • •. , •. , ....... "'· ..• , •. • 1.t..,. ""~-'.,··""··'";;,.ii..~.<. .... ..-.~ v"' .. 
t:tn .l11t(~tioc1.1tor:r orrlf-j_r n1a(lt~ ptxrsi1a11t t..(J a s_hJJ\,,.. c~ru.se. l1Har111~~ !~f--~~rtJ~ 
-lll_Q.tfrm u.t1dg_r.J{J;~li-?:.J.2 .. ftr.J5G or, unless thes~i ruk!s provide othfrwis~, on 
any other 11:i.ohon. 
Plaintiffs eanlier n:wtinn ti) allow d.i.scol!cry was .rnade '':pur~uant to hfoho Kuk: 
Di!:FENDANTS' :rvrKMOH,ANlHJM IN 0-PPOSITIO:N 
TO .PL/,:NTLFF'S H.lJLE M:'.{h) A.ND RULE GO(h)(tJ) MOTIONS 1\ 
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faet. 
'~[I?].i.n.d.ing'S o.f f~1ct: a.r~:!' l]{lt t1ecec~sar3? to &liJ}.po.rt. deci8lJ)11s of s·u.r11m.ary·· 
judgment moUorw un{k,:r LR. C.P. t,G, or to s-uppo.rt a dt~cision 1:1:!l.a.ting- to 
''''l''i.,. ')th<, ... ''''(·,t·-~'1!' ,:,,.,'('(-"'lt. "1'"iJ.l, ••<">;.w,~~··>.i· •1'<) ''l"'it-~q,,,~ .r,,,. i,,,..-nl:-ti-f·<>l'"." ().Jo .. ".,-~ ,_...,., __ .,.'C,,_\. .).,,t•'-•••J.\. ...... , ••. ,.4,1.,.~• '\'l~lr.,._J... ""''•'"-•J:''--~ •. ,... t,, M.).'t. -~-\..Ji.>.,. -'-'-"-~ .,.11,_li."i:-...~.~,-~.._.,.t,,:.t .... ,.5. 
··l·~ .,,--r ... ~~,,-..;.,)il '"nd '>!"' l I~ r1. tJ- .~i ·1 ,•·1-~·, ,, J)~}nk ~-t-' !,~,~~ ... -... •c•· Nr•)~Ro.4.-\..,_ '1f),,,( ·r.~.-.. 1,-, '· .,:,t_, ... ,.1,.;,,),>t U ,., .L. .. , ,. \..'-./.J,. ,. •f.1\1-)], !!,JO.A , •• c.~ .. ~, .. _.·uhl. > • •• .:. t •. , ... <:·I•'-<., .,.,_ ·;I: J.t .. ct .. ,,. 
842, 84G, ttG,:LP,;M -~no, ~n4 (H188) (citing LftC.P. 52fo)). Ar.To~·d, QjJJ.BD11 
,.., i,~ ·i~ {"'<q,~un.: .. u ~ /~::; fi-ir~·t•1--· '7.,:tt,~ ,..~·r)(\ "l'"'\.\"} 1'): t),.lt ·1~")1 l ·~9_<)1( i•'J{~(\,·~\ /tit~~,.rlt .... ~.._ .. ~ ~., .. ,:).L!:~ .. ~:.::J"···· ... Ll:., .!.'!:,.,. ,,.-,,!. ,., , •:ti.., I, , ..•. ,")_,) .,h .. t..,;, ... ._. .l,,.,,A,''.I ,.,,.\;\),_,., \ ... ,.i.".1,.Ii::;,c. 
of :frtct are unnecessary" in smm:n.faty judgm(mt m.r1tinns). 
For tfo~s{! .!'(:.a.s<i:ns, it is afo:.t:nd.ant1y clear that: 
(1) Beca.-usi=; Plairl tiff did not fifo a t.i1rrnly appeal., Im rn 
j·urit~{iictio11ally· h~irred. fron:1 HJJ};;t~r:tl1ng· th.e (lcru.rt~s orrl€r g.ra.:n.tLn.g· 
smm:mn'.Y :hid.g1mH"it, tfo:i jud.gnwnt enhm~d. tht1n,(m, and the Cou.i't.'s 
order denying reconsideration.; 
(2) Plaint.iJ:fs Ih1.It~ r:;i~(b) motion for additio:rwl fin.ding:~; was 
untin:wly .fifod. and. should :not: b€ fo,iard; ,'tnd 
(8} No timely Rule 52(a) n:wtfon. for ad.ditio:nr:d. fim.hngs vvas 
fifod and, .in any t!V1mt, sueh. a motion w<.rnld b(~ fr.ivo.k,us bt1caUSf} tlns 
Court1 in the first l:nstan1x,, '\.-Vai:i not. n:qulred to make a:ny find.in.gs of 
fact on Plaintiffs Ruki t56(d.) motion tu aJk;.\.v tliseov:ery. 
D'EFEND.ANTB' ME.MORANDUM IN OPIY)SITION 
'ff) PLA.N'ITFPS IHJLE iW(h) .AND RULE 60(h)(6) lWOTJONS .. B 
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J3., f~.la.i11ti.ff.i:1Hs .r1nt .. fiJHd. a R.lllr~-. 5Bfe.) ~rn.oti(}ll ... to, ~llter.01~ &,axtl~~nd ~t-hl~. it1d.!~~[n.e1:1t: .. an,t 
sud1_motion_would_bt' tln:w--ba:tT0d ,HHl should_Jw_denfod 
That did not occur. 
DEFENDA.NTS' l\JE1\-'10.RAN.DUrl-'i IN OPPOS1TION 
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r,... ",1,:i ;--; "'1' i-h- ,·,·r~;: ,.J .-•,·•t ., ''-'£"'" "( t: s.•ul--·,r·1· +·'·o ·l ; '1 i·hn .. , ,.,_,... +'o' " .t.:'!; ,, ,.,. ,,f ti1 ., 1.,., ,:h '-ul,.,l> ;., ,,hi:! ,:.. J.At..l,:t <' ,,.-:':, ,; "·'-'-:. ,,. ),.- ,., l..J., 1 ,·l•"'' .u ,,. ,, ,.-.1.,.u.<:• ,. ,l . . U,.i.t.<.!'s '). ,, .l;.: 
ix1crf:i<r·1 I-r"-""l'~'s h,.,.,11 f;.r,31'*.•"f•P •i~«,,., tr; fi i,,. J,is mq·t···.1.:()'"1 'r'1)•"ll'<):L1 h,:, f"l"'-'i !-.,~ ~ 1,,: ...... ,. A •• 1,_y J. .. .A.~.( •.. \..~.(Ji.• ........ "' -~· '-"v -· ~ , .... -..J ..... ) ... '"'"· I,. ... !.; • '-' , J,...,.,. "" .... ,. -t..~,s . .. ~-- .,. '-· t £,l,.~---
motiOil within fourtt!x;n days of flw emry of .final judgment, he did not 
.s1.1pport his rnofaon •.:vithin that pork,d. A pH.rt.y <:.annot ~;hfostep tlw 
.requiren:wt1t t:o file a motion withi:ti a (X,rtain pm·iod by filing an 
1.m~u_ppr>rh~d motion an<l promising suppo.rt. d.twvn the ro;,lcL s·ee Kuhn v . 
.C.Q.ktw.§ll.J311nkw;-_J,,~~n.<l.m1u:k,.Jnc._. 160 Idaho 240, 248, 2,:W "I:>.3d ~m2, 
1000 (201.0) (hulding that .n.wtion.s for a nww trial ,v1::n.~ untir.nely where 
th(~ movnnt fUed tlw mot.ions "l:Vithin tJw fourtetin-d~_y period dictated by 
thti .ruk\ bnt did nnt prov--.i.r.fo factnal s1..apport. for t.h1:~ n106on.s until aft1:•:t< 
t.l-3<> 'V"·.-1··1:.:i '"'"-~il'.,,,.,.,-'i' ''P·,1•~(~a"~f• fll""''~ ~or<>,.:: "V) f:;t;>t,,1,~l ~H"l""'~'1.". -t; l,:i.,1· ;1, £. "t.: f-''-•.J1..\_ . .A. ~~A1 .. .t.'\;•'"- -,~ ._F .. "'- . ..,. '~·"···· ,. ~.&.~- ·n ~"-'-· J.-·'-· Ji. •• "···~"''·"· •. t.'-_tJ}.>\.:-~,. ,1.._Ji,,;.,,. .t.. ... .>.. 
support. of tlH:;~i>. n:wfrms w.H:hin the foutteen--day pm·icxI prr:!t~erib~id by 
thr:: rule") . .Rnle 11(a.)(2)(B) <fom; n.ot requ1.r<cJ that a 111twant. support H 
motion. Jin' 1·econisiden:i:t.ion \-Yith ftn affid~tviL A . .n1ovant wh,., dot.is so, 
however, nrnst S8rv·~: the affidavit w.ith the~ mot.ion m1d within fl-K, period 
.,f ,,,,no ~-...._. .(.';1~--- 0 · •. t"' t'·11·:i. "'~(··11·,,,-t.l .... ,.,.,u .. :. ll-•J_. 1.L ·"~--~-:S ~) . •l~ t .. .J...t .... J : ,. ~L 
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.A di~t:rid: e<Ju.rt\, dm:isbn to grant or d;,~ny a LR.C.P. GO(b) :motion is 
~:\r.itl).i~ti t.b.e d.ist.rict co\1:rfis lliscrt~tior.1 .. J)a\~rs{}Il .·v ...... (~11t1vovicl1 ... F~Hn:1.ib1 
1'rth~J~ 1 •t~} Id.a.hr> :37fi~ :38(~~ .2B.:t fJ.Sd, 6~Jf.1, 7(tj {i~l)l()), 1\. district tY)ttrt r.lot~B 
l:l!)t al~1is~~- its discreti::.'lJl \\:rl1~n1 it '~(1) eorr<~i;tl):· }}<:~t<~t~i:vt~s- t!"1r~ L~Htl(~ as 
die;crd.i<.ma.ry, (2) acts within the bounds [if discn:•ticm and apphf.is thi,i 
co.rtect lf}gHJ stai1d.a.rcl~;, a:11d (a) rt~ach.e::s t.h.c clt~cisif.HJ tl11'\)\tgl1 rtn t~Jr~~rcist~ 
of .t£~i~~so11,~~ ('f(l~!)l1110.r __ '\';;hl1a.1~g_<::rH(_;o11§?t.t'., I11e,.. 1~1r~ 1.tfa.ho 9{)4~~ t)t)E~, 188 
P.:3d 840., 851 (2008). 
d.istr.ict: cmn:t ,1bu1;,,ed itB discr«:ition rn. nxling- upon a. Rul,,; GO(b){G) :motion when its 
<.fot.i~ion and ord:e:r "did. not rnent:im:1 [mov.ing lHtrty';-;;_l affidavit or attached invoices . 
. An agg1·i,,;vi~d pro:ty n:rny obta.it1 reiii:d' froni u final ju.dg:n:1fl:i.t by making 
a motion t<.l tht! t:dal court und.et LR.C . .P. GO(h). Such a motion Hhmlid. 
·t•,,..,:- l.,,:x i.t·,;:,,,.~ iv'""~v·o·,· ,,~ P s'lUh~f\t--l,t,~ f-,,, ... ,, t~~·•''-~1~• -:H,,1·t,,,., l J,•1h1,,,;·q~ v -:'-'-~"'. >_..,__. ..,.,J:, "'~·'-'t'II'.\., ,\;..•Jirr., '<:l!-:, ,.( ~- , \.-,_.JI.~-.>.,,..__ ..... '"'•'- \.Ji .... J,.,.,._~,..- . .,, "-'.t"' ., .. (11..e .• ~~-":.-!~!'"n:~.:J.:.~.::.:~.; .... :....!. 
1\rn~~?.f, 100 Idaho 414, 420, 5fm P.2d 98fi, 9H.l (Hl7H) (dtutkm.s omitt.t:id) . 
. For that reason, although tht~ court i8 ·v1;.isted \.Vith hr~Jad disr:retiqn. 11::. 
deh~:nn.i:n.ing wh;.;;th.e:r to grant m~ tien:y a H.ule GO(b} 1:i:wtkn:1, it.s digcretic,n 
is .lirnited <'HHi. may bti gTanted only on a shQwin.g of "un.iqw~ and. 
torn1).e.iling ·ci1~cl.1111st~t:t1c;:~1~" ju.stifJ·i11g l~€lie.t l\tlHtt.{:~r ill~_f:~ti~tg __ ~?f .. I~f~!g_,:-j 
117 Idaho 10:)1, 1098, 7~)3 P.2d 12(18, J~~m> (Ct.App.1!)8H) (citing J?.!&1!.h<1J 
Fi l -, -11••N I' i , .. ·,q ,_·•1:•c, p}· •)d • i:11 (JCQ':,.·-, Y!.u ___ 1;1t;±£1~ i ,Ji) .. ctt:l.-J.{) -cH}~.:'i ()(},l ~.£.i l,.:• · , .~-:.i,-:; ■,)}.J. 
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g:round8 for hringi:ng a fO(b) motion .. " First Bank_ &. __ Tr ... of Idaho _v . .Park(;:r _H:rtW., 112 
Plaintiff has not demonstrated 
{;O.n.1pe.Hin~; circuxn~tances" that would ju:-etif}' disturhin.g the finality (if the Court's 
' :1 ·. JUf ~rmm:ir. 
·1i\.. /1(._._•."ll1'1.r. ,.·.n1•1' l l!"l l'"' ,R_',_.,,_ ... ','l'',')l'f-,: ;)_ f ... _:_,,f (_',)'_,1· ,.)··3·,1 £(·· ,, ,~ rl ,l;.,.; T" "i T?1' ·1rl1" ,., ., .. , ".(! r<',, .-.!· q l" ,l r~.- 1~ ,,, ,.,-,:on .. !.l J. --~ , .... <t ........ 1 ~*t ~ i,~ J:: '- " '- .... ,°{A , )~ • • ~,Ai.t.tl,.,(.,AJ.•'1.2 .t 2. A -',J~,t, ,.,_:. .l.'.:.>..tA., ~'< .. -~L,. ,.:~J _.._l_,j{A~l-.. ~?-b 
of Law and i\:fot.ion t<.l 81.:it .Aside ,Judgment, p.K. 
fitrther liability.'' Id., p.,). 
DE.FEND.ANTS' l\fE"l\lORANDUM IN OPPOSI'I110N 
rf() J_)"L.iil'-?l'!"fJ:'F~~~:; ltl.TI.;1~: t)5l{1=~) itNI.1 l{lJ1~1~~ (;Q{b)(G) l\1I(~trI(JN·s "' ] {) 
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60(b}(G). If Ph=dnt.iff and his ,vife haH, an fas-ue with IDOL's respon.S('S. to their pub lie 
records niquests, which they apparently do, their rem<:!dy is to sr-::ek judiefal :rt":\vfow 
.rm:rsuant t(J Idaho (\)(le § 74-115, Th.is is their sole .remedy: 
Tlm sole n 1m"~dy for a pfl•son aggrieved by th1::• cfon.iaI of a_ reql1€ist ibr 
disclosure is to institutt~ proctH:idings in tht~ .di.strict <.~ourt oft.he county 
'"'·heni the r(;:Cords m.' 8{}ll1~?e part fh;;ir~~of art; focat;~d, to cornpf!l tfa, public. 
agency or indetwndent public body Qorpo:rnte and politic to make the 
infonmltion. avaifa.bk for pu.hhc insp.ection in: aceordmic(~ with the 
- . ''t·h' h t p1:ov1s:mns or , .. rn c .ap ,er. 
LC. § 74,115(1). Rule GO(h)(6) i~ not an available remedy under thf! f,l.:{B H.nd 
circumstance of thi5i case, 
motion to n:.consider a.o.d j migxmmt ·w·tw an appeal to a higlw.r cotn•t, Appamntly, he 
b - . ' "R' ' ·•c, ·b)( .• , 1· • l • rl'h· · 1 c ..ose not to no so ... me fL\ ., tiJ app 1es oxuy m rare cases ... · 1s .is not snc11 a case. 
The Court .is respectfully request(;d to enter its order denying the pending 
motions. 
DA'l'ED this. )--•f-l 
STATE; OF' IDAHO 
OFFIC1<; 0f'Tl{E ATTOHNEY GENEitAL 
..... ~-~••"" 
I3y ... ,.. .•. •·········--·--·1 ......... \.. .... ·--···--,,,._A" ............................. "····-········· 
DOUG WER'I'Il 
D~~puty Attorney G-er:l.eral 
DEFENDAN''PS' MIDMORANDUM. IN OP.POSITION 
'I"i'} QJ ·"N. l"~:11-,~1·;"."' "R).r il ·F·- ,~2- 'l-) :\ "NJ) "->.Irr :J~' L.•o:· ·t)) "f.{\ 11,r -ym .")N'-:1 .. 11 .l \ . .t ... U""l .. ,. _t .~ !:, . l.. ,~., ,.) ,~1) l°1..A -!' .!:lei_,) " .. < U \l.. (~-/ l~lt .l.1\. ~ ,7$ • 
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CF'!."•'I'Jfif'ATF 0~' ~EI{V~'"''.""' •• • •• c.<fl• •• · ._-· •••• •'-··~· .. .-•·.- .J_ •• •~- •.. .!-.Cl:<.< 
J ,·rr,, R l~' J)'lT ··,·1·,·1·)r-f''I f"I.-!' l l . .., . ' r· ., ·, ) r·· ~ .n . .1.-i.. .. _c1_,,.) i. C .:i., '.\, .... · f t :i.at on. t us ... uf qay o ~1a.i:nw.ry, ~-{ 18, cmi.S€Cl tu be 
,·,:·,r .. ,_ ] ' t· °l"' - ' l ·l· ' '"l' ..... • .. ·• ' ' ' ·f t·L, · f', ,·,o-·)' · :r l·i •· ""h ., f' ll · ··· v • "· ~~-·•. · ·J ·tr" ,-,c~ Vt:-(1 d ... , d!:: ~1.11. L(H'. .. !:!ul. 1::-0.i:\'Y O u(:: ,!,)It,-t>i..,ll'!h --:'ii 1.- .l~: .. 0. U\~·l.,lg .,_n(:,i.n•Xl ,,). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










01/31/18 TIME: 9:30 AM 
vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, STATE OF IDAHO, 
ETAL. 
Plaintiff / Petitioner Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: DOUGLAS WERTH Atty: JAMES MCMILLAN 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS 
CHARGE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT/ PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT ETC. 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
933 J Calls Case 
Present: I JAMES MCMILLAN, DOUGLAS WERTH BY PHONE, DALE 
JOHNSON 
J MOTIONS FILED BY THE JOHNSONS, I HAVE REVIEWED THIS IS THE TIME FOR 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTIONS, I HAVE ALSO REVIEWED THE RESPONSE, 
BIG ISSUE IS IF TIME BARRED 
JM SEVERAL DIFFERENT POST TRIAL MOTIONS, SEVERAL PREVIOUSLY FILED, DEALS 
WITH ORDERS MADE PRIOR TO JUDGMENT INCLUDING SUMMARY THEN UNDER 
APPELLATE RULES THE MTN TO RECONSIDER RESTARTS TIME FOR APPEAL, MOTIONS 
935 UNDER RULE 52 AND RULE 59, DEAL WITH AT TIME OF ORDER, THEN RULE 60 B, 
THINGS THAT COME UP AFTER THE OTHER MTNS EXPIRED, IN THIS CASE GROUNDS 
UNDER RULE 59E OR 60 B, 15T SECURITY BANK V NEIBEYER CASE, 
(ARGUMENT) 
937 DID FILE TIMELY 
RULE 52 AND RULE 59 TAKEN WITHIN 14 DAYS OF ISSUANCE OF ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION THEREFORE TIMELY 
938 52ACASE LAW 
UNDER 52 B DOES GIVE OPTION 
UNDER RULES 59 AND 60 CHANGE POSITION EVEN IF STAYS 
939 J I DON'T SEE YOU BROUGHT ANY MOTION UNDER RULE 59 
JM IN OUR PLEADING WE DISCUSSED, EVEN THOUGH MOTION DID NOT HAVE IT CAN STILL 
BE CONSIDERED 
J BROUGHT UNDER 
940 JM SPECIFICALLY BANK V NEIBEYER, IF BROUGHT WITHIN THE TIME LIMITS CAN STILL BE 
APPLIED, 
(ARGUMENT) 
941 BACK TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE, 59 E, DEVICE TO AVOID UNNECESSARY APPEAL TO 
HAVE COURT TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT WHAT WAS PRESENTED, GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED HE HAD A CAUSE OF 
ACTION, 
(ARGUMENT) 
944 FURTHER EVEN THROUGH COURSE OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS PROCEEDINGS 
PROLONG RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE, 
DURING COURSE OF ORAL ARGUMENT THEY STATED HUNDREDS OF DEPOSITIONS 
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NEEDED TO BE TAKEN, JOHNSONS MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION 
AND WAS QUOTED FEES OF $150 INDICATES MUCH WORK DONE WHICH INDICATES 
THEY RECEIVED INFORMATION VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS THAT MAY BE OF ISSUE AT 
THE STATE, PROVIDES GROUNDS FOR THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND 
RECONSIDER ORDERS DENYING ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY, 
BY STATUTE THEY HAVE A DUTY TO PRESERVE THE RECORDS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE 
TO SEE JUST WHAT THE STATE HAS, CONSIDERABLE COSTS IN NEW FILING, AT 
MINIMUM COURT SHOULD FURTHER ELABORATE ON ITS DECISION. MR. JOHNSON AND 
MRS. JOHNSON ARE PRESENT IF COURT REQUIRES TESTIMONY 
950 J TESTIMONY ON WHAT? 
JM THERE INTERACTIONS WITH THE STATE ETC. 
J I DON'T THINK ANY REQUEST TODAY NO ONE MENTIONED TESTIMONY 
JM EXPLANATION 
J HADN'T ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY MR. WERTH IS ON THE PHONE 
951 J MR. WERTH RESPONSE? 
DW THANK YOU VERY MUCH 
BEGIN WITH BRIEF OVERVIEW: GOES OVER CASE 
PL ULTIMATELY PREVAILED AND RECEIVED HIS BENEFITS, THIS ACTION WAS TO 
REIMBURSE HIM THE MONEY HE SPENT ON AN ATTORNEY DUE TO (GOES OVER CASE) 
954 NEED ONLY GO OVER TORTE CLAIM, 
MAIN POINT THIS IS AN ACTION TO RECOVER APPROXIMATELY $5000 IN ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
GOIN REVERSE ORDER 
954 PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WITH ATTEMPTING TO 
BOOTSTRAP 608 MOTION (ARGUMENT) UNSUBSTANTIATED NOT SUSTAINABLE, SOLE 
REMEDY OF NOT RESPONDING TO PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST SOLE REMEDY TO 
PROCEED IN THE COURT WHERE REQUESTED, 
ALSO SPECULATION BY FACT THE DEPT OF LABOR HAD AN ATTORNEY REVIEW OR BE 
INVOLVED THE STATUTE STATES THAT THE DEPT. OR PUBLIC AGENCY IS REQUIRED 
TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR SAY WHY THEY DID NOT, NOTHING NEGATIVE TO 
BE DRAWN FROM THE DEPT. SEEKING COUNSEL, INNUENDO BASED UPON THE SIZE 
OF AND REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF $150, ASSERTION MUST BE GOING ON , THE 
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT AUTHORIZES AN AGENCY TO REQUEST PRIOR PAYMENT OF 
SOME OF THE FEES AND ONCE THE REQUEST IS RESPONDED TO AT THAT TIME A 
STATEMENT OF THE ACTUAL TIME AND AMOUNT REQUESTED, ASKED FOR A MODEST 
AMOUNT OF FUNDS BEFORE IT LOOKED FOR WHAT WAS REQUESTED, I QUOTE FROM 
THE REQUEST, "ALL INTERNAL EMAILS" (LISTS MANY NAMES) OF COURSE THERE 
MIGHT NEED TO BE SUBSTANTIAL REDACTING DONE, 
WHAT IS BEFORE THE COURT HERE TODAY AS STATED IS 52 B MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS THAT RELATES ONLY TO THE ORDER DENYING THEIR REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
1002 (ARGUMENT) RULE 11.2 GOVERNS ORDERS (ELABORATES) 
NOTHING SAID ABOUT 59 E, IT WAS A 60 B MOTION 
1005 (ARGUMENT) 
1007 HAD TO SHOW UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES 
ALSO SAYS IT CANNOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTION FOR A TIMELY APPEAL, COUNSEL 
IS JUST REARGUING WHAT WAS ARGUED ORIGINALLY, UNDER PROPER STANDARD 
PLAINTIFF FALLS SHORT OF MARK REQUIRED, SOME OF THE ARGUMENT MADE: 
(ARGUMENT) 
1010 BASICALLY A FISHING EXPEDITION 
THAT IS ASKING THE COURT TO REOPEN TO FIND OUT IF MAYBE SOME OTHER CAUSE 
OF ACTION THAT THEY CAN REVIEW 
1111 MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS, I AM NOT GOING TO SAY MUCH, (ARGUMENT) 
DECLARATION OF MS. JOHNSON IF COURT LOOKS THROUGH HER ALLEGATIONS 
NEARLY ALL IRRELEVANT, OR INVOLVE SPECULATION OR SHOW NO KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE ASK COURT TO NOT CONSIDER OR GIVE LITTLE IF ANY WEIGHT, IN CONCLUSION 
AS HARD AS PLAINTIFF MAY TRY TO PAINT THESE MOTIONS A DIFFERENT COLOR, NO 
SHOWING UNDER 60 B OF UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES, '.ARGUMENT 
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REGARDING OTHER MOTIONS) RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THE COURT DENY 2 ,v 
ROUND OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS ANY QUESTIONS 
1015 J NO QUESTIONS THANK YOU 
1015 JM CLOSING ARGUMENT 
SEEKING ATTORNEY FEES BUT ALSO OTHER DAMAGES DUE TO THE DELAY, WITH 
REGARD TO PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST, ASKING FOR OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE 
INFORMATION THROUGH THE DISCOVERY PROCESS RATHER THAN THE RECORDS 
DEPARTMENT, 
WITH REGARD TO REQUEST RUNNING THROUGH AN ATTORNEY, NOT JUST ANY 
1017 ATTORNEY BUT THE DEPT. ATTORNEY, HIS DUTY IS TO PROTECT THE DEPT. POSITION 
IN THIS CASE , WOULD BE CLEANER AND BEST INTEREST IF WE COULD ASK FOR IN 
DISCOVERY, WE WANT DISCOVERY RATHER THAN PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST, 
1019 ARGUMENT 
Testimony? 
J NOT GOING TO HEAR TESTIMONY TODAY, I WILL TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT AND 
ISSUE A DECISION 
1022 END 
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• - - STATE OF IDAHO COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL 1:1IST?lCT 
2018FEB 13 AM 9: 43 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 




) CASE NO. CV-2017-0000423 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION & 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 









THIS MATTER came before the Court on January 31, 2018, for a hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, filed November 29, 2018. Plaintiff Dale Johnson is represented by attorney James 
McMillan. Defendants State of Idaho, Department of Labor (hereafter, "IDOL") and its named 
employees are represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. Mr. McMillan and Mr. 
(and Mrs. Rose) Johnson were present in the courtroom. Mr. Werth appeared by telephone. 
I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
• 09/14/2017-This Court entered "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' 
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I.R.C.P. 12(b )(1) Motion to Dismiss." 
• 09/14/2017-This Court entered "Judgment." 
• 09/28/2017-Plaintiff filed "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Discovery," 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l.2(b) and 56(d), respectively; and Declaration of Dale Johnson. 
• 10/25/2017-Plaintiff filed supporting Memorandum, Affidavit of James McMillan, 
Supplemental Declaration of Dale Johnson, and Declaration of Rose Johnson. 
• 11/08/2017-Hearing on plaintiffs motions held. 
• 11/15/2017-This Court entered "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs 
Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional Discovery." 
• 11/29/2017-Plaintiff filed "Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b) and 60(b), 
respectively; and Affidavit of James McMillan. 
• 01/18/2018-Plaintiff filed supporting Memorandum, Declaration of Dale Johnson, and 
Declaration of Rose Johnson. 
• 01 /31/2018-Hearing on plaintiffs motions held. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b), is untimely. 
In his "Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff moves for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
pursuant to Rule 52(b ). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) provides: 
(b) Amended or Additional Findings. On a party's motion filed no later than 14 
days after the entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings, or make 
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additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may 
accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. 
I.R.C.P. 52(b) (emphasis supplied). 
The Judgment in this case was entered on September 14, 2017. Thus, the 14-day deadline 
for filing a Rule 52(b) motion was September 28, 2017. The plaintiffs motion was filed on 
November 29, 2017, and therefore, is untimely. 
B. Plaintiff's request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a), lacks merit. 
In his "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff also requests additional 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, pursuant to Rule 52(a) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides, in part: 
(a) In General. 
(4) For a Motion. The court is not required to state findings or conclusions 
when ruling on an interlocutory order made pursuant to a show cause hearing or 
on a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on 
any other motion. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). 
The plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery was brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(d). Therefore, under Rule 52(a)(4), this Court was not required to state findings or 
conclusions when it denied that motion in its "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional Discovery." By the same token, 
the Court is not required to make additional findings or conclusions in regards to that motion. 
C. Plaintiff's request to alter and amend the Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), 
is untimely. 
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In his "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff also asks for the Judgment 
to be altered or amended, pursuant to Rule 59( e ). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( e) provides: 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 59(e) (emphasis supplied). 
The judgment in this case was entered on September 14, 2017. Thus, the 14-day deadline 
for filing a Rule 59(e) motion was September 28, 2017. The plaintiffs motion was filed on 
November 29, 2017, and therefore, is untimely. 
D. The time for the plaintiff to appeal the Judgment has expired. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides, in part: 
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right from the 
district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing 
stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or order of the district court 
appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. The time for an 
appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the 
filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action ( except motions under Rule 
60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or motions regarding costs or attorney's 
fees), in which case the appeal period for all judgments or orders commences 
to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such 
motion .... 
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, the time for filing an appeal began to run on the date of the Judgment, 
September 14, 2017. The time for filing an appeal was terminated by the filing of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Discovery on September 28, 201 7. The time 
for filing an appeal began to run again on November 15, 2017, the date the Court entered its 
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Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow 
Additional Discovery. Forty-two (42) days from November 15th was December 27, 2017. 
Therefore, the time for the plaintiff to appeal the Judgment expired on December 27, 2017. 
E. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), lacks merit. 
In his "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff moves for the Judgment to 
be set aside, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) provides that: 
"On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any other reason that justifies relief." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 
With respect to Rule 60(b ), the Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the following standard: 
As this Court wrote in Waller v. State, Department of Health and We(fare: 
A trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it appears 
that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal 
standards, and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason. A 
determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be 
determined by the trial court. Those factual findings will be upheld unless 
they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court applies the facts in a logical 
manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b ), while keeping in mind the 
policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have 
acted within its discretion. 
146 Idaho 234, 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). An I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion may be used to 
obtain relief from a final judgment; however, it should not be used as a 
substitute for a timely appeal. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 
607, 610 (1996). Although courts have broad discretion in granting or 
denying such motions, that discretion is bounded by the requirement that the 
party seeking relief demonstrate "unique and compelling circumstances" 
which justify relief. Id. at 349, 924 P.2d at 611. ... 
Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724,726,274 P.3d 589, 591 (2011) (emphasis supplied). 
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The grounds for plaintiffs Rule 60(b )( 6) motion are that during the course of the 
plaintiffs unemployment benefits claim before the Appeals Bureau of the IDOL, and subsequent 
appeal to the Idaho Industrial Commission, IDOL represented by its current counsel, "further 
caused Plaintiff damage by prolonging the proceedings, by (1) objecting to a request for a 
hearing and subpoenas before the Industrial Commission; (2) moving to reconsider the Industrial 
Commission's decision; and (3) its obstreperous conduct in responding to Plaintiffs numerous 
record requests, thus limiting Plaintiffs potential knowledge as to the extent of the governmental 
agencies' involvement in causing Plaintiffs damages." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, at p. 6 The plaintiff further suggests that IDOL's "responses [to public record 
requests] have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion over Plaintiffs requests" and 
"[t]aken together, this indicates that there may be significant relevant evidence available, that 
may possibly expose the Defendants to further liability, ... "Id. at p. 5. 
This Court recognizes that its determination of whether to grant or deny the plaintiffs 
Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary; and in making its determination, the Court has considered the 
plaintiffs motion, memorandum in support, supporting Affidavit of James McMillan and the 
Declarations of Dale Johnson and Rose Johnson 1 ( and the attachments thereto), together with the 
oral arguments of counsel at the motion hearing on January 31, 2018. 
Upon consideration thereof, this Court finds, first, that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion 1s 
improper to the extent that the plaintiff is trying to re-litigate the substance of his negligence 
claim and challenge the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by this Court in its original 
1 At the motion hearing, the defendant's attorney argued that nearly all of the allegations in the Declaration of Rose 
Johnson are irrelevant, involve speculation, or have not been shown to be based upon personal knowledge; and on 
that basis, requested that the Court not consider those parts of the Declaration, or alternatively, give the Declaration 
little, if any, weight. The argument is well-taken and this Court shall not consider those parts of the Declaration. 
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Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss, 
because "I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), which is the catchall for the rule, was not intended to allow a court to 
reconsider the legal basis for its original decision," First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros., 
Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 730 P.2d 950, 952 (1986) (footnote omitted), and "it should not be used 
as a substitute for a timely appeal." Maynardv. Nguyen, 152 Idaho at 726,274 P.3d at 591. 
Second, the plaintiff has offered in support of his Rule 60(b )( 6) motion the mere 
speculation that the IDOL' s request for a $150 fee in order for the plaintiff "to obtain records and 
internal IDOL communications" as "possibly indicating the existence of many hundreds of pages 
of records that have not been disclosed in the course of' the plaintiffs unemployment benefits 
proceedings. Declaration of Dale Johnson, at , 1. Mr. Johnson is speculating that the $150 fee is 
an "[ e ]xtraordinarily high cost for a response to my public records request, [ and] further 
indicate[ s] that there may [sic J significant relevant evidence that the Defendants are not 
disclosing in this case." Id. at , 5. This speculation by the plaintiff does not demonstrate the 
"unique and compelling circumstances" required for this Court to set aside the Judgment 
pursuant to 60(b)(6). The plaintiffs issues with the IDOL and other state government agencies 
about public records requests are irrelevant to this case, and a Rule 60(b) motion is not available 
as a remedy for disputes over public records requests. In fact, Idaho Code § 74-115 provides that: 
The sole remedy for a person aggrieved by the denial of a request for disclosure 
is to institute proceedings in the district court of the county where the records or 
some part thereof are located, to compel the public agency or independent public 
body corporate and politic to make the information available for public inspection 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
LC.§ 74-115(1) (emphasis supplied). 
This case involved the plaintiffs claim for negligence against the defendants, IDOL and 
its named employees; and the case has been finally adjudicated in favor of the defendants. The 
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proper way for the plaintiff to challenge this Court's judgment dismissing his Complaint was a 
timely appeal to a higher court. As stated above, the plaintiff did not file a timely appeal, and 
Rule 60(b) motion cannot now be used as a substitute therefor. The plaintiff's motion is denied. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment are DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby c/4:3,:}Ql/t a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered by facsimile 
transmission, this ~y of February, 2018, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
Fax: (208) 334-6125 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Fax: (208) 752-1900 
~fiiuftlb~. 
~yClerk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 8 
Page 340
Idaho Dept of Labor 2./2018 4:02:54 PM PAGE 15/. Fax Server 
LAWRJ~NCEO.W~4.SDEN 
AT'fOR.&~EY GENERAL 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN 
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IN THE DIS'f.RIC'f COUR'l' OJ~' 'l'HJc~ JtiRST JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OP THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO~"'NER 
DALE JOHNSON. an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
S'IATE en, IDAHO, .DEPAR'lMENT 
O.lt' LABOR, Amy Hohnstdn, Appeals 
Bureau Directt.n.\ Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, J"ant..>t 
Ho.rely, Appeals Hearing Exe.miner 
a11d Georgia Smith, Records 
Cu.,todian, and JOHN A.NU JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official oopacit,ies as employees of the 
State of Idaho. 
Defendant.~. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
DECLARA'I1ION OF DOUG 'WERTH 
IN SlJPPORT OF IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 
SE(..''(>:ND REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S l'J~ES 
I, DOUGLAS A. \VERTH, declare as follows.: 
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l. 1 a·n:i one of the atton1eys of record .fur Defendant State of Idaho, 
Depa:rt:rneni of Labor C"IDOL'j in the. a.bove-captiflned action. and I make this 
decla:rotion based upon my own. personal .kn.ow ledge anrl am r.:ompetent to testify to 
the matters herein. 
2.. IDOL is t.he p.revailing party. The Court gran~d IDOL's motion to 
dismisa and r,n September 14, 2017, it r~ntered judgment in favor of IDOL, diemi~aing 
t-he above.captioned action with projudiCE!. 
3. On November i 5t 2017, thi8 Court e11t-ererl its memora.ndu.m decision 
and order. denying Plainti.ff s Motion t-0 Reeonaider .and t-0 Allow Additional Discovery. 
4. Thereafter, on November 29f 2017, Plaintiff file.d an I.R.C.P. 52(b) 
nv,tion for additional findings of faet n.n. I.R.C.P. 60(h)(6) motion to set aside the 
judgment ("Second Post-Judgment Motions"). 
5. On February 13, 2018, this Court, denfod in their entirety Plaintifrs 
Second P-ost•Judgment Motion.'l. 
6. IDOI.:8 instant request for at.torm..:y fees relates S<>lely to attorney fees 
incuned in responding to Pla.intiff s Second Post..Judgment Mc,t-ions. 
7. The attorney fues incu.rred in responding to the Secpo.d Poat--.Judgment 
Motions and described in this declarat-ion are re~'ionable and wei;e rea.sr..inably and 
necessarily incurred and should be awarded. 
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'rinie and Labor Required 
8. 1 a!ll the de_p\1(:y attorney. general with the Iduho Office of Att,,rney 
General. {"OAG") who "has worked on behalf of IDOL in opposing the Second PtJst-
Judgment Moi:imis. 
9. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and oorre<:t sun1mary ,,;f the biUahle 
attorney fee hourR reflecting the time that I W<jrked on the Second Post.Judgment 
Motions and the pleadings requefting attorney f-ees from Nc;v,;!mbr:ir 30. 2017 through 
February 27, 2018 .. 
1.0. Th.is work pr::\rformed by ine in opposing the SeiX>nd Post.Judgment 
Motions and in 1-equestin.g attorney fees ·was .reasonable and the hours incurred 
retlected th.e nooessa:ry components of litigationJ in.eluding· legal rE~search. briefing, 
and preparation .for the or.al a:rgument on the Second Po.~t.Judgm.ent Motions, and in 
requesting an a.ward of attorney fees. 
The Novelty and Difficulty or the Questions 
11. ~rhe issue~ raised. in the Second Po~t-1J udgmertt Motfons we.re not novel 
or difficult. However, they did require legal refllearch and :reading of Idaho statutes, 
oourt rules a.nrl. case law pertaining to Ule -filing of Rule fJ2(b) and OO(b)(6) motions 
pursuant to the Id.a.ho .Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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'l'l1e Skill Requisite to Perto.rm t"he I..egal Service Prope.rly -
Experien~e a.nd Abilfty of Attorneys 
12. The skill and exptirie.no!! ·n!q1:u.red for me to effectively npresen.t the 
int-ereBts of IDOL l.'ela.t.ing tr; -th.e Second Po.st-,JudgmE:nt Motion., required tho.ro-ugh 
legal re~arc_h, drafting and editing of pleadings, and pre_paration for the oral 
a.rgum1:!nt mad.e by IDOL in. OPJms.itfon to Plainti.ff"s Rule 52(bj and Rule 60(1>)(6) 
motion.-s. I had the req\lisite F.!Xperieuce and skill for this case. 
13. J h,.1ve be-en pract.idng as a 1.itige tion attorney since 1988, arJd have a.t 
aU tiines since 1987 been f.l memb~ir in good sta.nding Vl--ith the Idaho Statf.: Bar. I 
have spent approxima.tely 17 years in privatf::i practice, appl'f,xi.mat.ely five years at 
the Idaho Attu:rney General's Office ('OAG"J, fivr~ ye-ars as a cou.nty proae.cuting 
attorney, and almost two years as a law clerk. I have- handled tomplex civil litigation 
and public afJCtor lit.iga.tic"in in state c011rts involving p.rr;oodural requirements in ch-"il 
actions, and have court trial and jury t.rial exJJerie.o.ce. I am admitted to practice in 
all state r...ourls of the State of ldahD, fhe. Supt1.:.me Court of the United St.ates of 
America, the U.S. Ninth Cfrcn.it Cun.rt uf Appeals, and the U.S. District Court for t"he 
Distric..-t of Idaho 
The Prevailing Charges for Like Wo.r.k and Na:1tu.re of the Fee 
1-4. I billed my time in. t.b.e St!ctmd t>ost..J\1dgment Moti.on.~ on an hourly 
basis. IDOL will be responsi.b1e for paying for my servioos pursuant to a com·plicated 
formu1a -used by the State -of .Idab.o to a.ssess -O.A.G legal costs to $ta1.e a.gendes, whir..h 
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fnrm:ula is deSC1•ihed in the ldaho Supreml:! Cr.rurt's O1>inion in. lnclusiion.._lxw. vJ l.rla_ho 
J)epartment of .l!~~J.th & __ }£.~~ltl'Am, 161 Id.a ho 28H, 885 P.3d 1, 3 (Idaho 201fi). The 
hourly attorney foe rate sought in. these Second Post~Judgment Mot.ion.a is $.150 pe.r 
hour. On o:r. ab<,,1t March 11, 2005, the -OAG conducted a study of the market- .rates 
chai·ged by local firms and feo awards and esta,bHshed a rate o.f $150 per ·hou.r for 
attorneys with m<J.r:e than 20 yea.rs• expe-rir::nce. The rau~ .is .reasonable, a.nd below 
market ra.tes for prevailing charges tb.r like work. During the five years immediately 
prior to coming to work at the -0.AG, I hilled at a much "higher rate than the 1·ate 
sought for my servfoes in t-hfa case-~ usually at- -$225 <Jr $"'JOO pE!r billable hour. 
Time Limitation$, Amount Involved, and Results Obtained 
.15. The Second Post-Judgment Motions- were fuund ttJ be v.-ithout merit and 
dismissed. IDOL prevailed in all respectR related t.o the St?rond Post-Judgment 
Motions. 
Undesirability and Awards in Sjmila·r Cases 
16. The '1undesirability'' fad.or is nut applicable. 
17. Awards in similar cases o.r~ h"lti:.ily to fu.r .exceed. tlle award sought in th.is 
ca ... rre, considering the below market honrly rates u.~d by the OAG. 
Natu.re and Length of the Profess:ional Relationsb.ip with the Client 
18. It is the du.ty of the OAG to represent agencies like IDOL. See Ida.hr, 
Code § 67y1401. Thus. it has a. long-st.anding professional rela.tion.~hip witb IDOL. 
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19, IDOL leaves to this Court's discretion the selection of a.ny othel' faetor it 
deem• app.r.opriat-e. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9· 1406(1)~ I declare under penalty of _perjury 
pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this L 2 day of February, 2018. 
STATE OJ' IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
-----··· By/h-"\.....-
DOUG \\'"'ERTH 
Lead Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF .SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTiFY that on this 2· 1 of February, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true: and correct copy of the foregoing by the following m-ethod(s) to: 
James A,f<i"Millan 
Attorney at Law 
51.2 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83878 
□U.S. Mail 
0 Rand Delivery 
0 Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
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Datt~ De~_ripti011_ofLegal \Vr,r.k 
l l/30i2017 Review Motion fur Additfom.tl ltindings ofFact and 
Conf'lusions.- of Law and Motion to Set A1.ide 
Jud_gment 
12/8/2017 Legal research re: timeli.n.ess of motions 
12/7/2017 Legal .research ]'.'8:· Rufa 60{b)(6) 
1/19/2018 Review memorandum 1;e: Additional Findings of 
F'act and CQn.cl-u_sions of Law and Motion to Set 
AF.lide ,Judgmr~nt e-tc.; Affidavit of Dale Johnson; 
Am.davit of Rmie JohJ1son 
1/19/2018 Legal ·resetu-ch re: memo.randum, affidavit.a 
1/23/2018 Legal research re: timeliness iss1.1es, standard.aJ of 
review, -case law 
1/2412018 Draft and finalize Memorandum. in Oppos.ition to 
Plaintiffs Rule 52(b) and 60(b)-(6) m.otioru1 
li31/2018 Prepare fur and attend (te.lep"honically) o.ral 
argument on motions 
O'.l/27/2018 Draft of Defendant Idaho Department o{ Labor's 
.Memorandum in S.upport of S&oond Request for 
.Attorney's Fees; Declaration of Doug \.Ver.th in 
Supp,,rt· of Idaho Department of Labor's SectJnd 
Request- for Attorney's. Fees; Defendant Idaho-
Department of Labor's Second Memorandum. of 
Attorneys Fees 
Tot-a.I Hou.rs 
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DOUG WERTH, ISB# 3660 
Lead Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
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Attorneys for Idaho Department of Labor 
COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
DEFENDANT IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 
SECOND MEMORANDUM OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
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Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor ("IDOL"), by and through its 
undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Second Memorandum of Attorney's Fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, 
and hereby requests that the Court award IDOL the fees outlined below: 
23.4 hours at $150/hour: $3,510.00 
ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED: $3,510.00 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the foregoing items are correct and 
are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
DATED this '27 day of February, 2018. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Lead Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this )..7 of February, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
□ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
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OUHT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judgment was entered by this Court on September 14, 2017, in favor of 
Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor ("IDOL") and against Plaintiff Dale 
Johnson ("Plaintiff'), and the above-captioned action was dismissed with prejudice. 
On November 15, 2017, this Court entered its memorandum decision and order 
denying Plaintiffs motion to reconsider and to allow additional discovery. 
Thereafter, on November 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed an I.R.C.P. 52(b) motion for 
additional findings of fact and an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion to set aside the judgment 
("Second Post-Judgment Motions"). 
The Second Post-Judgment Motions required IDOL to obtain legal services in 
order to oppose the motions, which were patently groundless. Undersigned counsel 
was required to carefully review the pleadings filed by Plaintiff and to research the 
legal issues presented by these motions. Then undersigned counsel drafted and, on 
behalf of IDOL, filed DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLANTIFF'S RULE 52(b) AND RULE 60(b)(6) MOTIONS. 
On February 13, 2018, this Court entered its memorandum decision and order 
denying Plaintiffs Second Post-Judgment Motions. The Court found no merit to any 
of Plaintiffs arguments proffered in support of his motions. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A court may award a prevailing party attorney fees if provided for by any 
statute or contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). A district court's determination of the 
DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES - 2 
Page 351
prevailing party is within the court's discretion, and will be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 830, 367 
P.3d 208, 225 (2016) (Syringa II) (quoting Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Const., 
LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49, 294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012)). A district court also exercises its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees, and that award is subject to review for an abuse 
of discretion. Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 425, 374 P.3d 585, 588 
(2016) (quoting Idaho Transp. Dep't v. Ascorp, Inc., 159 Idaho 138, 140, 357 P.3d 863, 
865 (2015)). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, '[s]o long as the trial court 
recognized the matter as discretionary, acted within the outer boundaries of the 
court's discretion, and reached its conclusion through an exercise of reason, this Court 
will not disturb the decision on appeal."' Syringa II, 159 Idaho at 831, 367 P.3d at 226 
(quoting Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. IDOL is the prevailing party because it prevailed in every respect in 
its opposition to the Second Post-Judgment Motions. 
The Second Post-Judgment Motions were denied by the Court. It cannot be 
disputed that IDOL is the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B); Syringa II, 159 Idaho 
at 831, 367 P.3d at 226. 
B. In filing his Second Post-Judgment Motions, Plaintiff acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides that in any proceeding where a state agency 
and a person are adverse parties, the Court must award the prevailing party 
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reasonable attorney fees if the Court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." IDOL is an agency within the meaning of 
this statute. The above-captioned action is a proceeding for purposes of Idaho Code 
§ 12-117(5)(c). 
An award to IDOL of its attorney fees in this case under Idaho Code§ 12-117 
because of Plaintiffs complete disregard of the plain and unambiguous text of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court repeatedly held in its February 13, 2018 
decision and order that the Second Post-Judgment Motions were untimely and/or 
unfounded. There was no good faith argument by Plaintiff for a modification of 
existing law; rather, Plaintiff simply disregarded the plain text of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. There was not a shred of legal support for Plaintiffs attempt to 
bootstrap his motions to his recent public records requests, which were made after 
his earlier set of Post-Judgment motions were denied. Rather, the Idaho Code 
expressly sets forth the sole remedy under the Public Records Act, which is a separate 
legal action. 
Two recent cases from the Idaho Supreme Court confirm that Plaintiffs failure 
to perform a minimum of factual and legal due diligence is a valid basis for awarding 
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. In Jayo Development. Inc. v. Ada County 
Board of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 345 P.3d 207 (2015), the legal dispute focused 
on the application of a property tax exemption provided by Idaho law. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the plain, unambiguous language of the statute did not 
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entitle the appellant to the property tax exemption. Id., 158 Idaho at 153, 345 P.3d 
at 212. This was contrary to the appellant's argument that it qualified under the 
plain language of the exemption. Id., 158 Idaho at 151, 345 P.3d at 210. In 
addressing the respondent's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellant pursued the appeal unreasonably. Id., 
158 Idaho at 154, 345 P.3d at 213. It explained that "[i]n instances where parties to 
appeals before this Court have advanced arguments based upon a disregard for plain 
language, we have found them to have acted without a reasonable basis in law." Id. 
(citing to Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n. Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716, 724, 302 P.3d 341, 
349 (2012); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 
(2005)). 
Similarly in Arnold v. City of Stanley. 158 Idaho 218, 345 P.3d 1008 (2015), 
the Arnolds filed suit under the Open Meetings Law's private right of action for "[a]ny 
person affected by a violation of' the Open Meetings Law. Arnold, 158 Idaho at 220, 
345 P.3d at 1010 (quoting Idaho Code § 67-2347(6) (repealed 2015)). The Idaho 
Supreme Court, agreeing with the district court, held that the Arnolds lacked 
standing to challenge the violation of the Open Meetings Law (an early meeting start 
time) under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute creating a cause of action. 
Id., 158 Idaho at 223, 345 P.3d at 1013. The Court then turned to the city's request 
for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. The Idaho Supreme Court explained 
that it did not typically award attorney fees in matters of first impression, but also 
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related that "the purpose of LC. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or 
arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges." Id., 158 Idaho 
at 224, 345 P.3d at 1014 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration 
omitted). The Court acknowledged the theory advanced by the Arnolds, and indicated 
that they may have reasonably pursued this theory in the district court, but they did 
not reasonably pursue it in the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The plain language of the 
statute was "clear enough that [the Court] believe[d] the Arnolds' appeal was made 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Id. As the Court remarked, "[a]sserting 
that an appeal involves a matter of first impression is not a 'free pass' to bring an 
appeal based on unreasonable arguments." Id. 
Jayo Development and Arnold support an award of attorney fees here. 
Plaintiff, in filing and pursuing his Second Post-Judgment Motions, acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact. Because of well-established law, and the plain 
language of applicable rules of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of 
Plaintiffs Second Post-Judgment Motions was inevitable. The law and reasoning set 
forth in this Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT and in DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLANTIFF'S RULE 52(b) AND RULE 
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60(b)(6) MOTIONS both demonstrate the complete lack of merit to Plaintiffs most 
recent motions. That law and reasoning is incorporated herein by this reference. 
IDOL bore unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against Plaintiffs 
Second Post-Judgment Motions. An award of attorney fees would serve as a deterrent 
to the filing of groundless post-judgment motions that do nothing more than vent a 
party's dissatisfaction with the judgment entered in a case. 
In sum, Plaintiff disregarded the plain language of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Second Post-Judgment Motions were not reasonably grounded in 
fact or law. IDOL is thus entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 
12-117. 
C. Plaintiff filed and pursued his Second Post-Judgment Motions 
without foundation by disregarding the plain and unambiguous text 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. For this reason IDOL is 
entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
Another basis for awarding attorney fees to IDOL is Idaho Code§ 12-121. As 
of March 1, 2017, Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that in any civil action, "the judge 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties when the 
judge finds that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation." 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws. Ch. 47;1 see also Hoffer v. Shappard, 
1 The full text and procedural status of House Bill 97, which became law on March 1, 2017, are 
available at https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/H0097/. House Bill 97 was the 
result of Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 380 P.3d 681 (2016). Case law prior to the Hoffer decision 
is still relevant because, as the Idaho Legislature explained, "It is the intent of the Legislature, by 
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160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696 (2016) (seemingly recognizing that whatever 
law was in effect as of March 1, 2017, as to Idaho Code § 12-121 would apply to all 
cases that had not become final as of that date). Under this standard, the Court looks 
at "whether the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Doble v. Interstate Amusements. 
Inc., 160 Idaho 307, 308-09, 372 P.3d 362, 363-64 (2016) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
For purposes of Idaho Code § 12-121, IDOL is a party. Plaintiff, as discussed 
above, had no reasonable basis in law or fact for bringing his Second Post-Judgment 
Motions. IDOL should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code § 
12-121. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IDOL was the prevailing party in this litigation. Given Plaintiffs disregard of 
the plain language of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, IDOL respectfully requests 
that it be awarded $3,510.00 in attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 
12-121. 
enactment of this legislation, to reinstate and make no change to Idaho law on attorney's fees as it 
existed before the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Hoffer v. Shappard .... " 2017 Sess. Laws. Ch. 47. 
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DATED this 2,1 day of February, 2018. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
--------By~___,, 
DOUG WERTH 
Lead Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;J..7 of February, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
□ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
~acsimile: (208) 752-1900 
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DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - 9 
Page 358
03/).3/2018 13: 51 FAX 208 752 1900 Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law ~001 -
JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff; 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
OBJECTION TO SECOND 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
FOR FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALE JOHNSON, by and through his counsel of 
record, JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits his 
Objection to the Defendants' Second Motion for Fees and Costs and Memorandum of 
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Fees and Costs as follows: 
1. Plaintiff did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and this 
action was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Plaintiff, 
in good faith, raised legitimate issues with regard to the effect of the post-judgment 
motions on the respective time for filing and time for appeal, and Plaintiff's 
t:heori.es were supported by citation to the applicable statutes and case law. A 
simple failure to prevail on said claims is not sufficient grounds for an award of 
attorneys' fees and costs; 
2. Defendants' counsel states that the hourly rate being claimed is 
determined via a "complicated formula." Declaration of Doug Werth, ,r 14, and cites 
to the case of Inclusion Inc. u. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 161 Idaho 
239, 385 P.3d 1 (2016). However, counsel fails to set forth, disclose, or otherwise 
explain the dollar amount currently used in said "formula" to Plaintiffs counsel or 
t:b.e Court, rendering it impossible to determine or verify the costs actually incurred 
as a result of this litigation (it should be noted that, in Inclusion, the State claimed 
a rate of $125 per hour); and 
3. The amount of time claimed for each task on Defendant's Second 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs is unreasonable and exorbitant, especially in light 
of counsel's claimed experience in legal practice and Defendants' claims that the 
legal issues in this matter are clear and well settled .. 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Second Motion and 
Memorandum for Fees and Costs should be DENIED. 
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DATED this 13th day of March, 2018. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the 13th day of March, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
U.S.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivered 
__x_ Facsimile to: (208) 334-6125 
~jr~ 
~illan 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES I-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 




) CASE NO. CV-2017-0000423 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER GRANTING 
) DEFENDANTS' SECOND 











THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Idaho Department of Labor's 
Second Memorandum of Attorney's Fees, filed February 27, 2018, requesting that the Court 
award the Idaho Department of Labor (hereafter, "IDOL") attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,510.00, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
IDOL also filed a supporting Memorandum and a Declaration of Doug Werth. On March 13, 
2018, the plaintiff filed an Objection to Second Motion and Memorandum for Fees and Costs. 
Both IDOL's motion and the plaintiffs objection were timely filed under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4)-(5) 
and 54(e)(4)-(5), and neither party has requested oral argument pursuant to I.R.CP. 7(b)(3)(D). 




WHEREFORE, upon consideration of the parties' written arguments and the court record 
in this matter, the following Memorandum Decision and Order are issued. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On September 14, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss and a Judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint for Damages with prejudice. The plaintiff later filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
and to Allow Additional Discovery and the IDOL filed a Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
These motions came before the Court for a hearing, after which the Court entered on November 
15, 2017, a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration 
and to Allow Additional Discovery and a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees. In the latter decision, the Court found that the IDOL 
and its employees (collectively, defendants) were the prevailing party, but that the defendants 
were not entitled to fees under either Idaho Code § § 12-117 or 12-121, because, inter alia, 
... it was not unreasonable for Mr. Johnson to believe-albeit incorrectly-that 
April 29, 2016, was the date the clock began to run on the filing of his Notice of 
Tort Claim; and because a decision [by the Industrial Commission] was issued on 
that date, there was a reasonable basis in fact for Mr. Johnson's mistaken belief. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Request for Attorney's Fees, at p. 6. 
On November 29, 2017, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b) and 60(b), 
respectively (hereafter, "second post-judgment motions"), and a supporting Affidavit of James 
McMillan. On January 18, 2018, a supporting Memorandum, Declaration of Dale Johnson, and 
Declaration of Rose Johnson were filed. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Rule 52(b) and Rule 60(b)(6) Motions was filed on January 26, 2018. The second post-judgment 
motions came before the Court for a hearing on January 31, 2018. The plaintiff and his counsel, 
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as well as the defendants' attorney, Doug Werth, appeared at the hearing. On February 13, 2018, 
this Court entered a Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment. IDOL now moves for an 
award of the attorney's fees incurred solely in responding to the second post-judgment motions, 
in the amount of $3,510.00, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The defendants are the prevailing party. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(B) provides that "[i]n determining which party to 
an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties .... " I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). In this case, the plaintiffs second post-judgment motions were 
denied as either untimely or without merit. Accordingly, this Court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, finds that the defendants are the prevailing party. 
B. The defendants are entitled to fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 12-121. 
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, in relevant part, that "in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency . . . and a person, . . . the court hearing the proceeding . . . shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." LC. 
§ 12-117(1) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that: "We review decisions 
applying other attorney statutes for an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 848, 243 P.3d 642, 664 (2010) (reviewing an award under LC. § 12-121), and we 
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now make clear that LC. § 12-117 is subject to the same standard .... " City of Osburn v. Randel, 
152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation . ... The 
term 'party' or 'parties' is defined to include ... the state of Idaho or political subdivision 
thereof." I.C. § 12-121 (emphasis added); see also I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). "The district court's 
determination as to whether an action was brought or defended frivolously will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion." Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 
629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (citation omitted). "[A]n award of attorney fees under I.C. § 
12-121 is not a matter of right, and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion, 'is 
left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation.' " Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington 
Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001) (quoting Owner-Operator Ind. 
Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public Util. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401, 408, 871 P.2d 818, 825 (1994)) 
( emphasis added). "Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the 
case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation." Idaho Military Historical 
Society, Inc. v. Maslen. 156 Idaho at 632,329 P.3d at 1080 (emphasis added). 
2. Court's Analysis 
With respect to the plaintiffs second post-judgment motions, this Court found in its 
February 13, 2018, Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Plaintiffs Motions for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Set Aside Judgment (hereafter, "February 13, 
2018, Memorandum Decision & Order") that: ( a) the plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings 
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b), was untimely; (b) the plaintiffs 
request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a), lacked 
merit; (c) the plaintiffs request to alter and amend the Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), was 
untimely; ( d) the time for the plaintiff to appeal the Judgment had expired, pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 14(a); and (e) the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
60(b )( 6), lacked merit. The Court hereby incorporates by reference the full findings of fact and 
conclusions of law set forth in its February 13, 2018, Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Considering the totality of the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in its 
February 13, 2018, Memorandum Decision and Order-effectively, that the plaintiffs second 
post-judgment motions were clearly untimely and had absolutely no merit, this Court now finds 
that the plaintiff in this case (who is the non-prevailing party) acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law in bringing his second post-judgment motions. Moreover, the Court is left with the 
abiding belief that the plaintiff brought his second post-judgment motions frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Accordingly, the Court finds, in the exercise of its 
discretion, that the defendants are entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-
117 and 12-121. Further, after considering the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the Court finds 
that the sum of $3,510.00, which was incurred by the IDOL in responding to the plaintiffs second 
post-judgment motions, is reasonable, and thus awards the sum of$3,510.00 in fees to the IDOL. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Defendant Idaho Department of Labor's Second Request for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED. 
The Defendant Idaho Department of Labor is awarded attorney's fees against Plaintiff Dale 
Johnson in the amount of $3,510.00 A Judgment awarding said attorney's fees shall be entered. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered by facsimile 
transmission, this~ day of March, 2018, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
Fax: (208) 334-6125 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83 873 
Fax: (208) 752-1900 
Dep~~~-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES I-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 




) CASE NO. CV-2017-0000423 
) 
) JUDGMENT FOR 













JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Labor, 
against Plaintiff Dale Johnson, in the amount of $3,510.00. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered by facsimile 
transmission, this~ day of March, 2018, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
Fax: (208) 334-6125 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Fax: (208) 752-1900 
~ ~. 
Dep~ 
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JAMES McMILLAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
512 Cedar Street 
• 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
ISB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals 
Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet 
Hardy, Appeals Hearing Examiner 
and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-Vin their individual and 
official capacities as employees of the 
State of Idaho, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-17-0423 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L.4 
Fee:$129 
TO: CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
AND TO THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
AND TO: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Defendants STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau Director, Mark Richmond, 
D:\Clients\Johnson, Rose\Nolice of Appeal (2018 03 01-JMc).doc 
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Appeals Hearing Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records Custodian, and JOHN 
AND JANE DOES 1-V in their individual and official capacities 
as employees of the State of Idaho and their attorney, Doug 
Werth, Deputy Attorney General, at: 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, DALE JOHNSON, appeals against each 
and every one of the above-named Respondents, STATE OF IDAHO, 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al., to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Orders 
entered on September 14, 2017, November 15, 2017, and February 13, 2018, by the 
Honorable Judge Buchanan, presiding; 
2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the Decisions described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to 
I.A.R. ll(a)(l) and (7); 
3. This appeal 1s taken upon matters of both law and fact. The 
preliminary statement of issues on appeal is as follows: 
a. Did the District Court err in granting Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and, in doing so, did the District Court err in determining the date of 
accrual for the purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act and/or err in finding 
that a valid presentment had not occurred prior to submission of the formal 
Notice of Tort Claim? 
b. Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration and in denying Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Discovery? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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c. Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? 
d. Did the District Court err in Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment? and 
e. Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment? 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the Record. 
5. Reporters' transcripts are requested for the hearings on Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, which took place on September 6, 2017, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, which took place on November 8, 2017, and Plaintiff's Motion for 
Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Motion to Alter/Amend 
Judgment, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment, which took place on January 31, 
2018. 
6. Plaintiffs/Appellants further requests that the following documents be 
included in the Clerk's record in addition to any automatically included pursuant to 
Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Opposition, 
Defendant's Reply, and all supporting Affidavits, Declarations, and 
memoranda; 
b. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Additional Discovery, 
Defendant's Opposition, Plaintiff's Reply, and all supporting Affidavits, 
Declarations, and memoranda; and 
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c. Plaintiffs Motion for Additional Findings of Fact, Motion to 
Alter/Amend Judgment, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Defendant's 
Opposition, and all supporting Affidavits, Declarations, and memoranda 
d. Any and all documents listed under Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b) 
(1). 
7. I certify: 
a. That one original and two copies have been filed with the 
District Court; 
b. That a copy has been served upon the Court's court reporter; 
c. That payment has been made to the Clerk of the Court for the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
d. That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be 
served by Rule 20. 
DATED this \ q f',day of March, 2018. 
JAMES McMILLAN, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
D:\Clients\Johnson, Rose\Notice of Appeal (2018 03 0 1-IMc).doc 
Page 378
CERTIFICATE OF S~RVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the the u day of March, 2018, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by the method 
indicated below: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Attorney for Defendants 
Valerie Larson 
215 South First Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Court Reporter 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
This matter is dismi,;sed with prejudice, 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ~by certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid. 
this Jf5._~ay of September, 2017, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DALE JOHNSON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, Amy Hohnstein, Appeals Bureau 
Director, Mark Richmond, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner, Janet Hardy, Appeals Hearing 
Examiner and Georgia Smith, Records 
Custodian, and JOHN AND JANE DOES I-V 
in their individual and official capacities as 
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) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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THIS MA TIER came before the Court on November 8, 2017, for a hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery, filed on September 28, 
2017; and on a Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees by Defendant State of Idaho, Department 
of Labor, filed September 28, 2017. 1
 Plaintiff Dale Johnson (hereafter, ··Mr. Johnson") is 
represented by attorney James McMillan. Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor 
(hereafter, ••IDOL") is represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. Mr. McMillan and 
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Mr. Johnson were present in the courtroom. Mr. Werth participated by telephone. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
Mr. Johnson has moved for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, entered on September 14, 2017. 
The motion for reconsideration is being made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 1.2(b ). 
The standard for determining a motion to reconsider under current Rule l l .2(b )( 1 ) 
[which is former Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B)] is set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Van v. Pormeuf Medical Center. 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 982 (2009), which provides 
that: "A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Id at 560. 212 P.3d at 990 (citation omitted) (emphasis suplied). In Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 
Idaho 266, 281 P.3d 103 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court further stated: 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B). On a 
motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible 
evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. 
See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 
1184 (2009) ( citing Coeur d1A/ene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of N Idaho, 118 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a motion for 
reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply 
the same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the 
original order that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the original order 
was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to 
grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original order was 
governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion 
for reconsideration. Likewise, when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review 
used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. If the decision 
was within the trial court's discretion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. 
On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for 
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must 
1 The Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees by Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Labor is determined in a 
separate Memorandum Decision and Order. 
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detennine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat summary judgment. In this case, the trial court was asked to reconsider 
the granting of a motion for summary judgment, so the summary judgment 
standard applied both to the trial court deciding the motion for 
reconsideration and to our review of that decision on appeal. 
Id at 276, 281 P.3d at l 13. (Emphasis supplied). 
In detennining IDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss, matters outside the pleadings were 
presented by both Mr. Johnson and IDOL, and were not excluded by the Court; and therefore, 
lDOL's 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss was treated as a motion for summary judgment under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 
P.3d 455, 459, and n.l (2005); I.R.C.P. 12(d). Pursuant to F'ragnella v. Petrovich, supra, this 
Court must apply the same standard of review on reconsideration that it applied when deciding 
the original motion to dismiss. 153 Idaho at 276,281 P.3d at 113. The Court recognizes that the 
decision whether to grant or deny Mr. Johnson's Motion for Reconsideration is discretionary. 
II. DISCUSSION 
On reconsideration, this Court has considered the oral and written arguments of counsel, 
and the declarations and affidavits filed in support and opposition to the motion for 
reconsideration. to-wit: (i) Declaration of Dale Johnson, filed September 28, 2017; (ii) Third 
Declaration of Lisa Mason, filed October 5, 2017 (duplicate original filed October IO, 2017): 
(iii) Affidavit of James McMillan, filed October 25, 2017; (iv) Supplemental Declaration of Dale 
Johnson, filed October 25, 2017; and (v) Declaration of Rose Johnson, filed October 25, 2017. 
In considering the sworn statements in the foregoing declarations and affidavits, and the 
documents attached thereto, this Court has liberally construed all facts and drawn all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Mr. Johnson. Having done so, this Court finds nothing in those 
declarations and affidavits that alters the finding in its September 14, 2017, Memorandum 
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Decision and Order that Mr. Johnson failed to satisfy the presentment and notice requirements of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA). I.C. § 6-901 et seq., specifically, Idaho Code§ 6-905. 
After liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. 
Johnson, this Court also affirms its finding that Mr. Johnson's notice of tort claim should have 
been presented to, and filed with the Secretary of State within 180 days of November 25, 2015, 
or by May 23, 2016. It was not until August 25, 2016, that Mr. Johnson filed his Notice of Tort 
Claim dated August 22, 2016, with the Secretary of State. Therefore, his Notice of Tort Claim 
was untimely. "Timely and adequate notice under the ITCA is a mandatory condition precedent 
to bringing suit," Alpine Village Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 936, 303 P.3d 617, 
623 (2013). The lack of timely notice by Mr. Johnson deprives this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court in the exercise of its discretion affirms its decision granting 
IDOL' s I 2(b )(1) Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this case with prejudice. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration.to Allow Additional Discovery are denied. 
Ill. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Additional Discovery are DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDE9D. 
DATED this_\')_~ day of November, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this JJ_ day of November, 2017, to: 
Doug Werth 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
512 Cedar Street 
Wallace, ID 83873 
~ eputy Clerk 
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THIS MATTER came before the Court on January 31, 2018, for a hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment. filed November 29, 20)8. Plaintiff Dale Johnson is represented by attorney James 
McMillan. Defendants State of Idaho, Department of Labor (hereafter, ••IDOL") and its named 
employees are represented by Deputy Attorney General Doug Werth. Mr. McMillan and Mr. 
(and Mrs. Rose) Johnson were present in the courtroom. Mr. Werth appeared by telephone. 
I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
• 09/14/2017-Tbis Court entered .. Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants• 




I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss/' 
• 09/14/2017-This Court entered "Judgment." 
• 09/28/2017-Plaintitffiled "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Discovery," 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. l 1.2(b) and 56(d), respectively; and Declaration of Dale Johnson. 
• 10/25/2017-Plaintiff filed supporting Memorandum, Affidavit of James McMillan, 
Supplemental Declaration of Dale Jolmson, and Declaration of Rose Johnson. 
• 11/08/2017-Hearing on plaintiff's motions held. 
• 11/15/2017-This Court entered "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional Discovery . ., 
• 11/29/2017-Plaintiff filed .. Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b) and 60(b), 
respectively; and Affidavit of James McMillan. 
• 01/18/2018-Plaintiff filed supporting Memorandum, Declaration of Dale Johnson, and 
Declaration of Rose Johnson. 
• 01/31/2018-Hearing on plaintiffs motions held. 
JI. DISCUSSION 
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
punuaot to LR.C.P. 52(h), is untimely. 
In his "Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment/' the plaintiff moves for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
pursuant to Rule 52(b}. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) provides: 
(b) .A.mended or Additional Findings. On a party's motion filed no later than 14 
days after the entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings, or make 
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additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may 
accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. 
I.R.C.P. 52(b) (emphasis supplied). 
The Judgment in this case was entered on September 14, 2017. Thus, the 14-day deadline 
for filing a Rule S2(b) motion was September 28, 2017. The plaintiffs motion was filed on 
November 29, 2017. and therefore, is untimely. 
B. Plaintiff's request for additional :findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
pursuant to I.R.CP. Sl(a), lacks merit. 
In his "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff also requests additional 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, pursuant to Rule S2(a) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S2(a) provides, in part: 
(a) In General. 
(4) For o Motion. The court is not required to state findiags or conclusions 
when ruling on an interlocutory order made pursuant to a show cause hearing or 
on a motion under Ru.le 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on 
any other motion. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). 
The plaintiff's Motion to Allow Discovery was brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure S6(d). Therefore, under Rule 52(a)(4), this Court was not required to state findings or 
conclusions when it denied that motion in its "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow Additional Discovery." By the same token, 
the Court is not required to make additional findings or conclusions in regards to that motion. 
C. Plaintiff's request to alter and amend the Judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), 
Is untimely. 




In his .. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment,t' the plaintiff also asks for the Judgment 
to be altered or amended, pursuant to Rule 59(e). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure S9(e) provides: 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
I.R.C.P. 59(e) (emphasis supplied). 
The judgment in this case was entered on September 14, 2017. Thus, the 14-day deadline 
for filing a Rule 59(e) motion was September 28. 2017. The plaintiff's motion was filed on 
November 29, 2017, and therefore, is untimely. 
D. The time for tile plaintiff to appeal the Judgment bas expired. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides, in part: 
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeaJ as a matter of right from the 
district court may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the 
c]erk of the district court within 42 days ftom the date evidenced by the filing 
stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or order of the district court 
appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. The time for an 
appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by tbe 
filing of a timely motion whlclt, if granted, could affect any findings ot fact, 
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action ( except motions under Rule 
60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or motions regarding costs or attorney's 
fees)t in which ease the appeal period for all judgments or orders commences 
to run upon the date of th.e clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such 
motion .... 
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, the time for filing an appeal began to run on the date of the Judgment, 
September 14, 2017. The time for filing an appeal was terminated by the filing of Plaintitrs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Allow Discovery on September 28, 2017. The time 
for filing an appeal began to run again on November 15, 2017, the date the Court entered its 
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Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration and to Allow 
Additional Discovery. Forty-two (42) days from November 15
th was December 27. 2017. 
Therefore, the time for the plaintiff to appeal the Judgment expired on December 27, 2017. 
E. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), lacks merit. 
In his "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside Judgment," the plaintiff moves for the Judgment to 
be set aside, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) provides that: 
''On motion and just tenns, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any other reason that justifies relief." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 
With respect to Rule 60(b), the Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the following standard: 
As this Court wrote in Waller 11. State. Department of Health and Welfare: 
A trial court's decision wlletlter to grant relief punuaa.t to I.R..C.P .. 60(b) 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it appears 
that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal 
standards, and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason. A 
determination under Rule 60(h) turns largely on questions of fact to be 
determined by the trial court. Those factual findings will be upheld unless 
they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court applies the facts in a logical 
manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping in mind the 
policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have 
acted within its discretion. 
146 Idaho 234. 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). An IAC.P. 60(b) motion may be used to 
obtain relief from a final judgment; however, it should not be used as a 
substitute for a timely appeal. Miller v. Haller. 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 
607, 610 (1996). Although courts have broad discretion in granting or 
denying such motions, that discretion is bounded by the requirement that the 
party seeking relief demonstrate "unique and eompelling circumstances" 
which justify relief. Id. at 349,924 P.2d at 611. ... 
Maynardv. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724,726.274 P.3d 589,591 (2011) (emphasis supplied). 
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The grounds for plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) motion are that during the course of the 
plaintiff's unemployment benefits claim before the Appeals Bureau of the IDOL, and subsequent 
appeal to the Idaho Industrial Commission. IDOL represented by its current counsel. "further 
caused Plaintiff damage by prolonging the proceedings, by (1) objecting to a request for a 
hearing and subpoenas before the Industrial Commission; (2) moving to reconsider the Industrial 
Commission's decision; and (3) its obstreperous conduct in responding to Plaintiff's numerous 
record requests, thus limiting Plaintiff's potential knowledge as to the extent of the governmental 
agencies' involvement in causing Plaintiff's damages." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment. at p. 6 The plaintiff further suggests that IDOL's "responses [to public record 
requests] have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion over Plaintiff's requests., and 
"[t]aken together, this indicates that there may be significant relevant evidence available, that 
may possibly expose the Defendants to further liability, •.. " Id. at p. S. 
This Court recognizes that its detennination of whether to grant or deny the plaintiff's 
Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary; and in making its determination, the Court has considered the 
plaintiff's motion, memorandum in support, supporting Affidavit of James McMillan and the 
·Declarations of Dale Johnson and Rose Jolmson1 (and the attachments thereto), together with the 
oral arguments of counsel at the motion hearing on January 31, 2018. 
Upon consideration thereof, this Court finds, first, that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion is 
improper to the extent that the plaintiff is trying to re-litigate the substance of his negligence 
claim and challenge the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by this Court in its original 
1 At the motion hearing, the defendant's attorney argued that nearly an of the allegations in the Declaration of Rose 
Johnson. are irrelevant, involve speculation, or have not been shown to be based upon personal knowledge; and on 
t!18t ~IS, req~ted that the Coun ~t consider those parts of the Declaration, or alternatively, give the Del;Jaration 
httle, ,r any, weight. The argument is well-taken and this Court shall not consider those parts of the Declaration. 







proper way for the plaintiff to challenge this Court's judgment dismissing his Complaint was a 
timely appeal to a higher court As stated above, the plaintiff did not file a timely appeal, and 
Rule 60(b) motion cannot now be used as a substitute therefor. The plaintiffs motion is denied. 
DI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 
Plaintiff's Motion for Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment are DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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